M23’s State-Building Project: Africa File Special Edition

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Executive Summary: Rwandan-backed M23 has launched a systematic state-building project to translate its military gains in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) into a de facto autonomous region. M23 has created a centralized parallel government to establish itself as the de facto state authority in M23-controlled eastern DRC. The group has launched initiatives to formalize control over and strengthen the local economy, including critical mineral supply chains and infrastructure. M23 has also sought to monopolize the use of force in areas that it controls through systematic recruitment and conscription efforts, targeting rival nonstate armed actors, and securing and policing population centers, possibly violating international law in the process. M23’s comprehensive state-building project is a notable inflection from previous Rwandan-backed insurgencies, and understanding the project is key to international peace plans, economic engagement, and justice mechanisms.

Assessment:

Rwandan-backed M23 has launched a systematic state-building project to translate its military gains in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) into a de facto autonomous region. The M23 conflict in the eastern DRC traces back to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which helped spark the First and Second Congo Wars in the late 1990s. Rwanda then backed insurgencies in the post-war era, including the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) and the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), to protect its interests in the eastern DRC. Former CNDP members established the first Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) iteration in 2012 and briefly captured Goma in 2013, before Rwanda—under significant international pressure—cut its support and the group’s senior leadership went into exile. M23 reemerged in late 2021, and the group has since steadily expanded its territorial control with significant Rwandan backing, despite various international and African-led peace initiatives to bolster pro-Congolese government forces against M23 and mediation efforts between the DRC and Rwanda.

M23 and Rwanda launched a large-scale offensive that captured extensive territory, including the North and South Kivu provincial capitals—Goma and Bukavu, in early 2025 after regional peace efforts broke down in late 2024. The United Nations (UN) reported that M23 had doubled its territorial control in early April compared to late 2024.[1] The group has largely replaced the Congolese government in urban areas and now also controls half of the district capitals—called “territories” in the eastern DRC—in North and South Kivu. CTP estimates that M23 operates in a geographical area that spans nearly 5,800 square miles with five million people—about half the size of Belgium with the population of Ireland.

Figure 1. M23 Advances in the Eastern DRC

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

M23’s primary focus since early 2025 has been expanding its parallel government to newly captured areas to facilitate its state-building efforts. The group had established administrative structures and controlled activities in its strongholds before it captured Goma and Bukavu.[2] M23 has used the urban infrastructure and administrative networks in Goma and Bukavu, however, to accelerate and centralize these efforts on a wider scale and rapidly establish state-like structures in these cities and their surrounding areas. M23 has appointed officials down to the local level and devoted significant resources to provide basic services, establish an alternative financial system, secure and police large population centers, adjudicate social and legal matters, and facilitate transportation and trade in the eastern DRC in 2025.[3] CTP has recorded at least 90 new appointments to the estimated 125 senior-level positions in M23’s civilian administration across North and South Kivu in 2025.

Read a full list of M23’s military and political appointees here

Figure 2. M23 Territorial Administrations

Source: Liam Karr.

M23’s comprehensive state-building project is a notable inflection from previous Rwandan-backed insurgencies. The RCD and CNDP’s parallel structures were heavily security-focused and limited in scope to actions such as protecting majority-Tutsi communities, collecting taxes, and exploiting minerals.[4] These groups did not undertake significant efforts to reform existing administrative structures, nor did they allocate resources to improve critical infrastructure, for example. M23 established parallel governing structures in 2012-2013, but the systems were short-lived and mostly localized.[5] The UN reported in July 2025 that M23 now aims to govern occupied areas in the long term through an “autonomous region” in the eastern DRC.[6]

This report examines M23’s political and military structures in the eastern DRC to inform peace, investment, and justice efforts. The US-backed peace framework to end the conflict in the DRC involves Qatari-brokered mediations to settle questions surrounding the return of Congolese government authority and M23’s control of territory. The accompanying US-led regional economic framework aims to formalize mineral chains in the Kivu provinces, including work standards and taxation.[7] Solving these complex challenges requires a shared understanding of the intent, scope, and scale of M23’s governance project and the current de facto authorities in place across North and South Kivu.

The ongoing conflict has also caused refugee displacement and alleged human rights violations. Defining the intentional and systematic drivers of these crises is necessary to meet international legal thresholds related to refugee and asylum statuses. Identifying key government structures and individuals is also critical to ensuring accountability for violations of international law or the peace agreements.

