Congo War Security Review
An in-depth review of activity related to the war in the eastern DRC between M23 and its Rwandan backers and pro-Congolese government forces every week. Map shapefiles are available by request via email at [email protected].
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Data Cutoff: November 17, 2026, at 8 A.M. EST*
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Key Takeaway: FRN reportedly continued to consolidate control over the RN3 after conducting an offensive on Bunyakiri town in Kalehe district in South Kivu, despite pro-Congolese government attempts to retake the town and key positions on the RN3. Tensions between the DRC and Rwanda deadlocked the race to lead the International Organisation of La Francophonie at its summit in Cambodia, leading member states to postpone the election by a year. DRC President Félix Tshisekedi signed the referendum law that will allow changes to the Congolese constitution and extend his tenure in power for a third term. The top US diplomat in Rwanda met with representatives of Rwanda’s largest mining company and the firms that market and process its tungsten in mid-November to discuss expanding Rwandan critical mineral exports to the United States.

Kinetic Activity in Rutshuru & Eastern Masisi Districts
Nothing significant to report.
Northern Axis: Lubero-Butembo-Beni-Bunia
Nothing significant to report.
Southern Axis: Bukavu-Uvira-Baraka-Kalemie
FRN reportedly continued to consolidate control over the RN3 after conducting an offensive on Bunyakiri town in Kalehe district in South Kivu, despite pro-Congolese government attempts to retake the town and key positions on the RN3. CTP reported previously that FRN conducted a major offensive through the Kahuzi-Biega National Park (PNKB) and on the RN3 to capture Bunyakiri in early November.[1] Pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters reportedly abducted as many as 26 people further south in the Kalonge group in Buhavu chiefdom in Kabare district on November 10.[2] FRN reportedly withdrew from Chambombo, Bukumba, and Shanje in the northern Kalehe highlands and redeployed forces toward the Bunyakiri axis around November 10.[3] Independent Congolese journalist Steve Mulindwa reported on social media on November 11 that FRN had advanced within the Katasomwa area east of the RN3 axis front line on the northern tip of the eastern section of the PNKB to around Sanduku, which is close to Cigoma, the administrative center of the Mubuku chiefdom.[4] FRN reportedly retook control of Chambombo, Bukumba, and Shanje in the Kalehe highlands later on November 11 after withdrawing briefly earlier that day.[5] Fighting reportedly took place near Chaminunu village in Kalonge further south in Kabare and was moving closer toward Shabunda district in South Kivu on November 11.[6] Chaminunu is about 10 miles west of Cifunzi in Kalonge on a local road.
Fighting between FRN and pro-Congolese government troops reportedly continued near Kambegeti, which is about five miles north of Bunyakiri on the RN3, and Kambale, which is closer toward Bunyakiri, on November 11, as pro-Congolese government forces continued efforts to try to retake lost positions.[7] Clashes also reportedly took place between a group of Wazalendo fighters and an FARDC unit in Kambageti, resulting in the death of a Congolese army (FARDC) captain on November 11.[8] Congolese intelligence services reportedly arrested an official from Bunyakiri in Hombo suspected of collaborating with FRN around November 11 and transferred him to Kisangani.[9] FRN-aligned media sources circulated videos on November 11 purportedly showing military equipment and armaments that FRN had seized in Bunyakiri.[10] The Congolese government-aligned outlet Tazama RDC denied on November 11 that FRN seized a large military arsenal in Bunyakiri.[11] FRN reportedly took control of Ebisha village, which is about four miles from Bunyakiri on the RN3, on November 11.[12] The FARDC claimed on November 11 that they had halted FRN’s advance on the RN3 axis.[13]
Fighting reportedly continued in Kambale and Ebisha on the RN3 on November 12.[14] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly dislodged FRN from Ebisha on November 12.[15] FRN accused the Congolese government of setting up mobile launch platforms for one-way attack (OWA) drones and deploying large numbers of troops and weapons on several unspecified routes in the eastern DRC on November 12.[16] Fighting reportedly continued in Kambale on November 13, as pro-Congolese government forces continued efforts to retake lost positions.[17] Senior FRN officials reportedly visited Bunyakiri around November 13.[18] Tazama RDC claimed on November 13 and 15 that FRN allowed “road maintenance vehicles” into Bitale and then Fumya along the RN3 to rehabilitate the road to facilitate resupply, mobility, and the movement of mobile air defense systems.[19] Fighting on the RN3 around Kambale reportedly died down, except for FARDC shelling of FRN positions on the RN3 and in Kambale, on November 14, with Kambale remaining under FRN control.[20] Tazama RDC claimed that FRN conducted attacks on FARDC-Wazalendo positions in Ebisha on November 15.[21]
The FARDC then reportedly targeted three FRN positions in Bunyakiri, reportedly in Bulambika, in at least six reported drone strikes on November 15, causing casualties and damaging civilian infrastructure.[22] Clashes reportedly resumed on the Bunyakiri axis on November 15.[23] FRN’s spokesperson, Lawrence Kanyuka, claimed on social media on November 15 that the FARDC air attacks on the RN3 targeted Bulambika and Kambale using OWA-type drones.[24] Fighting reportedly continued in Kambale on November 16 as pro-Congolese government forces continued efforts to recapture lost positions.[25] FRN then reportedly retook Ebisha on November 16 after dislodging FARDC-Wazalendo fighters.[26] FRN also reportedly flanked pro-Congolese government forces and used combat drones to bomb government positions, taking control of Bukondo, which reportedly overlooks Kambale and Kambegeti amid the course of clashes on November 16.[27]
Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly bombed the center of Minembwe town and made minor gains to the south of the town in the South Kivu highlands. The FARDC claimed control of Kabanju and Natulonge villages to the south of Minembwe on November 10.[28] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces repelled attacks from Twirwaneho and RED-Tabara in Malimba locality in Masango village in the Bijimbo group northeast of Minembwe and Mitamba in the Kirungu area in the Bavira chiefdom in the Uvira highlands on November 11.[29] Twirwaneho’s spokesperson, Fidèle Rugabo, claimed in an interview with Radio Umurage, a local Twirwaneho-aligned media outlet, on November 11 that pro-Congolese government forces had continued increasing troop numbers and military equipment, including drones, around Kabanju and Rugezi.[30] Radio Umurage claimed on social media on November 13 that pro-Congolese government forces deployed additional Congolese and Burundian troops and military equipment using helicopters and military vehicles to Kabanju and Rugezi on November 12.[31] Rugabo claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted air attacks on its positions on the southern front lines and reinforced their ranks with troops in Kabanju and Rugezi using helicopters and military pickup trucks.[32] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted ground attacks on Wihene and nearby areas on the southern front lines on November 15, as clashes reportedly broke out.[33] Rugabo claimed on social media that Twirwaneho repelled the attacks on Wihene on November 15.[34]
FRN denounced a humanitarian blockade imposed by government forces on Minembwe in a statement on November 16.[35] The FARDC then reportedly bombed a school complex in Ilundu and Madegu localities near the center of Minembwe on November 16.[36] The strikes reportedly destroyed nine classrooms and several administrative buildings at the school.[37] Rugabo denounced the attacks on social media on November 16.[38] Moïse Nyarugabo and the Mahoro Peace Association claimed on social media that government forces carried out the attacks using Chinese-made CH-10 drones operated from Kalemie.[39] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media on November 17 that Twirwaneho was using the school to stock munitions and drones.[40] Kanyuka denounced the attacks on social media on November 17.[41]
Wazalendo units attacked FRN in the Kaziba chiefdom in southeastern Walungu in South Kivu. Wazalendo fighters reportedly attacked FRN and clashed with the rebels in at least five villages near Lwanguku, the main trading center in Kaziba in southeastern Walungu, on November 11.[42] Kanyuka denounced the attacks on social media on November 11.[43] Fighting then reportedly broke out between FRN and the FARDC slightly south of Kaziba in Rurambo village in the Uvira midlands on November 17.[44]
FRN reportedly conducted a drone strike on an FARDC position in the Basile chiefdom in Mwenga district in South Kivu. FRN reportedly conducted a targeted drone strike on a FARDC position in Ngando locality in Basile chiefdom around November 11, killing an FARDC lieutenant colonel and five other soldiers.[45] CTP is unable to identify the precise location of Ngando. The Basile chiefdom is formed by the Ulindi River to the north, the Itombwe Sector in Mwenga to the south, and the Luindi and Burhinyi chiefdoms in Walungu to the east.


