Iran Update, June 9, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

Iran continues to signal that it will reject the recent US nuclear proposal. The United States recently sent a proposal to Iran that would require Iran to halt all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil after the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium.[i] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei criticized the US proposal on June 9 and stated that Iran will soon present a counter-proposal via Oman.[ii] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on June 8 that "no rational mind would accept" the US proposal.[iii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran's continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment could cause the US-Iran negotiations to collapse.[iv] US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a phone call on June 9 amid growing indications from Iranian officials that Iran is planning to reject the US proposal. [v] Trump stated after the phone call that Iran and the United States will meet on June 12, which corresponds with the reported US deadline for Iran to agree to a new nuclear deal.[vi] Netanyahu reportedly convened a security cabinet meeting to discuss Iran following the phone call.[vii]

The Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) released a statement following Trump and Netanyahu’s phone call on June 9 in which it threatened to attack Israel's "covert nuclear facilities" in response to a potential Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.[viii] The SNSC claimed that Iran would attack Israeli nuclear facilities using a "treasure trove” of sensitive information about Israeli nuclear facilities that Iran reportedly recently obtained and exfiltrated to Iran.[ix] Iranian officials announced Iran’s alleged acquisition of this sensitive information on June 7.[x] Iran's claim that it obtained intelligence about Israeli nuclear facilities is likely an information operation that seeks to advance several objectives. A US journalist reported on June 4 that Iran may include a demand for a nuclear weapons-free Middle East in its counter-proposal to the United States, citing two experts in contact with Iranian negotiators.[xi] Iran may calculate that it can use its alleged acquisition of "sensitive information” about Israeli nuclear facilities to bolster its argument for a nuclear weapons-free Middle East. Iran may also use this information operation to reinforce its threat to attack Israeli nuclear facilities in retaliation for a potential Israeli strike on Iran in order to try to deter such a strike.[xii]

Iran threatened to expand its nuclear program if the International Atomic Energy Agency passes a non-compliance resolution against Iran. The IAEA Board of Governors is meeting between June 9 and 13, during which the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) intend to submit a non-compliance resolution against Iran.[xiii] The United States and E3 drafted a non-compliance resolution in response to the May 31 IAEA comprehensive report that unscored Iran’s “less than satisfactory” cooperation with the IAEA. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi stated on June 8 that Iran has prepared "a list of countermeasures," including “technical" countermeasures, if the IAEA passes the non-compliance resolution.[xiv] Iran announced that it would install over 6,000 centrifuges at its enrichment facilities in retaliation for the IAEA Board of Governors' November 2024 censure resolution that condemned Iran for its failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA.[xv] It is unclear if Iran would decide to take a similar course of action in response to a non-compliance resolution. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could calculate that taking steps to further expand its nuclear program would increase the risk of snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.[xvi]

Iran is conducting an information operation to undermine the recent IAEA comprehensive report, likely to deter diplomatic and military action against Iran. The IAEA's recent comprehensive report confirmed that Iran conducted undeclared nuclear activities at four locations—Turquzabad, Marivan, Varamin, and Lavizan-Shian—until the early 2000s.[xvii] The Institute for Science and International Security published an analysis of the IAEA's comprehensive report on June 6 and highlighted that Iran conducted several implosion tests essential to building a nuclear weapon at Marivan in 2003.[xviii] The IAEA stated that Iran conducted these tests as part of its broader plan to conduct a cold test, which is typically the final test of a nuclear weapon implosion development program. The release of the IAEA’s comprehensive report follows reports that a "secret team" of Iranian weapons engineers and scientists is "exploring" a faster approach to build a nuclear weapon in a "matter of months.”[xix] Iran responded to the comprehensive report by claiming on June 7 that Israel sabotaged and contaminated its nuclear facilities at these four sites.[xx] Iran likely accused Israel of sabotage to obfuscate Iran's non-compliance with the IAEA and to try to deter a non-compliance resolution, potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran, and snapback sanctions.

Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework parties are committing electoral fraud ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections, according to leaked audio recordings. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Kurdish media reported on June 8 that an unspecified leader of Iranian-backed militia Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) threatened to fire AAH members who don’t update their voter registration and vote for candidates of AAH’s Sadiqoun political bloc.[xxi] The AAH leader also pressured the families of AAH members to vote for Sadiqoun candidates.[xxii] A professor at the Baghdad-based al Farahidi University, which is owned by Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi, was recorded telling students and their families to vote for Mandalawi in exchange for academic degrees and financial benefits.[xxiii] Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties have bought votes and threatened voters in previous elections.[xxiv]

National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim condemned corruption and electoral fraud on June 7.[xxv] Hakim’s condemnation came after various Shia Coordination Framework members opposed to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and his coalition, including AAH head Qais al Khazali, accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption.[xxvi] Hakim’s National Wisdom Movement will compete against Sudani and AAH in the upcoming November 2025 elections. It is unclear if Hakim is coordinating with Shia Coordination Framework parties to damage Sudani’s electoral prospects, although Hakim could benefit from a decline in support for Sudani’s coalition.[xxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a phone call on June 9 amid growing indications from Iranian officials that Iran is planning to reject the recent US nuclear proposal. Trump stated after the phone call that Iran and the United States will meet on June 12, which corresponds with the reported US deadline for Iran to agree to a new nuclear deal. Netanyahu reportedly convened a security cabinet meeting to discuss Iran following the phone call. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) released a statement following Trump and Netanyahu’s phone call on June 9 in which it threatened to attack Israel's "covert nuclear facilities" in response to a potential Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. The SNSC claimed that Iran would attack Israeli nuclear facilities using a "treasure trove” of sensitive information about Israeli nuclear facilities that Iran reportedly recently obtained and exfiltrated to Iran. Iran's claim that it obtained intelligence about Israeli nuclear facilities is likely an information operation that seeks to advance several objectives. Iran likely accused Israel of sabotage to obfuscate Iran's non-compliance with the IAEA and to try to deter a non-compliance resolution, potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran, and snapback sanctions.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework parties are committing electoral fraud ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections, according to leaked audio recordings. Kurdish media reported on June 8 that an unspecified leader of Iranian-backed militia Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) threatened to fire AAH members who don’t update their voter registration and vote for candidates of AAH’s Sadiqoun political bloc. A professor at the Baghdad-based al Farahidi University, which is owned by Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi, was separately recorded telling students and their families to vote for Mandalawi in exchange for academic degrees and financial benefits. National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim condemned corruption and electoral fraud on June 7.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iranian officials may be trying to prevent public unrest following the killing of 24-year-old Elaheh Hossein Nejad by condemning the killing and vowing to bring Hossein Nejad’s killer to justice. Hossein Nejad went missing on May 25 and was found dead several days later.[xxviii] Hossein Nejad was killed by a male driver, who described Elaheh as “really shameless” and claimed that he was “paying for her sins.”[xxix] Several female parliamentarians and Government Spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani visited Hossein Nejad’s family on June 7 and 9, respectively, to offer condolences.[xxx] The group of female parliamentarians demanded “swift and complete justice and the strictest legal punishment for the perpetrator.” President Masoud Pezeshkian’s daughter, Zahra Pezeshkian, also visited the family to convey the president’s condolences.[xxxi]  The Iranian public has responded to the killing of Hossein Nejad with anger and distrust. Many Iranians expressed outrage on social media over the regime’s failure to prevent the crime, despite its heavy surveillance and policing of women who “improperly” wear the hijab.[xxxii] Iranian officials may seek to preempt unrest by sending high-profile figures to visit Hossein Nejad’s family so that Hossein Nejad’s killing does not spark widespread protests, like the killing of Mahsa Amini in September 2022 sparked the Woman, Life, Freedom movement.

The grandson of former Iranian Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini, Ali Khomeini, visited Beirut on June 6 and toured the site of Israel’s June 5 airstrike on a drone facility in Beirut.[xxxiii] Khomeini called the Israeli strike “madness” and emphasized that it will not effect on the spirit of the Lebanese people or the Axis of Resistance.[xxxiv] Khomeini separately met with former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s family during his visit to Beirut.[xxxv] Khomeini visited Baghdad following his visit to Lebanon.[xxxvi] Khomeini discussed “issues related to the Axis of Resistance” with Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad Kazem Al Sadegh and Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani at the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad. Sadegh is reportedly a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[xxxvii]

The Iranian rial appreciated from 835,500 rials to one US dollar on June 6 to 825,000 rials to one US dollar on June 9.[xxxviii]