This report does not explicitly address Rwanda’s role in M23’s efforts beyond what has already been reported in the open source, as CTP will cover the topic in a future report. The UN has reported on numerous occasions that Rwanda exercises command and control over M23 and Rwanda provided “decisive” support—6,000 troops and advanced military technology—to support M23’s early 2025 offensive.[8] Human Rights Watch has claimed that Rwanda’s “apparent overall control of the M23…indicates that Rwanda is an occupying power under international humanitarian law” and meets the “international law standards for a belligerent [Rwandan] occupation of parts of eastern Congo,” which would make it responsible for M23’s actions.[9] Rwanda has repeatedly denied that it controls M23 and the many UN and HRW reports linking it to M23’s actions.

Key Takeaways:

• Political. M23 has established a centralized parallel government to position itself as the de facto state authority in the eastern DRC. The group has created well-organized leadership structures, consolidated and expanded its control over civil, cultural, and judicial affairs, and has taken significant steps to both forcibly and voluntarily return refugees, which has altered demographic and land dynamics in occupied areas.
• Economic. M23 has launched various economic initiatives to formalize its control over the local economy—including critical minerals—boost local economic activity, and eliminate the Kivu provinces’ reliance on the DRC’s national financial system. The group has faced major challenges in establishing a parallel economy and formal banking system due to its status as a sanctioned nonstate group, however, and has used temporary measures to avoid an economic collapse.
• Military. M23 has sought to monopolize the use of force in areas that it controls through systematic recruitment and conscription efforts, targeting rival nonstate armed actors, and securing and policing population centers. The group may have violated international law as part of these efforts.

Political

M23 has created and maintained well-organized leadership structures from the provincial to the local levels. The group appointed civilian governors and vice-governors with their own cabinets and senior advisers in both North and South Kivu in 2025.[10] The group has established provincial-level offices dedicated to specific policy areas such as vaccination campaigns and tourism and is preparing thousands of civil service employees to administer areas that it occupies.[11] M23 has also named district administrators and deputy district administrators, mayors and municipal leaders, and local chiefs in both provinces.

Figure 3. Senior Political Leadership

Source: Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.

M23 has reshuffled officials as needed to keep these structures dynamic and maximize their effectiveness and legitimacy. M23 moved a senior M23 propaganda official to a district administrator position in early April after initially naming him a municipal leader in Goma.[12] The group reappointed a vice governor in charge of finance in South Kivu after the previous official died in early May.[13] M23 removed and swiftly replaced the South Kivu governor, Emmanuel Birato, after a local M23 official accused Birato of embezzlement from an M23-run electricity company in early June.[14]

M23 continued to focus on consolidating political control on the local level in 2025. The UN and Congolese media reported in 2025 that M23 systematically intimidated and persecuted local chiefs and replaced them with M23 loyalists in numerous areas under its control.[15] Leaders from the ethnic Hunde community in North Kivu reportedly pledged their allegiance to M23 in late April.[16] The South Kivu governor integrated neighborhood chiefs in Bukavu into the civil service in mid-August.[17]

Read a full list of M23’s military and political appointees here

M23 has regulated civil and cultural affairs and assumed certain state administrative functions. M23 has issued official civil status documents. The group appointed migration officials and has issued its own travel documents and stamps on Congolese passports.[18] The Congolese and Burundian governments reportedly put passport controls on M23-occupied areas, which have disrupted regional travel and been a notable source of tension between M23 and these governments.[19] M23 has also issued marriage documents and birth certificates.[20]

M23 has tried to exert control over civil society institutions and media organizations. M23 suspended civil society activities and restricted the movement of residents and other civic groups in some areas.[21] The UN and Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that M23 has removed civil servants who dissented against M23, silenced and targeted its critics, and “systematically harassed, tortured, threatened, killed, and seized” property of some civil society leaders.[22] The group has reportedly threatened media officials, imposed strict regulations on local outlets, and closed some community radio stations.[23] M23 enhanced its coordinated information campaign through the establishment of a “digital army” and putting up public signage that promotes its agenda in some areas.[24]

M23 has focused on controlling and reforming youth education. The group appointed education officials and has overseen primary school and higher education in areas that it controls.[25] M23 assumed operational and financial management of the education sector and has ordered higher education institutions in North Kivu to “sever all ties” with the Congolese national education ministry.[26] The group outlined plans for major changes in the education sector, issued report cards and school fees and supervised activities and state exams, and even required schools and other public institutions to display M23’s flag and sing the group’s anthem.[27]