Northwest Axis: Masisi-Walikale-Lubutu-Kisangani
Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly repelled an FRN attack on the RP1030 near the Masisi-Walikale border and clashed with FRN separately in a remote area near the RP529 in North Kivu. The Congolese media outlet Actualite.cd reported that pro-Congolese government repelled an FRN attack on the hills of Luola and Chad, which is located in the Banakindi locality in the Kisimba group slightly north of the RP1030, on November 12.[46] Pro-Congolese government forces then reportedly clashed with FRN fighters coming from Kashebere on the RP529 reportedly near Ngenge in a remote area in the Waloa Yungu group on November 15.[47] The Waloa Yungu group is near the border between Masisi and Walikale, its eastern edge touching the Osso Banyungu sector in Masisi. Kashebere is located on the RP529 on the Masisi side of the border with Walikale, about eight miles from Nyabiondo town.

Southwest Axis: Bukavu-Kamituga-Shabunda-Kindu
FRN likely used its positions captured during the Bunyakiri offensive to push into southwestern Kabare district near the district border with Walungu in South Kivu. The group had reportedly advanced on a secondary axis across the eastern section of the PNKB into the Kalonge chiefdom in Kabare in early November.[48] FRN reportedly then captured the entire Nindja chiefdom, situated in southwestern Kabare to the north of the RP503, after clashing with FARDC and Wazalendo units on November 12, although some sources claimed that the rebels encountered little resistance.[49] This included Nindja’s administrative center, Luhago—which has been the location of occasional clashes between FRN and pro-Congolese government forces on the southwest axis—and Cikenge, Ihembe, Muhume, and Irega-Baronyi localites.[50] Nindja has more than 20 villages organized into three village groups. One open-source intelligence analyst noted on social media on November 13 that FRN contingents likely moved south into the chiefdom and the Luhago area after taking Kalonge to the north as part of the Bunyakiri operation.[51]

Major Political Developments
Tensions between the DRC and Rwanda deadlocked the race to lead the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) at its summit in Cambodia, leading member states to postpone the election by a year. OIF heads of state and government decided to postpone the election for the secretary-general for 12 months and keep Rwandan incumbent Louise Mushikiwabo in office during a transitional period at the summit in Cambodia on November 16.[52] Rwanda will not put forward a candidate in the next election in late 2027, while the three other declared candidates—Congolese candidate Juliana Lumumba, Mauritanian candidate Coumba Bâ, and former Romanian Prime Minister Dacian Cioloș—can maintain their candidacies and other member states can submit new ones.[53] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported on November 17 that a new ad hoc committee chaired by Cambodia as summit president will revise the appointment rules and is considering options including a two-term limit, a second round of voting, and regional rotation of the post of secretary-general.[54]
The Congolese government campaigned against Mushikiwabo’s bid for a third term in the run-up to the summit and threatened to leave the OIF if she won. DRC President Félix Tshisekedi had threatened to withdraw the DRC from the OIF if Mushikiwabo was re-elected.[55] Congolese Communication Minister Patrick Muyaya told French state media on November 11 that the DRC would “draw the consequences” if Mushikiwabo won reelection.[56] Congolese political analyst Christian Moleka assessed during an interview with Congolese journalist Stanis Bujakera on November 13 that the Congolese government’s strategy was more likely about playing “against Rwanda” more than it was backing its own candidate in Lumumba.[57]
France pressed the DRC, Rwanda, and Mauritania to withdraw their candidates in favor of Cioloș in the weeks and days before the summit. The French delegation reportedly had floated former Senegalese President Macky Sall as a fallback candidate in October, but he turned down the offer.[58] Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe insisted on social media on November 12 that the summit apply the OIF’s 2022 rules of procedure, which provide for electing the secretary-general by consensus, or by a simple-majority vote, which is an option that the OIF had never used.[59] French President Emmanuel Macron reportedly sent separate letters to Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Tshisekedi on the night of November 12 to 13 to ask them to withdraw their respective candidates.[60] The French magazine Jeune Afrique reported on November 13 that Macron’s letter suggested to Kagame that Tshisekedi and Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani had also committed to withdrawing their candidates to make way for Cioloș as a “compromise candidate,” and urged Kagame to announce Mushikiwabo’s withdrawal before the OIF’s ministerial conference on November 14 to avoid a vote.[61] Nduhungirehe confirmed the existence of the letter at the closed-door ministerial conference on November 14 and said that Rwanda would not withdraw its candidate, “even less so under duress,” according to Jeune Afrique.[62] Rwandan authorities denounced the French request as interference.[63] Congolese Foreign Minister Thérèse Wagner responded that the DRC would withdraw Lumumba and consider a “joint approach” in favor of Cioloș to avoid a vote and reiterated that the Congolese government did not rule out withdrawing from the OIF.[64] A Congolese government source told French state media that Lumumba’s withdrawal was tied to Mushikiwabo’s, while Ghazouani reportedly kept Bâ in the race.[65]
The French initiative divided delegations at the summit, and Rwanda characterized it as an attempt to impose a European candidate at Africa’s expense. Jeune Afrique reported on November 15 that the Djiboutian foreign minister told the November 14 ministerial conference that the “best way to maintain the unity of the organization is to respect its rules,” which was a position that the Ivorian, Gabonese, and Cameroonian delegations backed, while Romania, North Macedonia, Andorra, and Monaco defended a consensus appointment.[66] Bujakera reported on November 15 that France, Senegal, and Mauritius were among the states defending the consensus rule, while Mauritania joined Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Djibouti in calling for a vote if no agreement was reached.[67] Several African representatives told Jeune Afrique that Macron’s initiative for a consensus candidate was “deeply disrespectful to Africans.”[68] Nduhungirehe argued on social media on November 14 that a non-African candidate backed by an African state that had withdrawn its own candidate “in flagrant violation” of an African Union decision from earlier this year could not be a “consensus candidate.”[69] Africa Intelligence reported on November 15 that Rwandan diplomats played on “nationalist sentiment” by accusing France of trying to impose a European candidate at the expense of an African one, an argument that the French delegation and some African delegations rejected.[70]
Kagame and Macron reportedly clashed in a face-to-face meeting as the summit opened. Macron met with Kagame on the morning of November 15 and called on the DRC, Rwanda, and Mauritania to “engage in consultations among themselves” to find consensus, according to the French government.[71] Jeune Afrique reported on November 15 that the meeting was tense and that Kagame accused Macron of being “the sole divisive factor” at the summit “because of his own agenda and interests,” and criticized Macron’s “arrogant tone” and his attempt to “impose his views on other member states.”[72] Jeune Afrique reported that the exchange almost caused a personal rift between the two leaders, although France later denied that it had been heated.[73] Macron said the OIF’s expansion “requires us to build consensus to preserve unity,” while Mushikiwabo said the organization’s unity “does not imply uniformity of positions” and urged members to resist the temptation to “bilateralize” the OIF in opening speeches.[74]
African leaders and Macron reportedly made final efforts on the eve of the election to steer the summit toward consensus. Africa Intelligence reported on November 15 that Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye convened a closed-door meeting of heads of state that evening, in which several participants urged Kagame to withdraw Mushikiwabo after her two terms, but Kagame held firm.[75] The outlet reported that Kagame’s refusal angered a majority of member states and that Rwanda was counting on two backers—Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara and Djiboutian President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh—while Senegal, Benin, and Togo moved to rule out a vote and Rwandan diplomats criticized Faye’s meeting as organized under “French influence.”[76] Tshisekedi did not join the talks, but Africa Intelligence reported that he had instructed Muyaya to prepare a statement formalizing the DRC’s withdrawal from the OIF if Mushikiwabo won, which was shown to several African ministers. Muyaya said publicly that a withdrawal was still possible.[77] Macron held meetings into the night of November 15 and 16, staying in contact with his ally Beninese President Romuald Wadagni and Madagascar’s military leader, who agreed to back the consensus push, according to Africa Intelligence.[78]
Member states settled on postponing the election in a tense closed-door session. Africa Intelligence reported on November 17 that heads of state reached the decision after three hours of closed-door talks on November 16.[79] The outlet reported that Wadagni, Faye, and Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé moved for a consensus appointment against Rwanda, while Rwanda’s two main backers, Côte d’Ivoire and Djibouti, kept a low profile and only a handful of states, including Bulgaria, were ready to vote.[80] Diplomatic sources had told Bujakera on November 16 that Mushikiwabo lacked the votes to win, though a diplomatic source had told French state media on November 15 that the race with Cioloș was close.[81] Jeune Afrique reported that the delegates decided to postpone the election as heads of state began leaving the room and that member states approved the arrangement by a show of hands, with Bujakera reporting that 37 countries voted in favor.[82] Africa Intelligence reported that several speakers had called for Mushikiwabo’s term to end at the end of 2026, with a Canadian administrator taking over in the interim, but delegates dropped the option at the request of several African states that argued it would further ostracize Rwanda and sought an “honorable exit” for Mushikiwabo.[83] Mushikiwabo said in her closing remarks on November 16 that she had faced “numerous and strong pressures” to withdraw and that one member state in an apparent reference to France had challenged “at the very last stage” an electoral process that members had defined collectively.[84]
Tshisekedi signed the referendum law that will allow changes to the Congolese constitution and extend his tenure in power for a third presidential term. Tshisekedi officially promulgated the law, which the Congolese parliament had adopted in late October, on November 9.[85] The current constitution, which was finalized in 2006 after a settlement to the Second Congo War and subsequent political transition under former DRC President Joseph Kabila, established democratic institutions and limits Congolese presidents to a maximum of two five-year terms. Article 220 of the constitution lists several “locked” features of the political system that cannot be subject to a constitutional amendment, including the Congolese president’s number and length of terms.[86] Constitutional review also cannot occur during periods of war or martial law, according to Article 219.[87] The new law lays the groundwork for Tshisekedi to seek a third term, as it outlines how a new constitution could be drafted and then put to referendum, as well as how existing constitutional provisions could be changed. Tshisekedi had said in early 2026 that the government could not organize national elections set for 2028 due to the war in the eastern DRC but that he would accept a third term if approved through a national referendum.
