Iran Update, June 2, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 133.8 kilograms, or 3.2 significant quantities, since February 2025, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report.[i] Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce nearly 10 nuclear weapons. The Associated Press reported on May 31 that Iran possesses 408.6 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, or 9.8 significant quantities, as of May 17.[ii] A significant quantity is the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[iii] Iran had 274.8 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, or 6.6 significant quantities, in February 2025, by comparison. The IAEA report added that Iran’s total stockpile of enriched uranium is 9,247.6 kilograms, which marks a 953.2-kilogram increase since February 2025.[iv]   The IAEA report does not provide a month-to-month breakdown of Iran's uranium enrichment activity. It is therefore unclear whether Iranian uranium enrichment increased, decreased, or remained the same following the start of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations on April 12. Iran has previously increased its stockpile of enriched uranium to try to gain leverage in negotiations.[v] It is unclear, however, why Iran would pursue rapid enrichment amid the current US-Iran negotiations and potentially increase the risk of snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. The IAEA report comes as Iran has taken other measures to expand its nuclear program in recent months. Iran has installed new cascades of advanced centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow. Iran has also conducted metallurgical testing and computer simulations that could support the production of a nuclear weapon.[vi]

The IAEA separately published a comprehensive report on May 31 that states that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA has been “less than satisfactory” in “a number of respects.”[vii] The report noted that Iran has failed to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve concerns about undeclared nuclear sites and material in Iran. The IAEA confirmed that Iran conducted undeclared nuclear activities at three locations—Lavisan-Shian, Varamin, and Turquzabad—until the early 2000s.[viii] The IAEA published the comprehensive report on May 31 in response to an IAEA censure resolution in November 2024. The censure resolution was proposed by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany).[ix] The IAEA's quarterly and comprehensive reports both confirm Iranian non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement.

The United States and the E3 are planning to submit a resolution that formally declares Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in response to the recent IAEA reports, according to unspecified diplomats.[x] The United States and the E3 will reportedly submit the resolution at the next IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 9 and 10. The resolution would lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions. The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[xi] The IAEA Board of Governors previously passed a similar resolution declaring Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in September 2005.[xii] The Board of Governors referred Iran's non-compliance to the UN Security Council in February 2006, which led to the imposition of sanctions on Iran.[xiii] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on May 30 that Iran would respond to a resolution by "expand[ing] nuclear work."[xiv]

Iran is likely trying to prevent a possible non-compliance resolution and snapback sanctions ahead of the June 9 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi on June 1, during which Araghchi asked Grossi to explain "Iran's cooperation with the [IAEA]" at the Board of Governors meeting and warned that Iran would respond to "any inappropriate move by the European parties," almost certainly referring to snapback sanctions.[xv] Araghchi separately met with Grossi in Cairo, Egypt, on June 2.[xvi] Araghchi and Grossi’s meeting comes amid rising tensions between Iran and the E3. The E3 has threatened to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran if the United States  and Iran do not reach a “substantial deal” by August 2025. An Iranian hardline outlet described a recent meeting between Iran and the E3 on May 16 as “tense.”[xvii]  The same outlet claimed that the E3 demanded that any future agreement include a JCPOA-style snapback clause—a demand that Iranian officials have condemned as “illegal.”[xviii] Iranian officials have previously threatened a "serious response" if the E3 triggers snapback sanctions.[xix] Iran could increase its near weapons-grade uranium stockpile or further expand its nuclear program in other ways in response to snapback sanctions.

The United States presented a written nuclear proposal to Iran via Oman on May 31.[xx] Unspecified officials told the New York Times on May 31 that the proposal includes the establishment of a regional consortium comprised of Iran, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states. Axios similarly reported on May 31 that the proposal includes the establishment of a regional consortium to enrich uranium for civilian purposes. Axios reported that the United States and IAEA would oversee the consortium and that the United States wants the consortium’s enrichment facilities to be located outside of Iran, citing an unspecified source. The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson  emphasized on June 2 that a regional consortium "cannot in any way replace enrichment inside Iran.”

