Iran Update, June 3, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi likely discussed the Lebanese government’s efforts to prevent Hezbollah’s reconstitution during a visit to Beirut on June 3.[i] Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Youssef Rajji stated during a meeting with Araghchi that all reconstruction aid for Lebanon must go through state institutions and rejected any efforts to bypass the Lebanese government to support Hezbollah’s military reconstitution.[ii] Rajji’s comments likely refer to recent Iranian efforts to financially support Hezbollah’s reconstitution as the Lebanese state and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have simultaneously cracked down on Hezbollah activity across Lebanon. Iran recently attempted to smuggle funds to Hezbollah through Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport, for example.[iii] Iran will likely seek to establish other means through which to financially and materially support Hezbollah’s reconstitution. Araghchi told Lebanese officials that Iran seeks to open a “new page” in its relationship with Beirut. Araghchi emphasized Iran’s readiness to expand political and economic relations with Lebanon and reaffirmed Iran’s support for Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty during a meeting with Rajji.[iv]

US President Donald Trump confirmed on June 3 that the United States maintains its position that Iran cannot enrich uranium.[v] Trump's statement follows an Axios report on June 2 that the recent US written nuclear proposal to Iran would allow Iran to enrich uranium at three percent on Iranian soil for a negotiated period of time.[vi] Axios reported that the proposal also calls for the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium. Unspecified diplomatic sources told Reuters on June 2 that Iran plans to reject the proposal and considers the proposal a “non-starter” because it does not "soften the United States’ stance on enrichment.”[vii] Iranian media and officials have similarly expressed disapproval of the US proposal, citing "excessive [US] demands” and have reiterated that domestic uranium enrichment is an Iranian "red line.”[viii] Iranian plans to reject the US proposal suggest that the proposal calls on Iran to permanently suspend uranium enrichment after enriching uranium at three percent for a period of time.[ix] The US proposal may allow Iran to enrich uranium at three percent until the regional nuclear consortium is established, after which Iran would not be allowed to enrich any uranium domestically. Iranian officials have previously stated that Iran would agree to reduce its uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent, which is the enrichment limit in the 2025 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)[x] Iran would therefore likely not reject the US proposal if it allowed Iran to permanently enrich uranium at near-JCPOA levels, which further suggests that the US proposal requires Iran to eventually halt all domestic uranium enrichment.

Iran is likely continuing to try to prevent a possible non-compliance resolution and snapback sanctions ahead of the June 9 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters on June 2 that the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) are planning to submit a resolution at the upcoming Board of Governors meeting that formally declares Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in response to recent IAEA reports.[xi] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi met with 17 ambassadors from IAEA Board of Governors member states and separately with the E3 ambassadors to the United Nations (UN) on June 3.[xii] Gharibabadi warned them against implementing "any politically motivated action" against Iran.  Gharibabadi likely sought to convince the IAEA Board of Governors member states to vote against a non-compliance resolution at the upcoming meeting. A non-compliance resolution would lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger the JCPOA snapback mechanism. The E3 has recently threatened to trigger snapback sanctions if the United States and Iran do not reach a “substantial deal” by August 2025.[xiii] 

Gharibabadi held a separate meeting with the Chinese and Russian ambassadors to the UN on June 3, likely to encourage them to challenge efforts to impose snapback sanctions on Iran.[xiv] Any JCPOA signatory (the United States, the E3, China, and Russia) can initiate the snapback process by referring Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC. The JCPOA gives the UNSC 30 days to pass a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but the UNSC permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto such a resolution.[xv] China and Russia, therefore, have limited ability to block the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran. China and Russia are also members of the IAEA Board of Governors and could vote against a non-compliance resolution. There are, however, 35 members in the Board of Governors, and an IAEA resolution requires a two-thirds majority to be approved.[xvi]