The opposition and FRN have repeatedly denounced this process and viewed it as a play for Tshisekedi to stay in power. Proponents of constitutional revision have yet to articulate any governing principles beyond centralized rule and appeals to “popular sovereignty” that would explain how their proposals would achieve the stated goal of stabilizing and modernizing the country, which they claim is hindered by the current constitution. Regime opponents and critics view the proposed reform as a “constitutional coup” that will enable Tshisekedi to entrench his rule and further centralize power under the guise of reform. The Brussels, Belgium-based Egmont Institute assessed previously that the constitution project is tied to ambitions within Tshisekedi’s political party, which was locked out of power under previous regimes, and Tshisekedi’s ethnic community to consolidate power and retain national leadership for decades.[88] FRN had demanded an “official clarification” from the Congolese government regarding the referendum law and Tshisekedi’s recent remarks on the constitution and requested that the issue be included on the agenda for the next round of talks in a November 1 letter to Qatari mediators.[89] FRN has argued that the Doha agreements as based on the current constitutional order and claimed that any challenge to it would erode the trust necessary for their implementation.[90] Martin Fayulu told the French outlet Le Monde on November 12 that the result of a referendum would “inevitably be ‘yes’… because the election results are always what they want.”[91] Several unnamed regional observers and diplomatic sources expressed concern to Jeune Afrique on November 11 that the Congolese government could now equate political dissent for support for FRN, leading to a “wave of arrests” of the regime’s political opponents across the DRC.[92]
The Congolese government now has the full legal pretext to call a referendum. The legislation replaces a previous law from 2005 that was used to secure the approval of the current constitution. The explanatory memorandum for the law describes the current constitutional framework as too “narrow,” with the new law aiming to “broaden the scope of referendums” and give “full effect” to the provisions of Article 5 of the constitution, which states that sovereignty belongs to the people, who exercise it directly through referendums or elections.[93] The law establishes common rules for future referendums, which had already been provided for under the current constitution, but now provides for a procedure to “amend any existing constitutional provision” through referendum or submit a draft of a new constitution to voters in cases of “absolute necessity.”[94] André Mbata, the secretary-general of Tshisekedi’s ruling coalition, told Bujakera on November 11 that the referendum law “paves the way” for a new constitution without requiring one, arguing that the main point of the law was to fill a “legal vacuum.”[95] Religious confessions under the authority of Archbishop Évariste Ejiba Yamapia, who is close to government circles, echoed this argument on November 16 and said that the law “fills a gap” in the DRC’s legal framework, arguing that it “does not amount to a decision” to hold a referendum immediately.[96] The sponsor of the law, Paul-Gaspard Ngondankoy, said that 250,000 Congolese citizens would have to sign a petition to initiate the process of a new constitution that would then be submitted to Tshisekedi.[97] This procedure is separate from the revision procedure outlined in Article 218 of the constitution, which grants the right to several governments actors—Tshisekedi, the government following deliberation by Tshisekedi’s cabinet, or half the members of each of the two chambers of Parliament—or 100,000 citizens to petition one of the two chambers of Parliament to propose a constitutional revision.[98] Tshisekedi would then convene a commission of experts, followed by consultations with political parties and civil society.[99] A constituent assembly composed of members of parliament, senators, and provincial and local elected officials would then examine the draft.[100] Tshisekedi would submit it to a simple referendum vote if the draft were adopted, or the current constitution would remain in effect if rejected.[101]
Tshisekedi met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to discuss bilateral cooperation and the war in the eastern DRC. Tshisekedi met with Erdoğan on the sidelines of a UN conference in Antalya, Turkey on November 12.[102] Tshisekedi’s office said on social media that he and his Turkish counterpart discussed strengthen bilateral relations and the war in the eastern DRC.[103]
The United States selected its next ambassador to the DRC. The Trump administration nominated John Mark Burns to fill the post in mid-November.[104] Burns is a Christian pastor from South Carolina. The previous US ambassador to the DRC, Lucy Tamlyn, had left the post in December 2025.