It is unclear if the United States would allow Iran to continue enriching uranium on Iranian soil if it agreed to join a regional consortium. The New York Times reported that the US nuclear proposal calls on Iran to completely cease uranium enrichment. Axios reported on June 2 that the proposal would allow "low-level uranium enrichment on Iranian soil" for an unspecified period of time.[xxi] Axios reported that Iran would reduce uranium enrichment to 3 percent, which is below the 3.67 percent limit in the JCPOA.  The proposal also reportedly bars Iran from building new enrichment facilities conducting centrifuge research and development, and enriching uranium at underground facilities for an unspecified period of time. Under the proposal, Iran would limit enrichment activity at above-ground facilities and "dismantle critical infrastructure for conversion and processing of uranium."

Iran is reportedly planning to reject the US nuclear proposal, which would likely further stall the US-Iran negotiations.[xxii] An unspecified Iranian diplomat close to the Iranian negotiating team told Reuters on June 2 that Iran is drafting a negative response to the proposal and considers the proposal a “non-starter” due to its failure to address Iranian interests or soften the United States’ stance on enrichment.[xxiii] The source added that Iran’s nuclear negotiations committee, which is under the supervision of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, assessed that the US proposal is “completely one-sided” and does not serve Iran’s interests.[xxiv] An Iranian expert close to the regime similarly stated on June 1 that the contents of the US nuclear proposal decrease the chances of Iran and the United States reaching a new deal.[xxv]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office called on the international community to “act now” against Iran following the release of the IAEA reports on May 31. Netanyahu’s office described the reports as “a clear warning sign” that Iran is "totally determined to complete its nuclear weapons program."[xxvi]  These statements come amid reports that Israel is preparing to strike Iranian nuclear facilities if the US-Iran nuclear negotiations collapse..[xxvii] US President Donald Trump recently called on Netanyahu to avoid taking any action that could potentially jeopardize the US-Iran nuclear negotiations. [xxviii]

The Iranian armed forces are continuing to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.  The Financial Times reported on June 1 that Western intelligence and satellite imagery indicate that Iran has repositioned surface-to-air missile launchers, including S-300 air defense systems, near nuclear sites such as Natanz and Fordow.[xxix] Israeli airstrikes into Iran in April and October 2024 rendered Iran’s four Russian-made S-300 air defense systems inoperable, and it is very unlikely that Russia has supplied Iran with new S-300 systems. The IDF rendered an Iranian S-300 inoperable in April 2024 by striking the S-300's tomb stone engagement radar.[xxx] Iran displayed an S-300 with a “new, Iranian-designed” radar in February 2025.[xxxi] The Artesh Air Defense Force conducted air defense exercises in northern and western Iran in January 2025, including near Fordow and the Arak heavy water reactor.[xxxii]

Iranian commanders also continue to inspect air defense sites ahead of a potential Israeli or US strike on Iran. Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi and his deputy, Brigadier General Ali Akbar Talebzadeh, inspected the 10th Tactical Air Base in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on June 2.[xxxiii] Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard recently inspected Iran's Southeastern Air Defense Zone in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4 and May 30.[xxxiv] Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi conducted an inspection at the same air defense zone on May 16.[xxxv]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) is waging a campaign against Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, likely to damage Fayyadh’s electoral prospects in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. An AAH parliamentarian claimed on June 2 that parliament will question Fayyadh over his alleged support for certain Sunni groups.[xxxvi] Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali claimed on April 1 that Turkey equips the Ninewa Guards and Kirkuk Shield Forces, the former of which integrated into the 59th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) brigade in 2017.[xxxvii] AAH-controlled media similarly claimed in mid-April 2025 that Turkey and ”Baathists” train and equip these forces.[xxxviii] AAH-controlled media also claimed that Fayyadh took several trips to Turkey to facilitate the integration of these groups into the PMF.[xxxix]  AAH has supported legislation that would require Fayyadh to retire and likely seeks to replace Fayyadh with someone more favorable to AAH.[xl] Fayyadh will compete in the November 2025 parliamentary elections as part of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition, while Khazali will reportedly compete on a separate list.[xli] AAH may calculate that it can damage Fayyadh’s electoral prospects in the upcoming elections by highlighting his alleged ties to Turkey and support for the Ninewa Guards and Kirkuk Shield Forces.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened to resume its attack campaign against US forces in Iraq in a statement commemorating the death of former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini on June 2.[xlii] Kataib Hezbollah threatened that it would inflict “severe blows” on the United States if the United States ”procrastinat[es]” its withdrawal from Iraq. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xliii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have exploited loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to commit fraud and obtain funds to support operations since 2023.[xliv] The Wall Street Journal reported on May 31 that cross-border transactions increased from $50 million to $1.5 billion between January and April 2023 after the US Treasury and New York Federal Reserve took steps in 2022 to curb Iranian money laundering through Iraqi banks. Under this new method, Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would purchase large quantities of pre-paid Visas and Mastercards in Iraq and transport them into neighboring countries to withdraw the funds. The armed factions would withdraw cash from an ATM and transfer the money back to Iraq through electronic transfers or the hawala system. In Iraq, the militias would exchange the US dollars to Iraqi dinars for up to 21% above the official market rate.   Mastercard blocked over 100,000 Iraqi-issued cards and removed 4,000 merchants in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) suspected of being involved in fraudulent Iraqi transactions. Visa similarly sent alerts warning of fraud for approximately 70,000 Iraqi cards and approximately 5,000 UAE vendors. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Iranian regime have exploited lax oversight and loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to circumvent US sanctions on Iran.[xlv] The funds obtained through these loopholes are used to fund various Iranian and militia operations, including attacks on US forces in the region.

