Somalia Cancels UAE Agreements; Sudan-Pakistan Arms Deal: Africa File, January 15, 2026

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Key Takeaways:

• Somalia. Somalia canceled all bilateral agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which legally annuls UAE access to key Red Sea ports and military bases, although local governments have rejected the decision. The Somali Federal Government’s move could also have negative implications on counterterrorism efforts, given the UAE’s support for Somali federal and state forces combating al Qaeda and Islamic State–linked groups.
• Sudan. Sudan is reportedly finalizing an arms deal with Pakistan for crucial air reinforcements amid Rapid Support Forces’ advances in central Sudan. Saudi Arabia may fund the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF’s) acquisition of the arms, which would be the first known instance of Saudi military support to the SAF, and has increased pressure on UAE air supply lines to the rival Rapid Support Forces.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Félix Tshisekedi conceded to a possible Angolan-mediated national dialogue, weeks after M23 and Rwanda inflicted a major military defeat on the DRC coalition in late 2025. Tshisekedi’s attempts to control the dialogue could stymie its effectiveness, however, and M23 may be opposed to dialogue because it benefits from the current stalemate in peace talks.

Figure 1. Africa File, January 15, 2026

Source: Liam Karr.

Somalia

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The Somali Federal Government (SFG) canceled all bilateral agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which comes after the UAE facilitated Israel’s recognition of the breakaway Somaliland region. The SFG cabinet stated on January 12 that the cancellation applies to both deals signed with the SFG and all federal member states.^[1] The cabinet also specifically referenced port agreements in the Jubbaland and Puntland states and Somaliland.^[2]

The cabinet justified the cancellation by accusing the UAE of “hostile and destabilizing actions undermining national sovereignty.”^[3] Israeli officials claimed that the UAE facilitated Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state in late December 2025, which was the first recognition of Somaliland.^[4] Somalia called the recognition a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, pledging a diplomatic response.^[5] The UAE then transited Aidarous al Zubaidi—the leader of the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen—through Somaliland and Mogadishu en route to the UAE on January 8.^[6] Zubaidi fled Yemen after Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces retook areas that the STC had captured in a surprise offensive in early December.^[7] Somalia viewed the flight as an unauthorized use of Somali airspace to smuggle a political “fugitive” and opened an investigation.^[8] The Somali state minister for foreign affairs referred to the flight as the “last straw” among other points of contention that pushed Somalia to cancel agreements with the UAE.^[9]

The SFG’s move would degrade the UAE’s strategic depth in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region if enforced, although the anti-SFG Somali states rejected the cancellation. The UAE would lose access to military bases along the Gulf of Aden in Puntland and Somaliland that it uses to support operations against the Iranian-backed Yemeni Houthis and other maritime security operations.^[10] The fallout from the failed STC takeover in Yemen has already degraded the UAE’s regional position. The STC’s secretary-general announced that the group would disband, which the group’s spokesperson disputed, and the Saudi-backed Yemeni government annulled its military deals with the UAE, which has since withdrawn from the island of Socotra.^[11] The SFG’s move would also cause the UAE to lose its combined nearly $800 million investment in the port of Berbera in Somaliland and port of Bossaso in Puntland, thereby limiting Emirati influence in regional infrastructure and trade.^[12]

The loss of access would hinder the UAE’s ability to supply the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan’s civil war. The UAE is the primary backer of the RSF, with UAE support helping the RSF halt a Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) offensive toward western Sudan in early 2025, consolidate control of western Sudan, and launch an ongoing offensive in central Sudan in late 2025.^[13] The UAE provides weapons—including drones—and equipment to the RSF using a sprawling regional network, including bases in Chad and Libya.^[14] Emirati transport flights have a northern route through Egyptian and Saudi airspace and a southern route through Ethiopian, Somali, and South Sudanese airspace, with Bossaso serving as a transit point.^[15] The lack of flights on the northern route since January 5 indicate that Saudi Arabia has denied the UAE overflight permission due to Emirati actions in Yemen, although a plane from the UAE did pass through Saudi airspace on January 14.^[16] The SFG also denied overflight permission to all Emirati cargo and military aircraft on January 9 along with the cancellation of agreements to the facilities in Bossaso.^[17] Flight tracking data shows Emirati cargo flights have begun avoiding Somali airspace aside from drawdown activities. Satellite imagery analysis shows continued activity at the Emirati military base in Bossaso, although Middle East Eye cited local sources reporting that increased flights were the UAE withdrawing from the base.^[18]

Figure 2. Emirati-Linked Weapons Shipments in the Horn of Africa

Source: Liam Karr; Flightradar24 and Middle East Eye.

