SAF Gains in Central Sudan; DRC Ethnic Violence: Africa File, September 18, 2025

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Key Takeaways:

• Sudan—SAF. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) captured a key town on the road linking Khartoum to central Sudan. This advance will help the SAF strengthen supply lines to the front lines in central Sudan, which will enable the SAF to more easily reinforce its positions in central Sudan and support offensives toward RSF-controlled areas west and besieged SAF positions south.
• Sudan—RSF. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have resumed their drone strike campaign in eastern Sudan to undermine SAF governance and disrupt logistics.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo—M23. Pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters fomented ethnic tensions in South Kivu and protested the Congolese government after it deployed a controversial army general in early September. The Wazalendo uprising is another indication that the Congolese army is likely unable to control Wazalendo fighters, which could escalate M23 and Rwandan military actions in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and will almost certainly continue to be a challenge to peace efforts more broadly in the immediate and long term.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo—ISCAP-ADF. IS Central Africa Province—known locally as the Allied Democratic Forces—killed over 100 people in an attack in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo as part of its deadliest three-month attack campaign since early 2025.
• Mali. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate has inflicted substantial material losses as it enforces its blockade in western Mali, posing a severe threat to the legitimacy and stability of the Malian junta.
• Somalia. Al Shabaab attempted to recapture a coastal district capital in central Somalia as part of its campaign to reverse the gains of the Somali-led, US-backed offensive in 2022.

Figure 1. SAF Gains in Central Sudan; DRC Ethnic Violence: Africa File, September 18, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Assessments:

Sudan—SAF

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Liam Karr

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) captured Bara—a key town on the northern axis between Khartoum and central Sudan—from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on September 11. The SAF and affiliated militias reportedly advanced north from the North Kordofan state capital, el Obeid, and west from um Dam.^[1] Bara—located 40 miles north of el Obeid—is the SAF’s latest gain in its 2025 offensive in Kordofan region. The RSF controlled most of North Kordofan state and had entirely besieged el Obeid prior to February 2025.^[2] The SAF advanced from Khartoum to partially break the siege on el Obeid from the east in February 2025 and has since unsuccessfully attempted to advance to the south and west.^[3]

Figure 2. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War

Source: Liam Karr; Vista Maps; Thomas Van Linge.

The SAF has advanced further north on the road toward Khartoum since taking Bara. The SAF reportedly began attacking RSF positions around Jebrat al Sheikh—located 70 miles north of Bara—on September 13.^[4] The RSF still controls terrain north of Bara and west and south of el Obeid, however.

Control of Bara will help the SAF strengthen supply lines from Khartoum to el Obeid, enabling it to more easily reinforce the state capital and surrounding areas against RSF assaults. The RSF attacked Kazgil—located 30 miles south of el Obeid—on September 11, but the SAF repelled the attack.^[5] The group separately briefly retook al Ayara village—located 10 miles west of el Obeid—and made an incursion into the el Obeid outskirts before the SAF regained control on September 13.^[6]

Strengthened supply lines to el Obeid will bolster the SAF’s ability to use the state capital as a staging ground for offensives to relieve besieged SAF-held towns and move into RSF-controlled western Sudan. The SAF has used el Obeid to expand into South and West Kordofan states. The SAF advanced from el Obeid to take al Nahud—located 130 miles west in West Kordofan state along the main east–west highway—in February 2025 before the RSF recaptured it in May.^[7] The RSF has since pushed the frontline back to um Sumeima, a town 40 miles from el Obeid on the border of West Kordofan state.^[8] Al Nahud is a logistic hub connecting Kordofan region to Darfur region, including al Fasher—the besieged SAF-controlled capital of North Darfur state.

Figure 3. Control of Terrain in Western Sudan

Source: Liam Karr; Vista Maps; Thomas Van Linge.

The SAF advanced from el Obeid in an attempt to break the RSF’s partial siege on Dilling—located 100 miles south in South Kordofan state—in May and July 2025.^[9] The RSF halted the advances and eventually drove the SAF back to areas around el Obeid.^[10] Dilling is linked to the partially besieged SAF-controlled South Kordofan state capital Kadugli. Linking el Obeid to these two major towns would further strengthen SAF supply lines and open a second potential line of westward advance toward Darfur region.

Figure 4. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Kordofan Region

Source: Liam Karr; Thomas Van Linge; Vista Maps.