The United States will allow the Syrian transitional government to integrate foreign fighters into the new Syrian army in order to prevent foreign fighters from joining Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria.[xlvi] US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack told Reuters on June 2 that the United States reached an “understanding” that the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will integrate foreign fighters into the ranks of the new Syrian army “with transparency.”[xlvii] Barrack said that the United States prefers to keep foreign fighters under the command of the Syrian state rather than to exclude them.[xlviii] Barrack’s comments constitute a significant departure from the United States’ demand in March 2025 that the Syrian government bar foreign fighters from senior government positions, including military positions.[xlix] Unspecified sources close to the Syrian MoD told Reuters that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and his advisers argued to Western officials that excluding foreign fighters from the army could push them toward groups like al Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).[l] Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) has historically integrated numerous foreign militias into its military structure and many of these groups, such as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), are extremely loyal to HTS.[li] The Syrian government's integration of these fighters into the new chain of command reduces the risk that these fighters join extremist armed groups, particularly given a recent uptick in activity by Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria in May 2025.[lii]

Three unspecified Syrian defense officials said on June 2 that the MoD is planning to integrate 3,500 foreign fighters, including fighters from TIP, into the newly-formed 84th Division.[liii] TIP is an al Qaeda-affiliated Uyghur jihadist group that has fought alongside HTS and its predecessor organizations since the mid-2010s.[liv] The group is fully subordinate to HTS despite its al Qaeda affiliation and will therefore likely follow the chain of command of the new Syrian army. TIP political official Osama Bughra confirmed to Western media on June 2 that the group now operates “entirely under the MoD’s authority.”[lv] Syrian defense officials said that Syrian fighters will also join the 84th Division, which suggests that the unit will not be completely composed of foreign fighters.[lvi]

