Iran Update, June 4, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

(CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected the recent US nuclear proposal because the proposal would require Iran to eventually halt all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil.[i] Iran’s continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment could cause the US-Iran nuclear negotiations to collapse. Axios reported on June 2 that the US proposal would allow Iran to enrich uranium at three percent on Iranian soil during the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium.[ii] The United States reportedly seeks to establish the consortium outside of Iran. Iran would be required to halt all enrichment after the establishment of the consortium. Khamenei delivered a speech on June 4 in which he stated that enrichment in Iran "is a red line."[iii] Khamenei claimed that a nuclear industry without enrichment is “practically worthless" and emphasized that Iran would not become “dependent” on foreign countries for uranium.[iv] Under the US proposal, Iran would receive uranium for civilian nuclear purposes as part of the regional consortium but would not be allowed to independently enrich uranium on Iranian soil after the consortium is formed.   

Iran may accept the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium if it operates on Iranian soil. An unspecified senior Iranian official told Axios on June 3 that Iran is open to the consortium model, but only if the consortium’s enrichment facility is located in Iran.[v] Two unspecified Iranian officials separately told the New York Times on June 4 that Iran is planning to “bargain” for the regional consortium to be based on Kish or Gheshm islands in the Persian Gulf to maintain its right to enrichment on Iranian soil.[vi] An unspecified Arab diplomatic source told Israeli media on June 3 that the United States may propose placing the consortium on one of the disputed islands—Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, or Lesser Tunb.[vii] Iran seeks for the regional consortium to be based on Kish or Gheshm islands, rather than the disputed islands, given that the former are internationally recognized as Iranian territory while the latter are claimed by both Iran and the United Arab Emirates.

The Iranian officials speaking to the New York Times added that Iran is open to the consortium idea because Iran “does not want talks to fail."[viii] It is in Iran's interest to prolong the nuclear talks, given that it likely calculates that prolonging the talks will delay or prevent snapback sanctions and a potential US or Israeli strike on its nuclear facilities. US President Donald Trump accused Iran of “slow-walking [its] decision” after Khamenei rejected the US proposal on June 4. Iran has not yet submitted a formal response to the US proposal, which could reflect internal debates in Iran about how to reject the US zero enrichment demand in the proposal while also ensuring that the negotiations do not collapse.

Likely Iranian-aligned militants launched a small-scale rocket attack from southwestern Syria into the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on June 3.[ix] This attack marks the first time that militants have attacked Israel from Syrian territory since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[x] Militants launched two rockets from Tasil, Daraa Province, into the southern Golan Heights.[xi] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) briefly operated in Tasil in April 2025.[xii] Israeli media reported on June 3 that the rockets landed in open areas and did not cause any casualties.[xiii] The IDF launched several retaliatory air and artillery strikes targeting Syrian military sites and towns in southwestern Syria on June 3.[xiv] The targeted military sites included the new Syrian army’s 121st Brigade base near Kanaker, Rif Dimashq Province, and the 175th Brigade base near Izraa, Daraa Province.[xv]

Two likely Iranian-aligned groups separately claimed responsibility for the June 3 rocket attack.[xvi] Neither group has previously conducted any attacks targeting Israel. The Martyr Muhammad al Deif Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack and released a video that reportedly showed the rockets landing in the Golan Heights.[xvii] The Martyr Muhammad al Deif Brigades is a Hamas-aligned Palestinian resistance group that announced its formation on June 3.[xviii] The Islamic Resistance Front of Syria-the First of the Brave also claimed responsibility for the attack and published a video of the alleged rockets in their launching positions on June 3.[xix] The Islamic Resistance Front of Syria-the First of the Brave is an anti-Israel militia formed in January 2025 that uses iconography widely associated with or inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.[xx] The Islamic Resistance Front of Syria-the First of the Brave Spokesperson Abu al Qasim gave a speech on June 4 in which he stated that the Syrian government has become a “defeatist project demanding normalization” with Israel to gain “some personal and moral privileges.”[xxi] Qasim stated that this attack was a “clear warning” and that the group will conduct additional attacks targeting Israel in the future.[xxii] Qasim also noted that the group will attack “whoever tries to strip Syria of its resistance identity.”[xxiii] 