Artesh Ideological and Political Organization head Abbas Mohammad Hassani threatened on June 3 that Iran would target US ships in the Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, Atlantic Ocean, and Pacific Ocean in “the event of [US] mischief,” likely referring to potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.[xvii] Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to attack US bases and international shipping in response to a potential strike.[xviii] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri approved the deployment of military assets to the Nazeat Islands in the Strait of Hormuz in early May 2025.[xix] Senior Iranian military officials have also inspected defense and combat capabilities at military bases and air defense sites across southeastern Iran in recent weeks.[xx] This activity is likely part of a broader Iranian effort to simultaneously deter and prepare for a potential strike on Iran. Hassani's threat to attack US ships in the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean is consistent with Iranian aspirations to develop a naval presence beyond the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.[xxi]

Shia Coordination Framework members are reportedly encouraging Iraqis, including those in Sadrist strongholds, to register to vote in the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections even though Sadr announced that he will not compete in the elections.[xxii] The Shia Coordination Framework may seek to win votes from Iraqis who would have voted for Sadr in the elections. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Iraqi media reported on June 3 that several current and former Shia parliamentarians have implied that Sadr will participate in the upcoming elections despite the fact that Sadr announced in late March 2025 that his party will not participate in the elections.[xxiii] Iraqi media also reported on June 3 that Shia Coordination Framework parties are concerned about an Iraqi boycott of the elections, particularly in central and southern Iraq.[xxiv] These parties are likely specifically concerned that Shias in central and southern Iraq will boycott the elections given that such a boycott would result in fewer votes for Shia Coordination Framework parties. Iraqi media reported on June 3 that over nine million eligible Iraqi voters are expected to boycott the elections.[xxv]  Shia Coordination Framework members may be suggesting that Sadr will participate in the upcoming elections in order to encourage Iraqi Shias who were planning to boycott the elections to vote. The Shia Coordination Framework may calculate that, if Sadr ultimately does not participate in the elections, individuals who planned to vote for Sadr may instead vote for a Shia Coordination Framework party. Iraqi voters must update their voter registration by June 15 to be able to vote in the elections.  Sadr denounced any attempt by political parties to use his name implicitly or explicitly on May 31, possibly referring to its use as a campaign tactic.[xxvi]

Data from the Iraqi electoral commission, the Independent High Electoral Commission, shows that Iraqi voters have most frequently updated their voter registration in Ninewa Province and Baghdad’s Rusafa District.[xxvii] The Shia Coordination Framework recently announced that it will run in unified alliances in Ninewa, Salah al Din, and Diyala Provinces.[xxviii] CTP-ISW assessed that the Shia Coordination Framework will compete in unified alliances in these provinces to ensure that it does not split the vote and enable more unified Kurdish or Sunni alliances to win more seats.[xxix] Rusafa District is a Sadrist support zone.[xxx] A parliamentarian from Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun bloc told Iraqi media on June 3 that Sadiqoun is conducting a national campaign to encourage Iraqis in poor areas to participate in the upcoming elections.[xxxi] Sadr’s base has historically included poor Shia.[xxxii]

Two unspecified US officials told Fox News on June 2 that the United States has closed or transferred control of three bases in northeastern Syria to the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[xxxiii] The two officials said that the United States has closed Mission Support Site Green Village and transferred control of Mission Support Site Euphrates to the SDF.[xxxiv] Both sites are located east of the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province and supported SDF counter-ISIS operations. The United States also withdrew from a third unspecified position, according to the US officials.[xxxv] US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack similarly said on June 2 in an interview with Turkish media that the United States will reduce its presence in Syria from "eight bases to five to three” and will “eventually” reduce its presence to one base.

The officials speaking to Fox News added that 500 US troops have withdrawn from Syria in recent weeks.[xxxvi] These withdrawals are consistent with the US Department of Defense’s announcement on April 18 that the United States will reduce the number of US forces deployed in Syria to “less than a thousand” in the coming months.[xxxvii] The United States maintained roughly 900 US personnel in Syria between 2019 and 2024, when the United States increased the number of troops to 2,000 US personnel.[xxxviii]

Barrack said that the United States has encouraged the SDF to resolve its disputes with the transitional government and integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[xxxix] Middle East Eye also reported on June 3 that the United States has mediated talks between the SDF and Turkey about the US withdrawal from Syria, handover of ISIS prisons and camps, and SDF integration into the MoD.[xl] The Syrian MoD is expected to soon deploy to northeastern Syria to backfill the SDF as part of a recent integration agreement, but Damascus and the SDF do not yet appear to have agreed to the terms of these deployments.[xli]  Outstanding disagreements between the SDF and Damascus could pull resources and attention away from the SDF to conduct counter-ISIS operations in northeastern Syria if the integration process is not smooth or worse, is unsuccessful.

