Iran Strike Updates

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Information Cutoff: 6:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) will be publishing two updates over the next 24 hours from June 15-16, 2025, to provide insights into the ongoing strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, military infrastructure, and key military and nuclear program leadership. We will continue to produce Iran Update special editions until the strikes conclude. We will prioritize covering Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities in response to the attacks that threaten US forces and interests.  

Key Takeaways

• The IDF expanded its air campaign into Iran by beginning to strike regime institutions, including some related to internal security and social control. This comes the day after the IDF began striking energy infrastructure. The degradation of the Iranian coercive apparatus coupled with energy shortages could destabilize the regime.
• The IDF conducted its furthest strike eastward as part of its efforts to establish air superiority over Iran. The IDF specifically struck an Artesh airbase around Mashhad in northeastern Khorasan Razavi Province. Most of the Israeli strikes targeting air defenses have been around western and central Iran thus far.
• Iran has continued its missile campaign targeting Israel, having launched 10 total barrages at the time of this writing. Two of these barrages occurred in recent hours. The IDF has intercepted around 92 percent of the missiles that Iran has fired at Israel thus far, according to an Israeli official speaking to Reuters.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) expanded its ongoing air campaign on June 15 to target Iranian governance institutions, some of which are related to internal security. The expansion of targets to include regime institutions comes after the IDF expanded its air campaign on June 14 to include critical Iranian energy infrastructure.[i] CNN geolocated footage of smoke near the Justice Ministry in western Tehran on June 15.[ii] Israeli strikes also targeted the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry in Tehran.[iii] The IDF also reportedly struck institutions that are part of the Iranian internal security apparatus, including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) headquarters.[iv] The LEC has many subordinate units, including the Prevention and Operations Police, which commands law enforcement stations across Iran, and Special Units, a highly trained, anti-riot force that deploys when regular police cannot contain civil disorder.[v] Disruption to institutions like the LEC could degrade the regime's ability to maintain internal security and social control. These internal security functions are particularly important given that recent Israeli strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure will likely worsen Iran’s ongoing energy crisis and lead to more widespread and frequent electricity shortages and outages. Frustration over energy shortages could trigger internal unrest.

An outlet controlled by the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff published an article calling for the deployment of the Basij across Iran in order to promote internal security and regime stability.[vi] The Basij is a paramilitary organization that recruits and organizes regime loyalists and uses them to produce and disseminate propaganda, suppress internal dissent, and conduct civil defense operations. The article called for the Basij to “conduct widespread patrols and establish stop-and-search [posts].” The article argued that these activities are necessary to counter Mossad infiltration across Iran. The regime would almost certainly use such Basij activities to identify dissidents and suppress any nascent protest activity.

The IDF expanded its air campaign geographically on June 15 as part of its efforts to establish air superiority over Iranian airspace.[vii] The IDF struck an aerial refueling aircraft at Mashhad Airport in northeastern Iran. Mashhad Airport is approximately 2,300 kilometers from Israel, which makes the strike on the airport the deepest strike that Israeli aircraft have conducted in Iranian territory since the start of the Israeli air campaign on June 12.[viii] The Artesh Air Force 14th Tactical Airbase is co-located at Mashhad Airport.[ix] The IDF also struck Mehrabad International Airport in central Tehran on June 15.[x] The Artesh Air Force 1st Tactical Airbase is co-located at Mehrabad International Airport.[xi] The IDF reported that it continued to strike surface-to-air missile systems in western Iran.[xii] Israeli strikes on Iranian air defenses systems and military airports will degrade Iran’s ability to restrict Israeli operations in its airspace.

The IDF struck a reported IRGC warehouse in Anahita neighborhood, Kermanshah City, on June 15.[xiii] A London-based Iranian human rights organization posted a video on June 15 reportedly showing the aftermath of the Israeli strikes on two of the buildings at the IRGC facility in Kermanshah.[xiv]  

The IDF continued to target defense industrial sites, including facilities that produce missile navigation systems, missile fuel, surface-to-surface missiles, and components for IRGC air defense systems.[xv]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed on June 15 that an Israeli airstrike killed IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Brigadier General Mohammad Kazemi and his deputy, Hassan Mohaghegh.[xvi] The strike also killed IRGC intelligence officer Mohsen Bagheri.[xvii] Kazemi previously led the IRGC Counterintelligence Organization and was therefore responsible for internal monitoring of the Iranian armed forces.[xviii] Kazemi replaced former IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Hossein Taeb in 2022.[xix] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly dismissed Taeb due to incompetence after the IRGC Intelligence Organization failed to prevent several Israeli assassinations and covert operations in Iran.[xx]