The UN and the United Kingdom (UK) extended their sanctions regime to FRN. The UN added FRN to its sanctions list on November 11, largely as a formality after the group succeeded M23 and its political branch, Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) in mid-October.[105] The UK also updated its DRC sanctions list to add FRN as an alternative name for AFC on November 12.[106]
Significant US-Backed Economic Activity
The top US diplomat in Rwanda met with representatives of Rwanda’s largest mining company and the firms that market and process its tungsten in mid-November to discuss expanding Rwandan critical mineral exports to the United States. The US Embassy in Kigali said on November 16 that Chargé d’Affaires John Armiger had met with representatives of Trinity Metals, US tungsten processor Global Tungsten & Powders (GTP), and commodity trader Traxys to explore ways to boost critical mineral trade from Rwanda to the United States.[107] Neither the US Embassy nor Trinity announced a new agreement or disclosed volumes or terms.[108] Trinity had said in August 2025 that Traxys, which is its offtake partner, had concluded a commercial agreement with GTP—the largest tungsten processor in the United States—to supply tungsten concentrate from Trinity’s Nyakabingo mine directly to the United States.[109] Trinity’s major shareholder, TechMet, is partly owned by the US government through the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).[110]
[1] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/november-11-2026
[2] https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120458547901116910; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2120432812612342179
[3] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/11/crise-securitaire-le-frn-se-retire-de-chambombo-bukumba-et-shanje-et-redeploie-les; https://x.com/byobemalenga/status/2120522340287099160; https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/2120530084859650384; https://x.com/michombero/status/2120533362347495507; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120539213007331548; https://x.com/VolcansLes/status/2120545372401545454; https://x.com/243Afro12253/status/2120545806180868266; https://x.com/simeonisako13/status/2120547792288395542; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2120554882008834476; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/2120562804428030374; https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/2120574130336702881
[4] https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120580453170389302
[5] https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2120583793710862812; https://x.com/kivuutile/status/2120596469560602774; https://x.com/7uneCd/status/2120599192900870530; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2120621404496273469; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2120622249203888246; https://x.com/Kivuinfo24/status/2120623219963228354; https://x.com/wakeup243/status/2120625626776211531
[6] https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2120593826012131697
[7] https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2120423389172990216; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2120432308691878115; https://x.com/michombero/status/2120449370088694079; https://x.com/TheMwamiDRC/status/2120627472899203275; https://x.com/amluzayamo/status/2120800638665646189; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2120803894687121476; https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2120805277419057624; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120843045943808023
[8] https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2120613133584883863; https://x.com/TheMwamiDRC/status/2120627472899203275; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/12/sud-kivu-le-frn-prend-ebisha-et-progresse-vers-hombo-sur-la-rn3
[9] https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120458547901116910; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2120468435377570145
[10] https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/2120461001531314354; https://x.com/byondo99/status/2120476805505159389; https://x.com/Katsuva_R/status/2120496817884234036
[11] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2120582974378827894
[12] https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2120522689710547353; https://x.com/kivunewstoday/status/2120523700936003651; https://x.com/RutegaBin/status/2120541921651073164; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2120549974043942933; https://x.com/byuku_senge/status/2120552076988305875; https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/2120557572545479019; https://x.com/wakeup243/status/2120569939992207683; https://x.com/Kivuinfo24/status/2120589057931526648; https://x.com/byondo99/status/2120601757231505772; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/12/sud-kivu-le-frn-prend-ebisha-et-progresse-vers-hombo-sur-la-rn3
[13] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/12/est-de-la-rdc-alors-que-les-combats-sintensifient-sur-differents-fronts-les-fardc; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2120590006477525481; https://x.com/7sur7_cd/status/2120604303610278148; https://x.com/FARDC_Info/status/2120605405369815292
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[69] https://x.com/onduhungirehe/status/2121650954919608403
[70] https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/faye-calls-last-ditch-francophonie-talks-to-avert-collapse,110931026-art
[71] https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/11/15/somment-de-la-francophonie-emmanuel-macron-appelle-a-l-unite-et-au-consensus-face-aux-tensions-entre-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda_6810995_3210.html; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20261115-francophonie-%C3%A0-phnom-penh-derni%C3%A8res-tractations-avant-la-d%C3%A9signation-du-prochain-secr%C3%A9taire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861771/politique/oif-huis-clos-sous-haute-tension-et-vif-echange-entre-macron-et-kagame
[72] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861771/politique/oif-huis-clos-sous-haute-tension-et-vif-echange-entre-macron-et-kagame
[73] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861771/politique/oif-huis-clos-sous-haute-tension-et-vif-echange-entre-macron-et-kagame; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861844/politique/oif-louise-mushikiwabo-reconduite-pour-un-an-son-depart-desormais-programme
[74] https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/11/15/somment-de-la-francophonie-emmanuel-macron-appelle-a-l-unite-et-au-consensus-face-aux-tensions-entre-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda_6810995_3210.html; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861771/politique/oif-huis-clos-sous-haute-tension-et-vif-echange-entre-macron-et-kagame; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2121794933677814069; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2121801713363353722
[75] https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/faye-calls-last-ditch-francophonie-talks-to-avert-collapse,110931026-art; https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/tense-talks-leave-oif-leadership-race-unresolved,110931137-art
[76] https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/faye-calls-last-ditch-francophonie-talks-to-avert-collapse,110931026-art; https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/tense-talks-leave-oif-leadership-race-unresolved,110931137-art
[77] https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/faye-calls-last-ditch-francophonie-talks-to-avert-collapse,110931026-art; https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/15/tense-talks-leave-oif-leadership-race-unresolved,110931137-art; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20261115-francophonie-%C3%A0-phnom-penh-derni%C3%A8res-tractations-avant-la-d%C3%A9signation-du-prochain-secr%C3%A9taire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral
[78] https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/17/oif-survives-showdown-but-leadership-battle-is-far-from-over,110931746-art
[79] https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/17/oif-survives-showdown-but-leadership-battle-is-far-from-over,110931746-art
[80] https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/17/oif-survives-showdown-but-leadership-battle-is-far-from-over,110931746-art
[81] https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2122171774704001285; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20261115-francophonie-%C3%A0-phnom-penh-derni%C3%A8res-tractations-avant-la-d%C3%A9signation-du-prochain-secr%C3%A9taire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral
[82] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861844/politique/oif-louise-mushikiwabo-reconduite-pour-un-an-son-depart-desormais-programme; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2122247365922853151
[83] https://www.africaintelligence.com/the-continent/2026/11/17/oif-survives-showdown-but-leadership-battle-is-far-from-over,110931746-art
[84] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1861844/politique/oif-louise-mushikiwabo-reconduite-pour-un-an-son-depart-desormais-programme; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2026/11/16/l-election-du-secretaire-general-de-l-organisation-internationale-de-la-francophonie-reportee-d-un-an_6811682_3212.html; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20261116-francophonie-faute-de-consensus-l-oif-reporte-d-un-an-l-%C3%A9lection-du-secr%C3%A9taire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral
[85] https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2120271311104577804; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2120394418138104175; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congolese-president-signs-contested-referendum-law-amid-fears-over-third-term-2026-11-11; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20261111-rdc-promulgation-de-la-loi-sur-l-organisation-du-r%C3%A9f%C3%A9rendum-ce-que-cela-peut-changer; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-11-11/congo-president-enacts-law-that-lays-ground-to-extend-his-tenure; https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/11/12/en-rdc-felix-tshisekedi-promulgue-une-loi-controversee-qui-lui-ouvre-la-voie-a-un-troisieme-mandat_6809048_3210.html; https://x.com/AssembleeNatRDC/status/2113734485015494999; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2113669055106183429