This attack may have been an attempt to fuel tension between Israel and Syria in order to undermine recent deconfliction and diplomatic efforts between the two countries. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz posted on X on June 3 that Israel holds Syrian President Ahmed al Shara “directly responsible for every threat” and attack on Israel from Syrian territory.[xxiv] The IDF also stated on June 3 that the Syrian transitional government will continue to bear consequences “as long as hostile activity continues from its territory.”[xxv] The Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a statement that reaffirmed that Syria “has not and will not” pose a threat to any country in the region.[xxvi] The ministry added that some external actors are seeking to destabilize the region to advance their own interests.[xxvii] Israel has repeatedly expressed concern regarding threats to Israel from Syria since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[xxviii] The IDF has conducted ground and air operations in southern Syria since December 2024 with the aim of eliminating these threats, including Iranian-backed networks in Syria.[xxix] The Syrian transitional government has repeatedly called on Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory to the 1974 deconfliction line.[xxx] Israel and Syria have taken steps in recent weeks to ease tensions. Several unspecified sources told Western media on May 27 that Israeli and Syrian officials are holding direct talks on joint security and “broader political understandings” to calm tensions and prevent further conflict.[xxxi] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara also reportedly expressed willingness to normalize relations with Israel during meetings with US officials in April 2025.[xxxii] Renewed tension between Israel and Syria could undermine the countries’ recent efforts to prevent military escalation and reach a political and diplomatic understanding.

The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) spokesperson announced on June 4 that the LEC arrested an “ISIS-affiliated network” in Tehran.[xxxiii] LEC forces arrested 13 individuals who were part of the network, including the leader, members of support and coordination teams, and suicide operatives. LEC forces seized suicide vests and backpacks, among other equipment. The network reportedly planned to execute attacks at public ceremonies across Iran, likely during the current flurry of commemoration ceremonies for former Iranian Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini. Police departments across Tehran, Esfahan, Qom, and Alborz provinces coordinated to arrest the individuals. Iranian officials have recently articulated a clear commitment to border security amid an uptick in militant activity since December 2023.[xxxiv] Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which is the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, has conducted several attacks in Iran in recent years. ISKP members detonated suicide vests during a ceremony in Kerman Province in January 2024 commemorating the anniversary of the United States killing former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani.[xxxv] ISKP separately conducted two attacks targeting the Shah Cheragh Shrine in Shiraz, Fars Province, in October 2022 and August 2023.[xxxvi]

Shia Coordination Framework members opposed to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and his coalition accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption, likely to damage Sudani’s electoral prospects in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. An unspecified Shia Coordination Framework member opposed to Sudani claimed on June 4 that Sudani is paying voters to vote for him.[xxxvii] The source also claimed that Sudani is using prominent members of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition to increase support for his coalition. The Shia Coordination Framework member accused Karbala Governor Nassif al Khattabi and Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, who are members of Sudani’s coalition, of using public funds in their electoral campaigns. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) head Qais al Khazali and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki are running against Sudani in the upcoming November 2025 elections and have recently accused Sudani and members of his coalition of corruption.[xxxviii] It is unclear who made the recent allegations against Sudani, Khattabi, and Fayadh. Sudani has derived a large amount of popular support among the Iraqi population for his anti-corruption policies.[xxxix] Corruption charges against Sudani, real or fabricated, could diminish support for his coalition.

The Shia Coordination Framework reportedly rejected a proposal by Sudani for a “political consensus” to prevent conflicts during the formation of the next government after the parliamentary elections.[xl] A Shia Coordination Framework member told Iraqi media on June 4 that Sudani sought to negotiate an agreement with the Coordination Framework to allocate control of the presidency, speakership, and premiership. Sudani reportedly sought to negotiate this agreement to prevent deadlock in parliament following the elections. The Iraqi Parliament failed to elect a president and prime minister for a year following the 2021 elections for multiple reasons, including disputes between Iranian-backed parties and Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr.[xli]

Sudani is likely attempting to secure a second premiership. Iraqi public polling throughout the Sudani administration has shown that Sudani is popular among voters and will likely win a significant portion of seats in parliament in the November 2025 elections.[xlii] Unspecified Shia sources told Saudi media in September 2024 that Sudani had formed alliances with 50 unspecified Shia Coordination Framework members, around 60 parliamentarians, and multiple provincial governors.[xliii] A member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization told Iraqi media on May 25 that the Shia Coordination Framework would not prevent Sudani from serving a second term, indicating that the Shia Coordination Framework has discussed the possibility of Sudani continuing to serve as prime minister.[xliv]

Key Takeaways:

• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected the recent US nuclear proposal because the proposal would require Iran to eventually halt all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. Iran’s continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment could cause the US-Iran nuclear negotiations to collapse. Khamenei claimed that a nuclear industry without enrichment is “practically worthless" and emphasized that Iran would not become “dependent” on foreign countries for uranium. Under the US proposal, Iran would receive uranium for civilian nuclear purposes as part of the regional consortium but would not be allowed to independently enrich uranium on Iranian soil after the consortium is formed.
• Israel-Syria Tensions: Likely Iranian-aligned militants launched a small-scale rocket attack from southwestern Syria into the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on June 3. This attack marks the first time that militants have attacked Israel from Syrian territory since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. Two likely Iranian-aligned groups separately claimed responsibility for the June 3 rocket attack. Neither group has previously conducted any attacks targeting Israel. This attack may have been an attempt to fuel tension between Israel and Syria in order to undermine recent deconfliction and diplomatic efforts between the two countries.
• Iranian Internal Security: The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) spokesperson announced on June 4 that the LEC arrested an “ISIS-affiliated network” in Tehran. LEC forces arrested 13 individuals who were part of the network, including the leader, members of support and coordination teams, and suicide operatives. LEC forces seized suicide vests and backpacks, among other equipment. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which is the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, has conducted several attacks in Iran in recent years.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Shia Coordination Framework members opposed to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and his coalition accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption, likely to damage Sudani’s electoral prospects in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. The Shia Coordination Framework separately rejected a proposal by Sudani for a “political consensus” to prevent conflicts during the formation of the next government after the parliamentary elections.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The US maximum pressure campaign against Iran has hampered Iran’s ability to export oil to China. Bloomberg reported on June 3 that Iran exported 1.1 million barrels of condensates and crude oil per day to China in May 2025, which marks an approximately 26 percent decrease in Iranian crude exports to China since April.[xlv] Chinese independent refiners are reportedly processing near record-low amounts of Iranian oil. Reuters reported in early May that recent US sanctions on two small Chinese independent refineries—Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical and Shandong Shengxing Chemical—have begun to disrupt China’s refinement of Iranian crude oil.[xlvi] Ship-tracking data shows that Chinese refiners stockpiled crude oil earlier in the year, which may also explain the recent decrease in Iranian oil exports to China.[xlvii]

The Parliamentary Civil Committee met on June 4 to address issues facing Iranian truck drivers.[xlviii] Truck drivers across Iran have gone on strike since May 22 to protest a planned fuel price increase as well as rising insurance costs and low wages.[xlix] Anti-regime media recently reported that over 400,000 truck drivers remained on strike as of June 1.[l] The strike has reportedly expanded to include other transportation workers, including taxi drivers.[li] The strike has caused disruptions to supply chains at a time when the Iranian economy is already reeling from the impacts of international sanctions, mismanagement, and corruption.[lii] CTP-ISW previously noted that economic-related protests and strikes have the potential to evolve into anti-regime protests.[liii]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem in Beirut on June 4.[liv] Araghchi and Qassem may have discussed challenges stemming from the Lebanese government’s efforts to block Hezbollah’s reconstitution. Araghchi emphasized Iran’s readiness to support Lebanon. The meeting between Araghchi and Qassem followed Araghchi’s June 3 announcement that Iranian companies are ready to participate in Lebanon's reconstruction.[lv] Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Youssef Rajji stated during a meeting with Araghchi on June 3 that all reconstruction aid must go through state institutions and rejected any effort to bypass the Lebanese government to support Hezbollah’s military reconstitution.[lvi] The Lebanese Armed Forces are working to dismantle Hezbollah military infrastructure in southern Lebanon as part of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement. The Lebanese government’s insistence on any Iranian reconstruction aid going through the Lebanese state could impede Iranian efforts to support Hezbollah.

The Iranian rial depreciated from 824,000 rials to one US dollar on June 3 to 837,500 rials to one US dollar on June 4.[lvii]

Syria

The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is establishing a formal chain of command for a volunteer force that the MoD envisions will include 200,000 individuals.[lviii] A Syrian military official told Emirati media that the MoD has recruited 100,000 of a planned 200,000 soldiers to join the Syrian Army.[lix] The MoD plans to divide these forces into 20 divisions with five brigades each: two infantry brigades, an armored brigade, a special forces brigade, and a multi-task brigade.[lx] A Syrian MoD official said that most brigades are currently “at skeleton stage.”[lxi] This formal chain of command may assist Damascus in asserting better command and control over the disparate militias that comprise the Syrian army. The MoD has not consistently dissolved pre-existing command structures and has allowed some former militias to reflag as brigades in the Syrian army, however.[lxii] This type of integration often results in members of former militias answering to their former militia commander instead of observing the formal chain of command. The Syrian transitional government reportedly pays soldiers between $150 and $500, partly from assets seized from the Assad regime.[lxiii] The transitional government will very likely struggle to pay the entire Syrian army from these assets, particularly once the force doubles in size. Local media in Deir ez Zor Province reported that some divisions are struggling to pay their forces due to a lack of cash flow from the transitional government and some recruits are switching divisions to be paid.[lxiv] Salaries are reportedly dependent on the leadership of each faction.[lxv] Turkey paid the salaries of Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) factions as of late May 2025, but it remains unclear if direct Turkish support to the SNA has persisted.[lxvi] Qatar and Saudi Arabia have committed to fund public sector salaries in Syria to help with the transitional government’s budget shortfall, but it is unclear whether this assistance will include military salaries.[lxvii]

