Iran Update, June 11, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

The United States authorized the voluntary departure of US military dependents and began preparations for a partial US Embassy Baghdad evacuation amid new pessimism about US-Iran nuclear talks.  US President Donald Trump reportedly acknowledged that Iran has delayed US-Iran nuclear talks in a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 9, though he reiterated that the United States still opposes military action against Iran and believes a nuclear deal with Iran is possible.[i] Trump expressed similar qualified pessimism in a New York Post interview on June 10, when he said that he is “less confident” now than before about Iran agreeing to end uranium enrichment.[ii] Multiple US officials have said publicly that Iran will not be able to enrich uranium under a nuclear agreement.[iii] Trump also added that Iran will not possess a nuclear weapon "regardless of whether a deal is reached."[iv] The United States began instituting a series of force protection measures on June 11 following the increase in pessimism. Axios reported on June 11 that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth authorized the voluntary departure of military dependents from locations across the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, citing an unspecified US defense official.[v] An unspecified US official separately told Reuters on June 11 that the US military plans to authorize the temporary departure of service members' families from Bahrain due to "heightened tensions in the region".[vi] Unspecified US and Iraqi sources separately told Reuters on June 11 that the United States is also preparing a partial evacuation of the US Embassy in Baghdad due to unspecified “tensions in the Middle East.“[vii] An unspecified Iraqi official added that the decision was due to “potential security concerns related to possible regional tensions.”[viii]

Some reports suggest that Iran is opposed to several provisions of a recent US nuclear negotiations proposal. The time and date of the sixth round of nuclear talks have not yet been announced. The United States hopes the sixth round of negotiations will occur on June 12, while Iran insists on June 14.[ix] An Iranian expert close to the Iranian regime claimed on June 11 that several provisions of the US nuclear proposal were so "maximalist, excessive, and even humiliating" that they compelled Iran to issue a firm and proportional response. The "proportional response" may refer to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s categorical rejection of the recent US nuclear proposal, which would require Iran to eventually halt all uranium enrichment on its own soil.[x] This Iranian response may have influenced Trump's remarks about the decreasing likelihood of a deal.[xi] Trump separately told Fox News on June 11 that Iran has become “much more aggressive” in the negotiations.[xii] Unspecified senior US officials told Fox News that Iran appears to be delaying the process while it advances its nuclear program.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), which monitors maritime security issues, also reacted on June 11 to increased tensions in the region. UKMTO published an advisory on June 11 that warned mariners about a rise in military activity in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman due “to heightened tensions in the region.”[xiii] UKMTO advised vessels transiting the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Strait of Hormuz to exercise caution and report any incidents or suspicious activity.[xiv] The advisory comes amid previous alert reports and Iranian threats to international commercial shipping since May 2025. UKMTO previously reported on May 18 that several vessels experienced Global Positioning System (GPS) interference in the Strait of Hormuz for several hours.[xv] Iran has historically conducted GPS jamming to create conditions to seize ships that inadvertently enter its territorial waters.[xvi] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri threatened on May 12 that Iran would respond to any attack by disrupting international commercial shipping.[xvii] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami also inspected IRGC naval units in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf islands on June 11 to evaluate units’ readiness.[xviii] Salami stated that the IRGC Navy is “fully equipped and operationally ready” to respond to any threat and that it has prepared specific responses for all scenarios. Any Iranian response to any military action taken against Iran would likely include operations in the Persian Gulf.

