Iran Update, October 20, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of  War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

A senior Iranian official suggested in an interview with Nour News on October 13 that the Iranian regime is unable to develop a long-term strategy because it continues to suffer from shock and paralysis after the Israel-Iran War.[i] Nour News interviewed Iranian Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani on October 13 as part of its "Pathway" series, which aims to present perspectives on how Iran can navigate post-war challenges. Nour News is affiliated with Ali Shamkhani, who is one of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s advisers to the Defense Council. Khani stated that the regime is in a “permanent state of crisis” in which Iranian officials are only focused on the possibility of renewed conflict with Israel and the United States.  Khani argued that this mindset has paralyzed Iranian officials and made them unable to devise long-term defense, economic, and political strategies.[ii] The Iranian regime has adopted stop-gap interim solutions, such as purchasing MiG-29s from Russia, which would be useless against F-35s, and conducting mass arrests of Iranians in the hope of solving Iran’s counter-intelligence failures.[iii] Khani suggested that these reactive approaches do not solve more fundamental strategic issues that Iran faces in its competition with Israel and the United States.[iv] Khani asserted that the regime’s reactive decision-making drains decisionmaker bandwidth and prevents senior leaders from confronting major post-war problems, including reconstruction, economic growth, and, presumably, the failure of Iran’s strategic theories of deterrence and defense.

Khani presented alternative policies that focus on societal resilience and deterrence at the strategic level.[v] Khani stated that Iran must accept that war is always a possibility but emphasized that the Iranian regime cannot allocate all of its resources and capabilities to preparing for war. Khani proposed that Iran should adopt a “more balanced and hybrid” and “people-based” security strategy, while still prioritizing its development of military capabilities. Khani also warned that Iran could fall behind in the international order if the Iranian regime does not fundamentally change its economic and defense strategy.

Khani also made a series of operational- and tactical-level proposals focused on command decentralization and technical improvements for certain weapon systems in light of the setbacks that Iran faced during the war.[vi] Khani proposed expanding former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari‘s 2005 “mosaic doctrine,” which decentralized the IRGC by establishing 32 IRGC provincial units across Iran.[vii] Khani argued that Iran should decentralize supply chains, defense systems, and command and control authority to lower levels to make wartime decision-making more efficient and effective.[viii] Khani probably believes that decentralizing Iranian decision-making would help Iranian leaders overcome the command and control challenges they faced when Israel killed senior Iranian commanders during the war. Israeli strikes against senior IRGC commanders inhibited Iran’s ability to immediately retaliate against Israel.[ix]

Khani also called on the regime to improve its missile guidance systems and implied that the regime should employ maneuverable reentry vehicles as part of an effort to advance its missile program.[x] Khani stated that Iran must improve its missiles’ circular error probable (CEP), which is “the radius of a circle, centered at the intended target, within which 50 percent of the missiles would be expected to impact.”[xi] A maneuverable reentry vehicle can be used to evade anti-ballistic missile systems or improve the accuracy of ballistic missiles by altering their trajectory during the terminal stage of flight. These proposals demonstrate that some Iranian officials acknowledge the relatively low accuracy rate of Iranian missiles.  The IRGC Aerospace Force announced on October 18 that it added an anti-electronic warfare system to the Ghadr ballistic missile and a precision-guided warhead to the Emad ballistic missile, which further highlights how the Iranian regime is trying to develop its ballistic missiles to perform more effectively in the event of a future conflict with Israel.[xii] Iran used the Emad and Ghadr missiles in its April and October 2024 attacks on Israel, as well as during the Israel-Iran War.[xiii]  

IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim News Agency separately called on the Iranian regime to develop long-term solutions to mitigate the impact of sanctions. This article illustrates that at least some Iranian regime elements are beginning to focus more on long-term solutions instead of short-term stop-gap measures.[xiv] Tasnim’s emphasis on long-term solutions is consistent with Khani’s call for a long-term strategic rethink. Tasnim stated that the Iranian economy cannot rely on “informal mechanisms” to mitigate the impact of international sanctions, which may be a reference to barter agreements and other mechanisms that Iran uses to evade sanctions.[xv] Tasnim called for using regional and multilateral platforms to promote trade that does not rely on the Western financial system.[xvi] Iranian officials frequently emphasize the importance of cooperation with BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states to "de-dollarize” trade.[xvii] Iranian media reported on October 19 that two Russian banks agreed to accept letters of credit issued by Iranian banks to facilitate Russian agricultural exports to Iran and allow Iran to circumvent the SWIFT international banking and finance system.[xviii] Tasnim also highlighted the importance of the private sector and called for reducing Iran’s reliance on oil exports.[xix]   Tasnim also called on the Iranian regime to downsize the government, eliminate monopolies in the economy, and promote private sector competition.[xx]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani said on October 20 that 250 to 350 US “military advisers and support personnel” will remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, to support US operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria.[xxi] The advisers will reportedly work with personnel at al Tanf Garrison in southern Syria to support “counter-ISIS surveillance and coordination.”[xxii] Sudani told Iraqi media that recent “developments in Syria,” almost certainly referring to the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, require the presence of US advisers at Ain al Asad.[xxiii] The Iraqi federal government has considered postponing the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq after the fall of Assad due to concerns that ISIS could exploit the situation in Syria to threaten Iraq.[xxiv] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xxv] Sudani said that this agreement required all US forces to withdraw from Ain al Asad Airbase by September 2025, but it is unclear whether this included non-combat US military advisers and support personnel.[xxvi] Sudani’s statements come after the US Department of Defense announced on September 30 that the United States has reduced its military presence in Iraq.[xxvii] A US official told Reuters on September 30 that the United States will reduce its military personnel from 2,500 to less than 2,000 and redeploy most of the remaining personnel to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from federal Iraq.[xxviii] The official also said that the United States is in the process of transferring control of Ain al Asad Airbase to the Iraqi federal government.[xxix]

Lebanese and Israeli officials are very unlikely to begin negotiations in the coming weeks because preliminary diplomatic efforts aimed at renewing negotiations have reportedly stalled. Lebanese and Israeli officials were reportedly expected to begin indirect negotiations after the new US Ambassador to Lebanon, Michel Issa, assumes his position in the coming days.[xxx] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam told Saudi media on October 19 that preliminary discussions between Israel and Lebanon to formally renew indirect negotiations reached a “dead end,” however.[xxxi] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun recently called for renewed talks with Israel to discuss issues in the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah, including an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, border demarcation, Israeli operations in Lebanon, and the issue of disputed territories.[xxxii] Salam claimed that the preliminary discussions stalled due to Israel’s refusal to cease its operations in southern Lebanon.[xxxiii] Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri told Saudi media on October 20 that US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack told the Lebanese government that Israel had rejected a US-proposed negotiations framework.[xxxiv] The US-proposed framework reportedly called for a two-month cessation of Israeli operations in Lebanon, an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, and negotiations on other outstanding issues.[xxxv] Berri stated that Lebanon has abandoned “any negotiating process” with Israel outside of the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire monitoring committee.[xxxvi]

Neither Israel nor Lebanon has changed its position on key outstanding issues, including the timeline for disarming Hezbollah, which could further delay the full implementation of the US and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) disarmament plans. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun reiterated on October 17 that Lebanese officials will not participate in indirect negotiations with Israel until Israel ceases its operations and fully withdraws from southern Lebanon.[xxxvii] Unspecified Lebanese sources told Saudi media on October 19 that Aoun believes that negotiations with Israel should occur simultaneously with the implementation of the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah.[xxxviii] Lebanese officials and the LAF have repeatedly claimed that continued Israeli operations limit the LAF’s ability to fully deploy its forces to southern Lebanon and disarm Hezbollah.[xxxix] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed and previously refused to discuss the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[xl]

