Iran Update, October 17, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on October 16 that Iranian activity around Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)’s underground facilities indicates that Iran is not attempting to retrieve centrifuges or uranium stocks. ISIS assessed that Iran may be trying to establish secure access to ENTC tunnels and reinforce tunnel entrances against future strikes.[i] ISIS reported that satellite imagery of the tunnel entrances to the ENTC’s underground facilities showed that Iran cleared out all debris in front of the northern tunnel entrance and most of the debris in front of the middle tunnel entrance in late July and late September, respectively.[ii] ISIS reported that imagery from September 30 showed a backhoe piling rocks in front of the northern tunnel entrance, which ISIS said could be a sign that Iran is trying to reinforce the northern tunnel against possible future strikes.[iii] The ISIS report added that Iran is likely prioritizing ”slow and safe access” to the ENTC underground facilities because it may be dangerous to enter after the strikes.[iv] The United States struck the ENTC on June 22.[v] ISIS stated that the extent of damage to the three tunnels could not be assessed at this time.[vi]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 16, likely primarily to discuss sanctions evasion and mitigation efforts.[vii] This is Larijani’s first visit to Russia since the UN Security Council reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27.[viii] Iran relies heavily upon Russia as a key partner to mitigate the impact of international sanctions. The reimposition of UN sanctions restored an arms embargo and broad UN restrictions upon Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[ix] Larijani likely discussed ways that Russia can assist Iran in evading and mitigating the impact of sanctions. Iran and Russia have historically collaborated through networks of foreign-based front companies and shadow fleets transporting sanctioned goods, such as energy exports and arms sales.[x] Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya stated on October 1 that Russia does not recognize the “snapback as coming into force,” suggesting that Russia will continue to assist Iran evade sanctions as it did before the imposition of snapback sanctions.[xi] Larijani and Putin also likely discussed Russian military assistance that Russia could provide to Iran. Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov separately stated on October 13 that Russia would “develop military-technical cooperation with Iran” with “no restrictions.”[xii]  Larijani could also have discussed military support for Iran from Russia in addition to sanctions evasion and mitigation. Iran seeks to buy Russian military equipment, though procuring it has been difficult given Russia’s prioritization of the war in Ukraine. Russian assets like the S-300 have also proven incapable of stopping Israeli or US air attack, and Russian aircraft like the MiG-29 and Su-35 are unlikely to seriously challenge the US-made F-35.

Iranian media also reported that Larijani conveyed an unspecified message from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to Putin.[xiii] Kremlin newswire TASS previously reported on October 9 that Putin claimed that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Russia that Israel is committed to a settlement and “is not interested in confrontation with Iran.”[xiv] Putin’s claim likely reflects Russia’s ongoing interest in serving as a political intermediary between Iran, the United States, and Israel. Russia has consistently attempted to position itself as a mediator between Iran and the United States during nuclear negotiations in early 2025.[xv][xvi]

Turkey is attempting to secure an agreement with the Syrian government that would allow Turkish forces to target Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters deep inside Syria and possibly set conditions for future military operations targeting the SDF. Unspecified Turkish officials told Bloomberg on October 17 that Turkey and Syria have discussed expanding the 1998 Adana Agreement so that it allows Turkey to target Kurdish fighters up to 30 kilometers in Syrian territory.[xvii] The 1998 Adana Agreement, which the Turkish government signed with the Assad regime, currently allows Turkey the right to target Kurdish fighters it deems a threat up to five kilometers into Syrian territory.[xviii] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan used this agreement to justify Turkey’s right to launch a military offensive targeting the SDF in 2019, citing the Assad regime’s lack of “measures” taken to rein in Kurdish fighters near the border.[xix] Turkey has recently threatened to take military action against the SDF—which it views as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party—by the end of 2025 if the SDF does not integrate into the Syrian state by that date.[xx] Turkey's ability to target the SDF deeper in Syrian territory would allow Turkey to set conditions for possible future military operations targeting the SDF, including by targeting key SDF tactical and operational commanders within the 30-kilometer operational zone. Turkey has previously struck SDF forces deep into Syria—much deeper than 30 kilometers—but an amendment to the 1998 Adana Agreement would enable ground pursuit and help alleviate any possible friction with the new Syrian government.

It is unclear if the Syrian government will permit an expansion of the Adana Agreement under these terms, given that doing so may risk ending recent Kurdish cooperation with the government. The Syrian government has negotiated with the SDF over its integration into the Syrian state while it has simultaneously attempted to prevent Turkey from conducting another destabilizing military offensive in northern Syria.[xxi] The Syrian government and SDF recently reached a limited breakthrough in negotiations and agreed to integrate the SDF into the Syrian army in three divisions and several independent brigades after months of stalled negotiations. Many of the mechanisms of the SDF’s integration into the Syrian army still need to be finalized, according to SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi on October 16.[xxiii] Abdi said that the recent SDF-government progress gives Turkey “no excuse” to act in Syrian territory, however.[xxiv]