An Emirati withdrawal from Somalia could allow Saudi Arabia to enhance its regional position, as it is engaged in a broader competition with the UAE for regional influence. Saudi Arabia backs the SAF in Sudan, with recent reports indicating that it may fund the SAF’s acquisition of advanced Pakistani weapons.^[19] Saudi Arabia denounced the UAE-backed STC offensive in Yemen and played a key role in Yemeni government forces recapturing territory, providing logistic support and conducting airstrikes.^[20] Saudi Arabia stated that the UAE facilitated STC leader Zubaidi’s evacuation through Somalia, which Somalia cited as the “last straw” leading to the cancellation.^[21] Bloomberg reported that Saudi Arabia has advocated for Somalia to break from UAE, although Somalia denied that Saudi pressure prompted the cancellation.^[22]

The SFG’s ability to enforce the cancellation is unclear, however, as the UAE could maintain and bolster ties with anti-SFG local governments. The Jubbaland, Puntland, and Somaliland governments issued separate statements invalidating the cancellation and reaffirming their ability to make agreements separately from the SFG.^[23] Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni was reportedly set to travel to the UAE after the SFG announced the cancellation.^[24] The Emirati-based Berbera port operator, DP World, has also said that the cancellation would not affect its operations.^[25] The UAE has strong ties with the de facto independent Somaliland and autonomous Jubbaland and Puntland states, as shown by its reported facilitation of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and military involvement with all three governments.^[26]

Figure 3. Somali States Align Against Mogadishu

Source: Liam Karr.

The SFG’s move could hamper counterterrorism efforts against al Qaeda and Islamic State-aligned groups. The cancellation includes security agreements, which largely focus on counterterrorism.^[27] The UAE has supported Somali efforts to combat al Shabaab. The UAE has conducted airstrikes against al Shabaab positions in Jubbaland, al Shabaab’s stronghold.^[28] The UAE has also trained, equipped, and provided salaries for federal and state forces intermittently during the tenure of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. The UAE helped stand up a federal police unit and supported historically undertrained and underpaid Somali National Army forces at a training center in Mogadishu.^[29] The UAE has similarly used its bases in Jubbaland and Puntland to support state forces, including the Puntland Maritime Police Force.^[30] The UAE was providing salaries for at least 3,400 soldiers at the beginning of 2026.^[31]

Figure 4. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations

Source: Kathryn Tyson and Liam Karr.

The UAE has also been involved in Puntland’s offensive against the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), which has severely degraded but not defeated the group since 2024. Puntland has credited UAE air support, which has included airstrikes, as playing an important role in the campaign.^[32] The UAE-supported Puntland Maritime Police Force has conducted operations against ISS.^[33] Puntland has reportedly contained ISS to several valleys in the Cal Miskaad mountains, relegating remaining ISS fighters to moving in small groups to evade Puntland forces.^[34] ISS has reemerged in previously cleared areas, however, and its core leaders remain at large.^[35]

Figure 5. Puntland 2025 Counter-ISS Offensive

Source: Liam Karr.

Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo

Sudan is reportedly finalizing a Saudi-backed arms deal with Pakistan, which would provide the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) with crucial air reinforcements. Reuters reported that the deal would be worth $1.5 billion.^[36] The deal includes 10 attack aircraft, over 200 drones, and air defense systems.^[37] A retired Pakistani general stated that the JF-17 fighter jets may also be included.^[38]

The potential deal comes amid Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF’s) advances in central Sudan, as the SAF has been unable to achieve air superiority.^[39] The RSF consolidated control of west-central Sudan in December 2025 and has since intensified its sieges of multiple population centers in central Sudan, including el Obeid, the SAF’s regional headquarters.^[40] The RSF has crucially utilized United Arab Emirates (UAE)-supplied drones and air defenses to drive its advance.^[41] The RSF frequently targets critical infrastructure in SAF-controlled territory with drones, disrupting SAF logistics and undermining its ability to govern.^[42] The group also weakens SAF defense through drone strikes before launching ground operations.^[43] Air defense systems have enabled the RSF to shoot down some SAF aircraft, including several drones and two supply planes.^[44] The supply planes were supposed to supply RSF-besieged SAF units.^[45]

Saudi Arabia at least backed the deal and may provide the funds for the SAF to acquire the arms, which would be the first documented instance of Saudi Arabia militarily supporting the SAF during the war. Reuters cited two sources that reported Saudi facilitation of the deal, with the retired Pakistani general stating that it was “possible” that Saudi funds the transaction.^[46] A journalist from Africa Intelligence separately reported the Saudi Arabia would allocate $1.2 billion of its own arms deal with Pakistan to Sudan.^[47] Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are currently discussing their own arms deal worth up to $4 billion, potentially including JF-17 fighter jets.^[48] $2 billion of the deal would be a conversion of preexisting Saudi loans to Pakistan and used to purchase JF-17 fighters jets.^[49] Several military transport flights have transited from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia since January 13.^[50] Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense pact in September 2025.^[51] SAF ally Turkey has held talks with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia about joining the pact.^[52]

Potential Saudi military support for the SAF comes amid an intensification of the Saudi-UAE rivalry in the Red Sea region. Saudi Arabia has recently become more involved in Sudan as the RSF advances, which has likely prompted greater competition across the region. Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (MBS) asked US President Donald Trump to devote more attention at a meeting on November 18.^[53] CTP and Saudi officials assessed that the UAE interpreted MBS’s meeting as a request to penalize the UAE for its support of the RSF, resulting in horizontal escalation in Yemen.^[54] The UAE backed the Southern Transitional Council’s (STC’s) offensive on Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces, which Saudi Arabia helped reverse by early January.^[55]

Saudi Arabia has put greater pressure on Emirati air supply lines to the RSF. The UAE’s evacuation of the STC leader through Somalia led Somalia to cancel all bilateral agreements to the UAE.^[56] The cancellations legally jeopardize the UAE’s access to its military base in Puntland state, which the UAE uses as a transit point for supply shipments to the RSF.^[57] Bloomberg reported that Saudi Arabia has been pressuring Somalia to reduce its ties to the UAE, although Somalia’s information minister denied that Saudi Arabia influenced the cancellation.^[58] A lack of Emirati flights through Saudi airspace en route to UAE bases in Chad and Libya since January 5 additionally indicates that Saudi Arabia has denied the UAE overflight permission.^[59]

Sudan’s prioritization of air reinforcements in the Pakistan deal mirrors its request in a stalled deal with Russia. SAF officials revived long-standing talks for Sudan to acquire air defense systems and possibly fighter jets in exchange for leasing Russia a naval base in October 2025.^[60] SAF officials—including SAF head and leader of the SAF-led government Abdel Fattah al Burhan—have claimed that they have since halted the process, however.^[61] Russia and Sudan have discussed the deal since 2017 and signed a preliminary agreement in 2019, but Sudan has slowed its implementation.^[62]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Félix Tshisekedi has turned to Angolan President João Lourenço to mediate a possible Congolese national dialogue. Tshisekedi reportedly asked Lourenço, who is a close ally of the Congolese president, to mediate a national dialogue during closed-door meetings in Luanda, the Angolan capital, in early January.^[63] A national dialogue in the Congolese political tradition is a state-convened forum that brings together political actors, civil society members, and religious officials to negotiate solutions to various crises. Tshisekedi had met with Lourenço previously on December 14, days after Rwandan-backed M23 rebels captured Uvira town in South Kivu province, then dispatched an envoy to meet with Republic of the Congo President Denis Sassou Nguesso, an influential player in the region, on December 20.^[64] The Congolese government has denied that it initiated the dialogue, which the political and armed opposition has been demanding, and said that Angolan-led efforts do not seek to establish another peace track.^[65] The Angolan foreign ministry said on January 11 that it has been in contact with Qatar—mediator of the Doha process between M23 and the Congolese government—and Massad Boulos, who is President Trump’s Africa adviser.^[66]