Hezbollah would likely attempt to use any delay in Israeli-Lebanese negotiations to reconstitute its forces, increase its weapons stockpile, and bolster its domestic support base, which would likely increase Hezbollah’s relative strength vis-a-vis the Lebanese government and thus make it more challenging for the government to disarm Hezbollah. Israeli media reported on October 18 that Hezbollah has restored its chain of command after the IDF killed a significant number of its top commanders during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[xli] Israeli media also reported on October 18 that Hezbollah is rapidly rebuilding its military capabilities.[xlii] Hezbollah has reportedly adopted a new weapons strategy that requires fewer personnel, less money, and limited infrastructure, which could include prioritizing low-cost weapons such as drones.[xliii] Hezbollah reportedly began prioritizing domestic drone production in June 2025 to reduce its reliance on Iranian weapons.[xliv] Iran may focus on rebuilding its armed forces and nuclear and missile programs after the Israel-Iran War, which may further constrain Iranian financial support for Hezbollah.[xlv] The IDF destroyed approximately 70 percent of the drones belonging to Hezbollah’s primary aerial unit, Unit 127, during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[xlvi] Israeli media also claimed that Hezbollah has continued to provide compensation to its supporters whose homes were destroyed in the conflict.[xlvii] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation for individuals who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[xlviii] Hezbollah parliamentarian Hassan Fadlallah claimed on October 20 that Hezbollah has completed around 80 percent of the first phase of its reconstruction plan, which stipulates that Hezbollah will allocate $1 billion to reconstruct Beirut’s southern suburbs and the surrounding villages.[xlix] These actions highlight how Hezbollah is actively trying to maintain its domestic support base and reconstitute as a military organization. Any delay in the implementation of the US proposal would give Hezbollah more time to try to achieve these objectives.

These reports may be overstating the degree to which Hezbollah has reconstituted its capabilities and maintained its support base. Hezbollah has reportedly struggled to appoint new leaders to key political and military roles, according to a Saudi media report in September 2025.[l] Hezbollah units reconstituted from the Hezbollah cadres that survived the war will be less effective than their predecessor units given that Israel killed a significant number of Hezbollah’s experienced commanders and left Hezbollah with a much less experienced command cadre. Hezbollah’s new reported weapons strategy may allow the group to reconstitute some of its weapon capabilities, but the group still faces numerous setbacks to replenish its weapons arsenal.[li] The fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the crackdown by the Lebanese government on weapons and money smuggling through Lebanese airports and border crossings make Iranian efforts to resupply Hezbollah relatively slow and inefficient.[lii] Hezbollah has also largely struggled to maintain its financial commitments to its fighters and Shia support base following the conflict. Hezbollah’s main financial institution, al Qard al Hassan, temporarily froze compensation payments to fighters in February 2025 and later indefinitely suspended payments to fighters in June 2025.[liii] Al Qard al Hassan has not resumed these payments as of September 2025.[liv] Hezbollah’s financial struggles have reportedly caused unprecedented discontent among its Shia support base, which could grow over time if Hezbollah is unable to fulfill these commitments.[lv]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Reflections on the Israel-Iran War: A senior Iranian official suggested in an interview with Nour News on October 13 that the Iranian regime is unable to develop a long-term strategy because it continues to suffer from shock and paralysis after the Israel-Iran War. Khani presented alternative policies that focus on societal resilience and deterrence at the strategic level.
• US Withdrawal from Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani said on October 20 that 250 to 350 US “military advisers and support personnel” will remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, to support US operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria.
• Lebanese Hezbollah Disarmament: Lebanese and Israeli officials are very unlikely to begin negotiations in the coming weeks because preliminary diplomatic efforts aimed at renewing negotiations have reportedly stalled. Hezbollah would likely attempt to use any delay in Israeli-Lebanese negotiations to try to reconstitute its forces, bolster its domestic support base, and increase its weapons stockpile.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji met with Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani in Tehran on October 20 to discuss bilateral cooperation and border security.[lvi] Araji’s delegation included Kurdistan Regional Government Interior Minister Reber Ahmed.[lvii] Araji and Larijani discussed the March 2023 Iran-Iraq border security agreement that requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate Kurdish opposition groups away from the Iran-Iraq border.[lviii] Araji and Larijani signed a memorandum of understanding in August 2025 to “develop” the agreement.[lix] Araji and Larijani’s recent meetings reflect ongoing Iranian concerns about the threat that Kurdish opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan pose to Iran. Iran views Iraqi Kurdistan as a rear area from which anti-regime Kurdish groups can foment instability against the regime.[lx] Iran accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in western Iran during the Mahsa Amini protest movement and has frequently accused Kurdish opposition groups of cooperating with Israel to facilitate attacks in Iran.[lxi]