M23 has tried to influence cultural practices. M23 closed brothels in several neighborhoods in Goma in mid-May.[28] M23 appointed recreation officials who have held festivals and events, participated in religious services, and led popular gatherings.[29] M23 has implemented forced labor practices called salongo—required weekly community service.[30] Senior M23 officials often perform salongo in public and encourage locals to join.[31] The group issued “participation receipts” to civilians who complete salongo and has punished those who refuse to take part.[32]

M23 has laid the groundwork to establish a parallel judicial system. M23 created an arbitration court for local conflicts in Goma and Bukavu in late May while working to finalize a more comprehensive system.[33] M23 took further steps when it appointed a 25-member commission to oversee the establishment of “independent” civil and military courts and judicial institutions in M23-controlled areas in August.[34] M23 said in mid-August that the “restoration of judicial authority has become a strategic priority” for the group.[35] Congolese media reported in late August that M23 plans to take “physical control” of all administrative personnel in M23-controlled areas.[36] The Congolese government has denounced M23’s efforts to establish parallel courts and has said it will annul any judicial acts or decisions taken by M23 authorities.[37]

M23—with Rwandan support—has taken steps to forcibly and voluntarily return refugees, which has altered demographic dynamics. M23 dismantled refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and forced at least 700,000 people to disperse when it captured Goma in late January.[38] Almost two million IDPs have returned to their places of origin since January.[39] The group has repatriated thousands of Rwandan refugees, reportedly mainly from majority-Hutu areas in North Kivu, to Rwanda since May.[40] Some of the transfers were done under UN oversight, but the UN told HRW in June that the screening was “done under pressure”—presumably from M23 or Rwanda—and that the refugees had no other choice.[41] M23 has called the refugees “Rwandan subjects” and dependents of extremist Hutu militants and destroyed Congolese identity documents of some of these refugees in mid-May.[42]

M23 and Rwanda have helped resettle Tutsis into M23-controlled areas. The UN reported that M23 and Rwanda repatriated Congolese Tutsi families from to M23-controlled Congolese territory, including many areas that M23’s and Rwanda’s repatriation efforts of Rwandan refugees had vacated.[43] The DRC government accused M23 and Rwanda on several occasions in 2025 of resettling “Rwandan families” in the eastern DRC as part of deliberate plan to reshape local demographics.[44] Many IDPs who dispersed from refugee camps near Goma returned to their places of origin to find their land occupied by M23 or other families.[45] The July UN report said that M23 systematically “destroyed archives in order to erase institutional memory and evidence of land tenure” as the group continued to facilitate the return of refugees from Rwanda.[46]

M23 has positioned itself as the de facto state authority in the eastern DRC in its engagement with regional or international actors. M23 has collaborated with the UN and other international organizations on numerous occasions in 2025. M23 negotiated the peaceful withdrawal of Southern African Development Community troops from Goma in April.[47] M23 allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross to evacuate hundreds of Congolese national police officers and Congolese army troops from Goma in late April.[48] M23 has worked with UN authorities on multiple occasions to repatriate Rwandan refugees to Rwanda since May.[49] Senior M23 officials hosted the head of UN forces in the DRC in Goma to discuss its mandate and the security and humanitarian situation in the eastern DRC in mid-June.[50] Two senior UN officials for humanitarian and refugee affairs visited the eastern DRC and met with M23 officials in Goma in June and August.[51]

M23 has dictated UN access to areas under its control like a sovereign entity. M23 refused to let the UN Security Council’s team of experts on the DRC conduct investigations on its territory in March.[52] M23 has imposed restrictions on UN forces and accused the UN of aiding pro-Congolese government fighters in attacks on M23 positions in Goma and other M23-controlled areas.[53] French state media reported in April and June that M23 has tried to renegotiate UN forces’ mandate in areas that it controls.[54]

Neighboring states and outside actors have increasingly recognized M23 as the de facto authority in the eastern DRC. M23 met with a coalition of Congolese religious leaders in Goma to discuss a nationwide peace effort in mid-February.[55] M23 appointed a diplomacy chief in early May and has reached out to Congolese diaspora communities, mainly from Europe and North America, who have contributed recruits to M23’s ranks.[56] The Ugandan president reopened several major cross-border trading posts in M23-controlled Rutshuru district in North Kivu without prior approval from the Congolese government in early July.[57] Burundi and M23 reportedly swapped prisoners in late July.[58] The Kenyan president nominated a consul general to Goma without prior approval from the Congolese government in mid-August.[59]