[86] https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/DRC%20-%20Congo%20Constitution.pdf
[87] https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/DRC%20-%20Congo%20Constitution.pdf
[88] https://egmontinstitute.be/app/uploads/2024/12/Erik-Kennes_Paper_128.pdf?type=pdf; https://www.dw.com/fr/rdc-n%C3%A9h%C3%A9mie-mwilanya-f%C3%A9lix-tshisekedi-joseph-kabila/a-77100843
[89] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/06/doha-le-frn-de-joseph-kabila-saisit-la-mediation-qatarie-contre-le-projet-de-changement; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2118635380761079883; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20261106-constitution-en-rdc-le-groupe-politico-militaire-frn-veut-une-clarification-du-pouvoir-lors-des-discussions-de-doha
[90] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/03/le-frn-fait-part-lonu-de-ses-inquietudes-liees-aux-velleites-de-changement; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/03/rdc-apres-la-rencontre-kabila-swan-le-frn-exprime-des-reserves-sur-le-renouvellement-du; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2117631449306136893; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2117664927288545763
[91] https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/11/12/en-rdc-felix-tshisekedi-promulgue-une-loi-controversee-qui-lui-ouvre-la-voie-a-un-troisieme-mandat_6809048_3210.html
[92] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1860740/politique/rdc-felix-tshisekedi-promulgue-une-loi-ouvrant-la-voie-a-un-changement-de-constitution
[93] https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2120271311104577804
[94] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20261111-rdc-promulgation-de-la-loi-sur-l-organisation-du-r%C3%A9f%C3%A9rendum-ce-que-cela-peut-changer; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2120271311104577804
[95] https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2120622066114179464
[96] https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2122318417277362437; https://www.dw.com/fr/rdc-la-loi-r%C3%A9f%C3%A9rendaire-divise-les-%C3%A9glises-congolaises/a-79926558
[97] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20261111-rdc-promulgation-de-la-loi-sur-l-organisation-du-r%C3%A9f%C3%A9rendum-ce-que-cela-peut-changer
[98] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20261111-rdc-promulgation-de-la-loi-sur-l-organisation-du-r%C3%A9f%C3%A9rendum-ce-que-cela-peut-changer; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2120271311104577804
[99] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20261111-rdc-promulgation-de-la-loi-sur-l-organisation-du-r%C3%A9f%C3%A9rendum-ce-que-cela-peut-changer
[100] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20261111-rdc-promulgation-de-la-loi-sur-l-organisation-du-r%C3%A9f%C3%A9rendum-ce-que-cela-peut-changer
[101] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20261111-rdc-promulgation-de-la-loi-sur-l-organisation-du-r%C3%A9f%C3%A9rendum-ce-que-cela-peut-changer
[102] https://x.com/Presidence_RDC/status/2120849364113367101; https://lepotentiel dot cd/2026/11/12/cop31-a-antalya-tshisekedi-et-erdogan-consolident-laxe-kinshasa-ankara; https://x.com/YvesBuya1/status/2120863019823443983
[103] https://x.com/Presidence_RDC/status/2120849364113367101
[104] https://www.theafricareport.com/436340/us-africa-trump-picks-pastor-and-early-backer-as-us-ambassador-to-the-drc
[105] https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16506.doc.htm; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20261112-rdc-onu-ajoute-frn-front-refondation-nation-liste-de-mouvements-sous-sanctions-afc; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2120817019083723156; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2121647623094276160
[106] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/14/rdc-apres-lonu-le-royaume-uni-integre-son-tour-le-frn-de-joseph-kabila-dans-les; https://www.opensanctions.org/programs/GB-DRC; https://x.com/xtr_africa/status/2121455358577172727; https://english.congovirtuel dot com/british-sanctions-against-afc-m23-joseph-kabila-increasingly-exposed-to-diplomatic-and-financial-pressure
[107] https://x.com/USAmbRwanda/status/2122328566004363454
[108] https://x.com/USAmbRwanda/status/2122328566004363454; https://x.com/Trinity_Metals/status/2122387870887588167
[109] https://contents.trinity-metals.com/historic-agreement-to-supply-tungsten-concentrate-from-trinity-metals-in-rwanda-to-the-united-states; https://www.mining.com/trinity-metals-to-supply-tungsten-concentrate-from-rwanda-to-the-us; https://www.northernminer.com/news/rwanda-sends-first-tungsten-to-us/1003882038
[110] https://www.mining.com/trinity-metals-doubles-us-tungsten-concentrate-supply-to-20; https://www.engineeringnews.co dot za/article/trinity-metals-appoints-new-cfo-2026-08-25
Data Cutoff: November 10, 2026, at 1 P.M. EST*
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Key Takeaway: FRN conducted a major offensive through the Kahuzi-Biega National Park and on the RN3 to capture Bunyakiri town in Kalehe district in South Kivu. Officials from the Congolese, Burundian, and Rwandan governments attended the Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow in late October. Numerous Congolese army officers and fighters have reportedly defected to FRN since Joseph Kabila became its head on October 12. The United States and the DRC held the second meeting of the Joint Steering Committee for the US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement in Paris.

Kinetic Activity in Rutshuru & Eastern Masisi Districts
FRN clashed with pro-Congolese government Wazalendo and fighters from the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) in Rutshuru district in North Kivu. The FRN-aligned media outlet Kivu Morning Post reported that clashes occurred in the Tongo and Bambo groups in the Bwito chiefdom in western Rutshuru on November 2 as part of military operations that FRN carried out against Wazalendo and FDLR elements in the area near the Virunga National Park for several days.[1] Congolese government-aligned sources then claimed on social media on November 10 that Wazalendo fighters attacked FRN positions in Kakoro locality near Nyamilima town in the Binza group in Bwisha chiefdom in eastern Rutshuru close to the border with Uganda.[2]

Northern Axis: Lubero-Butembo-Beni-Bunia
Nothing significant to report.
Southern Axis: Bukavu-Uvira-Baraka-Kalemie
Fighting between FRN-aligned Twirwaneho fighters and pro-Congolese government fighters continued in the South Kivu highlands. A Twirwaneho-aligned media outlet claimed on social media that fighting broke out in the Kuwamabuye area on October 29 after pro-Congolese government forces attacked Twirwaneho positions.[3] Twirwaneho’s spokesperson, Fidèle Rugabo, and another Twirwaneho-aligned source claimed on social media that Twirwaneho had repelled the attacks in Kuwamabuye and that pro-Congolese government forces had shelled Nyamabuguma and Point Zéro on October 29.[4] Point Zéro is an operationally significant hilltop about 15 miles east of Minembwe on a local road. FRN reportedly targeted several Congolese army (FARDC) special force fighters further north of Minembwe in the area around the Bijombo group in Masango village in a drone strike on October 30, reportedly killing at least seven soldiers.[5] Masango is in the Basimukinji first group in the midlands northeast of Minembwe and has been the scene of significant fighting in recent months. One possible FARDC special force fighter claimed on social media that the strike may have been conducted by a Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2.[6] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed on social media that Twirwaneho commander Charles Sematama was present in Kuwamabuye around October 30 after several days of clashes.[7] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that fighting resumed on October 31 and November 1 and that pro-Congolese government forces took control of Kuwamabuye and three other operationally significant hills on the front line south of Minembwe, known as Natulonge, Kabanja, and Bissakara.[8] The Congolese media outlet Radio Maendeleo reported on social media on November 1 that the FARDC had captured several villages and consolidated their positions around Masango.[9] Rugabo denied that the FARDC captured the four hills south of Minembwe and Rugabo and Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed that Twirwaneho repelled pro-Congolese government force attacks on Kuwamabuye and Gipimo on November 2.[10] FRN’s political spokesperson, Lawrence Kanyuka, claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Wihene near Rugezi south of Minembwe and on Point Zéro on November 1 and 2.[11] Twirwaneho-aligned sources, Congolese journalist Héritier Munyampfura, and Congolese journalist Steve Mulindwa claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces continued conducting drone attacks on Wihene and Minembwe center, reportedly targeting Madegu center, Kakenge, and Irundu in two successive attacks, on November 3.[12] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted drone attacks on Minembwe center on November 3.[13] Rugabo denounced the attacks on Minembwe and Kakenge on social media on November 4.[14] The Congolese government-aligned media outlet Tazama RDC claimed on social media that the FARDC conducted the strike and had targeted a Twirwaneho military position.[15] Mulindwa reported on social media on November 4 that pro-Congolese government forces conducted new attacks on FRN in the Lulenge sector south of Minembwe near Lulimba at the crossroads of the RP1121 and RN5 since the weekend and had deployed several battalions to Lulenge.[16] Pro-Congolese government forces then reportedly conducted another drone attack on Kakenge on November 5, killing two children.[17] Rugabo denounced the attack on social media on November 5.[18] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly conducted attacks and clashed with Twirwaneho fighters on the Rugezi axis near Rugomero and Nyarurango and the Mukoko, Nyrauhinga, and Nyamabuguma areas east of Minembwe on November 6.[19] Kanyuka and Rugabo claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Point Zéro and Rugezi on November 8.[20] Rugabo claimed on social media that Twirwaneho repelled a pro-Congolese government force attack on the axis between Kuwamabuye and Kabanju on November 9, as fighting reportedly continued in the area.[21] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Point Zéro, Rugezi, Kimete, Nyarurango and Rugomero on November 9.[22] Rugabo claimed on social media that Twirwaneho dislodged pro-Congolese government forces and retook control control of Kimete and Kabanju on November 9.[23] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces then conducted attacks on the Ndondo area of Bijombo, particularly in Rubarati, Ruhuha, and Marimba to the northeast of Minembwe.[24] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces retook control of Kabanza, a hill above Kuwamabuye, and Kimete and Kashamata villages on November 10.[25] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted a drone strike that killed several Twirwaneho commanders near Kaziba on November 10.[26]
