The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

Russia continues to position itself as a mediator in the US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Russia’s mediation of the US-Iran talks would be very unlikely to secure US interests given Russia’s alignment with Iran. US President Donald Trump stated on June 4 that Russian President Vladimir Putin offered to "participate" in the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[i] Russia’s offer to mediate the negotiations comes after Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei explicitly rejected a recent US nuclear proposal to Iran because the proposal would require Iran to eventually halt all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil.[ii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran’s continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment could cause the US-Iran nuclear negotiations to collapse.[iii] Iran and Russia have held several meetings since March 2025 to discuss the dispute between Iran and the United States over Iran’s nuclear program.[iv] Russia has opposed stated US objectives in the nuclear negotiations and the recent US proposal by supporting Iran’s right to enrich uranium.[v] Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov claimed in early March 2025 that Iran’s production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk."[vi] Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce nearly 10 nuclear weapons.[vii] Russia’s support for Iran’s domestic uranium enrichment is inconsistent with the stated US position against uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. US President Donald Trump confirmed on June 3 that the United States maintains its position that Iran cannot enrich uranium.[viii]

Iran and Russia have deepened political and military cooperation in recent years, particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Iran has supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by providing Russia with Fateh-360 ballistic missiles and launchers and Shahed drones.[ix] Iran reportedly purchased Russian Su-35 fighter jets in January 2025, though Russia has not yet delivered the Su-35s to Iran.[x] Russia has also supported and cooperated with Iran’s Axis of Resistance in recent years. This cooperation has included working with Iran and Iranian-backed militias to attack US forces in the Middle East.[xi] Russia also supported the Axis of Resistance against Israel during the October 7 War, including by providing targeting intelligence to the Houthis to support attacks on international shipping and US vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[xii] Iran and Russia signed a strategic cooperation agreement in January 2025, which further illustrates their close collaboration and alignment in working to erode US global influence.[xiii]

Iran is leveraging its membership in multilateral organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to try to mitigate the effects of international sanctions. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf attended the 11th BRICS Parliamentary Forum in Brazil on June 4 and 5.[xiv] Ghalibaf called for a joint legislative charter among BRICS members to counter sanctions.[xv] Ghalibaf urged BRICS members to use alternative financial tools, such as BRICS Pay, and conduct commercial transactions using national currencies instead of the US dollar. Ghalibaf met with Brazilian officials on the sidelines of the forum to promote the expansion of bilateral ties through the Iran-Brazil Joint Economic Commission.[xvi]

Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin separately attended a meeting for central bank governors of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states in Beijing on June 2.[xvii] Farzin proposed the creation of a joint bank for SCO member states in order to facilitate financial transactions among members and reduce reliance on institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Iran’s emphasis on cooperation with BRICS and SCO members is part of a broader Iranian effort to build a parallel international order that challenges “Western dominance” and US “unilateralism.“[xviii]

Senior Iranian military commanders continue to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard inspected Iran's Northern Air Defense Zone at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran Province on June 5 to evaluate military units and defense capabilities at the site.[xix] Sabahi Fard also inspected air defense positions near former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini’s mausoleum in southern Tehran. Sabahi Fard may have inspected the Hazrat-e Amir Brigade Air Defense Site. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck the Hazrat-e Amir Brigade Air Defense Site in October 2024.[xx] The brigade is located roughly 8 miles from Khomeini’s mausoleum and about 7 miles from the Northern Air Defense Zone at Mehrabad Airport. Sabahi Fard has inspected at least 12 Iranian air defense sites across Iran since April 2025.[xxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Russia continues to position itself as a mediator in the US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Russia’s mediation of the US-Iran talks is unlikely to secure US interests given Russia’s alignment with Iran. Russia has opposed stated US objectives in the nuclear negotiations and the recent US proposal by supporting Iran’s right to enrich uranium. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov claimed in early March 2025 that Iran’s production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk." Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce nearly 10 nuclear weapons.
• Iranian Efforts to Undermine Sanctions: Iran is leveraging its membership in multilateral organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to try to mitigate the effects of international sanctions. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf attended the 11th BRICS Parliamentary Forum in Brazil on June 4 and 5. Ghalibaf called for a joint legislative charter among BRICS members to counter sanctions. Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin separately attended a meeting for central bank governors of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states in Beijing on June 2. Farzin proposed the creation of a joint bank for SCO member states in order to facilitate financial transactions among members and reduce reliance on institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
• Iranian Preparations for a Potential Strike: Senior Iranian military commanders continue to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard inspected Iran's Northern Air Defense Zone at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran Province on June 5 to evaluate military units and defense capabilities at the site. Sabahi Fard also inspected air defense positions near former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini’s mausoleum in southern Tehran. Sabahi Fard may have inspected the Hazrat-e Amir Brigade Air Defense Site.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian appreciated from 837, 500 rials to one US dollar on June 4 to 836,500 rials to one US dollar on June 5.[xxii]