Economic

conomic:

M23 has tried to establish a parallel financial system. The group has taken steps to set up alternative banking and payment systems. The Central Bank of Congo severed all ties with local banks and microfinance institutions in M23-controlled areas in early 2025, which has severely disrupted economic activity. M23 reopened the main public financial institution in Goma—the Caisse générale d’epargne du Congo (CADECO)—in early April and appointed a parallel management team.[60] The CADECO branch in M23-controlled territory is de jure under the authority of the Central Bank of Congo, which denounced the relaunch as an illegal ploy to fund M23’s activities.[61]

M23 has raised funds for its activities and administration through an extensive tax regime. The group has overhauled tax policy in areas that it controls since March and imposed compulsory taxes—some of which locals have described as excessive and confiscatory—on residents, private businesses, traders and producers, and non-governmental organizations.[62] The July UN report said that M23 had “supplanted the legitimate state tax collection system” and threatened to close local businesses and non-governmental organizations that did not comply with new tax policy.[63] The group has appointed senior public finance and tax officials in both Kivu provinces, issued its own tax bills, and reportedly designated CADECO as the main collection authority.[64]

M23 has regulated regional economic activity and tried to encourage trade and investment. M23 created senior leadership roles for promoting investment and has eased financial regulations in some areas to encourage commerce.[65] The group launched a business registration and management office that requires economic operators to receive accreditation from M23—likely also functioning as a tax—to legally participate in commercial activities in late April.[66] M23 has supervised border post crossings and regulated vehicle use and hours at customs posts.[67] The July UN report said that M23 replaced Congolese government customs officials with M23 appointees and delegated the regulation of cross-border trade between Goma and Rwanda to Rwandan officials.[68]

M23 has sought to establish control over the land economy through land management and urban planning edicts. The group seized and redistributed public and private property in 2025 and has initiated construction on plots of land that were subject to land conflict disputes before M23 gained control in certain areas.[69] The M23-appointed South Kivu governor began issuing land management laws throughout South Kivu in late July.[70] Reuters reported in September that the group established an “arbitration center” to resolve land disputes.[71] M23-appointed North Kivu governor Joseph Bahati—known as Bahati Erasto—said in early August that the group plans to subdivide Goma into four communes.[72]

M23 has faced major challenges in implementing its broader economic agenda, however, and has used temporary measures to avoid an economic collapse. The Congolese government’s suspension of official banking operations, high M23 tax rates, and depressed demand have contributed to general economic paralysis in M23-occupied areas. Hundreds of businesses across many sectors have stopped operations, and millions of residents in M23-controlled urban areas have been affected by widespread cash shortages, price volatility, high mobile money transfer fees, and fraud and unstable currency exchange rates in parallel cash markets.[73] M23 has tried to revive market confidence through high-level administrative management and the establishment of CADECO while lobbying for recognized banks to reopen.[74]

The local and regional economy in M23-controlled areas has marginally improved since March, but liquidity challenges are still a major issue.[75] Residents and economic operators in M23-controlled areas have relied on third-party payment systems and other provinces and neighboring countries—mainly Beni and Butembo in Congolese government–controlled North Kivu, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania—to obtain cash, conduct transactions, and procure raw materials.[76] M23 has threatened local banks to reopen and ordered business owners and economic operators to open accounts in CADECO, but most people have been unwilling to deposit already-scarce funds into CADECO due to political instability and concerns over CADECO’s solvency.[77]

M23 has been unable to overcome these economic obstacles, largely due to M23’s status as an armed rebellion and internationally sanctioned nonstate entity. Banking branches must receive recognition from the regulatory authorities of a recognized government and international banking institutions to operate. M23 is a sanctioned nonstate actor, however, which imposes significant restrictions on its financial relationships.[78] Outside financial institutions and private businesses, some of whom declared force majeure in early 2025, remain unlikely to assume the risk of steep penalties for doing business with—and indirectly funding—M23.[79]