Iran has conducted 10 waves of ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel from Iranian territory since the start of the Israeli air campaign against Iran on July 12. Iran has conducted two waves of ballistic missile attacks since CTP-ISW's 6:00 AM ET data cutoff on June 15.[xxi] The IDF reported that Iran launched “several missiles” at Israel in the first wave but that none of the missiles landed in Israeli territory.[xxii] Iran launched a second wave of missiles targeting Haifa in northern Israel.[xxiii] Israeli media reported that Iran launched approximately 30 missiles in the second wave.[xxiv] An Iranian ballistic missile struck a building in Haifa, injuring two Israeli civilians.[xxv] The IDF has thus far intercepted about 92 percent of the Iranian munitions that Iran has launched at Israel as part of its Operation True Promise III, according to Israeli officials speaking to Reuters.[xxvi]

Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have released statements condemning the Israeli air campaign against Iran but have not claimed any retaliatory attacks against Israel or the United States at the time of this writing. Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) Spokesperson Jawad al Talibawi warned the United States against supporting the Israeli air campaign against Iran on June 15.[xxvii] Talibawi’s warning comes after Kataib Hezbollah (KH) threatened to attack US forces and other unspecified targets in the region if the United States intervenes in the conflict.[xxviii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may target the United States even if it does not directly participate in or approve Israeli attacks on Iran because Iran and its proxies believe that the United States approves Israeli actions in the region. 

Information Cutoff: 6:00 AM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) will be publishing two updates per day while conditions in the Middle East warrant it. Our updates will provide insights into the ongoing strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, military infrastructure, and key military and nuclear program leadership.

We will produce two updates per day while conditions in the Middle East warrant it. This first update covers events between 6:00 PM ET on June 14 and 6:00 AM ET on June 15. The second update will cover events between 6:00 AM ET and 6:00 PM ET on June 15.

Key Takeaways

• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has targeted several nuclear sites in Tehran since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 14.
• A US weapons expert reported on June 15 that, if Israel does not render the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) inoperable, then Iran would be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium (WGU) for nine nuclear weapons by the end of the first month using its pre-attack 60% enriched uranium stockpile.
• The IDF has also targeted several military and defense industrial sites outside Tehran since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 14.
• Israel expanded its ongoing strike campaign against Iran on June 14 by attacking critical Iranian energy infrastructure.
• Iran has conducted two waves of ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel from Iranian territory since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 14.
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to strike Iranian missile launchers, which is likely limiting the scale of the Iranian response to Israel.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has targeted several nuclear sites in Tehran since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 14. The IDF struck the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[i] The IDF killed former SPND Research and Technology Department head Mansour Asgari on June 14.[ii] The IDF also struck the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry (MODAFL), which controls SPND.[iii] The IDF separately struck unspecified "nuclear weapons development laboratories" in Tehran, as well as an unspecified "chemical materials research and development site" and centrifuge production facility in western Tehran.[iv] Two Israeli defense officials told the New York Times that the “nuclear weapons development laboratories” were experimental laboratories.[v] The IDF stated that Iran used the "chemical materials research and development site” to produce raw materials for the development of nuclear weapons.[vi]

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on June 15 that Israeli officials received intelligence prior to the start of the Israeli air campaign on June 12 that Iran had formed a “weapons group.”[vii] The correspondent reported that Iran established the “weapons group” in the months following Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. The correspondent reported that the “weapons group” was in the “experimental stage” and was conducting “successful experiments on the components” of a nuclear weapon. Israeli media reported on June 13 that Israel has killed military commanders and nuclear scientists who were part of the “weapons group.”[viii] Israeli media also reported that the “weapons group” was based in several universities in Tehran and at the Parchin military complex east of Tehran.