Sudan—RSF

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) conducted drone strikes targeting critical infrastructure in Khartoum and White Nile states between September 9 and 14. The Khartoum strikes targeted Sudan’s main oil refinery, a fuel depot, military facilities, and multiple power stations.^[11] Local media sources reported that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) shot down several drones but not all of them.^[12] The strikes reportedly damaged the Yarmouk military factory and power stations, causing a citywide blackout in Khartoum.^[13] The White Nile strikes targeted the um Dabaker power station, Kenana Airport, and other facilities in Kosti, damaging at least two fuel depots.^[14]

Figure 5. RSF Drone Strikes in Sudan

Source: Liam Karr; ACLED; Thomas Van Linge; Vista Maps.

The drone strikes are the first time that the RSF has targeted eastern Sudan since May 2025.^[15] The RSF struck Port Sudan, the SAF-aligned government’s de facto capital, in May 2025. The strikes hit an airport, military targets, and fuel and power facilities, disrupting air traffic and causing a citywide blackout.^[16]

The RSF has likely used Chinese-made, Emirati-supplied drones in past strikes. Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab previously reported that the RSF likely possesses Chinese-made FH-95 drones at Nyala Airport in South Darfur state.^[17] The New York Times reported that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) likely provides drones to the RSF.^[18] The New York Times also extensively documented the UAE’s use of facilities in Chad and Libya to provide other weapons and supplies to the RSF.^[19] The RSF has recently enhanced its drone capabilities. The Humanitarian Research Lab and Reuters reported that the RSF now possesses long-range kamikaze drones at Nyala Airport likely manufactured in China.^[20]

The RSF is conducting drone strikes to make SAF-controlled territory ungovernable and disrupt SAF logistics. CTP has previously assessed that attacks on civilian infrastructure like power stations undermine the SAF’s ability to provide services to the population.^[21] Strikes on fuel depots and military bases disrupt the SAF’s ability to resupply frontline units in Kordofan region, potentially stalling advances. The strikes could lead the SAF to reallocate time and resources to securing critical infrastructure instead of continuing its offensive in Kordofan region. These efforts could involve redeploying air defense assets from other areas and purchasing more air defense systems.^[22]

Democratic Republic of the Congo—M23

Author: Yale Ford

Pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters fomented ethnic tensions in South Kivu and protested the Congolese government after it deployed a controversial army general in early September. The Congolese army (FARDC) deployed a high-ranking general—General Olivier Gasita—to Uvira, the government-controlled South Kivu provincial capital, on September 1.^[23] Gasita is a South Kivu native of Banyamulenge descent, who are Congolese Tutsis that have lived in the province for generations.^[24] Thousands of Wazalendo fighters and civil society officials took control of Uvira and staged large-scale protests in response to Gasita’s deployment, paralyzing Uvira from September 2 to September 9, and reiterated accusations that Gasita and other officers failed to prevent Rwandan-backed M23’s capture of Bukavu in early 2025.^[25] The Congolese government reiterated its support for Gasita and dispatched a delegation that included the deputy prime minister of the interior to “restore state authority” and negotiate with the Wazalendo in mid-September.^[26]

Figure 6. Wazalendo Fighters Take Over Uvira

Source: Yale Ford.

The Wazalendo deliberately fomented ethnic tensions as part of the protests.^[27] Wazalendo members—including Justin Bitakwira, a South Kivu representative in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC’s) National Assembly, whom the European Union sanctioned for hate speech in 2022—labeled Gasita a “Rwandan” and a “double agent” with close ties to M23, despite no evidence of these claims.^[28] Wazalendo fighters have given Banyamulenge civilians ultimatums to leave Uvira and said they would “launch an operation to send the Tutsis back to Rwanda.”^[29] Human Rights Watch reported on September 15 that Wazalendos “harassed, threatened, abducted, and restricted access to services” for Banyamulenge civilians in Uvira.^[30] The Banyamulenge community and several other human rights organizations released similar findings and warned of escalating ethnic violence against the Banyamulenge.^[31]

The Wazalendo uprising in Uvira is another indication that the FARDC is likely unable to control Wazalendo fighters, which will almost certainly continue to be a challenge to peace efforts in the immediate and long term. The Wazalendo fighters are allied to the Congolese army by law but are not a formal party to US- and-Qatar-led peace efforts.^[32] A Qatari-brokered ceasefire between the DRC and Rwanda led to a sharp drop in overall violence in the eastern DRC in early 2025 but has failed to limit direct hostilities between M23 and Wazalendo fighters.^[33] The UN reported in July 2025 that the FARDC “continued to rely systematically” on Wazalendo fighters and anti-Rwanda militia groups to fight M23.^[34] The FARDC-Wazalendo alliance has limits, however. Wazalendo fighters across the eastern DRC have rejected the outcome of these peace efforts repeatedly in 2025. Wazalendo fighters reiterated this rejection in early September and demanded their formal inclusion in peace efforts as a condition of cooperation with the Congolese government, among other demands.^[35]