Turkey may leverage planned weapons shipments in order to secure this agreement with the Syrian government. Turkish officials told Bloomberg that Turkey plans to supply the Syrian Defense Ministry with armored vehicles, drones, artillery, missiles, and air defense systems in the coming weeks.[xxv] These shipments are likely part of the military training and ”consultation” agreement that Syrian officials signed with Turkey on August 13.[xxvi] This agreement and the weapons transfers that it entails could give Turkey additional leverage over the Syrian government because the Syrian Defense Ministry does not currently own many of these systems.[xxvii] Turkish officials said that this equipment will be deployed in northern Syria.[xxviii]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Nuclear Facilities: The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported that Iranian activity around Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)’s underground facilities indicates that Iran is not attempting to retrieve centrifuges or uranium stocks. ISIS assessed that Iran may be trying to establish secure access to ENTC tunnels and reinforce tunnel entrances against future strikes.
• Iran and Russia: Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, likely primarily to discuss sanctions evasion and mitigation efforts. This is Larijani’s first visit to Russia since the UN Security Council reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27. Iran relies heavily upon Russia as a key partner to mitigate the impact of international sanctions.
• Turkey in Northern Syria: Turkey is attempting to secure an agreement with the Syrian government that would allow Turkish forces to target Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters 30 kilometers inside Syria and possibly set conditions for future military operations targeting the SDF. Unspecified Turkish officials told Western media that Turkey and Syria have discussed allowing Turkey to target Kurdish fighters up to 30 kilometers in Syrian territory. Turkey may leverage planned weapons shipments in order to secure this agreement with the Syrian government.
• Sectarian Violence in Iraq: Additional details about the recent political assassination of Sunni Sovereignty Alliance candidate and Baghdad Provincial Council member Safaa al Mashhadani indicate that Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters conducted the attack. Iraqi media reported that Mashhadani was “in a dispute” with an unspecified group that had attempted to seize land in Tarmiyah. Mashhadani continuously advocated for the removal of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from Tarmiyah, which these groups would have perceived as a threat to their dominance north of Baghdad.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

Additional details about the recent political assassination of Sunni Sovereignty Alliance candidate and Baghdad Provincial Council member Safaa al Mashhadani indicate that Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters conducted the attack.[xxix] CTP-ISW previously assessed Iranian-backed militias killed Mashhadani on October 16.[xxx] An informed source shared additional details with Iraqi media on October 16 about the ongoing investigation into Mashhadani’s assassination in al Dhubat neighborhood, Tarmiyah District, on October 14.[xxxi] The source told Iraqi media that the assassination's perpetrators are based in Tarmiyah and planted a command-detonated explosive device on Mashhadani‘s car in Tarmiyah District.[xxxii] The perpetrators also reportedly made the device locally and linked it to a cell phone detonation system. The source added that Mashhadani was “in a dispute” with an unspecified group that had attempted to seize land in Tarmiyah, which is almost certainly in reference to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The Iraqi government only very rarely publicly accuses Iranian-backed militias of crimes, while it would almost certainly highlight the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS)’s role in the murder if ISIS was responsible. Mashhadani’s assassination followed his October 14 announcement that the Baghdad Provincial Council suspended the allocation of investment licenses for projects in the Baghdad Belts following reports of unspecified violations against local farmers and landowners.[xxxiii] This announcement could be part of Mashhadani’s dispute with an unspecified group. Iranian-backed Shia militias have long maintained a presence in Tarmiyah and other predominantly agricultural areas north of Baghdad.[xxxiv] Both Kataib Hezbollah and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada have explicitly and implicitly called for Sunnis in Tarmiyah to be displaced and presumably replaced with Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) facilities or other populations.[xxxv] Mashhadani continuously advocated for the removal of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from Tarmiyah, which these groups would have perceived as a threat to their dominance north of Baghdad.[xxxvi]

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

Israeli airstrikes targeting the Houthi command network in August 2025 reportedly incapacitated Houthi Interior Minister Abdulkarim al Houthi.[xxxvii] Yemeni sources speaking to a Saudi news outlet claimed that Abdulkarim, who is current Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi’s uncle, has been in a coma for the past six weeks.[xxxviii] Israeli forces reportedly targeted Abdulkarim in the same airstrike that killed Houthi Chief of General Staff Mohammad Abdulkarim al Ghamari.[xxxix] CTP-ISW is unable to independently verify Abdulkarim’s condition, but if he is comatose, the Houthis will be forced to replace a key decisionmaker for the Houthi internal security apparatus. Abdulkarim is a top Houthi leader, and he is extremely close to Abdulmalik al Houthi.[xl] Abdulkarim is responsible for designing and maintaining the Houthis’ internal security strategy to control territory in Yemen, including domestic population suppression.[xli] Abdulkarim also reportedly maintains close ties with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and Lebanese Hezbollah, according to counterterrorism experts.[xlii]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

US and Lebanese officials have continued to discuss the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) plan to disarm Hezbollah. US, French, LAF, and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) military leaders met in Naqoura in southern Lebanon on October 15 to monitor the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire and discuss the LAF’s progress in implementing its Hezbollah disarmament plan.[xliii] US Central Command reported that the LAF has seized 10,000 rockets and 400 missiles and removed over 205,000 unexploded ordnance during its disarmament operations in 2025.[xliv] CTP-ISW has not observed any reports of Hezbollah fighters turning over their weaponry to the LAF, however. Diplomatic sources told Lebanese media on October 17 that the new US Ambassador to Lebanon, Michel Issa, will arrive in Beirut “within 10 days.”[xlv] Lebanese media recently reported that the United States will begin mediating talks between Israel and Lebanon on issues related to the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah once Issa assumes his position.[xlvi] Lebanese Finance Minister Yassin Jaber met with US officials in Washington, DC, on October 17 and called on the United States to put pressure on Israel to halt its operations in Lebanon and adhere to the November ceasefire agreement.[xlvii] Lebanese officials have repeatedly called on the United States to pressure Israel to halt Israeli operations in Lebanon.[xlviii] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed.[xlix]