M23 has opted for temporary measures to stem the economic crisis and manage public scrutiny. Congolese media sources have reported on several occasions in 2025 that counterfeit currency has circulated in M23-controlled areas.[80] The group has lowered service fees and used price controls for services and goods on multiple occasions in 2025.[81] M23 has also lowered or annulled some taxes and duties and tried to explain its tax policy and blame the Congolese government to mitigate public backlash.[82]

These measures are unlikely to solve M23’s economic challenges—particularly cash shortages—barring any change to M23’s legal status, however. Congolese banks must hold a certain amount of reserves, whether in Congolese francs, which the Central Bank regulates and controls, or in US dollars, to underwrite their operations.[83] It remains unlikely that the Central Bank will return service to banks under M23 control or authorize the use of Congolese francs for official reserves. M23 is also barred from using US dollars for its reserves, given that the US Treasury Department—the regulator of the US dollar—has sanctioned M23, senior M23 officials, and its wider political umbrella of associates.[84] Badly damaged Congolese franc banknotes are circulating widely in Goma and Bukavu, likely due to unregulated overuse in informal markets, which has disrupted trade and transactions.[85]

M23 has consolidated control over major global critical mineral supply chains in North Kivu. M23 strengthened its control over the production and transport of “3T” networks—tin, tantalum, and tungsten—in North Kivu. M23 has controlled Rubaya, which produces 15 to 20 percent of the global coltan supply, since April 2024.[86] The UN and other organizations reported that M23 tightened control over 3T networks by consolidating control over the cross-border Rubaya-Goma-Rwanda transit corridor, which has reportedly increased the security and efficiency of Rubaya’s mining operations.[87] M23 imposed new mining taxes in 2025, and Reuters estimated that a 15 percent tax M23 imposed on tantalum production in Rubaya in early 2025 could equate to nearly half a million dollars in monthly revenue.[88] Bahati—a key figure in the Rubaya trade before his appointment—appointed a provincial “mining delegate” to his administration in late March to help oversee major mining operations.[89]

Figure 4. M23 Activity in Mineral-Rich Areas of the Eastern DRC

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr; Information Peace Information Service.

M23 significantly expanded its access to and control of critical mineral production in South Kivu as well as other natural resources. M23 seized control of several major mines and trading centers near the RN2 north of Bukavu during its early 2025 offensive. M23 captured the Lumbishi and Numbi mining areas in Kalehe district, which produce gold, tourmaline, and 3Ts, in early February.[90] M23 took control of tin-producing Nyabibwe village—about 30 miles south of Minova—and smuggled 186 tons of looted minerals to Rwanda from Nyabibwe via Lake Kivu in early February, according to the UN.[91] M23 also captured the Luhihi gold mining site, which is near the Kavumu airport on the RN2.[92] M23 seized control of Katasomwa, a gold mining village on the northern tip of the Kahuzi-Biega National Park, in late April.[93]

M23 has taken control of several mining hotspots south of Bukavu. M23 captured Kamanyola, a mining town on the border between the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi, in mid-February.[94] M23 seized the Chinese-owned Twangiza industrial gold mine in Walungu district in early May and reportedly restarted production in mid-July.[95] The company that had operated the Twangiza mine site claimed in late June that unidentified Rwandan nationals “entirely controlled” the site.[96]

M23’s control over Bukavu has allowed M23 to exercise significant control over the mineral trade in South Kivu. Bukavu has been a key trading and transport hub for high-value minerals for decades. The July UN report said that the capture of Bukavu awarded M23 “strategic dominance” over regional mineral supply routes across several districts in South Kivu.[97] The International Peace Information Service reported in late July that mineral smugglers have used Bukavu to transport large quantities of minerals mined in M23-controlled areas and other places in South Kivu since early 2025.[98]

M23 may be exploiting a vast forested area in South Kivu for timber. Congolese media reported in May that there has been a spike in illegal logging and artisanal charcoal production near the Kahuzi-Biega National Park near the RN2 in 2025.[99] An independent Congolese journalist said on social media in mid-May that special markets were established around Kahuzi-Biega for the buying and selling of timber and other natural resources.[100] Locals told Reuters in late May that charcoal prices nosedived as supply rapidly increased and that expanded road access under M23 control in South Kivu has contributed to increased illegal logging.[101]

M23 has provided public services and allocated state resources to revitalize infrastructure. M23 has provided public services and tried to improve the quality of these services. M23 assumed control of state-run water production and treatment services in Goma and Bukavu in early 2025 and has started water pipeline projects and tried to expand water access.[102] M23 took over waste management activities from over twenty private companies in Goma and began charging garbage collection fees in late May.[103] M23 has supplied energy services to residents and businesses in North and South Kivu and touted the expansion of access to different areas under its control.[104]