It is unclear if the Syrian transitional government’s decision to integrate TIP into the 84th Division will complicate its nascent relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC has long opposed Uyghur militants’ activities in Syria and maintained a strategic partnership with the former Assad regime in order to suppress TIP.[lvii] PRC Representative to the United Nations (UN) Fu Cong recently called on the Syrian government to fight against “foreign terrorist fighters,” including TIP and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), on March 25.[lviii] ISW assessed in late January 2025 that the containment of TIP, ETIM, and other Uyghur groups would likely shape the PRC’s Syria policy.[lix] PRC officials may calculate that TIP’s inclusion in the Syrian government can sufficiently contain the group and prevent it from threatening the PRC. The PRC has pursued a diplomatic relationship with the new transitional government and PRC officials have conducted three official visits to Damascus since February 2025.[lx] Syria has invited Chinese investment for its reconstruction and growth and recently signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with a Chinese firm to invest in free trade zones in Rif Dimashq and Homs provinces.[lxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 133.8 kilograms, or 3.2 significant quantities, since February 2025, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report. Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce nearly 10 nuclear weapons. It is unclear whether Iranian uranium enrichment increased, decreased, or remained the same following the start of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations on April 12. The IAEA separately published a comprehensive report on May 31 that states that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA has been “less than satisfactory” in “a number of respects.”
• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: The United States presented a written nuclear proposal to Iran via Oman on May 31. Unspecified officials told the New York Times on May 31 that the proposal includes the establishment of a regional consortium comprised of Iran, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states. Axios similarly reported on May 31 that the proposal includes the establishment of a regional consortium to enrich uranium for civilian purposes. It is unclear if the United States would allow Iran to continue enriching uranium on Iranian soil if it agreed to join a regional consortium. Iran is reportedly planning to reject the US nuclear proposal, which would likely further stall the US-Iran negotiations.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) is waging a campaign against Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, likely to damage Fayyadh’s electoral prospects in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. AAH may calculate that it can damage Fayyadh’s electoral prospects in the upcoming elections by highlighting his alleged ties to Turkey and support for the Ninewa Guards and Kirkuk Shield Brigades.
• Threat to US Forces: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened to resume its attack campaign against US forces in Iraq in a statement commemorating the death of former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini on June 2. Kataib Hezbollah threatened that it would inflict “severe blows” on the United States if the United States ”procrastinat[es]” its withdrawal from Iraq.
• Iraqi Militia Funding: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have exploited loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to commit fraud and obtain funds to support operations since 2023. The Wall Street Journal reported on May 31 that cross-border transactions increased from $50 million to $1.5 billion between January and April 2023 after the US Treasury and New York Federal Reserve took steps in 2022 to curb Iranian money laundering through Iraqi banks.
• Iranian Preparations for Potential US or Israeli Strikes: Financial Times reported on June 1 that Western intelligence and satellite imagery indicate that Iran has repositioned surface-to-air missile launchers, including S-300 air defense systems, near nuclear sites such as Natanz and Fordow. Iranian commanders also continue to inspect air defense sites ahead of a potential Israeli or US strike on Iran.
• Syrian Army Formation: The United States will allow the Syrian transitional government to integrate foreign fighters into the new Syrian army in order to prevent foreign fighters from joining Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria. US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack told Reuters on June 2 that the United States reached an “understanding” that the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will integrate foreign fighters into the ranks of the new Syrian army “with transparency.” Unspecified sources close to the Syrian MoD told Reuters that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and his advisers argued to Western officials that excluding foreign fighters from the army could push them toward groups like al Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Three unspecified Syrian defense officials said on June 2 that the MoD is planning to integrate 3,500 foreign fighters, including fighters from TIP, into the newly-formed 84th Division.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iran displayed Iranian-made military equipment during a Belarusian Defense Ministry media delegation’s visit to Iran on May 31.[lxii] The Belarusian media delegation visited the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which is a subsidiary of the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry and is involved in the manufacturing of Iranian military equipment.[lxiii] The DIO oversees several state-owned defense contractors and has been sanctioned by the United States for supporting the Iranian missile and nuclear programs.[lxiv]  Iranian and Belarusian officials discussed Iranian military capabilities, including Iran’s drone technology. The media delegation’s visit to the DIO follows a flurry of recent engagements between Iranian and Belarusian defense officials. Iran recently displayed Iranian-made drones, missiles, and other military equipment at a military exhibition in Minsk, Belarus, on May 22.[lxv] Iran has also reportedly sought to establish a drone factory in Belarus since May 2023 to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[lxvi]

Syria

US and Syrian military officials reportedly met in Damascus on May 30.[lxvii] Syrian media reported on May 30 that Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra met with Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve Commander Major General Kevin Leahy and Combined Special Operations Joint Task Force-Levant Commander Brigadier General Michael Brooks in Damascus.[lxviii] US Central Command (CENTCOM) has not confirmed the meeting at the time of this writing. CENTCOM previously reported that Leahy and Brooks were present when US Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack raised the US flag over the US Ambassador’s residence in Damascus on May 29.[lxix] Barrack conducted his first official visit to Syria on May 29 and met with senior Syrian officials, including Qasra.[lxx]