Syria

Syria and Lebanon have continued to dismantle likely Iranian-linked weapons smuggling networks along the Syria-Lebanon border. Syrian forces have interdicted at least two weapons shipments in Homs Province en route to Lebanon since May 29.[xxiii] The seized shipments included Kornet anti-tank guided missiles, ammunition, small arms, machine guns, and other unspecified military equipment.[xxiv]  These shipments were likely headed to Hezbollah-affiliated fighters in the Bekaa Valley, given that the weapons were interdicted in Homs Province, which borders the Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah has historically used Kornet anti-tank missiles to attack Israeli tanks.[xxv] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) closed six known smuggling routes between Syria and Lebanon near Yahfoufa on May 30.[xxvi] Yahfoufa is located northwest of the Syrian town of Serghaya, which lies on a road that travels northward into Hezbollah’s stronghold in the Bekaa Valley.[xxvii] The LAF has reportedly shut down 107 illegal border crossings with Syria since January 2025.[xxviii] An unspecified Lebanese military source told Saudi media on May 29 that the LAF is enhancing its presence along the Lebanon-Syria border and maintaining strict control over areas that are known for smuggling.[xxix] The Syrian transitional government and the LAF have held meetings in recent months to enhance military coordination between the two countries.[xxx] Syrian Chief of Staff Major General Ali al Naasan and Syrian Deputy Interior Minister for Police Affairs Major General Ahmed Latouf recently met with LAF Liaison Officer Brigadier General Michel Boutros on May 27 and 28 to discuss border security and counter-smuggling efforts.[xxxi]

The European Union (EU) Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Suica, announced on June 5 that the EU will provide the Syrian transitional government with a 175 million euro grant to support Syrian social and economic projects.[xxxii] The grant will support Syrian public institutions, grassroots energy projects, education, health, agriculture, transitional justice mechanisms, and human rights institutions.[xxxiii] The grant follows the EU’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria on May 28.[xxxiv] Suica visited Damascus and met with President Ahmed al Shara and Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani on June 5 to discuss the grant and the return of Syrian refugees residing in Europe.[xxxv] Suica confirmed that Shaibani will attend an EU ministerial conference in Brussels later in June.[xxxvi] She also noted that the EU Commission is working to integrate Syria into several initiatives with its Mediterranean partners, including the Erasmus+ program and the New Pact for the Mediterranean.[xxxvii] Suica was the first EU commissioner to visit Damascus since the Syrian transitional government was established in March 2025.[xxxviii]

Iraq

A “political source” told Iraqi media on June 5 that the Shia Coordination Framework has agreed to amend the Iraqi electoral law ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[xxxix] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The proposed electoral law amendment reportedly adjusts the way that votes are allocated to candidates by automatically distributing 20 percent of the votes cast for the candidate with the most votes in a district to other candidates on the same list.[xl] Iraq currently distributes only surplus votes, or votes exceeding the minimum number of votes required to win a seat, from the top-performing candidate to other candidates on the same list.[xli] Iraq previously used this system in elections between 2010 and 2018.  Iraq removed the ability to transfer votes between candidates on the same list ahead of the 2021 elections.[xlii] The Shia Coordination Framework passed an amendment in 2023 to return Iraq to the 2010-2018 system, likely to favor Shia Coordination Framework parties ahead of the 2025 elections.[xliii] The Shia Coordination Framework’s reported consensus on this newly proposed amendment suggests that the Shia Coordination Framework views this amendment as a tool to increase the likelihood that it will remain an influential bloc in the formation of the next Iraqi government. Shia Coordination Framework parliamentarians will reportedly discuss the amendment at the next parliament session.[xliv] The Iraqi Parliament is on recess until early August 2025.[xlv]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis conducted a drone attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on June 4 as part of the Houthi campaign to enforce an economic blockade on Israel.[xlvi] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted the Houthi drone.[xlvii] Some international airlines have suspended flights through September 2025 due to concerns of Houthi attacks on Ben Gurion Airport.[xlviii]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.    

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.