Angolan diplomacy has explored the prospects of a dialogue in recent weeks. Tshisekedi and Lourenço discussed the terms of the dialogue in early January.^[67] Tshisekedi said after their January 5 meeting that Lourenço had “very interesting” peace proposals he would consider.^[68] Tshisekedi said that he would respect an Angolan call for an “immediate and unconditional” ceasefire as a confidence-building measure if M23 did the same.^[69] Lourenço already hosted former DRC President Joseph Kabila and two of his close associates for talks in Luanda in late December.^[70] Angola hosted a delegation of religious officials in Luanda on January 14 and has reportedly already made contact with other members of the political opposition, notably Moïse Katumbi, the exiled leader of a high-profile opposition party, since December.^[71] Representatives from the Angolan government are expected to visit Kinshasa, the Congolese capital, to assess the conditions of a dialogue before potentially proposing a more concrete framework soon.^[72]

Tshisekedi has avoided a dialogue since early 2025, because he likely views it as a threat to his power. Tshisekedi held numerous meetings with allies, Congolese opposition leaders and religious officials, and African Union (AU) mediators, who pressured him to convene a dialogue in after M23 captured the North and South Kivu provincial capitals in early 2025. Congolese officials, opposition politicians, and M23 leaders support the initiative as the most viable way to address the underlying causes of recurring conflicts in the DRC and would aim to redistribute power via significant reforms and a transitional or reshuffled government. The religious leaders presented Tshisekedi with a concrete plan in late August 2025 for him to initiate an AU-backed dialogue.^[73] Tshisekedi agreed in principle to it but has slow-walked the process for months and set conditions to control its outcome. CTP assessed previously that Tshisekedi likely tried to mollify the opposition to control a dialogue or promise reforms under a unity government in place of a dialogue.^[74] Tshisekedi’s administration has argued that it does not suffer from a lack of legitimacy and criticized the dialogue effort as M23-backed “subversion” to displace him from power.^[75] CTP assessed in mid-2025 that Kabila likely aims to use his tacit alliance with M23 and political influence to regain power in some form through a national dialogue.^[76]

M23’s and Rwanda’s defeat of the DRC coalition in South Kivu province in late 2025 was the main factor in Tshisekedi’s concession to a dialogue. CTP assessed in October that a successful M23 offensive on Uvira would cause a legitimacy crisis for Tshisekedi, increase the risk of pressure for a dialogue, and further expose his inability to roll back M23-Rwanda’s territorial gains.^[77] CTP assessed after M23 and Rwandan forces captured Uvira in December that the town’s fall was a strategic setback for the Congolese government that would likely erode its domestic credibility and further weaken its military strategy against M23.^[78] The French magazine Jeune Afrique reported on January 12 that Tshisekedi’s trips to Luanda were the direct result of M23’s capture of Uvira.^[79] Lourenço reportedly denied Tshisekedi’s formal request for military assistance and pressed him to finally agree to a dialogue, fearing an M23 advance on the southern DRC that would threaten mineral investments and the Lobito corridor.^[80] M23 staged a partial withdrawal from Uvira under US political pressure on the group and Rwanda a week later, but M23 still de facto controls the town and could use it as a launchpad for a future offensive toward the DRC’s mineral-rich region in the former Katanga region.^[81] The Congolese government has accused M23 of faking the withdrawal and Rwanda of maintaining troops and deploying new battalions on Congolese soil.^[82]

Figure 6. M23 and Allies Activity in South Kivu

Source: Yale Ford; Liam Karr; Anping Zhu.