The Syrian transitional government is continuing to strengthen economic cooperation with Gulf countries. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara received a high-level Saudi delegation led by Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal bin Farhan al Saud in Damascus on May 31.[lxxi] Shara, Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani, and Farhan discussed enhancing bilateral cooperation and economic coordination.[lxxii] Shara and Shaibani separately conducted a visit to Kuwait on June 1.[lxxiii] Shara and Shaibani met with Kuwaiti Emir Mishal al Ahmad al Jaber al Sabah, Kuwaiti Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Ali al Yahya and Kuwaiti Interior Minister Fahad Yousef Saud al Sabah.[lxxiv] Shara and Shaibani also met with unspecified Kuwaiti businessmen to discuss economic and investment cooperation.[lxxv] This trip marked Shara’s first visit to Kuwait since coming to power in December 2024.[lxxvi]

Qatar and Saudi Arabia will provide Syria with financial support for Syrian public sector salaries.[lxxvii] Qatar and Saudi Arabia announced on May 31 that they will deliver joint financial support to Syria over a three-month period.[lxxviii] The joint statement did not provide details about the size or start date of the financial support.[lxxix] Qatar and Saudi Arabia have supported Syria economically in recent months. Qatar and Saudi Arabia settled Syria’s remaining $15 million arrears to the World Bank in May 2025, which will enable Syria to receive reconstruction grant approval and economic support.[lxxx] Qatar will also support the payment of Syrian civil sector salaries after the US Treasury Department granted Qatar a sanctions exemption on May 7.[lxxxi] The Syrian government previously announced in January 2025 that it would raise public sector salaries by 400% the following month but has not been able to do so due to a lack of funding.[lxxxii] The Qatari and Saudi initiatives to pay Syrian salaries will provide immediate relief to some segments of the Syrian population, while the removal of sanctions will have a more gradual effect on the Syrian economy.

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara appointed a long-time Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) commander as deputy defense minister on June 1.[lxxxiii] The Syrian MoD reported that Major General Mohammed Khair Hassan Shuaib (Abu al Khair Taftanaz) was one of the commanders who planned ”Operation Deterrence of Aggression,” which overthrew the Assad regime in December 2024.[lxxxiv] Taftanaz previously served as the Idlib-based commander for the HTS-led Fateh Mubin Operations Room from 2019 until December 2024.[lxxxv] Taftanaz also reportedly founded the HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government’s military college in Idlib Province.[lxxxvi] Taftanaz commanded special operations units and the “Abu Bakr” faction in Jaysh al Fatah from March 2015 until January 2017.[lxxxvii] Jaysh al Fatah was a coalition of Syrian Islamist opposition groups that formed in March 2015 and later joined HTS in 2017.[lxxxviii] Shara’s appointment of long-time loyalists like Taftanaz to key positions in the transitional government and military suggests that Shara seeks to continue to maintain his own and HTS’s influence within ministries that directly concern internal security and state stability.

The Syrian transitional government and a majority-Kurdish delegation continued integration negotiations on June 1.[lxxxix] The negotiations aim to implement the framework agreement that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi signed on March 10.[xc] Transitional government and Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) representatives continue to negotiate how Damascus will administer SDF-controlled territory in northeastern Syria.[xci] The transitional government and majority-Kurdish delegation agreed to resume paused prisoner exchanges in majority-Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo City on June 2.[xcii] The sides also agreed to form specialized committees to implement the March 10 agreement and discussed educational coordination between AANES and the transitional government.[xciii]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted three separate airstrikes targeting surface-to-sea and surface-to-air missiles in Latakia and Tartous provinces on May 30.[xciv] The IDF airstrikes targeted the 107th Brigade barracks east of Jableh, a military base north of Latakia City, and a military base northeast of Tartous City.[xcv] The IDF said that the surface-to-sea missiles posed a threat to “international and Israeli freedom of navigation.”[xcvi] The strikes likely targeted missile stockpiles left over from the Assad regime. The strike on the 107th Brigade barracks killed one and injured three Alawite civilians.[xcvii] The IDF airstrikes on the coast are the first Israeli strikes in Syria since May 5 and follow reports of direct negotiations between the Syrian transitional government and Israel on May 27.[xcviii]