Shia Coordination Framework parties continue to attempt to discredit Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani ahead of the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Six Iraqi parliamentarians affiliated with the Shia Coordination Framework issued a complaint against Sudani with the Iraqi Federal Commission of Integrity on October 20 for exploiting his position as prime minister for electoral purposes.[lxii] The parliamentarians called for an investigation into several issues related to Sudani, including the formation of his Reconstruction and Development electoral alliance. The Federal Commission of Integrity is responsible for investigating and preventing corruption within the Iraqi federal government and is led by a judge who is affiliated with the Iranian-backed Badr Organization.[lxiii] The complaint against Sudani comes after Shia Coordination Framework parties have repeatedly accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption and Baathist ties in recent months.[lxiv]

Unidentified gunmen shot a relative of Baghdad Provincial Council and Sunni Azm Alliance member Muthaana al Azzawi in Yusufiyah District, Baghdad Province, on October 18.[lxv] Azzawi said that unknown individuals shot his father in the leg.[lxvi] Azm Alliance member Bashir Shihab al Khazraji told Iraqi media on October 19 that the Azm Alliance has faced numerous threats and media attacks during its election campaign.[lxvii] Unidentified perpetrators separately set fire to Kurdistan Democratic Party candidate and parliamentarian Mahma Khalil Ali Agha’s campaign posters in the courtyard of Agha’s office in Sinjar District, Ninewa Province, on October 16.[lxviii] These instances of electoral violence and intimidation follow the recent assassination of Sunni Sovereignty Alliance candidate and Baghdad Provincial Council member Safaa al Mashhadani in Tarmiyah District, Baghdad Province, on October 14.[lxix] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias killed Mashhadani.[lxx] Iraqi security forces arrested the perpetrators of Mashhadani’s assassination on October 20 but have yet to release additional details at the time of this writing.[lxxi]

Syria

A Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) negotiator called on the Syrian government to take meaningful steps to improve the SDF’s trust in the government in order to advance the ongoing integration negotiations between the SDF and the Ministry of Defense (MoD).[lxxii] A senior SDF commander, Sipan Hamo, told SDF media on October 18 that the October 11 meeting between the transitional government and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi produced no tangible results, despite the meeting’s “positive atmosphere.”[lxxiii] Abdi announced on October 13 that the SDF and the Syrian transitional government reached a preliminary agreement to integrate the SDF into the MoD after the MoD and SDF engaged each other in Aleppo City on October 7.[lxxiv] Hamo emphasized that there are several obstacles that are preventing the SDF from integrating into the MoD, including the transitional government’s failure to provide security assurances for the Kurds and its exclusion of SDF members from important government positions and the constitutional process.[lxxv] Hamo outlined a series of steps that the government could take to improve the SDF’s trust in the government. These steps include facilitating the return of Kurdish civilians to Afrin City in Aleppo Province, providing compensation for displaced Kurds, and holding individuals who committed violations against Kurds accountable.[lxxvi] Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) forces committed numerous violations against Kurdish civilians after occupying Afrin in March 2018, and have continued to commit violations, including housing, land, and property violations, against Kurds still in Afrin since 2022.[lxxvii]  Hamo said that Afrin is the SDF’s “benchmark” for the future of negotiations with the Syrian government.[lxxviii] SDF and transitional government officials have continued to hold talks after the October 11 meeting. A Syrian Interior Ministry delegation, accompanied by an International Coalition delegation, most recently visited the SDF-controlled town of Tabqa, Raqqa Province, on October 20, to discuss the security situation in Aleppo Province with SDF officials.[lxxix]

Turkey continues to apply pressure on the SDF amid ongoing integration negotiations between the transitional government and the SDF. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told Turkish media on October 18 that the withdrawal of SDF forces from “Arab-majority areas” remains a top priority for Turkey.[lxxx] Fidan said that the October 11 meeting between the Syrian government and the SDF did not result in a “real agreement on integration” and emphasized that Turkey is closely monitoring the Syrian government’s efforts to consolidate its authority.[lxxxi] Fidan’s statement comes amid Turkish efforts to secure a security agreement with the Syrian government that would allow Turkish forces to target SDF forces deep inside Syria, which could set conditions for future Turkish military operations against the SDF.[lxxxii] Turkey views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and has threatened military action against the SDF if the SDF does not integrate into the MoD by the end of 2025.[lxxxiii]

Arabian Peninsula

The UAE may be building a 2,200-meter-long runway on Zuqar Island, Yemen, in the Red Sea.[lxxxiv] The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) controls Zuqar Island, and the UAE has previously built other runways in areas controlled by its Yemeni partners and proxies, all of which are opposed to the Houthis.[lxxxv] A 2,200-meter-long runway could support large transport aircraft that could ferry weapons and personnel to the island.