Clashes between FRN and pro-Congolese government forces broke out briefly in the Ruzizi Plain. Significant fighting had broken out in the Kaziba chiefdom in southern Walungu and near the Ruzizi Plain in mid-October and continued in lower intensity into late October.[27] Clashes reportedly occurred briefly near Mino village between Luvungi and Katagota and Rwege, an area between Katogota and Lubarika, on November 1, as both sides continued to reinforce their positions.[28] Kanyuka claimed in a statement on social media on November 4 that FRN did not maintain the intention to march on Uvira.[29]

Northwest Axis: Masisi-Walikale-Lubutu-Kisangani
FRN conducted a major offensive through the Kahuzi-Biega National Park (PNKB) and on the RN3 to capture Bunyakiri town in Kalehe district in South Kivu. Clashes reportedly broke out in the PNKB near Tshivanga on the edge of the park and the Kalonge cheifdom—serving as the junction between the RN3 in the PNKB and the Kabare district toward Cifunzi—as FRN launched the offensive on November 6.[30] Videos circulated on November 7 purportedly showing FRN fighters in Bitale—roughly 20 miles west of Tshivanga on the RN3 through the PNKB—as FRN fighters reportedly advanced from the PNKB using drones and anti-air defense systems, took control of Cifunzi as the main center in Kalonge, and dislodged pro-Congolese government fighters from Bitale and several other villages on the second axis toward Bunyakiri.[31] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly conducted counterattacks on FRN positions and captured Katasomwa, Nyawaronga and a place called Checheni near the northern tip of the PNKB in the Mubugu highlands on November 8.[32] The Mbugu area connects further north toward the Ziralo group in northern Kalehe near the border with North Kivu through mountain trails. Radio Maendeleo reported on social media that FRN reinforced its position heavily in Bushaku, which is close to Katasomwa to the east toward the RN2, in a likely attempt to stop any Wazalendo advance from Katasomwa toward the RN2 on November 8, as some sources claimed that FRN had already recaptured Katasomwa.[33] Fighting reportedly resumed on the Bunyakiri axis on November 8, as pro-Congolese government forces attempted to halt the FRN advance around Bitale but failed as FRN consolidated their positions between Kalonge and the front line and captured Bulambika—about two miles from Bunyakiri center and three miles from the Kichanga airfield and supply center—on the second axis before capturing Bunyakiri center and continuing their advance on the RN3 toward Kambale.[34] Local civil society reportedly estimated that FRN advanced and took control of somewhere between 12 and 37 miles of the RN3 within just two days.[35] The distance between Tshivanga on the eastern side of the PNKB and Kambale is about 33 miles on the poorly maintained RN3. Bulambika is the largest town in the Kalima group in the Buhavu chiefdom in Kalehe.[36] Kichanga was the main supply center for all Wazalendo and FARDC troops operating throughout Kalehe and also used for operations in Kabare and Masisi.[37] Bulambika has administrative offices, a general hospital, a health zone office, a Catholic parish, and a central prison.[38] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly withdrew northwest on the RN3 toward Irangi in the Hombo Sud sector after FRN captured Bulambika and Bunyakiri.[39] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces recaptured Katasomwa on November 8.[40] Rumors circulated that eco-guards from the PNKB and some FARDC officers on the RN3 supported the FRN’s capture of Bitale on November 7, which the eco-guards denied in a statement issued on November 9.[41] Some sources indicated that FRN had regained control of Katsomwa around November 9.[42] FRN reportedly stopped their advance at Kambale on November 9, although other sources reported that FRN had advanced a few miles further on the RN3 as far as Kambegeti.[43] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Katasomwa, Kidoveri, and Kalongi in the Bushaku area on November 9.[44] The FARDC said on November 9 that it would mount a counteroffensive and retake positions that it lost on the Bunyakiri axis.[45] Fighting reportedly resumed near Kambale on November 9 as pro-Congolese government forces tried to retake lost positions.[46] Munyampfura reported on social media on November 9 that FRN fighters were deployed as far as Colobera on the Kalonge axis.[47] Radio Maendeleo reported on November 9 that the Kalonge chiefdom was almost entirely under FRN control and that the rebels had occupied a former camp that served as an FARDC headquarters and another camp considered a Wazalendo stronghold.[48] The FRN announced salongo in Bunyakiri and captured areas for November 14 around November 10.[49] FRN reportedly captured several localities around Katasomwa and the Bushaku area on November 10, including Kitendebwa, Kalongi, Kiduveri, Nyamugari, Mwamiwaijwi, and Mushunguti, after dislodging pro-Congolese government fighters.[50] Wazalendo fighters announced an offensive further north in Ziralo on November 10 with the aim to capture Numbi.[51] Wazalendo fighters then claimed that they retook Chambombo in Ziralo on November 10.[52] Fighting reportedly continued in Kambegeti on the RN3 on November 10 after pro-Congolese government fighters failed to conduct a counteroffensive on Kambale and were pushed back.[53] The FARDC denounced a disinformation campaign on November 10 that it said circulated accusations on social media that portrayed certain FARDC commanders as being in collusion with FRN.[54]
Pro-Congolese government forces launched an offensive against FRN near the RP529 around Kazinga town in North Kivu. Wazalendo fighters reportedly conducted attacks on and clashed with FRN on the hills of Burubi near Muhanga between Kibati and Kashebere on October 30.[55] Fighting reportedly broke out further south in Kazinga on October 31, as pro-government forces launched attacks on FRN positions around the town and then claimed control of it.[56] Fighting then reportedly moved toward Mahanga center and Kilongo on November 3 as pro-Congolese government forces continued their offensive.[57] Mahanga is roughly 10 miles southwest of Nyabiondo town. Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Mahanga, Buhimba, and Kazinga on November 3.[58] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly attacked and claimed control of Mirindano village, which is about five miles south of Mahanga on a local road, on November 3 and 4.[59] The FARDC reportedly then took control of Mahanga, Kilongo, and Kibanda from FRN on November 4, after two days of combat.[60] Fighting reportedly resumed in Kibati on the RP529 on November 5, after FARDC-Wazalendo fighters conducted attacks on FRN positions.[61] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Mahanga and Buhimba on November 6.[62] Clashes reportedly continued in Mahanga and Buhimba on November 6, as the two sides split control of Mahanga and FRN attempted to recapture full control of the town.[63] Actualite.cd reported that clashes continued in Kibati for the second day on November 6 as the two sides continued to share control of the area.[64] Actualite.cd reported on November 7 that pro-Congolese government forces repelled the FRN counterattacks on Mahanga.[65] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on FRN positions further south in southern Masisi in Muhayirwa and Katoyi on November 7 and 8.[66] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Mahanga and Buhimba on November 8.[67] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Kazinga and Mahanga on November 9.[68]
Fighting reportedly briefly broke out on the RP1030 near the Masisi-Walikale border in North Kivu after FRN attacked pro-Congolese government positions. Actualite.cd reported that FRN targeted Wazalendo and FARDC positions in Minjenje in drone attacks on November 4.[69] Actualite.cd reported separately that fighting then broke out on November 7 after FRN attacked pro-Congolese government positions in Malemo.[70]


Southwest Axis: Bukavu-Kamituga-Shabunda-Kindu
Pro-Congolese government fighters attacked FRN in several areas near the RP503 on the Nzibira axis in the Walungu district highlands southwest of Bukavu in South Kivu. Wazalendo fighters had conducted an incursion in Kaniola near Walungu town and clashed with FRN on October 21.[71] Radio Maendeleo reported that clashes between FRN and Wazalendo fighters in several villages in the Kamisimbi group, which is north of Walungu town and about six miles south of Bukavu center near the RN2, on November 3.[72] Fighting reportedly resumed on November 5, when Wazalendo fighters clashed with FRN in Nzibira, Luntukulu, Nyamargehe, Kishadu, and Kaniola, likely initiated by Wazalendo elements.[73] Kaniola is about six miles west of Walungu town. Luntukulu is about 10 miles south of Nzibira in the Luindi chiefdom in northern Mwenga. Kishadu is about six miles west of Nzibira on the RP503. Nyamarhege is about six miles from Nzibira. Tazama RDC claimed on social media that fighting also took place in several remote localities in the Luhago group, which is about eight miles north of Nzibira on a local road in the Ninja chiefdom in southern Kabare district, on November 5.[74] Congolese-government aligned sources also claimed that Wazalendo fighters attacked FRN positions in Chulwe and Nzibira on November 5.[75] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Nyamarhege, Lulaba, and Chulwe in the Nzibira area on November 5.[76] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that Wazalendo fighters took control of Chulwe on November 6, as fighting reportedly continued on the RP503 axis and between Nzibira and Luntukulu.[77] Local sources told Actualite.cd on November 6 that the FARDC and its allies had launched an offensive against FRN.[78]