M23 reopened most regional air and lake transportation routes that were severely affected by its early 2025 offensive. M23 reopened the ports in Goma and Bukavu on Lake Kivu and allowed boat traffic to resume in mid-February.[105] The group resumed operations of a state-owned transportation company responsible for railway and transport services, including boat navigation on Lake Kivu, in mid-April.[106] M23 announced in late April that it would reopen the Kavumu airport near Bukavu to the public in early May.[107] M23 has not yet restored the Goma airport, however, despite claiming on multiple occasions in 2025 that it planned to reopen it soon.[108] The Goma and Kavumu airports are both key logistic hubs for regional movement and humanitarian operations in North and South Kivu.[109]

Figure 5. M23 Focuses on Infrastructure

Source: Yale Ford.

M23 has launched major road rehabilitation projects in several areas in North and South Kivu. M23 commissioned the paving of a 35-mile stretch of the RP529 from Sake to Masisi town in early May.[110] Bahati said in early May that M23 will also launch a rehabilitation project for a road, that connects Sake and Kanyabayonga in Lubero district, presumably the RP1030.[111] The group is rehabilitating sections of the RN2 north of Goma in Nyiragongo district in North Kivu.[112] M23 launched a roadworks project on the RN2 near Nyabibwe in South Kivu in mid-June.[113] M23 launched construction work in collaboration with a Kenyan company on several major avenues in Bukavu and roads that connect Bukavu to other districts in South Kivu, including the RN2, in mid-August.[114]

Improved roads would likely also allow M23 to strengthen its military logistics. The group has relied frequently on the use of airstrips to resupply equipment and additional troops on the frontlines far from its center of gravity. Improved roads that link its support zones around Goma and Bukavu to the frontlines and between the two provincial capitals on the RN2 would allow M23 to more easily move troops, military equipment, and weaponry.

Military

M23 has launched counterinsurgency operations in parts of the eastern DRC with lingering anti-M23 militia presences to eliminate armed resistance in areas under its control. M23 has increased the tempo of its counterinsurgency operations against anti-M23 militia groups, including suspected Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) militants and allied pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters, in M23-controlled Rutshuru district in North Kivu since mid-July.[115] M23 has tried to clear and hold insurgent strongholds as part of the campaign in Rutshuru but has faced significant resistance from militia fighters.[116]

Figure 6. Senior Military Leadership

Source: Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.

M23 has targeted FDLR strongholds and possibly a distinct Wazalendo faction called Collectif des Mouvements pour le Changement-Forces de Défense du Peuple (CMC-FDP) in the campaign. Congolese media reported frequently in July and early August that M23 explicitly targeted villages in Rutshuru under FDLR-CMC-FDP control or suspected of harboring enemy fighters that embed into local populations and launch attacks on M23.[117] The FDLR and CMC-FDP are extremist Hutu groups that have long-standing connections to these areas, where large Congolese Hutu populations are present.[118] Rwandan troops allegedly participated in the Rutshuru campaign.[119]

Figure 7. M23 Areas of Operation in the Eastern DRC

Source: Yale Ford.

M23 has used indiscriminate violence and collective punishment against civilians during these counterinsurgency operations, which may violate international humanitarian law and may constitute war crimes if confirmed. The UN cited “first-hand accounts” in early August that claimed that M23 counterinsurgency operations in four villages in Rutshuru led to the death of at least 319 unarmed civilians, mostly Hutu farmers, in mid-July.[120] HRW and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported in mid-August that M23 “summarily executed” over 140 civilians, mostly Hutu and some ethnic Nande—including women and children—in least 14 localities under M23 control in Rutshuru between July 10 and July 30.[121] The UN and HRW reported that the total civilian death count in Rutshuru in July could amount to over 300.[122]

Uncorroborated reports from Congolese media outlets and government officials have accused M23 of systematically perpetrating several other mass-casualty attacks on civilians in Rutshuru and other areas in the eastern DRC since the alleged July massacre. A local magazine in Goma claimed that M23 killed 123 people across Goma and Rutshuru district over two weeks from late July to early August.[123] The Congolese army claimed that M23 killed 80 civilians in Kalehe district in northern South Kivu in early August.[124] A Rutshuru official told Congolese media in mid-August that M23 had killed more than 30 civilians in the Bwito chiefdom in Rutshuru in August.[125]