A US weapons expert reported on June 15 that, if Israel does not render the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) inoperable, then Iran would be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium (WGU) for nine nuclear weapons by the end of the first month using its pre-attack 60% enriched uranium stockpile.[ix] The Institute for Science and International Security reported on June 9 that Iran could convert its current stockpile of 60% enriched uranium at the FFEP into 233 kilograms of WGU in three weeks.[x] The Institute for Science and International Security reported that 233 kilograms of WGU would be enough to produce nine nuclear weapons, given that 25 kilograms of WGU is required to produce one nuclear weapon.[xi]

The IDF has also targeted several military and defense industrial sites outside Tehran since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 14. The IDF reportedly struck Shiraz Electronics Industries in Shiraz, Fars Province, on June 15.[xii] The United States sanctioned Shiraz Electronics Industries in September 2008 for producing electronics equipment for the Iranian armed forces, including “radars, microwave electron vacuum tubes, naval electronics, avionics and control systems, training simulators, missile guidance technology, and electronic test equipment.”[xiii] Shiraz Electronics Industries is a subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries (IEI), which is controlled by MODAFL.[xiv] The IDF also struck an Iranian munitions factory in Esfahan on June 15.[xv] The IDF struck the same munitions factory in a kamikaze drone attack in January 2023.[xvi] MODAFL reportedly used the factory to produce ballistic missiles and drones.[xvii]

Israel expanded its ongoing strike campaign against Iran on June 14 by attacking critical Iranian energy infrastructure. The IDF struck the Shahran oil depot on the northwestern outskirts of Tehran on June 14.[xviii] The Shahran oil depot holds three days’ worth of fuel for Tehran in at least 11 storage tanks.[xix] Iranian media reported that the IDF also struck the Shahr Rey oil refinery in southern Tehran on June 14.[xx] The Shahr Rey refinery is one of Iran’s largest oil refineries.[xxi] The IDF targeted two Iranian natural gas refineries in Bushehr Province on June 14.[xxii] Social media users reported long lines at gas stations in Tehran on June 15.[xxiii]

Disruptions to Iran’s energy sector will likely worsen the country’s ongoing energy crisis and lead to more widespread and frequently electricity shortages and outages. Iranians have previously protested against the regime in response to energy shortages. Demonstrations over rising gas prices in 2017 and 2018 escalated into broader anti-regime protests.[xxiv]

The IDF has continued to strike Iranian air defense systems to maintain air superiority over Iran. The IDF struck Iranian radar systems overnight on June 14 and 15.[xxv] The IDF posted footage of an Israeli strike on a radar tower.[xxvi]  BBC analyzed satellite imagery from June 14 that showed "significant damage” to an IRGC radar site in Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan Province.[xxvii] The IDF struck a military base in Piranshahr on June 13.[xxviii]

Iran has conducted two waves of ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel from Iranian territory since June 14.[xxix] The IDF reported that Iran launched 80 ballistic missiles in total.[xxx] The first wave targeted the Haifa area in northern Israel and the second wave targeted the Tel Aviv area in central Israel. An Israeli military correspondent reported that Iran also launched “dozens” of drones targeting Israel.[xxxi] The Israeli Air Force (IAF) intercepted at least 10 drones.[xxxii] An Iranian ballistic missile struck a building in Bat Yam, south of Tel Aviv, killing four Israeli civilians and injuring 100 others.[xxxiii] Iranian media circulated videos of fires at Haifa Port and an oil refinery in Haifa.[xxxiv] Israeli media reported that pipelines and transmission lines between facilities at the Bazan Oil Refinery Complex sustained limited damage from Iranian missile attacks.[xxxv]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to strike Iranian missile launchers, which is likely limiting the scale of the Iranian response to Israel. The IDF continued to damage and destroy missile launchers overnight on June 14 and 15.[xxxvi] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Israeli drones are flying in western Iranian airspace to locate and attack launchers that Iran could use to attack Israel.[xxxvii] A missile analyst identified several damaged transporter erector launchers (TEL) that Israel struck on June 14 as Haj Qasem launchers.[xxxviii] Haj Qasems are medium-range solid-fuel ballistic missiles with a range of around 1,400 kilometers, which suggests that Iran may have intended to use Haj Qasem missiles to attack Israel. Two IRGC members speaking to the New York Times on June 14 stated that Iran originally planned to launch 1,000 ballistic missiles at Israel in response to the Israeli strikes on Iran.[xxxix] The IDF estimates that Iran has thus far only fired between about 150 to 250 missiles in eight waves of attacks since Iran launched its first missile barrage at Israel on June 13.[xl] Iran launched 200 missiles across two waves of attacks in a single day in its October 2024 attack on Israel in comparison.[xli] CTP-ISW previously noted on June 12 that the initial Israeli strikes appear, in part, to be aimed at degrading Iran’s retaliatory capabilities.