The runway could also be used to conduct surveillance for counter-smuggling or defensive operations against Houthi attacks. One of the UAE’s strategic objectives when it entered the war in Yemen in 2015 was to secure shipping lanes in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea, which are important for the viability of the UAE’s economy.[lxxxvi] A runway on a Red Sea island could help secure this UAE objective at relatively limited cost. The Houthis have yet to react to the new construction. The UAE could also give the runway to a proxy or partner force that could surveil Houthi activities and support military operations against the Houthis.

An unknown projectile struck the Indian-owned, Cameroon-flagged liquefied petroleum gas tanker Falcon, which was reportedly carrying Iranian cargo, in the Gulf of Aden on October 18.[lxxxvii] Tanker Trackers assessed that the tanker was most likely headed to Ras Issa, Yemen, to supply the Houthis with fuel.[lxxxviii] The Falcon is part of Iran's ghost fleet that illicitly transports oil and petroleum products, according to United Against Nuclear Iran.[lxxxix] Iran denied that the vessel is affiliated with Iran.[xc] The vessel has not visited Iran since at least April 2020 and last docked at the Khawr al Zubair Terminal in Basra, Iraq, in October 2024, according to commercially available maritime data.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Isolated ceasefire violations between Israel and Hamas, including small arms fire and Israeli airstrikes, have not resulted in the breakdown of the October 9 ceasefire agreement. Hamas and Israel agreed to a ceasefire and hostage-prisoner exchange on October 9.[xci] Both Hamas and Israel accused each other on October 19 of violating the ceasefire agreement, which prompted both parties to launch attacks.[xcii] Both parties have since reiterated their commitment to the ceasefire agreement and have continued to implement it.[xciii]

[i] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/250551

[ii] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/250551

[iii] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/250551; https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1970439025321246944  ; https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1330332/; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-turns-internal-crackdown-wake-12-day-war-2025-06-25/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/30/us/politics/israel-iran-assassination.html ; https://www.hamshahrionline dot ir/news/958092/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-turns-internal-crackdown-wake-12-day-war-2025-06-25/  ;

[iv] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/250551

[v] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/250551

[vi] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/250551

[vii] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf

[viii] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/250551

[ix] https://www.axios.com/2025/06/13/israel-mossad-attack-iran-response

[x] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/250551

[xi] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/250551;

https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/6805/#:~:text=The%20Department%20of%20Defense%20has%20places%20emphasis,or%20%22The%20probability%20is%200.50%20that%20an

[xii] https://Farsnews dot ir/rahgozar_b/1760856519061609339

[xiii] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-iran-hezbollah-conflict/card/iran-says-it-used-four-types-of-ballistic-missiles-SXCDtZjZXIP5HUrElsw4; https://www.ap.org/news-highlights/spotlights/2024/as-iran-threatens-israel-the-danger-of-tehrans-long-vaunted-missile-program-remains-in-question/

[xiv] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/07/28/3427800

[xv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-6-2025/ ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/how-china-secretly-pays-iran-for-oil-and-avoids-u-s-sanctions-b6f1b71e?st=kPsKon ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-10-06/china-s-cars-for-iran-metals-how-sanctions-revived-barter-trade; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-september-25-2025/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/07/02/3407312/ ; https://www.rosatom dot ru/journalist/news/sostoyalas-vstrecha-glavy-rosatoma-alekseya-likhacheva-s-vitse-prezidentom-irana-prezidentom-organiz/

[xvi] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/07/28/3427800

[xvii] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/252096/; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/07/08/3411821; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/02/3184504

[xviii] farsnews dot ir/rahgozar_b/1760877752787142492

[xix] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/07/28/3427800

[xx] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/07/28/3427800

[xxi] https://apnews.com/article/iraq-islamic-state-sudani-us-military-advisers-2180dbaf3ea209bd6af32b43c266603d

[xxii] https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-announcing-the-timeline-for-the-end-of-the-military-mission-of-the-global-coalition-to-defeat-isis-in-iraq ; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/

[xxiii] https://apnews.com/article/iraq-islamic-state-sudani-us-military-advisers-2180dbaf3ea209bd6af32b43c266603d