Iran continues to threaten to target US and Israeli assets in the region, likely to deter potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh stated on June 11 that “Iran has access” to all US bases in the region and would target them "without hesitation if provoked."[xix] Nasir Zadeh added that the United States will "certainly suffer more casualties" than Iran in the event of an "enemy mistake and any aggression" against Iran.[xx] Nasir Zadeh is not responsible for the planning or conduct of operations, but his statements echo threats from other senior Iranian officials and military entities. Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened in recent months to attack US bases and forces in the Gulf countries in response to any attack on Iran.[xxi] IRGC-affiliated media claimed on June 10 that Israeli secret nuclear facilities are "within range" of the Iranian armed forces and that Iran could destroy them with “hundreds of ballistic missiles” with a single order.[xxii] The Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) similarly threatened on June 9 to target Israeli secret nuclear facilities and claimed that Iran has obtained sensitive intelligence that it could use to strike those sites if Israel attacked Iranian nuclear facilities.[xxiii]

The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) submitted a non-compliance resolution that declares Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 11.[xxiv] The IAEA Board of Governors has not yet voted on the resolution and will resume its meeting on June 12.[xxv] The non-compliance resolution will reportedly give Iran an unspecified period to address its “less than satisfactory” cooperation with the IAEA’s probe into three undeclared Iranian nuclear sites.[xxvi] The IAEA Board of Governors previously passed a similar non-compliance resolution against Iran in September 2005.[xxvii] The Board of Governors later referred Iran's non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in February 2006, which led to the imposition of UN sanctions on Iran.[xxviii] The Board of Governors could similarly refer the new non-compliance resolution to the UNSC, assuming the Board of Governors passes the resolution. Such an action could lead to the imposition of further UN sanctions on Iran. The E3 could separately use the non-compliance resolution in future efforts to impose snapback sanctions on Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[xxix]

Iran has threatened to expand its nuclear program if the IAEA passes a non-compliance resolution against Iran. A UK-based outlet reported on June 11 that it has "learned" that Iran will "likely" open a new uranium enrichment facility in response to a non-compliance resolution.[xxx] This report is consistent with statements from Iranian officials threatening to take "technical" counter-measures in response to an IAEA non-compliance resolution.[xxxi] Iran has previously announced it would take steps to expand its nuclear program in retaliation for IAEA resolutions.[xxxii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could calculate that taking steps to further expand its nuclear program at this time would increase the risk of snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.[xxxiii]

Russia offered to accept Iran's "excess" enriched uranium stockpile as part of a potential US-Iran nuclear agreement.[xxxiv] Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on June 11 that Russia is "ready to provide assistance" to the United States and Iran regarding the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[xxxv] Ryabkov added that Russia could remove Iran's "excess nuclear material" and downblend it.[xxxvi] Downblending is the process of converting highly enriched uranium into low-enriched uranium. Iran previously sent 25,000 pounds of its 20 percent enriched uranium to Russia in December 2015 as part of the 2015 US-Iran nuclear deal.[xxxvii]  Russia’s offer comes amid recent Russian efforts to acquire a more influential role within US-Iran negotiations, including repeated offers to mediate the talks.[xxxviii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia's involvement in the US-Iran nuclear talks would be very unlikely to secure US interests due to Russia's alignment with Iran.[xxxix] Russia has opposed the stated US demands in the negotiations by supporting Iran's right to enrich uranium and has tried to interfere with US-E3 attempts to declare Iran non-compliant with IAEA standards.[xl] A Wall Street Journal journalist reported on June 11 that Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov delivered an "extremely long statement" at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 11, likely to delay a vote on the non-compliance resolution against Iran.[xli] It is notable that Russia is simultaneously offering to support the US-Iran nuclear negotiations while trying to help Iran delay the vote on a non-compliance resolution and avoid further sanctions.

US Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack told al Monitor on June 10 that the US holds several “expectations” for Syrian President Ahmed al Shara to act upon following the US decision to lift sanctions on Syria.[xlii] The shift to ”expectations” from ”conditions” to lift sanctions reflects the US decision to lift sanctions before all the previous conditions to lift sanctions were met. ”Expectations” imply the US anticipates these previous conditions will be met in the future. Barrack stated that the United States expects transparency from Shara as he acts on the priorities that US President Donald Trump outlined to Shara during their meeting in Riyadh on May 14.[xliii] Barrack noted that the United States expects Shara to curb Palestinian militant activity in Syria, prevent an ISIS resurgence, and take steps towards an eventual entry into the Abraham Accords.[xliv] The US previously gave the Syrian government a list of “confidence-building“ conditions in mid-March 2025 that Damascus needed to address before the United States would consider removing sanctions.[xlv] The similarities between the former confidence-building measures and the expectations described by Barrack suggest that US priorities in Syria not changed significantly, however. The March conditions reportedly included US-Syria counterterrorism cooperation, barring foreign fighters from senior political or military positions, the destruction of remaining chemical weapons stockpiles, and ending Palestinian political and militia activity in Syria.[xlvi] The Syrian government has taken steps to address these conditions in recent months. The Syrian transitional government has taken steps to eject Palestinian militant organizations from Syria, engaged Israel in deconfliction talks, and has continued to dismantle Iranian-linked networks in Syrian territory, but it has not removed foreign fighters from senior military positions.[xlvii] The United States and the Syrian transitional government recently agreed to integrate foreign fighters into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to prevent foreign fighters from joining Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria.[xlviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Tensions in the Middle East: The United States authorized the voluntary departure of US military dependents and began preparations for a partial US Embassy Baghdad evacuation amid new pessimism about US-Iran nuclear talks. Some reports suggest that Iran is opposed to several provisions of a recent US nuclear negotiations proposal.
• Iranian Threats Towards the United States: Iran continues to threaten to target US and Israeli assets in the region, likely to deter potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.
• IAEA Board of Governors Meeting: The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) submitted a non-compliance resolution that declares Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 11. Iran has threatened to expand its nuclear program if the IAEA passes a non-compliance resolution against Iran.
• Iran-Russia Cooperation: Russia offered to accept Iran's "excess" enriched uranium stockpile as part of a potential US-Iran nuclear agreement.
• Syria Sanctions: US Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack told al Monitor on June 10 that the US holds several “expectations” for Syrian President Ahmed al Shara to act upon following the US decision to lift sanctions on Syria.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Two separate fires broke out near critical maritime infrastructure in southern Iranian provinces.[xlix] A fire broke out at a waste storage facility near Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on June 11.[l] The incident follows an April 26 explosion at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas that destroyed a shipment of sodium perchlorate—a precursor for solid missile fuel—and disrupted port operations.[li]  The Hormozgan Province crisis management director claimed that the June 11 incident posed no threat to nearby residential areas or critical infrastructure and urged residents to disregard rumors. Another fire broke out at a methanol cargo vessel at Kaveh Methanol Company’s pier in Dayyer Port, Bushehr Province, on June 11.[lii] The Iranian Red Crescent spokesperson reported that the fire killed at least three crew members and injured two others.

The Iranian rial depreciated from 820,500 rials to one US dollar on June 10 to 824,500 rials to one US dollar on June 11.[liii]

Syria

Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra has hosted several high-level Western officials since May 2025, possibly in an attempt to try to obtain foreign military assistance for Syria.[liv] Qasra separately met with Czech and French defense officials on June 3 and 10 in Damascus to enhance military cooperation between the two countries.[lv] Qasra also hosted with US and UK military officials in May 2025.[lvi] Qasra’s frequent meetings with Western defense and military officials come amid recent Western efforts to provide support to the Syrian MoD. The United Kingdom decided on April 24 to lift asset freezes on the Syrian Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, and General Intelligence Directorate.[lvii] The European Union (EU) also reportedly discussed a sanctions relief proposal in mid-May that would allow member states to provide funding to Syria’s defense and interior ministries.[lviii] This proposal would allow for cooperation between Syria‘s security apparatus and the EU on reconstruction, capacity-building, counterterrorism, and migration.[lix]

A northern Syria-based source reported that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) engaged the Syrian army near Tishreen Dam, Aleppo Province, on June 10.[lx] The source said that the SDF conducted a drone strike targeting a Syrian army position in al Saideen, west of the Tishreen Dam.[lxi] At least three Syrian army soldiers were injured, according to the source.[lxii] The Syrian army reportedly shelled unspecified targets near the dam in response to the drone strike.[lxiii] CTP-ISW cannot verify local reporting about kinetic engagements near the dam. Such an engagement would be significant in that the SDF and Syrian government have agreed and have begun to implement a demilitarized zone around the dam.[lxiv] The Syrian army’s 72nd Division, which comprises five Syrian National Army (SNA) factions, was recently deployed to positions near the dam as of May 19.[lxv] These factions are under very limited government control and may not respond as the MoD directs them.