The frequency of Iran’s missile barrages targeting Israel has decreased since the start of the Israeli air campaign on June 12, which suggests that Israeli strikes are impacting the rate at which Iran can launch missiles at Israel. Iran conducted six waves of attacks using between 100 and 200 missiles on June 13 and 14.[xlii] Iran has only conducted two waves of attacks using 35 to 40 missiles each since June 14.[xliii]

Israel has also struck missile stockpiles that could have supported Iranian attacks against Israel. Israel has struck missile bases that reportedly stored solid- and liquid-fueled missiles, including Ghadr, Qiam-1, Fateh-110, and possibly Kheybar Shekan ballistic missiles.[xliv] Iranian media reported that Iran has used Emad, Ghadr, and Kheybar Shekan missiles to attack Israel since June 12.[xlv] Iran used Emad, Ghadr, and Kheybar Shekan missiles during its April and October 2024 attacks on Israel.[xlvi] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) unveiled a new underground missile base that contained Kheybar Shekan, Ghadr, Sejjil, Emad, and Haj Qassem missiles in March 2025.[xlvii] Former Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri claimed in March that the new facility included enough missiles for Iran to conduct an attack “dozens of times” greater than its October 2024 attack on Israel.[xlviii] A missile expert identified photos of fallen Iranian missile debris that fell in Israel as boosters of Emad-type liquid-fueled medium range ballistic missiles and potentially a recently unveiled loitering munition drone named Rezvan.[xlix]

The Axis of Resistance--with the exception of the Houthis--has thus far failed to meaningfully intervene and impose costs on Israel for the Israeli air campaign against Iran. The IDF reported that Israeli air defenses detected two rockets launched from the Gaza Strip on June 14. The rockets fell in open areas near Nir Oz in southern Israel.[l] No group has claimed the attack at the time of this writing.  An unspecified Hezbollah official told Western media that Hezbollah “will not unilaterally launch an attack on Israel in support of Tehran.”[li]

Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have released statements condemning the Israeli air campaign but have not claimed any retaliatory attacks against Israel or the United States at the time of this writing.[lii] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada (KSS) leader Abu Alaa al Walai threatened on June 11 to conduct attacks targeting the United States and its regional allies if the United States supported that Israeli air campaign against Iran.[liii] Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri released a statement condemning Israel’s strikes on Iran and held the United States responsible for Israeli actions.[liv] Ameri did not issue any explicit threat to retaliate against Israel or the United States. Kataib Hezbollah (KH) Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi warned that KH will attack US forces and other unspecified targets in the region if the United States intervenes in the conflict.[lv] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may target the United States even if it does not directly participate in or approve Israeli attacks on Iran because Iran and its proxies believe that the United States approves Israeli actions in the region.

The Houthis have conducted at least three separate drone and missile attacks targeting Israel since June 12.[lvi] The Houthis fired a ballistic missile at Ben Gurion Airport on June 13.[lvii] The IDF intercepted the missile.[lviii] The IDF also intercepted three drones launched from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen on June 13.[lix] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea stated on June 15 that the group targeted “sensitive” Israeli sites in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area with several ballistic missiles in coordination with Iran.[lx] The Houthis announced on June 12 that they would participate in a potential conflict if Israel or the United States struck Iran.[lxi]

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) will be publishing two updates per day while conditions in the Middle East warrant it. Our updates will provide insights into the ongoing strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, military infrastructure, and key military and nuclear program leadership. We will prioritize covering Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities in response to the attacks that threaten US forces and interests.

We will produce two updates per day while conditions in the Middle East warrant it. This evening update covers events between 6:00 AM ET and 6:00 PM ET on June 14. CTP-ISW published a morning update that covered events between 2:00 PM ET on June 13 and 6:00 AM ET on June 14.