[xxiv] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/12/23/syria-us-troops-trump-hts-turkey/

[xxv] https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-announcing-the-timeline-for-the-end-of-the-military-mission-of-the-global-coalition-to-defeat-isis-in-iraq ; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/

[xxvi] https://apnews.com/article/iraq-islamic-state-sudani-us-military-advisers-2180dbaf3ea209bd6af32b43c266603d

[xxvii]

[xxviii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/pentagon-says-iraq-mission-being-scaled-back-2025-10-01/

[xxix] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/pentagon-says-iraq-mission-being-scaled-back-2025-10-01/

[xxx] https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/43347 ; https://www.nidaalwatan dot com/article/347704-التفاوض-مبادرة-رئاسية-بحجم-التحولات-واشنطن-تؤيد-وتدعم-بضغط-على-نتنياهو

[xxxi] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5199054-عون-أطلق-مبادرته-لحضّ-واشنطن-على-التدخل-لإنقاذ-مفاوضات-الناقورة

[xxxii] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/315902-reports-aoun-receives-message-calling-for-direct-talks-with-israel ; https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-negotiations-trump-aoun-613d2eb94e7f1c8f7cfdd14dd8136e85

[xxxiii] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5199054-عون-أطلق-مبادرته-لحضّ-واشنطن-على-التدخل-لإنقاذ-مفاوضات-الناقورة

[xxxiv] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5199383-بري-يكشف-لـالشرق-الأوسط-تفاصيل-سقوط-مقترح-التفاوض-مع-إسرائيل

[xxxv] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5199383-بري-يكشف-لـالشرق-الأوسط-تفاصيل-سقوط-مقترح-التفاوض-مع-إسرائيل

[xxxvi] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5199383-بري-يكشف-لـالشرق-الأوسط-تفاصيل-سقوط-مقترح-التفاوض-مع-إسرائيل

[xxxvii] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/315902-reports-aoun-receives-message-calling-for-direct-talks-with-israel ; https://apnews.com/article/mideast-wars-israel-lebanon-hezbollah-withdraw-53e399dc2aee8800af729218edd3d3c5

[xxxviii] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5199054-عون-أطلق-مبادرته-لحضّ-واشنطن-على-التدخل-لإنقاذ-مفاوضات-الناقورة

[xxxix] https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/1970554648156090389 ; https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1968702247186944079  

[xl] https://www.arabnews dot com/node/2603593/amp

[xli] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hkxan5wcle ; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/10/26/israel-demolishes-massive-hezbollah-underground-bunker-in-southern-lebanon/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-faces-long-recovery-officials-fear-thousands-fighters-lost-israel-2024-11-27/  

[xlii] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hyobzilreg ; https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hkxan5wcle

[xliii] https://aawsat dot com/شؤون-إقليمية/5198751-تقديرات-إسرائيلية-عن-إعادة-بناء-حزب-الله-قدراته-العسكرية ; https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hyobzilreg

[xliv] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/by11zol4mxl

[xlv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-13-2025/

[xlvi] https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/article-827047 ; https://x.com/IDF/status/1861733354384617527  

[xlvii] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hkxan5wcle

[xlviii] https://ict.org dot il/hezbollahs-financing-ecosystem-crime-families-as-a-case-study/  

[xlix] https://www.newarab.com/news/hezbollah-implement-3-billion-reconstruction-plan-reports ; https://www.almanar dot com.lb/article/278377/; https://www.almanar dot com.lb/article/275687/

[l] https://www.alhadath dot net/2025/09/25/ارباك-وصراع-قوى-داخل-حزب-الله-وحدة-التنسق-نحو-الحل-

[li] https://aawsat dot com/شؤون-إقليمية/5198751-تقديرات-إسرائيلية-عن-إعادة-بناء-حزب-الله-قدراته-العسكرية

[lii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-25-2023 ; https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/03/the-transformation-of-the-iraqi-syrian-border-from-a-national-to-a-regional-frontier?lang=en&center=middle-east ; https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/life-returns-to-al-bukamal-after-iranian-militias-flee/

[liii] https://www.newarab.com/news/hezbollah-freezes-war-compensation-al-qard-al-hassan-report  ; https://www.jns.org/hezbollah-struggling-to-pay-followers-in-wake-of-israels-offensive/  ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/22/hezbollah-lebanon-iran-financial-crisis/  