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Reconstitution: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi likely discussed the Lebanese government’s efforts to prevent Hezbollah’s reconstitution during a visit to Beirut on June 3. Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Youssef Rajji stated during a meeting with Araghchi that all reconstruction aid for Lebanon must go through state institutions and rejected any efforts to bypass the Lebanese government to support Hezbollah’s military reconstitution. Rajji’s comments likely refer to recent Iranian efforts to financially support Hezbollah’s reconstitution as the Lebanese state and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have simultaneously cracked down on Hezbollah activity across Lebanon.
• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: US President Donald Trump confirmed on June 3 that the United States maintains its position that Iran cannot enrich uranium. Trump's statement follows an Axios report on June 2 that the recent US written nuclear proposal to Iran would allow Iran to enrich uranium at three percent on Iranian soil for a negotiated period of time. Axios reported that the proposal also calls for the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium. Unspecified diplomatic sources told Reuters on June 2 that Iran plans to reject the proposal and considers the proposal a “non-starter” because it does not "soften the United States’ stance on enrichment.” Iranian plans to reject the US proposal suggest that the proposal calls on Iran to permanently suspend uranium enrichment after enriching uranium at three percent for a period of time.
• Iranian Threats to Maritime Shipping: Artesh Ideological and Political Organization head Abbas Mohammad Hassani threatened on June 3 that Iran would target US ships in the Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, Atlantic Ocean, and Pacific Ocean in “the event of [US] mischief,” likely referring to potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to attack US bases and international shipping in response to a potential strike.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Shia Coordination Framework members are reportedly encouraging Iraqis, including those in Sadrist strongholds, to register to vote in the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections even though Sadr announced that he will not compete in the elections. The Shia Coordination Framework may seek to win votes from Iraqis who would have voted for Sadr in the elections.
• US Military Withdrawal from Syria: Two unspecified US officials told Fox News on June 2 that the United States has closed or transferred control of three bases in northeastern Syria to the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The two officials said that the United States has closed Mission Support Site Green Village and transferred control of Mission Support Site Euphrates to the SDF. Both sites are located east of the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province and supported SDF counter-ISIS operations. The officials speaking to Fox News added that 500 US troops have withdrawn from Syria in recent weeks.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iran is continuing to work with revisionist countries to undermine and mitigate the impact of international sanctions. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf traveled to Venezuela and Cuba on June 2 and 3, respectively.[xlii] Ghalibaf stated prior to departing for Venezuela that the BRICS Development Bank and alternatives to the SWIFT international banking and financial system can help Iran counter US sanctions.[xliii] Ghalibaf will visit Brazil, which is a member of BRICS, in the coming days.[xliv] Ghalibaf met with the Venezuelan transportation and foreign ministers as well as Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in Caracas.[xlv] Ghalibaf acknowledged that the distance between Iran and Venezuela presents an obstacle to increasing economic cooperation and called for resolving “problems in the field of transportation” to facilitate trade between the two countries.[xlvi] Iran and Venezuela’s economic relationship is largely centered around energy. Iran has exported condensates and crude oil to Venezuela, repaired Venezuelan refineries, and delivered oil tankers to Venezuela.[xlvii] Iranian and Venezuelan officials signed several energy-related agreements, including agreements to construct joint refineries, during former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Venezuela in June 2023.[xlviii]

Ghalibaf separately met with the Cuban parliament speaker and Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel in Havana on June 3.[xlix] Ghalibaf presented four “nuclear medicine kits” to Diaz-Canel, which Iranian media reported were meant to highlight the “capabilities of Iranian scientists.”[l] Ghalibaf called for developing air and shipping routes between Cuba and Iran during his meeting with the Cuban parliament speaker.[li]