The Salafi-jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has conducted several new assassinations, probably to capitalize on the public anger over the transitional government’s release of prominent Assadists and emphasize the group’s ability to punish former Assad regime members. The transitional government announced on June 10 that it had released National Defense Forces (NDF) commander Fadi Saqr from custody and allowed him to join the “Civil Peace Committee,” which generated significant anger among Syrian citizens.[lxvi] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah called on its followers on June 10 to share the identities and locations of other recently released Assad regime figures to conduct extra-judicial revenge killings in response to the government’s announcement to release many Assad regime members from custody on June 10.[lxvii] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s recent posts to coordinate attacks targeting recently released Assadists received the highest levels of audience engagement since the group relaunched its social media on May 17, though the engagement remains relatively low.[lxviii] CTP-ISW also observed Sarayah Ansar al Sunnah’s subscriber count increase from under 1,000 users on June 4 to 1,581 at the time of writing. This is still an extremely limited follower base and demonstrates the group’s lack of popularity. The group has claimed several attacks since its June 10 post, however. It assassinated a former Assad regime member and injured another in the town of Dijabijja, Homs Province, on June 10, and killed an Alawite man in Tartous City on the same day.[lxix] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah also announced that it will continue to target Alawites in Homs Province on June 11.[lxx] The group’s efforts to kill former regime members and Alawites, who are viewed by some sectarians as complicit in the Assad regime’s crimes, could enable it to gain support from other segments of the population. The group’s hardline Salafi-jihadi beliefs will make it harder for the group to recruit outside of the Salafi-jihadi milieu in Syria, however.

The Syrian transitional government must balance the prosecution of former Assad regime members who committed crimes, such as Fadi Saqr, with the reintegration of low-level former Assad regime members. The transitional government’s arrests of Assadists have been erratic and poorly explained, with some high-ranking officials being imprisoned while others, such as Saqr, are released without sufficient explanation, which has increased tensions across Syria.[lxxi] This behavior risks destabilizing Syria as many Syrians question the release of known criminals like Saqr while lower-level Assadists are targeted, and regime victims turn to revenge killings as a path to justice.[lxxii]

Iraq

The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) requested on June 11 that the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) clarify whether Sovereignty Alliance head Khamis al Khanjar is under investigation for suspected Baath Party links.[lxxiii] This request for clarification follows State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki’s call on June 6 for the AJC and IHEC to investigate candidates and parties for suspected Baath Party links.[lxxiv] Iraqi law bans Baath Party members from working in the government and running in local or national elections.[lxxv] The AJC replaced the De-Baathification Committee in 2008 to prevent “the return of the Baath’s ideology, power, or practices,” but has been weaponized by Iranian-backed actors, including Maliki, to sideline Sunnis.[lxxvi]

Khanjar resigned from his position as leader of the Sovereignty Alliance in October 2024 after the AJC summoned him for alleged Baath Party links, but the AJC’s decision to summon him may be an attempt by sectarian Shia parties to sideline Khanjar.[lxxvii] Khanjar helped form the United Sunni Leadership Coalition in January 2025 to advance long-held Sunni political demands, which were perceived as a threat to Iranian-backed Iraqi Shias.[lxxviii] Iraqi media reported on April 20 that Khanjar’s Sovereignty Party will participate in Anbar Province in the upcoming elections.[lxxix] Sectarian Shia actors like Maliki and other Iranian-backed parties could manipulate the AJC’s authority to investigate candidate backgrounds to sideline political opposition ahead of the November 2025 parliamentary elections.  

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.    

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.