Iraq

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

The Houthis conducted a ballistic missile attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on June 1 as part of the Houthi campaign to enforce an economic blockade on Israel.[xcix]  The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted the Houthi missile.[c] Some international airlines have suspended flights to Israel through July 2025 due to concerns about Houthi attacks on Ben Gurion Airport.[ci] Houthi President Mahdi al Mashat called on companies that operate in Israel to “leave quickly.” Mashat implicitly warned that the Houthis may conduct additional attacks targeting Israel in the coming days that could pose “real and significant dangers” to these companies if they do not leave.[cii]

The Houthis also claimed three separate drone attacks targeting “vital” sites in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area, Ashdod, and Eilat.[ciii]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.    

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

div>

[i] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-uranium-7f6c9962c1e4199e951559096bcf5cc0?taid=683ae0271dc7320001739354&utm_campaign=TrueAnthem&utm_medium=AP&utm_source=Twitter

[ii] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-uranium-7f6c9962c1e4199e951559096bcf5cc0?taid=683ae0271dc7320001739354&utm_campaign=TrueAnthem&utm_medium=AP&utm_source=Twitter

[iii] https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/PUB2003_web.pdf

[iv] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-uranium-7f6c9962c1e4199e951559096bcf5cc0?taid=683ae0271dc7320001739354&utm_campaign=TrueAnthem&utm_medium=AP&utm_source=Twitter ; https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-weapons-grade-uranium-trump-0b11a99a7364f9a43e1c83b220114d45

[v] https://www.cpreview.org/articles/2025/4/irans-game-of-strategic-uranium-enrichment

[vi] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-weapons-grade-uranium-trump-0b11a99a7364f9a43e1c83b220114d45 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-plans-uranium-enrichment-expansion-natanz-fordow-iaea-report-says-2024-11-28/ ; https://www.axios.com/2024/06/18/iran-nuclear-model-us-israel-assessing-intelligence

[vii] https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/31/middleeast/iran-nuclear-weapons-watchdog-report-intl

[viii] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/iaea-report-says-iran-had-secret-activities-with-undeclared-nuclear-material-2025-05-31/

[ix] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/20/world/europe/iran-nuclear-iaea-censure.html

[x] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/west-plans-push-iaea-board-find-iran-breach-duties-diplomats-say-2025-05-30/

[xi] https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2016-03/UNSC-Res-2231_0.pdf

[xii] https://www.iranwatch.org/library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/iaea-board-governors-vote-tally-9-24-05

[xiii] https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R40094#:~:text=IAEA%20in%201974.-,2,concerns%20about%20its%20nuclear%20program.

[xiv] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/west-plans-push-iaea-board-find-iran-breach-duties-diplomats-say-2025-05-30/

[xv] https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-nuclear-iaea-uranium-a8450632660b4fca6e27a1a4cfd66fe5 ;

https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/751080/

[xvi] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/226695

[xvii] https://farhikhtegandaily dot com/news/207000 ;

https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-europeans-hold-nuclear-talks-friday-diplomatic-sources-say-2025-05-13/

[xviii] https://farhikhtegandaily dot com/news/207000

[xix] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-warns-europeans-that-reimposing-sanctions-could-have-irreversible-2025-05-12/ ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/751080/

[xx] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/31/us/politics/iran-nuclear.html

[xxi] https://www.axios.com/2025/06/02/iran-nuclear-deal-proposal-enrich-uranium

[xxii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-poised-dismiss-us-nuclear-proposal-says-iranian-diplomat-2025-06-02/

[xxiii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-poised-dismiss-us-nuclear-proposal-says-iranian-diplomat-2025-06-02/

[xxiv] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-poised-dismiss-us-nuclear-proposal-says-iranian-diplomat-2025-06-02/

[xxv] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1929247707689849026

[xxvi] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1928787130643296632

[xxvii] https://www.axios.com/2025/05/21/israel-strike-iran-nuclear-facilities

[xxviii] https://www.axios.com/2025/05/27/trump-netanyahu-not-bomb-iran-nuclear-talks