The FARDC’s inability to control Wazalendos will almost certainly be a long-term obstacle to peace negotiations and any efforts to implement a peace deal in the eastern DRC. The late June US-brokered peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda committed both sides to “support the disengagement, disarmament, and integration” of nonstate armed groups.^[36] The FARDC and Wazalendo—the latter with over 70 subgroup commanders in South Kivu alone—have separate chains of command in many cases, however, and the FARDC has faced long-standing difficulties in constraining, demobilizing, or integrating militia fighters into the ranks of FARDC.^[37] Domestic and international efforts to demobilize and reintegrate militia fighters and self-defense groups failed and led to persistent violence in the eastern DRC in the decades after the Second Congo War.^[38] The FARDC spokesperson reaffirmed the FARDC’s alliance with the Wazalendo but admitted that it is unable to control them in early September.^[39]

Widespread ethnic violence against Banyamulenge citizens would almost certainly increase M23 and possibly Rwandan involvement in the eastern DRC. The Wazalendo and other belligerent actors in South Kivu have long harassed and accused Banyamulenge of not being Congolese and supporting M23.^[40] M23 and Rwanda trace anti-Banyamulenge sentiment to genocide ideology rooted in the 1994 Rwandan genocide and often justify military action in South Kivu on the basis of targeted violence against the Banyamulenge. The M23 spokesperson denounced the recent Wazalendo campaign against the Banyamulenge in early September and said that it resembled the situation in Goma, the North Kivu provincial capital, before M23 “liberated” it.^[41]

Democratic Republic of the Congo—ISCAP/ADF

Author: Yale Ford

IS Central Africa Province (ISCAP) killed over 100 people in its deadliest single attack in North Kivu province in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since mid-2024. ISCAP, known locally as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), killed at least 100 civilians in a village in western Lubero district in North Kivu on September 8.^[42] The attack marks ADF’s most lethal recorded attack in Lubero since ADF expanded into Lubero in mid-2024.^[43] The group targeted civilians in Ntoyo village, which is roughly 3 miles east of Manguredjipa—an important administrative and economic center in Lubero. The attack caused significant population displacement in the area, and Congolese media reported that ADF also kidnapped around 100 people near Manguredjipa.^[44]

Figure 7. ISCAP Area of Operations in the DRC

Source: Yale Ford.

The attack is the latest mass-casualty event in ADF’s deadliest three-month attack campaign in the eastern DRC since early 2025. The group has perpetrated several large-scale, targeted attacks on civilians in the eastern DRC since early July. ADF attacked several villages near the border between Ituri and North Kivu and killed at least 70 civilians in early July.^[45] ADF killed at least 49 civilians in an attack on a church in northern Irumu district in Ituri province in late July.^[46] ADF conducted a string of attacks that resulted in at least 47 civilian deaths in Lubero in mid-August.^[47] The group has also conducted several smaller-scale attacks across Ituri and North Kivu since July, including attacks that killed at least 18 civilians in Beni district in North Kivu on September 9.^[48]

ADF’s ongoing mid-2025 campaign is the group’s deadliest three-month period since early 2025. ADF has killed at least 376 civilians since early July, ranking below December 2024 to February 2025 when ADF killed 508 civilians, according to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.^[49]

Figure 8. Civilian Fatalities Caused by ISCAP, May 2024–September 2025

Source: Yale Ford; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

ADF conducts attacks against civilians to show strength and retaliate for and redirect the focus of joint DRC-Uganda counterterrorism operations against the group. ADF has conducted its campaign at least partially in retaliation for recent joint DRC-Uganda counterterrorism operations, dubbed Operation Shujaa. The Congolese and Ugandan armies launched a major offensive against ADF’s largest subgroup in Ituri province that reportedly dislodged it from its stronghold in mid-July.^[50] ADF fighters have told locals in several villages since July that it attacked and targeted civilians in response to recent Shujaa operations.^[51] ADF typically increases the rate and scale of its attacks on civilians in response to intensified pressure from Operation Shujaa.^[52]

ADF likely aims to redirect the operational focus of Operation Shujaa and give an impression of strength. ADF has previously conducted highly lethal attacks on civilians to divert Shujaa’s operational focus and take advantage of security gaps to kill more civilians.^[53] The Bridgeway Foundation and experts on ISCAP have assessed that ADF likely also aims to show strength following Shujaa operations that degrade the group.^[54] ADF likely seeks to show that it can remain mobile and capable of conducting coordinated and sophisticated attacks despite Shujaa’s occasional successes. The ADF uptick in mid-2025 aligns with a dry season in North Kivu between mid-May to around August, however, which could also signal that campaign is tied to seasonal conditions, as in years past.^[55]