Senior Iranian military commanders are continuing to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Iranian Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Kiomars Heydari inspected the 840th Missile Group in Aran and Bidgol, Esfahan Province, on June 3, to evaluate the base’s combat and defense capabilities.[lii] Iranian media published footage in October 2024 of missiles crossing over Aran and Bigdol during the October 2024 Iranian missile attack on Israel.[liii] Heydari stated during his visit to the 840th Missile Group that the Artesh plans to build five new missile bases within its structure.[liv]

Iranian ultraconservative outlet Raja News attacked Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri on May 30 for criticizing current Iranian policing tactics.[lv] Bagheri stated on May 26 that Iran’s evolving society requires a “thoughtful and scientific” approach.[lvi] Bagheri warned that the Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) “will get nowhere” with a harsh method based on “batons and daggers.” Bagheri added that the LEC must understand the younger generation and how to engage them effectively.[lvii] Raja News, which is affiliated with the Paydari (Stability) Front led by Saeed Jalili, accused Bagheri of straying from Khamenei’s directives.[lviii] Raja News also questioned Bagheri’s shift from a revolutionary figure to a more "ambiguous" public figure."[lix] Hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-linked Javan News defended Bagheri in response to the Raja News report and accused Raja News of echoing "Israeli talking points."[lx] Javan News labeled the outlet as belonging to “super-revolutionary” circles.[lxi] Raja News’s public attack on Bagheri was unusually harsh and the public disagreement between two hardline Iranian outlets highlights the existing fractures within hardline circles.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian nominated Ali Madani Zadeh as Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance on June 1.[lxii] Madani Zadeh is an associate professor of economics and Dean of the Graduate School of Management and Economy at Sharif University of Technology in Tehran.[lxiii] He has received postgraduate degrees from Sharif University of Technology, Stanford University, and the University of Chicago. This nomination comes after Iranian parliamentarians impeached former Economic Affairs and Finance Minister Abdol Nasser Hemmati in March 2025 in response to worsening economic conditions.[lxiv] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Hemmati’s removal was unlikely to alleviate Iran’s economic issues.[lxv] The Iranian Parliament will begin Madani Zadeh’s confirmation process next week.[lxvi]

Syria

The Syrian transitional government continues to strengthen ties and pursue economic cooperation with Gulf countries. A Syrian delegation headed by Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani visited Qatar on June 3.[lxvii] Syrian and Qatari ministers discussed expanding energy and economic cooperation.[lxviii] Shaibani stated that Qatar agreed to continue supplying gas to Syria via Jordan and to reactivate the Qatari-Syrian Holding Company to facilitate investment in Syria .[lxix] Qatar and Syria established the Qatari-Syrian Holding Company in 2008 to enhance investment opportunities in Syria.[lxx] Qatar previously agreed to supply three months of natural gas to Syria in March 2025.[lxxi] Western media reported on June 2 that two-thirds of Syria’s energy transmission grid is either completely destroyed or in need of major repair, which would cost roughly $5.5 billion.[lxxii] The Syrian transitional government has consistently sought assistance from Gulf countries to rebuild and mitigate the effects of its severely damaged energy sector since coming to power in December 2024.[lxxiii]

Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab met with Saudi Interior Minister Abdulaziz bin Saud bin Naif bin Abdulaziz in Jeddah on June 2.[lxxiv] Khattab and Abdulaziz discussed enhancing security cooperation to combat terrorism, organized crime, and drugs.[lxxv] Khattab and Abdulaziz also discussed strengthening border security and information sharing.[lxxvi] Abdulaziz affirmed Saudi Arabia’s commitment to helping Syria restore stability and security.[lxxvii]

The Syrian transitional government has taken steps to counter recent Salafi-jihadi activity across Syria. The General Security Service (GSS) and 70th Division conducted counter-ISIS operations in Tulul al Safa, Suwayda Province, on June 3.[lxxviii] ISIS fighters recently detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting Syrian MoD vehicles in two separate attacks in Tulul al Safa on May 22 and May 28.[lxxix] GSS forces also arrested three ISIS fighters responsible for a May 18 vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack on a GSS station in al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province.[lxxx] These attacks are part of an uptick in activity by Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria in May 2025.