[xxix] https://www.ft.com/content/dd7a69cb-314b-452c-b87d-0f7ec2a6601a

[xxx] http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran

[xxxi] https://www.ft.com/content/dd7a69cb-314b-452c-b87d-0f7ec2a6601a

[xxxii] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/23/3236527; https://iranpress dot com/eqtedar-1403-drills--iran-flexes-air-defense-muscles-in-qom; https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/irans-nuclear-program-overview#:~:text=Khondab%20Heavy%20Water%20Production%20Plant,currently%20under%20construction%20in%20Arak.

[xxxiii] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/751419/

[xxxiv] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/750645

[xxxv] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/750645

[xxxvi] https://alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=225483 ; https://almadapaper dot net/404339/

[xxxvii] https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1907015362056450103 ; https://greydynamics.com/popular-mobilization-forces-exploring-iraqs-armed-entities/ ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/285760

[xxxviii] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=220053

[xxxix] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/asaib-ahl-al-haq-accuses-faleh-al-fayyad-turkish-collusion

[xl] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-12-2025  ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/825332/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A

[xli] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/200520257 ; https://almadapaper dot net/403865/

[xlii] https://t.me/centerkaf/5026

[xliii] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/    

[xliv] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-visa-mastercard-dollars-sanctions-militias-0ecea0b9?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAhr1uSTiruOYrGuIWjIIjbRuUW27PFcNXZmCHl0tZaWn1CO6YrhcdUEwk2In9o%3D&gaa_ts=683d80bd&gaa_sig=nk2zUi0FJs_UxUi7rcoM8CjVcuK5W1F4_XeluNzwSsh8gSxEsptAbOH99ab2F_wA-2Iel3qF-FLXKaB8FTIb2w%3D%3D

[xlv] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2053

[xlvi] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-gives-nod-syria-bring-foreign-jihadist-ex-rebels-into-army-2025-06-02/

[xlvii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-gives-nod-syria-bring-foreign-jihadist-ex-rebels-into-army-2025-06-02/

[xlviii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-gives-nod-syria-bring-foreign-jihadist-ex-rebels-into-army-2025-06-02

[xlix] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25

[l] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-gives-nod-syria-bring-foreign-jihadist-ex-rebels-into-army-2025-06-02

[li] https://www.danielegarofalomonitoring.com/p/yurtugh-tactical-interview-with-their?ref=syriaaccountability.org ; https://www.rferl.org/a/foreign-fighters-syria-military-hts-blowback-concerns/33266542.html

[lii] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-27-2025

[liii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-gives-nod-syria-bring-foreign-jihadist-ex-rebels-into-army-2025-06-02

[liv] ttps://www.enabbaladi dot net/archives/394397 ; https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/01/us_airstrike_killed_1.php   

[lv] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-gives-nod-syria-bring-foreign-jihadist-ex-rebels-into-army-2025-06-02

[lvi] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-gives-nod-syria-bring-foreign-jihadist-ex-rebels-into-army-2025-06-02

[lvii] https://apnews.com/article/79d6a427b26f4eeab226571956dd256e ; https://apnews.com/article/591f9b238c84477b87cfac68bfe169fc;  https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/zyxw/202309/t20230922_11148442.shtml

[lviii] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/eng/xw/zwbd/202503/t20250327_11583088.html#:~:text=We%20urge%20the%20Syrian%20interim,as%20the%20Turkistan%20Islamic%20Party.

[lix] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-january-16-2025

[lx] https://www.iswresearch.org/2025/02/iran-update-february-21-2025.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-27-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-12-2025

[lxi] https://english dot enabbaladi.net/archives/2025/05/ports-authority-confirms-identity-of-chinese-company-investing-in-syria/

[lxii] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/750855/

[lxiii] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/defense-industries-organization-dio

[lxiv] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8653-2024-INIT/en/pdf

[lxv] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/232141

[lxvi]
https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-742605

[lxvii] https://www.facebook.com/61569916686090/posts/%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82%D8%B9%D9%82%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%81_%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88/122134672448663889/ ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/143496 ; https://x.com/SyrNetworkNews/status/1928524152513704129