The Israeli air campaign is driving generational turnover in Iranian military leadership.[i] Israeli strikes have killed numerous senior military officers so far. These individuals, such as Mohammad Bagheri and Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh, had occupied some of the highest positions in the Iranian armed forces for years and, in some cases, decades.[ii] Many of these officers had close personal bonds to one another, having forged brotherly ties in their youth during the Iran-Iraq War and maintained those relationships as they rose together through military ranks in the following decades. These relationships created an informal influence network at the highest echelons of the Iranian military establishment. These officers were extremely influential in shaping Iranian strategy due to their positions at the top of the military hierarchy and their immediate access to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. These officers intervened in Iranian domestic affairs on several occasions to assert their shared political preferences and see the regime through internal crises. CTP-ISW identified this network in a 2013 report, labeling it the IRGC Command Network.[iii] That Israel has killed so many members within and in the orbit of the Command Network in recent days means that Israel has not only removed a key leadership cadre—it has also degraded one of the most stable and influential factions in the Islamic Republic. The Command Network has been an enduring presence in Iranian decision-making circles for decades—one of the few factions to remain so dominant other than Khamenei himself. It is too soon to assess what implications the dismantlement of the Command Network will have on Iranian behavior and strategy.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Major General Amir Hatami as the overall Artesh commander.[iv] Hatami replaces Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi, whom Khamenei earlier appointed as Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) chief. The selection of Hatami is notable for several reasons. Khamenei overlooked Artesh Deputy Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Hossein Dadras, who has been the Artesh second-in-command since 2017, and instead favored Hatami for the top post. Hatami is a career Artesh officer but has little experience in senior Artesh command positions compared to Dadras. Hatami spent much of his career working in the AFGS before becoming the defense and armed forces logistics minister under the second Hassan Rouhani administration (2017-2021). Hatami was the first Artesh officer to become the Iranian defense minister in decades, highlighting the great trust that Khamenei had in him. Khamenei appointed Hatami to become his personal adviser for Artesh affairs at the end of Rouhani’s term, further demonstrating support for Hatami, despite the deteriorating relationship between Khamenei and Rouhani.

Hatami is notably a vocal proponent of Iran’s “active deterrence” doctrine, which has underpinned the offensive strategy that Iran has had since 2014-16.[v] Active deterrence is a preventive warfare doctrine that emphasizes interventions abroad to expand Iranian influence and strategic depth and strengthen the Axis of Resistance.[vi] It does not follow, of course, that Hatami’s promotion will presage additional Iranian interventions abroad. But it does at least reflect the influential role that Hatami appears to have played in shaping Iranian strategy and Khamenei’s decision-making in recent years.

Key Takeaways

• The Israeli air campaign is driving generational turnover in Iranian military leadership. Israeli strikes have killed numerous senior military officers so far. Many of these officers had close personal bonds to one another, having forged brotherly ties in their youth during the Iran-Iraq War and maintained those relationships as they rose together through military ranks in the proceeding decades.
• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Major General Amir Hatami as the overall Artesh commander. Hatami is notably a vocal proponent of Iran’s “active deterrence” doctrine, which has underpinned the offensive strategy that Iran has had since 2014-16.
• The IDF has continued to target Iranian military targets across Iran, likely to degrade Iran’s retaliatory capabilities.
• This update contains early bomb damage assessments (BDA) of several Iranian facilities, including Natanz, Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, and several military bases.
• Two US officials said Israeli strikes at Natanz were “extremely effective,” but a senior Israeli official added that the damage is not yet “fatal.”
• Israel struck the Artesh Air Force 2nd Tactical Airbase (TAB) in Tabriz on the night of June 12 to 13, as CTP-ISW previously reported. The strikes destroyed several buildings north of Artesh Air Force aircraft hangars and cratered the approaches from the hangars to the runway.
• Israel may have destroyed a likely aircraft hangar and a radar at Hamedan Air Force Base (43km north of Hamedan) on the night of June 12 to 13.
• Israel struck several buildings at the Amand Missile Base that likely stored ballistic missiles.
• Israel struck the Bakhtaran (Panj Pelleh) underground missile base in Kermanshah on June 13.
• Israel expanded its ongoing strike campaign against Iran on June 14 by targeting critical energy infrastructure. This expansion marks new Israeli efforts to degrade Iran’s capacity to sustain its military and nuclear program.
• CTP-ISW is monitoring reports that the IDF struck the Shahran oil depot on the northwestern outskirts of Tehran on June 14.
• Iran may respond to the Israeli escalation by threatening international maritime security.
• Iranian officials said that Iran will not return to US-Iran nuclear negotiations until Israel halts its attacks on Iran and Iran has finished its retaliatory attacks on Israel.
• Some of Iran’s partners and proxies in the Axis of Resistance have so far failed to meaningfully intervene and impose costs on Israel for targeting Iran so far.
• Iran has launched seven waves of ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel from Iranian territory since initial Israeli strikes on June 12.