[liv] https://en.kataeb dot org/articles/war-victims-sell-uncashed-hezbollah-checks-amid-compensation-payments-freeze

[lv] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/04/world/middleeast/hezbollah-weapons-lebanon.html

[lvi] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%88-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B0-%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86

[lvii] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/252054/

[lviii] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%88-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B0-%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A

[lix] https://apnews.com/article/iran-iraq-security-deal-larijani-8b89956de9c043703a1c3253de981f86

[lx] ttps://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-13-2025/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-23

[lxi] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-13-2023/ ; https://nournews dot ir/Fa/News/127294

[lxii] https://almadapaper  dot net/416304/

[lxiii] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-federal-commission-integrity

[lxiv] https://964media dot com/602457/ ; https://almadapaper dot net/404669/ ; https://almadapaper dot net/414206/ ; https://almaalomah dot me/news/111697/

[lxv] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9-%D9%88%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%86

[lxvi] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/181020252

[lxvii] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9-%D9%88%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%86

[lxviii] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/نينوى-مجهولون-يقتحمون-مكتبا-لنا-ب-مرشح-للانتخابات-ويضرمون-النيران-بلوحاته-الدعا-ية

[lxix] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/869481/السيادة-ينعى-مرشحه-المشهداني-امتداد-لنهج-الإقصاء-والغدر ; https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/trends-alsumaria/543926/%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B0-%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD-%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%B6%D9%88-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3

[lxx] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-16-2025/

[lxxi] https://baghdadtoday dot news/285569-.html

[lxxii] https://sdf-press dot com/archives/46888

[lxxiii] https://sdf-press dot com/archives/46888

[lxxiv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-14-2025/ ; https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20251013-syrian-kurdish-leader-says-reached-first-deal-on-merging-forces-with-regular-army

[lxxv] https://sdf-press dot com/archives/46888

[lxxvi] https://sdf-press dot com/archives/46888

[lxxvii] https://www.ecchr dot eu/en/case/crimes-in-syria-the-neglected-atrocities-of-afrin/ ; https://kurd-online dot com/%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D9%8F%D9%85%D9%91%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%80%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88/ ; https://syriaaccountability.org/expanding-syria-sanctions-the-case-against-abu-amsha/

[lxxviii] https://sdf-press dot com/archives/46888

[lxxix] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1980324402748068330

[lxxx] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/779360/%d9%81%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%a7%d9%86-%d9%8a%d8%ad%d8%b0%d8%b1-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%83%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%ae%d8%b7%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d9%84%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%af%d9%85-%d9%81/#

[lxxxi] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/779360/%d9%81%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%a7%d9%86-%d9%8a%d8%ad%d8%b0%d8%b1-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%83%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%ae%d8%b7%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d9%84%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%af%d9%85-%d9%81/#

[lxxxii] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-10/erdogan-says-1998-pact-with-damascus-allows-turkey-to-hit-kurds-k1kxn0qn

[lxxxiii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/sectarian-violence-risks-dividing-syria-despite-sharaas-diplomacy-2025-09-15

[lxxxiv] https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-rebels-zuqar-island-airstrip-uae-c8c0182307ccefcb3f51854493f3ae00

[lxxxv] https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-rebels-zuqar-island-airstrip-uae-c8c0182307ccefcb3f51854493f3ae00

[lxxxvi] https://agsi.org/analysis/the-uaes-three-strategic-interests-in-yemen/

[lxxxvii] https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/1979568132600811801; https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/1979576429965963667

[lxxxviii] https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/1979568132600811801

[lxxxix] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/stop-hop-ii-ghost-armada-grows

[xc] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/237833/Attacked-ship-has-no-links-to-Iran-Mehr-reporte; farsnews dot ir/rahgozar_b/1760861501670993099

[xci] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgqx7ygq41o  

[xcii] https://www.npr.org/2025/10/19/nx-s1-5579554/israel-and-hamas-accuse-each-other-of-breaching-fragile-ceasefire-in-gaza

[xciii] https://www.npr.org/2025/10/19/nx-s1-5579554/israel-and-hamas-accuse-each-other-of-breaching-fragile-ceasefire-in-gaza

 [RR2]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMA5h

 [JM3]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMA4Y

 [JM4]https://criticalthreats.imeetcentral.com/p/aQAAAAAFMA4V