Pro-Congolese government fighters likely also attacked FRN on the front line on the RN2 in Mwenga district in South Kivu. Fighting reportedly broke out in Kasika village, which is the seat of Luindi about 14 miles north of the government-controlled town of Mwenga on the RN2, and Kidasa, Kalambi, Kionvu, and Kigongo villages on November 5.[79] Kidasa and Kalambi are about three and six miles further south of Kasika on the RN2, respectively. Kionvu is a small village to the east of Kalambi off the RN2.[80] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces initiated the engagements in Kasika.[81] Kanyula claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Kasika again on November 6.[82] Fighting reportedly continued around Kasika on November 6, with both sides largely maintaining their positions.[83]

Major Political Developments
Officials from the Congolese, Burundian, and Rwandan governments attended the Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow in late October. Russian President Vladimir Putin co-chaired the third Russia-Africa Summit with Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye as African Union chair in Moscow on October 28 and 29.[84] DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan Prime Minister Justin Nsengiyumva also attended the summit.[85] Tshisekedi said that he was seeking Russian support to enforce UN resolutions related to the war in the eastern DRC.[86] Rwanda and Russia’s Rosatom signed a memorandum of understanding to advance the assessment and development of Rwanda’s nuclear infrastructure, including plans for a small modular reactor, on October 28.[87] The DRC and Russia signed three bilateral agreements that included formalizing the creation of an intergovernmental commission.[88] Ndayishimiye held a bilateral meeting with Putin on October 29.[89] Tshisekedi held bilateral talks with Putin at the Kremlin on October 30.[90] Tshisekedi told Putin that the Washington and Doha peace processes had failed to deliver, sought increased bilateral cooperation, and urged him to help secure an extension of MONUSCO’s mandate.[91] Putin said that the DRC was one of Russia’s “most promising partners in Africa.”[92] Tshisekedi and Ndayishimiye also received honorary doctorates from a university in Moscow.[93]
Tshisekedi held a press conference with a Congolese diaspora audience in Moscow to discuss a range of issues on October 30.[94] Tshisekedi said that Russia will become an “even more important” partner for the DRC.[95] Tshisekedi dismissed the judicial investigation launched by Belgian authorities into alleged corruption involving his family as a “plot” concocted by his “enemies” and a “fake lawyer who has been dealing with Rwandans for 30 years” and said that he had directed his lawyers to “counterattack.”[96] The searches of several properties in Belgium linked to Tshisekedi’s family initiated by Belgian authorities in October had required an independent judicial assessment of the allegations initially filed in July 2025.[97] Tshisekedi claimed that former DRC President Joseph Kabila had once remarked to him when they were on good terms that he was not fond of Rwanda, claiming again that Kabila was a puppet president serving Rwandan interests.[98] Tshisekedi reiterated the DRC’s position that the FDLR issue was a “pretext” used by Rwanda and claimed that the Congolese government had begun gathering FDLR members in Kitona, pending their transfer to host countries or voluntary repatriation to Rwanda.[99] Tshisekedi claimed further that an unnamed African head of state had agreed to host them but was subsequently threatened by Rwandan President Paul Kagame who warned against assisting the DRC with the matter.[100] The French magazine Jeune Afrique reported that Congolese regional integration minister Floribert Anzuluni had considered Togo and Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé as a potential host country for demobilized FDLR fighters.[101] The report said that Togo had “politely declined” to host FDLR members, however, and cited two sources who said that the decision was not due to pressure from Rwanda.[102] An unnamed source close to Togolese mediation told Jeune Afrique that Togolese authorities were “surprised” that the Congolese government was unilaterally advancing the demobilization plan and “acting as the mouthpiece for the FDLR.”[103] Tshisekedi also announced on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa summit that a Congolese national dialogue was making progress but the government would only include those who have “nothing to do with Rwanda.”[104] Tshisekedi explained why he was “combatting” the current Congolese constitution, referring to issues with the current constitution and sovereignty-related concerns.[105] Tshisekedi also reiterated the government’s position that the death of Manassé Lomboto, a bodyguard for opposition leader Prince Epenge who was likely killed by militants linked to Tshisekedi’s political party during protests in Kinshasa in mid-September, was due to “illness” and defended Epenge’s arrest for comments he made related to Lomboto as Epenge was attempting to travel to Europe in late October.[106] The Congolese political opposition denounced Tshisekedi’s remarks on Lomboto and accused the president of trying to influence and co-opt the justice system.[107]
Numerous FARDC officers and fighters have reportedly defected to FRN since Kabila became its head on October 12. The Congolese defense minister had instructed the FARDC chief of staff to issue an indefinite ban on FARDC officers from leaving the country without prior authorization on October 15 after a defense council meeting that Tshisekedi chaired on October 14.[108] A copy of the order was sent to the Maison Militaire, Congolese military intelligence, and the DRC’s directorate of migration.[109] Kanyuka claimed on October 18 that more than 120 “compatriots who came from Kinshasa” had joined FRN.[110] FARDC Brigadier General François Kamanzi, commander of military operations in Kongo Central province, reportedly defected from the FARDC and joined FRN by transiting through Angola in late October.[111] Kamanzi is reportedly a Congolese Tutsi from Rutshuru district in North Kivu and previously served in other Tutsi-led movements in the eastern DRC.[112] Kanyuka had also claimed on October 27 that two other FARDC officers had defected to FRN.[113] Manzi Willy, the FRN vice governor of North Kivu, claimed on social media on October 27 that Lieutenant Arnold Lemba Lula from the Garde républicaine (GR) had defected to join FRN.[114] Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu, a military and security analyst, said on social media on October 27 after Kamanzi’s defection that several other FARDC general and senior officers were also preparing to join FRN in the coming weeks.[115] FARDC Colonel Ghislain Umba Ndolo, the deputy commander for operations and intelligence of an infantry brigade based in Tanganyika province, reportedly defected around October 28.[116] FARDC Major Jean Twite Kumwimba, a member of the GR, reportedly then defected and arrived in Goma.[117] FRN-aligned sources claimed on October 30 that Germain Katanga, a former FARDC Brigadier General, joined FRN.[118] An unverified report from Rwandan media outlet KT Press on October 30 claimed that these officers and more than 600 FARDC soldiers had joined FRN.[119] The outlet cited regional accounts that claimed that 635 FARDC soldiers, led by seven officers, crossed into FRN-controlled territory through Nzibira in South Kivu on October 28.[120] The FARDC’s spokesperson claimed in early November that Kamanzi was a double agent and had several AFC-M23 military officers killed by providing information on their positions when he was in the army.[121]
The International Contact Group for the Great Lakes (ICG) expressed concern over the creation of FRN and urged all parties to remain committed to the Washington and Doha process in its first statement since August. The ICG, which France chairs and which includes the United States, Canada, the European Union, and several other European countries, released a statement on October 30 encouraging all parties to remain committed to a “peace resolution of the conflict and to fulfill their obligations without delay.”[122] The ICG said that it “categorically rejects the pursuit of political objectives through the use of violence,” a position directed at the newly formed FRN.[123] The statement did not call for FRN’s exclusion from a political settlement or explicitly rule out negotiations with its representatives. The group reiterated the need for all parties to “respect the rule of law” and the Congolese constitution, noting the “importance of a peaceful and inclusive inter-Congolese dialogue involving all key Congolese stakeholders as an essential prerequisite for lasting peace in the DRC.”[124] Tshisekedi had said on October 24 in a meeting with his political coalition that he “did not like” the constitution, a day after the National Assembly had adopted the law for organizing a referendum on constitutional revision.[125] The group also noted that the rule of law and the “protection of fundamental rights is crucial to ensure that all political parties and civil society organizations can freely exercise their role.”[126] ICG recalled its previous statement on the FDLR demobilization plan and called on Congolese authorities to present an “action plan and timeline” for the protocol.[127]