Israel’s Air Campaign in Iran

The IDF has continued to target Iranian military targets across Iran, likely to degrade Iran’s retaliatory capabilities. The IDF confirmed on June 14 that it struck an unspecified underground weapons facility in western Iran.[vii] The IDF stated that the facility was used to store and launch dozens of ballistic and cruise missiles.[viii] An Iran-focused analyst reported that the Israeli strikes collapsed the facilities’ entry points and silo openings.[ix] Satellite imagery shows that the IDF struck the Bid Ganeh ballistic missile site in Tehran Province and the Khomein missile site in Markazi Province.[x] The Bid Ganeh site likely stored medium-range ballistic missiles, according to open-source watchers on social media.[xi] Satellite imagery shows that the Israeli strike on the Khomein missile site damaged the drive-through facility, which allows for the efficient movement of missiles and other related equipment.[xii] The IAF reported that it was unable to destroy all of Iran’s missiles and has set disrupting Iran’s ability to launch large barrages as its top priority.[xiii] 

Israel struck Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) (12km east of Esfahan City) on the night of June 12-13.[xiv] Satellite imagery published on June 14 showed damage to several warehouses and other buildings in the complex. The ENTC houses a number of nuclear facilities, including a metallic uranium production facility, a Uranium Conversion Facility, Fuel Manufacturing Plant, and Fuel Fabrication Laboratory, as well as reactors. CTP-ISW previously reported on June 13 that the Israeli strikes hit the metallic uranium production facility and other infrastructure for re-converting enriched uranium to produce nuclear fuel.[xv] The IAEA added that four critical buildings at Esfahan nuclear sites were damaged in the June 13 strike, including the Uranium Conversion Facility and the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant.[xvi] These comments likely refer to ENTC, though they could apply to Natanz (see below), which is also in Esfahan Province.

Two US officials said Israeli strikes at Natanz were “extremely effective,” but a senior Israeli official added that the damage is not yet “fatal.”[xvii] Israel struck the Natanz Enrichment Complex, which is one of Iran’s nuclear facilities, on June 12 and 13.[xviii] Satellite imagery on June 13 confirmed that the strikes destroyed the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz.[xix] Satellite imagery posted on June 14 shows damage to buildings in the northwest and northeast corners of the facility, as well as other buildings elsewhere in the facility (see above). The senior Israeli official told Israeli Army Radio that the strikes inflicted significant damage to Natanz’s air defense systems and Natanz itself.[xx] The two US officials said in a comment to CNN that the strikes knocked out electricity in Natanz’s lower levels, which is where centrifuges used to enrich uranium are stored.[xxi] The IAEA separately added that the electric infrastructure at Natanz was destroyed.[xxii]

Israel struck the Artesh Air Force 2nd Tactical Airbase (TAB) in Tabriz on the night of June 12 to 13, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[xxiii] The strikes destroyed several buildings north of Artesh Air Force aircraft hangars and cratered the approaches from the hangars to the runway. This airbase houses three Iranian squadrons (the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd Tactical Fighter Squadrons) that fly the MiG-29 and F-5, according to open-source watchers on social media and the Aviationist.[xxiv] Iran will likely rapidly repair the runways, but cratering these surfaces would have prevented aircraft from interfering with Israeli operations on the night of June 12 to 13. The base also stored SA-6 Gainful surface-to-air systems.[xxv]

Israel may have destroyed a likely aircraft hangar and a radar at Hamedan Air Force Base (43km north of Hamedan) on the night of June 12 to 13. Satellite imagery posted on June 14 shows damage to a probable aircraft hangar on the northeastern side of the runway. The hangar’s parking spots are large enough to house F14 Tomcats (with wings swept), F4 Phantoms, MiG-29s, or F5s. Hamadan reportedly hosts the 31st Tactical Fighter Squadron, which flies F4s.[xxvi]

Israel struck a number of buildings at Amand Missile Base that likely stored ballistic missiles. CTP-ISW previously reported that Iran stores Ghadr medium-range ballistic missiles at Amand.[xxvii] Many of the buildings to the west of the main Amand facility are surrounded by walls or high earthen berms, which suggests that Iran may have stored the missiles in these buildings. Earthen berms and walls can help contain explosions.