The alleged massacres fit what the UN has chronicled as a yearslong “systematic” M23 campaign that involves indiscriminate violence against civilians in areas with suspected Hutu extremists.[126] The UN has reported on multiple occasions since June 2023 that M23 operations targeting FDLR strongholds have involved killing and punishing civilians suspected of supporting or being related to FDLR or other anti-M23 militias, particularly when M23 encountered local dissent and resistance to its territorial authority.[127] The UN reported in July 2025 that M23 attacks civilians for being present near M23 patrol routes, attempting to flee, or any other perceived resistance during operations or to its authority.[128] The July UN report said that these abuses are a “widespread and systematic campaign of intimidation and repression.”[129]

Indiscriminate violence and collective punishment against civilians clearly violate prohibitions from the 1949 Geneva Conventions against murder; mutilation ;cruel, humiliating and degrading treatment; and torture of noncombatants.[130] The Fourth Geneva Convention defines collective punishment as violence, harassment, or other sanctions taken against a group in retaliation for an act committed by individuals who are considered part of the group.[131] Collective punishment acts violate both the 1949 Geneva Conventions and subsequent international legal protocols, which prohibit collective punishment on the basis that such attacks target people who are not responsible for criminal conduct and that criminal responsibility can be attributed only to individuals, not a group.[132]

M23 has launched law enforcement efforts to help monopolize the use of force and eliminate possible insurgent cells in areas where it has established military control. The group has conducted conventional police operations and tried to reduce violent and nonviolent crime. Both Goma and Bukavu and their peripheral areas faced persistent insecurity, including spikes in violent crime such as homicide and robbery, after M23 captured the two provincial capitals in early 2025.[133] The group began organizing day and night patrols, allocated forces for police operations, and established a crime-fighting intelligence unit in Goma.[134] M23 installed security cameras in Goma to “track criminals” in early July.[135] M23 has even tried to reduce nonviolent crime, dismantling operations accused of trafficking and fraud and suspected of being linked with Congolese government networks.[136] The group has also installed fire authorities and tried to put preventive measures in place for urban fires.[137]

M23 has tried to balance the need to police urban areas with conventional military operations. M23 lacked the law enforcement personnel to fully secure Goma and Bukavu while it pursued offensives on several lines of advance in early 2025.[138] M23 redeployed hundreds of Congolese national police officers who surrendered to M23 and underwent “training” in early 2025 to Goma and Bukavu and other areas under M23 control in late August.[139] M23 officials have said that the new deployment aims to “professionalize” the police and will allow M23 troops to focus on the front lines and leave urban security to the police.[140]

M23 has used the issue of insecurity in urban areas to systematically target suspected criminals and pro-Congolese government sympathizers. Many armed militia fighters refused to surrender to M23 in early 2025, particularly in Goma, who then embedded into local populations and launched sporadic attacks on the group and committed crime.[141] M23 has conducted several large-scale cordon and search operations targeting densely populated neighborhoods with high crime rates, mainly in Goma, Sake, and Rubaya in North Kivu, since early May.[142] M23 regularly screens hundreds of civilians as part of these operations and detains and often forcibly transports young men to prisoners or M23 training bases for reintegration.

M23 has blamed insecurity on the Congolese government and used the issue to justify its arrest campaign. M23 has accused the Congolese government of distributing weapons to anti-M23 fighters in urban centers and seeking to sow chaos.[143] M23 and pro-M23 media have justified the cordon operations against suspected militia fighters on the basis of this threat, pointing to the thousands of firearms it has confiscated since January.[144] It remains unclear, however, whether the Congolese government has used its networks to arm and fund militia fighters in M23-controlled urban centers since January. Goma was heavily militarized—with tens of thousands of armed personnel and caches of weapons—and urban crime was an issue before M23 launched its early 2025 offensive.