Mali

Author: Miles Charles

Jamaat Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) has escalated the scale of its blockade on western Mali. JNIM ambushed two escorted convoys of at least 90 and 80 tankers on September 13 and 14, respectively, in the largest attacks of its blockade on western Mali.^[56] The escorting troops fled on both occasions, allowing JNIM to collectively set at least 60 tankers on fire.^[57]

Figure 9. JNIM Chokes Southern and Western Mali

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The attacks are part of a broader campaign to delegitimize the junta and destabilize the economy of western Mali. JNIM declared a total blockade on Kayes and Nioro—key cities in western Mali—in July and began enforcing the blockade and threatening to attack fuel tankers on September 3.^[58] JNIM has since attacked fuel tankers and buses at least seven times in various parts of southern and western Mali.^[59] The group has targeted foreign companies across Mali more broadly since June, when it threatened that all companies operating in Mali must secure permission from JNIM to continue operating.^[60]

The campaign threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the Malian junta. The junta’s failure to ensure the safety of escorted convoys weakens its credibility as a security provider. The Malian junta has increased patrols and conducted several drone strikes in western Mali since the campaign began but failed to counter JNIM’s blockade tactics, which are predicated on small groups ambushing vulnerable targets.^[61]

Continued insecurity along these routes will likely push businessmen to cut deals with JNIM or refuse to transport fuel, further eroding the junta’s legitimacy. The junta continues to deny that a blockade is in effect but reportedly met with a group of Malian petroleum professionals to discuss the recent attacks on September 16.^[62] Prime Minister Adboulaye Maïga assured the petroleum officials that large-scale responses are underway to improve the security of supply routes.^[63]

The disruption of key supply routes risks causing a fuel crisis that could erode popular support for the junta. Reuters reports that Malian officials believe the country could run out of fuel within two weeks if supplies from Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, which provide nearly 95 percent of Mali’s petroleum, are cut off.^[64] A fuel crisis would likely trigger severe inflationary pressure on fuel and food, crippling the national economy.^[65] Price shock on these necessities could degrade popular support for the junta in insulated urban centers. The junta has already suffered several destabilizing blows since early August, including an alleged coup plot. CTP and others have assessed that the arrests are likely related to internal power struggles and possible discontent with the deteriorating security situation.^[66]

Somalia

Author: Michael DeAngelo

Somali security forces repelled a large-scale al Shabaab assault on el Dheere, a district capital in central Somalia. Militants reportedly traveled from Mareeg, a nearby coastal town, and Osweyne, a town located 30 miles northwest of el Dheere.^[67] The fighters then launched a complex attack involving a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) and overran Somali National Army (SNA) positions to advance to the center of el Dheere.^[68] The SNA mounted a counteroffensive to push al Shabaab back to the outskirts of the town.^[69] US Africa Command conducted an airstrike outside of el Dheere in support of the SNA counteroffensive.^[70] The SNA regained control of the town, with the Ministry of Defense claiming that Somali forces killed 70 militants.^[71]

Al Shabaab has already almost entirely overturned the gains of the US-backed offensive led by the Somali Federal Government (SFG) in central Somalia from 2022 to 2023.^[72] El Dheere is one of only two district capitals that the SFG regained during the offensive and still controls.^[73] Al Shabaab has isolated el Dheere by cutting off SFG lines of communication from Adale, Middle Shabelle region, a major coastal town located to the southwest. Al Shabaab has relinked support zones connecting its southern stronghold to its havens in central Somalia and already captured more territory than it controlled prior to the 2022 offensive.^[74]

Figure 10. Al Shabaab Retakes Central Somalia

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Al Shabaab’s tactical defeat in el Dheere is unlikely to halt its current campaign. Al Shabaab has effectively besieged el Dheere and will be able to sustain attacks in the future. Al Shabaab has established control over or is heavily pressuring the coastal road that connects el Dheere to Harardhere to the northeast and Mogadishu via Adale to the southwest. Al Shabaab uses support zones as staging grounds for operations, including by manufacturing VBIEDs.^[75] CTP has previously assessed that al Shabaab is setting conditions to retake Haradhere, which is the other SFG-controlled district capital in the area. The group has also significantly increased attacks in Adale district in 2025.^[76]

Al Shabaab’s recapture of el Dheere would help consolidate its support zones in central Somalia and give the group a coastal logistic hub. El Dheere and Harardhere are two of the last positions that the SFG can use to pressure al Shabaab’s support zones in Galgadud region. CTP has previously assessed that al Shabaab would likely use greater sea access to reengage with other criminal actors, such as the Yemeni Houthis or Somali pirates, to diversify and expand its arms and revenue streams.^[77]

Africa File Data Cutoff: September 18, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.