Israel struck the Bakhtaran (Panj Pelleh) underground missile base in Kermanshah on June 13.[xxviii] The Bakhtaran (Panj Pelleh) underground missile base reportedly stores Qiam-1 and Fateh-110 ballistic missiles.[xxix] The base also reportedly houses an underground facility, two munition storage areas, and missile launch pads.[xxx] It is not clear if Israel damaged the underground facility, however.

Israel expanded its ongoing strike campaign against Iran on June 14 by targeting critical energy infrastructure. This expansion marks new Israeli efforts to degrade Iran’s capacity to sustain its military and nuclear program. The IDF targeted Iranian gas refineries and industrial facilities early June 14, following waves of airstrikes on air defenses and nuclear-linked sites across western Iran and Tehran on June 13.[xxxi] The IDF struck a natural gas processing facility linked to Iran’s South Pars field in Bushehr Province on June 14, triggering an explosion and fire that forced Iranian authorities to shut down Phase 14.[xxxii] South Pars is one of the largest gas fields in the world and central to Iran’s domestic energy supply.[xxxiii] The IDF also reportedly targeted Fajr-e Jam Gas Refinery in Bushehr Province on June 14.[xxxiv] The Wall Street Journal reported that Israel may have been targeting nearby air defenses, while IRGC-affiliated media said “a collision with a hostile small aircraft“ caused the explosion.[xxxv] The refinery processes gas from the South Pars field and the Nar and Kangan fields and plays a key role in purifying Iran’s domestic natural gas supply.[xxxvi] Over 90 percent of Iran’s electricity is generated by gas-powered thermal plants.[xxxvii] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu previously pledged not to target oil infrastructure during calls with former US President Joe Biden in October 2024 due to the risk that targeting oil infrastructure would cause the price of oil to rise.[xxxviii]

CTP-ISW is monitoring reports that the IDF struck the Shahran oil depot on the northwestern outskirts of Tehran on June 14.[xxxix] CTP-ISW will cover these events in the June 15 morning edition.

Disruptions to Iran’s natural gas production will likely worsen the country’s ongoing energy crisis and lead to more widespread electricity blackouts, however. Iranians have previously protested against the regime in response to energy shortages. Demonstrations over the rising gas prices in 2017 and 2018 escalated into broader challenges for the regime’s stability.[xl]

The IDF separately targeted Farda motors automative factory in Boroujerd, Lorestan Province, on June 14.[xli] The strike reportedly caused extensive damage to production lines, vehicle parts, and completed cars, according to Iranian media. It remains unclear whether Farda Motors had any ties to Iranian military entities or was operating under the direction of Iran’s military-industrial organizations.

Iran may respond to the Israeli escalation by threatening international maritime security. Former IRGC officer and current parliamentary security committee member Esmail Kowsari stated on June 14 that Iran is reviewing whether to close the Strait of Hormuz.[xlii] IRGC-affiliated media also reported on June 14 that the Iranian Navy intercepted a British warship in the Sea of Oman and forced it to change course.[xliii] Iranian media claimed that the warship had entered the northern Indian Ocean to assist Israeli missile guidance efforts against Iran. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to attack US bases and international shipping in response to a potential strike.[xliv]

Israel has conducted a decapitation campaign targeting Iranian military leadership in addition to the strikes targeting nuclear and military infrastructure.[xlv] Israeli strikes have killed the IRGC Intelligence Aerospace Force Chief Deputy Brigadier General Khosrow Hassani on June 13.[xlvi] IRGC media reported that Hassani was with IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh during the Israeli strike that killed Hajizadeh.