[lxviii] https://www.facebook.com/61569916686090/posts/%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82%D8%B9%D9%82%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%81_%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88/122134672448663889/ ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/143496 ; https://x.com/SyrNetworkNews/status/1928524152513704129

[lxix] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1928138497879089579

[lxx] https://x.com/Sy_Defense/status/1928057130428379441 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-29-2025 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/29/world/europe/syria-damascus-envoy-barrack-israel.html

[lxxi] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/130889

[lxxii] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/932

[lxxiii] https://x.com/syrianmofaex/status/1929129935072837902

[lxxiv] https://x.com/syrianmofaex/status/1929129935072837902 ; https://x.com/syrianmofaex/status/1929153303641727081 ; https://x.com/syrianmofaex/status/1929183060840333501

[lxxv] https://x.com/syrianmofaex/status/1929183060840333501

[lxxvi] https://www.newarab.com/news/al-sharaa-makes-first-kuwait-visit-fall-assad

[lxxvii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-provide-financial-support-with-qatar-syrias-state-employees-saudi-2025-05-31

[lxxviii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-provide-financial-support-with-qatar-syrias-state-employees-saudi-2025-05-31 ; https://www.spa dot gov.sa/en/N2331348

[lxxix] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-provide-financial-support-with-qatar-syrias-state-employees-saudi-2025-05-31 ; https://www.spa dot gov.sa/en/N2331348

[lxxx] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-qatar-settle-syrias-outstanding-arrears-around-15-million-world-2025-04-27 ; https://apnews.com/article/syria-world-bank-saudi-arabia-qatar-debt-007d228b56cd1a42cc1daaf1e662cfec

[lxxxi] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-financing-syrian-salaries-gets-us-go-ahead-sources-say-2025-05-07

[lxxxii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-caretaker-government-hike-public-sector-salaries-by-400-next-month-2025-01-05 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-financing-syrian-salaries-gets-us-go-ahead-sources-say-2025-05-07

[lxxxiii] https://t.me/Sy_Defense/490 ; https://x.com/aabnour/status/1873581380451635623 ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/130952

[lxxxiv] https://t.me/Sy_Defense/490 ; https://x.com/AljawhariS25970/status/1873682886261391599

[lxxxv] https://t.me/Sy_Defense/490

[lxxxvi] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/أحمد-الشرع-يناقش-مع-فصائل-ردع-العدوان-شكل-المؤسسة-العسكرية

[lxxxvii] https://t.me/Sy_Defense/490 ; https://www.syria dot tv/الرئيس-الشرع-يعيّن-اللواء-محمد-خير-شعيب-نائباً-لوزير-الدفاع

[lxxxviii] https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/world/middleeast/syria-russia-airstrikes-rebels-army-conquest-jaish-al-fatah.html ; https://web.archive dot org/web/20170126163729/https://www.qasioun.net/ar/news/show/48838/جيش_المجاهدين_يعلن_انضمامه_لحركة_أحرار_الشام

[lxxxix] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1929508198337106118 ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/130991

[xc] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/130992

[xci] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1929508198337106118

[xcii] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/131071 ; https://kurd-online dot com/تأجيل-الدفعة-الثانية-من-تبادل-الأسرى-ب ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/130994 ; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1929524555686568425

[xciii] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/130992 ; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/130993

[xciv] https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1928545114441372087  ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1928538003691147513

[xcv] https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1928545114441372087 ; https://x.com/obretix/status/1928854555179045301

[xcvi] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1928538003691147513

[xcvii] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1928551142109085998

[xcviii] https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1928561144228114939 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-israel-direct-talks-focused-security-sources-say-2025-05-27/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025

[xcix] https://t.me/army21ye/3050

[c] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-856218

[ci] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/airlines-suspend-flights-israel-after-houthi-attack-airport-2025-05-06/ ; https://www.israelhayom dot com/2025/05/20/flight-cancellations-to-israel-extended-by-major-airlines/ ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/british-airways-extends-suspension-of-israel-flights-to-end-of-july/

[cii] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1929289522187305070

[ciii] https://t.me/army21ye/3050

K81u