Syria

Unspecified Syrian government officials told Western media on June 8 that the Syrian transitional government has started integrating foreign fighters into the new Syrian army.[xxxix] The United States and the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently agreed to integrate foreign fighters into the Syrian MoD to prevent foreign fighters from joining Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria.[xl] The United States previously demanded in March 2025 that the Syrian government bar foreign fighters from senior political and military positions.[xli] Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) has historically integrated numerous foreign militias into its military structure and many of these groups are extremely loyal to HTS.[xlii] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara stated in late April 2025 that the Syrian transitional government would consider giving Syrian citizenship to foreign fighters who have lived in Syria “for many years” and “stuck beside the revolution.”[xliii] An unspecified Syrian military official told Emirati media on June 3 that the Syrian government will give most foreign fighters citizenship by the end of the year.[xliv] More than six foreign fighters told Western media on June 8 that they do not plan to leave Syria.[xlv] Several of the fighters stated that they seek Syrian citizenship.[xlvi]

US President Donald Trump is reportedly planning to sign an executive order that will remove several US sanctions on Syria.[xlvii] An unspecified US official told al Monitor on June 9 that Trump is expected to sign an executive order in the coming days.[xlviii] The official stated that the executive order will be a “full revocation of Syria’s sanctions architecture.”[xlix] The executive order will reportedly revoke a series of decades-old executive orders that prohibited Americans from exporting various services, goods, and technology to Syria.[l] This executive order comes amid a series of measures by the Trump administration to lift all sanctions on Syria.[li]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a drone strike targeting a Hamas member in the village of Beit Jinn, Rif Dimashq Province, on June 8.[lii] The drone strike wounded two people, according to local sources.[liii] Local Syrian journalists disputed the IDF’s report that the strike targeted a Hamas member.[liv] Hamas did not comment on the strike. The drone strike follows a likely Iranian-aligned rocket attack from southwestern Syria into the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on June 3.[lv] The IDF responded to the rocket attack with air and artillery strikes on June 3.[lvi]

The governor of Syria’s Central Bank stated that Syria will fully reconnect to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) international payment system “in a matter of weeks.”[lvii] Syrian Central Bank Governor Abdulkader Husrieh stated in an interview with the Financial Times on June 9 that Syria plans to attract foreign investment, remove trade barriers, stabilize the Syrian currency, and reform banking practices.[lviii] Husrieh’s comments follow a series of international sanctions relief efforts that began after the United States announced that it would lift all sanctions on Syria on May 23.[lix]

Iraq

Sadrist Basra Governor Assad al Eidani accused an unspecified member of the Fatah Alliance of attempting to sway Basrawi voters ahead of the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[lx] A member of the Fatah Alliance, which is led by Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, stated in a leaked audio recording that unidentified actors have wasted billions of Iraqi dinars on unimplemented projects in Basra Province. Shia political parties have fought closely in Shia-dominated Basra Province in previous elections.[lxi] A Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated Iraqi parliamentarian recently called for the dismissal and trial of Eidani on May 21 after Eidani reportedly attempted to demolish homes in an area where Iranian-backed parties may have substantial economic interests.[lxii] It is unclear whether the recent calls to dismiss Eidani were an attempt to diminish Eidani’s electoral prospects in the upcoming elections.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali denied on June 7 that he pressured the Iraqi federal government to stop transferring funds to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).[lxiii] The Iraqi Finance Ministry announced on May 29 that the Iraqi federal government would stop transferring funds to the KRG due to the KRG’s failure to transfer oil and non-oil revenue to the Iraqi federal government.[lxiv] The Iraqi federal government’s transfer of funds to the KRG is a frequent point of contention between the federal government and KRG. An Iraqi parliamentarian aligned with Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani told al Araby al Jadeed on June 5 that unidentified Shia Coordination Framework leaders have pressured Sudani to maintain the government’s decision to stop transferring funds to the KRG.[lxv] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. CTP-ISW assessed on May 6 that Shia Coordination Framework leaders may be pressuring Sudani to abide by the federal government’s decision in an attempt to create fissures between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which governs the KRG, and political parties that the KDP could ally with in the upcoming elections, such as Sudani’s coalition.[lxvi] Asaib Ahl al Haq is competing against Sudani’s coalition in the upcoming elections.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.    

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.