Iran has launched seven waves of ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel from Iranian territory since initial Israeli strikes on June 12.[xlvii] An interceptor, shrapnel, or ballistic missile impacted in Tamra, northern Israel, and killed three people.[xlviii] Fourteen people were wounded.[xlix] A projectile also struck a house east of Haifa.[l] Iran has also launched at least two waves of one-way attack drones targeting Israel.[li] The IDF has so far intercepted about 90 percent of the Iranian munitions that Iran has launched as part of its Operation True Promise III.[lii] At least 10 interceptors, shrapnel, or ballistic missiles struck the Tel Aviv area on June 13 and earlier on June 14.[liii]

Iranian officials said that Iran will not return to US-Iran nuclear negotiations until Israel halts its attacks on Iran and Iran has finished its retaliatory attacks on Israel.[liv] Iran withdrew from the negotiations on June 13.[lv] Omani Foreign Minister Badr al Busaidi and a senior US official confirmed on June 14 that the sixth round of talks—originally scheduled for June 15--had been cancelled.[lvi] A senior US official said that the Trump administration remains committed to negotiations with Iran and hopes Iran will ”come to the table soon.”[lvii] This is consistent with remarks from US President Donald Trump on June 13 that Iran now has a "second chance" and that "even more brutal” attacks on Iran will follow if Iran does not commit to a nuclear deal with the United States.[lviii] Two sources told Axios that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told several unspecified foreign ministers that Iran would be willing to resume talks with the US after Iran’s retaliation on Israel is over.[lix] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian similarly stated that Iran will not participate in negotiations while Israel continues to attack.[lx]

Russian President Vladimir Putin held phone calls with the heads of state of the United States, Israel, and Iran on June 13 and June 14.[lxi] Putin‘s call with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on June 13 marked Pezeshkian’s first call with a foreign leader since Israel launched its air campaign, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[lxii] It is notable that Pezeshkian’s first call was to Putin and illustrates the close and growing relationship between Iran and Russia. Heads of state often call trusted partners in times of crisis. Iran’s closest allies are its Axis of Resistance, but those relationships are often managed by the IRGC. Putin also told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a phone call that issues related to Iran’s nuclear program should be resolved through political diplomatic efforts, according to the Kremlin.[lxiii] Russia has consistently supported Iranian objectives in the recent nuclear talks by supporting Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium, though Russia does support the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon.[lxiv] Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that Trump told Putin during a June 14 phone call that US Special Envoy to the Middle East and lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff is ready to resume nuclear talks with Iran.[lxv]  Trump did not confirm this in his own statement about the phone call. Putin has recently offered to facilitate the US-Iran nuclear negotiations in a likely attempt to portray Russia as a useful collaborator and partner that the United States needs to achieve certain global outcomes.[lxvi]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with People’s Republic of China Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi.[lxvii]

Some of Iran’s partners and proxies in the Axis of Resistance have so far failed to meaningfully intervene and impose costs on Israel for targeting Iran so far. The IDF reported that the Israeli air defense system detected two rockets launched from the Gaza Strip on June 14 at 11:41 ET that fell near Nir Oz, southern Israel.[lxviii] No group has claimed this launch at the time of writing. Lebanese Hezbollah has not participated in the conflict at the time of this writing. These groups all released generic statements condemning the Israeli strikes on June 13.[lxix]

Houthi Leader Abdul Malik Badr al Din al Houthi stated during a televised speech that the Houthis support “the Iranian response and are partners in the position with everything we can.”[lxx] Houthi stated that aggression against Iran is aggression against all Arab countries, calling for all countries in the region to support the Iranian response.[lxxi] This speech is similar to the Houthis’ Political Bureau’s previous statement in support of Iran on June 13.[lxxii] The Houthis have targeted Israel since Israel’s air campaign. The Houthis previously launched three drones and one ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen towards Israeli territory on June 13.[lxxiii] Houthi drone and ballistic missile attacks are not an inflection or new constraint on air defense bandwidth for Israel because the Houthis have regularly struck Israel with drones and missiles since November 2024.[lxxiv] These attacks do further constrain Israeli air defense bandwidth when combined with Iranian attacks, of course.

The IDF may have killed Houthi Chief of Staff Muhammad Abdulkarim al Ghamari in a targeted airstrike in Yemen on June 14.[lxxv] IDF sources told Israeli media that the IDF conducted strikes in Yemen in an attempted targeted attack on Ghamari.[lxxvi] Yemeni media reported that an explosion on October 14 Street in Sanaa was a result of an airstrike.[lxxvii] Ghamari has served as the Houthi Chief of Staff since 2016.[lxxviii] Ghamari was responsible for overseeing Houthi military operations and directing the procurement and deployment of various weapons.[lxxix] Ghamari reportedly has close ties to Hezbollah and the IRGC.[lxxx] The Houthis have not confirmed or commented on the strike at the time of writing. An Israeli source told Israeli media that the IDF ”will soon know if it succeeded.”[lxxxi]