M23’s ability to secure Goma and Bukavu is key to implementing its broader political agenda across North and South Kivu. CTP assessed in April 2025 that persistent insecurity in M23-controlled areas and sporadic attacks on the group taint M23’s legitimacy as a capable governing force.[145] Persistent insecurity undermines M23’s public image as a stabilizing force that can govern and provide security to large population centers better than the Congolese government. M23 officials have claimed regularly since May that M23 has improved security.[146] Congolese media outlets have continued to report persistent insecurity in M23-occupied areas and incidents of violent crime, including murder, however.[147]

M23 has allegedly carried out numerous arbitrary arrests and held prisoners in inhumane prison conditions, likely in violation of international law. Congolese and French media as well as UN and independent human rights watchdogs reported throughout 2025 that M23 arbitrarily arrested people accused of collaborating with enemy forces and assassinated or disappeared people in some cases.[148] Amnesty International and the UN reported in May September, respectively, that M23 kidnapped people in Goma and Bukavu and detained and tortured suspected pro-Congolese government fighters in “inhumane” and overcrowded detention centers in Goma.[149] The Congolese government, local civil society groups, and international human rights organized have denounced M23’s arrest campaign and use of violence against civilians in urban centers as violations of international law and human rights.[150]

M23’s crackdown may violate elements of international humanitarian law, which applies to armed conflict, and general human rights law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—two UN treaties that apply to all member states—explicitly forbid arbitrary detention and call for the humane treatment of prisoners.[151] The Geneva Conventions mandatethat during an armed conflict, armed powers still must treat all prisoners humanely, cannot torture detainees, and can only arrest civilians for “imperative reasons of security.”[152]

M23 has helped further monopolize the use of force in areas under its control by systematically incorporating recruits, forcible conscripts, and seized equipment into its military forces. M23 has added thousands of fighters to its ranks through forcible and voluntary means in 2025.[153] The UN reported that M23 had 5,000 fighters deployed in the Kivu provinces and was training over 7,000 recruits in late April.[154] The group has forcibly demobilized, trained, integrated, and redeployed thousands of Congolese army (FARDC) troops and pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters to fight on M23’s side in 2025.[155] M23 has kidnapped and forcibly conscripted hundreds of young men—possibly thousands, including conscripts as young as 15—into its ranks, either arbitrarily arresting them for suspected collaboration with the Congolese government or presenting them as voluntary recruits, in North and South Kivu.[156] Conscription is notably a right reserved in international law for sovereign states.[157] M23 has also recruited many fighters into its ranks through mass recruitment drives and accelerated ideological and military training programs.[158]

The group has likely integrated military equipment that it captured in Goma into active use. M23 seized heavy and light weaponry, including long-range artillery and truck-mounted rocket launchers, hundreds of small arms, and tactical military equipment in Goma.[159] M23 captured military vehicles and aircraft, such as Soviet-era T-54/55 tanks, US-made BATT UMG armored personnel carriers, and possibly up to 20 Belarusian unmanned aerial vehicles—likely one-way attack drones, according to the open-source intelligence outlet Janes.[160] M23 also captured several attack and transport helicopters and a Russian-made Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jet, which M23 repaired and returned to service in early July according to pro-M23 social media sources.[161] CTP assessed in mid-August that M23 has likely used some of this equipment against pro-Congolese government forces in South Kivu.[162]

M23’s force generation efforts may violate international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions explicitly prohibit nonstate armed actors from forcibly conscripting individuals into their ranks.[163] The Hague Conventions and subsequent Geneva Conventions also note that even warring states cannot “compel nationals of the hostile party to take part in operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent’s service before the war,” as M23 has with FARDC and militia fighters.[164]

M23 has denied all allegations that it has violated international law and sought to portray itself as a responsible governing force. M23 characterized reports in early 2025 regarding its arrest campaign in urban centers as “grotesque” and propaganda.[165] The group has released their own human rights reports and accused the Congolese government of committing state-sponsored crime.[166] M23 and Rwanda denied responsibility for the alleged killings in Rutshuru district in July.[167] Top M23 officials participated in at least one workshop led by the International Committee of the Red Cross that focused on the basic principles of international humanitarian law in early July.[168]

M23 will likely remain engaged with regional peace efforts to buy time to further consolidate control over occupied areas in the eastern DRC. Staying in Qatari-brokered talks gives M23 time to gain even greater leverage by consolidating stronger de facto control over occupied areas. An entrenched M23 administration would be even more intractable and able to push for a greater role in any future deal that legitimizes M23 autonomy or gradually incorporates into a Congolese government administration. The UN and CTP have assessed on several occasions that M23’s efforts to build a parallel administration signal M23’s long-term goal to govern occupied areas “whatever the outcome of negotiations.”[169]

Africa File Data Cutoff: September 8, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.