Sectarian-motivated attacks have increased across Syria since May 28 in correlation with an increase in Saraya Ansar al Sunnah propaganda. CTP-ISW has recorded six instances of sectarian-motivated attacks since May 28, compared to a single attack between May 21 and 28.[lxviii] Three of these attacks followed a clash between drug smugglers and General Security Service (GSS) forces in Qatana, Rif Dimashq Province, on May 30.[lxix]  Saraya Ansar al Sunnah abducted and executed a Druze man in Qatana on May 31.[lxx] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah propaganda posts more than doubled in the past week. Salafi-jihadi groups such as Saraya Ansar al Sunnah utilize social media to spread their ideology to a wider audience and encourage their followers to conduct “lone wolf” attacks that target religious minorities and Assad regime remnants in Syria.[lxxi] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah frequently provides its audience religious justification to kill religious minorities whom they view as apostates.[lxxii]

Revenge killings targeting former Assadists have slightly increased across Syria since May 28. CTP-ISW has recorded nine instances of revenge killings targeting former Assad regime members since May 28, compared to six attacks between May 21 and 28.[lxxiii] Seven revenge killings took place in Hama City.[lxxiv] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah claimed two of the seven killings.[lxxv] Hama was the site of the 1982 Hama massacre, which was orchestrated by Bashar al Assad’s father, Hafez, and Assad’s uncle, Rifaat.[lxxvi] The massacre, which killed an estimated 30,000 people, traumatized the populace who carried deep-seated resentment against the Assad regime.[lxxvii] This resentment combined with a nascent transitional justice system creates conditions in which the population may pursue vigilante justice for crimes committed under the Assad regime.  The recent formation of a transitional justice and missing persons committee by the transitional government on May 18 has not decreased the rate of revenge killings in Syria.[lxxviii] This is likely due to Syrians’ skepticism of the transitional government’s ability to administer justice in an effective and meaningful way. The transitional government must try, prosecute, and sentence individuals who committed crimes and atrocities under Assad in order to demonstrate its commitment to transitional justice and increase trust among Syrians that the government will punish those who harmed the Syrian people.

Iraq

The US Department of Defense denied any changes or delays to the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in a statement to Iraqi media on June 4.[lxxix] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[lxxx] The US Department of Defense announced in April 2025 that the United States will reduce the number of US forces deployed in Syria to “less than a thousand” in the coming months.[lxxxi] The US drawdown in Syria leaves a vacuum which Iraqi officials have warned ISIS could exploit to reconstitute and threaten Iraq.[lxxxii] The Iraqi federal government has reportedly considered postponing the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in recent months due to concerns that ISIS could exploit the fall of the Assad regime in Syria to threaten Iraq.

Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) 26th Brigade Commander Maitham al Zaidi accused unspecified actors of imprisoning and interrogating PMF members for political purposes on June 4. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lxxxiii] The PMF 26th Brigade, also known as the “Abbas Combat Division,” is loyal to Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani.[lxxxiv] Zaidi claimed that unspecified actors imprisoned a PMF member for failing to provide his regiment commander with ten voting cards.[lxxxv] Zaidi also claimed that unspecified actors detained a different PMF member for 40 days because the member’s relatives support a rival candidate in the upcoming parliamentary elections.[lxxxvi] Zaidi added that unspecified actors harshly interrogated a group of PMF recruits at a camp in southern Iraq after a candidate lost an election.[lxxxvii]  The 2016 PMF Commission Law, which formalized the PMF as an independent entity reporting directly to the Iraqi prime minister, prohibits PMF members from associating with any political parties.[lxxxviii] Zaidi called for comprehensive PMF reforms to ensure compliance with the law.[lxxxix]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

The Houthis conducted a ballistic missile attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on June 3 as part of the Houthi campaign to enforce an economic blockade on Israel.[xc]  The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted the Houthi missile.[xci] Some international airlines have suspended flights to Israel through September 2025 due to concerns about Houthi attacks on Ben Gurion Airport.[xcii] 

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.    

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.