Insurgent attacks targeting Syrian government forces continue to take place sporadically. An unspecified armed group targeted a GSS security checkpoint near Ashrafieh Sahnaya, Rif Dimashq Province, on June 2.[lxxxi] The armed militants killed three GSS members.[lxxxii] Unspecified militants previously targeted Druze civilians and transitional government forces manning checkpoints in Ashrafieh Sahnaya in late April 2025.[lxxxiii] Insurgent activity in Syria has declined since its height in March 2025.[lxxxiv] The lack of recent insurgent attacks contrasts sharply with insurgent activity in March 2025, when insurgents targeted government forces multiple times a week.

Syrian businessman and the maternal cousin of Bashar al Assad, Rami Makhlouf, has continued to threaten a revolt against the Syrian transitional government despite a sharp decrease in pro-Alawite insurgent activity. Makhlouf has repeatedly claimed to have assembled forces in coastal Syria and framed himself as a defender of Alawites, including most recently in a May 28 statement.[lxxxv] Makhlouf continued to spread misinformation on May 28 about the March 2025 coastal violence that resulted in the extrajudicial killing of over 800 people.[lxxxvi] Makhlouf claimed that June 2025 will mark the “beginning” of anti-government activity and that this activity will accelerate in July 2025.[lxxxvii] Makhlouf’s claim that June and July 2025 will lead to the restoration of Alawite power under “the return of the previous system” is not supported by the trend of decreased insurgent activity on Syria’s coast. Multiple factors, including a lack of Alawite support, government pressure, and poorly executed insurgent operations, have probably contributed to the decrease in insurgent activity. Government forces have continued to arrest Assad-linked insurgents and seize weapons stockpiles in insurgent support zones, which further reduces the possibility of a resurgence of insurgent activity in the near future.[lxxxviii]

A pro-Alawite insurgent group is using a Salafi-jihadi group’s activities targeting Alawites to amplify sectarian narratives and support pro-Alawite insurgent objectives. Pro-Alawite insurgent group Coastal Shield Brigade warned Alawites to “stay home and remain calm” after Salafi-jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah announced on May 29 that it obtained the personal information of over 5,000 Alawites, former regime members, and human rights workers.[lxxxix] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah threatened to create and publish a “target bank” with the information.[xc] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is a Salafi-jihadi group ideologically close to ISIS that has conducted numerous attacks in western Syria targeting accused regime remnants, most of whom are Alawite.[xci] It is unclear if Saraya Ansar al Sunnah actually obtained Alawites’ personal information .[xcii] The Coastal Shield Brigade’s amplification of Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s threat demonstrates how Alawite insurgent groups can use the recent uptick in Salafi-jihadi activity in Syria to advance sectarian narratives that support insurgent objectives. The Coastal Shield Brigade has previously accused Saraya Ansar al Sunnah of “elicit[ing] terror” on the Syrian coast due to the group’s violence against minorities, particularly Alawites.[xciii] Claims like this are consistent with the sectarian content that pro-Alawite social media accounts and insurgents often proliferate, which attempt to reinforce a pre-existing sense of disenfranchisement and fear among Syrian Alawites.[xciv] Alawite insurgents use these claims to present themselves as the protectors of their communities, likely to cultivate further support among Alawites for the insurgency.[xcv]

Iraq

Iraq transferred 832 individuals from al Hol camp in northeastern Syria to al Jada camp in Ninewa Province on June 1.[xcvi] This transfer marks the eleventh group of individuals that the Iraqi government has repatriated from Syria in 2025. The Iraqi Migration Ministry spokesperson said that over 12,600 Iraqis remain at al Hol as of June 2025.[xcvii] Deradicalization and repatriation of former ISIS families is a time and resource intensive process. The Iraqi government began to repatriate thousands of ISIS-affiliated families and internally displaced persons (IDP) in 2021 and has faced immense challenges in doing so.[xcviii] The Iraqi government has struggled to integrate ISIS families and IDPs into their new communities, and returnees often face extreme isolation and suspicion from these communities.[xcix]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

The Houthis conducted a ballistic missile attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on June 2 as part of the Houthi campaign to enforce an economic blockade on Israel.[c]  The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted the Houthi missile.[ci] Some international airlines have suspended flights to Israel through September 2025 due to concerns about Houthi attacks on Ben Gurion Airport.[cii] 

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.    

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.