Tshisekedi’s attempts to control the dialogue could stymie its effectiveness. The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported on January 12 that Tshisekedi wants to exclude “armed groups” and some Congolese religious officials in potential talks.^[83] The M23-aligned journalist Steve Wembi reported on January 8 that Tshisekedi proposed that religious officials participate in the dialogue but not organize it.^[84] The Congolese government wants the dialogue to be held in Kinshasa, not abroad, where it can control the setting.^[85] Wembi reported that Tshisekedi would commit to release M23 prisoners on a case-by-case basis, although the DRC has nominally agreed to this for months and has yet to do so through the Doha process.^[86]

These conditions could impede a dialogue or prevent it from occurring altogether. The Congolese government has issued death sentences, arrest warrants, and bounties for Kabila and several high-ranking M23 officials, making their presence in Kinshasa highly risky without ironclad guarantees. Kabila is not a member of M23 but maintains an opportunistic alliance with the group, and the government’s aggressive prosecution against him has been a hindrance to a dialogue and a source of contention between the DRC and M23 in peace talks. Kabila’s camp raised these issues during their visit to Angola.^[87] Tshisekedi’s efforts to exclude certain members of the opposition and political elite could undermine the dialogue’s purpose of creating a fully inclusive process and addressing the causes of armed conflict.

The exclusion of armed groups, particularly M23 and pro-Congolese government militia groups, would additionally limit its effectiveness. A dialogue that included only members of the Congolese political elite in Kinshasa and redistributed positions in the government or state-run companies would not resolve the security crisis in the eastern DRC or governance issues nationwide. M23 is a Rwandan proxy, but its raison d’être—and that of the estimated 120 armed groups active in the eastern DRC—speaks to deeper issues of political and social turmoil in the country. The Congolese army suspended and swiftly replaced its spokesperson in Kinshasa for making overtly racist remarks against ethnic Tutsi women on state television in late December.^[88] M23 has deliberately sought to reshape local demographics and conducted counterinsurgency operations to eliminate armed resistance in areas under its control since April 2025, often using indiscriminate violence and collective punishment against civilians suspected of links to ethnic Hutu armed groups.^[89]

M23 may be opposed to dialogue because it benefits from the current stalemate in peace talks. M23 has tried to portray itself as committed to the Doha process, while blaming the Congolese government for its lack of progress. The two sides have yet to reconvene for formal talks, presumably due to the Congolese government’s refusal, and significant fighting has continued on the ground since they signed a Qatari-brokered peace framework agreement on November 15.^[90] The framework was nonbinding and without an operable ceasefire, and CTP assessed that negotiations to resolve most of the key provisions face many challenges and are far from implementation.^[91] M23 and Rwanda have blamed the DRC and accused it of refusing to release M23 prisoners, boycotting ceasefire evaluation meetings, and delaying new Doha talks to secure more favorable mediation with Angola.^[92]

M23 has refused to support additional talks in Angola without a resolution to the Doha process. Lourenço invited M23 to Angola, but the group has said in response that Doha was a “valuable achievement” and that it is already in a “marriage” with the DRC in Doha, requiring the government to shoulder the blame and declare a “divorce” for its formal end.^[93] Rwanda has echoed this sentiment.^[94]

M23 has also shown a lack of good faith in the Doha process, however, and is likely using drawn-out negotiations to further entrench itself in the eastern DRC. CTP and the UN have assessed that M23’s offensive military actions—including on Uvira—violate any ceasefire and the group’s belligerent rhetoric and maximalist demands in peace talks have contributed to Doha’s weaknesses and indicate a lack of good faith in finding a feasible compromise to the conflict.^[95] M23 has launched a systematic state-building project to translate its military gains in the eastern DRC into a de facto autonomous region.^[96] M23’s long-term goal is likely to govern occupied areas regardless of the outcome of negotiations, but an entrenched M23 administration would be even more intractable and able to push for a greater role in any future deal that legitimizes M23 autonomy or gradually incorporates into a Congolese government administration. M23’s control over the eastern DRC aligns with Rwanda’s strategic objectives to protect and strengthen its political and economic influence and establish a buffer zone on the border with Rwanda.

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The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.