Envoys representing Tshisekedi and Kabila reportedly attempted to broker some form of understanding shortly before Kabila formally launched the FRN in mid-October. The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported on November 11 that Kabila envoy Jean Mbuyu Luyongola initiated a mediation effort with Tshisekedi adviser Fortunat Biselele a few weeks before Kabila announced the FRN on October 12.[128] The report said that Kabila conveyed through Luyongola that he wanted to establish a channel of communication with Tshisekedi.[129] The report said that Luyongola then met with Bisele and Tshisekedi in Tshisekedi’s office in Kinshasa for two hours.[130] The report said that Luyongola raised the issue of the death sentence that the government leveled on Kabila in September 2025.[131] Tshisekedi reportedly said the sentence could be discussed if Kabila left Goma, condemned Rwanda, and cut all ties with the rebels.[132] Kabila said through Luyongola that the outcome of the discussions and any commitments made by the Congolese government must be put in writing.[133] The report said that the effort came to nothing, and Kabila announced the formation of the FRN on October 12.[134] Kabila denied through M23-aligned journalist Steve Wembi on social media on November 2 that Kabila had dispatched an envoy to meet with Tshisekedi.[135] Exiled Congolese journalist Pero Luwara said on social media on November 2 that a “rapprochement” between the two heavyweights’ envoys, including by François Muamba on Kabila’s side, was a “rumor” and offered an alternative explanation of the event.[136] Luwara claimed that around early October Biselele and Eberande Kolongele, a Tshisekedi security adviser, had brought in Luyongola from his home “almost by force of arms” to deliver a message to Kabila that he wanted to establish a channel of communication.[137] Luwara claimed that Kabila rejected the overture and indicated that he had “nothing to say” to Tshisekedi, ending the matter.[138] Kabila’s close associates accused Tshisekedi of disseminating a “truncated” version of the affair.[139]
The United States announced that it would terminate Rwanda from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade preference program. US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said on November 2 that the United States would exclude Rwanda and South Africa for “engaging in practices that are inconsistent with AGOA’s eligibility criteria” beginning in January 2027.[140] Greer’s office said that these practices included those that “pose a threat to US national security and foreign policy interests” in Africa.[141] Greer said that the Trump administration was concerned about “trade and investment barriers, rule of law, political pluralism, internationally recognized worker rights, human rights, and threats to US national security and foreign policy interests” in Rwanda.[142] The United States has significantly increased diplomatic and political pressure on Rwanda related to the war in the eastern DRC since early 2026. Rwandan or M23-linked persons and entities account for 15 of the 16 individuals and entities sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in the Great Lakes region in 2026.[143] The United States has framed these actions as enforcement measures to support the implementation of the Washington Peace Accords (WPA). Cameron Hudson, a former State Department and National Security Council official on Africa, told the French outlet Le Monde on November 4 after Rwanda’s exclusion from AGOA that the United States has “only one strategic interest in the DRC: to get its hands on the minerals. Its entire policy in the region serves this objective.”[144]
MONUSCO head James Swan traveled to Goma to meet with senior FRN officials in early November. Swan and a delegation of senior UN officials arrived in Goma on November 2 and met with Kabila and other senior FRN officials on November 3.[145] This is the first exchange between senior UN officials and Kabila since he launched FRN. The exchanges reportedly focused on the ceasefire, the peace process, the debate on changing the Congolese constitution, and MONUSCO’s mandate.[146] MONUSCO framed the trip as part of Swan’s regular consultations in the eastern DRC.[147] Swan also met with officials from the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism.[148] Bertrand Bisimwa, one of the FRN vice presidents, said after the meeting with Swan that FRN was not in favor of the renewal or expansion of MONUSCO’s mandate but recognized the role that it plays under the Doha process to support the ceasefire verification mechanism.[149] Bisimwa claimed that FRN inherited AFC-M23’s commitments to the Doha process and remain committed to them.[150] Bisimwa said the FRN views the Doha agreements as based on the current constitutional order, arguing that any challenge to it would erode the trust necessary for their implementation and risk the “collapse” of the Doha process.[151] These comments effectively placed the constitutional question at the center of international mediators’ concerns, rather than framing it solely as an internal Congolese dispute.[152] FRN demanded an “official clarification” from the Congolese government regarding the referendum law and Tshisekedi’s October 24 and 30 remarks on the constitution and requested that the issue be included on the agenda for the next round of talks in a November 1 letter to Qatari mediators.[153]
The Congolese interior minister threatened to take legal action against Article 64 Coalition (C64) members who travel to FRN-controlled areas to discuss an inclusive national dialogue. C64 members had met in Italy in late October for their first-in person meeting the coalition’s creation in May.[154] The C64’s five leaders, Martin Fayulu, Jean-Marc Kabund, Moïse Katumbi, Augustin Matata Ponyo, and Delly Sesanga, said in a statement on October 27 that they rejected both constitutional change and armed rebellion and would seek to meet Tshisekedi and Kabila separately “to find a Congolese solution to the crisis” and agree to a “genuine inclusive national dialogue.”[155] C64 leaders then met with European officials in Brussels on October 29 and Paris on November 2.[156] Moïse Katumbi reaffirmed the coalition’s opposition to constitutional revision and armed rebellion in an interview with Jeune Afrique on November 3 and said that its leaders planned to travel to Togo, Kenya, South Africa, Angola, Uganda, and Ethiopia.[157] Katumbi said that C64 would begin the tour to promote an inclusive national dialogue with a meeting with Tshisekedi in Kinshasa but that he and former DRC Prime Minister Matata Ponyo would not attend.[158] Katumbi said that C64 members would then all travel to Goma to meet with Kabila publicly.[159] Katumbi argued that “Goma is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Kabila is Congolese,” and that the Congolese government is negotiating with FRN directly in Doha.[160] Katumbi said that he had no intention of meeting with Kagame and recalled that he and Tshisekedi had met with Kagame when they were both in the opposition.[161] Jacquemin Shabani, the DRC Deputy Prime Minister for the Interior, responded to Katumbi’s remarks in his own interview with Jeune Afrique on November 4, threatening that any political figure traveling to Goma to meet with Kabila would face “criminal penalties” similar to the death penalty issued against Kabila.[162]
The Congolese government is reportedly trying to formulate a more assertive diplomatic campaign within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) against Eswatini and other member states it views as sympathetic to Kabila. Africa Intelligence reported on November 6 that the Congolese government is trying to counter the influence of Eswatini, which issued Kabila a diplomatic passport, and other SADC member states, including South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, that maintain close ties with Kabila.[163] The report said that Tshisekedi’s government views Eswatini as Kabila’s primary diplomatic ally in SADC and is strengthening its diplomatic efforts to counter Eswatini and Kabila’s other supporters in the bloc.[164] The report noted that Eswatini officials and other regional leaders and diplomats are displeased with the Tshisekedi government’s treatment of Kabila, particularly the death penalty conviction in 2025.[165] The report said that the DRC’s national security council, Floribert Anzuluni, and the Congolese ambassador to Botswana and permanent representative to SADC are “closely monitoring” the issue with Eswatini.[166]
The Congolese government is threatening to withdraw from the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) if Rwanda’s Louise Mushikiwabo wins a third term as the organization’s secretary-general at an upcoming summit. Leaders of the OIF’s 53 member states will choose the next secretary-general at a summit in Cambodia on November 15 and 16.[167] The DRC nominated Juliana Amato Lumumba, who is the daughter of Congolese independence leader Patrice Lumumba, in early 2026 to challenge Rwandan Louise Mushikiwabo, a former Rwandan foreign minister who has led the OIF since January 2019. The Congolese government has long accused Mushikiwabo and the OIF of failing to adequately criticize Rwanda’s alleged actions, describing the organization under her leadership as a “second Rwandan embassy” in Paris.[168] Rwandan officials have rejected attempts to frame the election as a bilateral dispute and defended Mushikiwabo’s candidacy on the basis of her record as OIF head.[169] Jeune Afrique reported that Tshisekedi told the French foreign minister during a meeting on October 2 in Kinshasa that the DRC could withdraw from the OIF if Mushikiwabo secured a third term, prompting French officials to increase diplomatic efforts between the DRC and Rwanda to avoid the DRC’s withdrawal, including a reported proposal by French President Emmanuel Macron to delay the election by one or two years while retaining Mushikiwabo—which Tshisekedi rejected—among other stopgap measures.[170] The Congolese government is still reportedly considering leaving the OIF if Mushikiwabo is reelected.[171] Most observers see the race as primarily a contest between Mushikiwabo and Romania’s Dacian Cioloș, as Lumumba is less well-known and her campaign has lost momentum following multiple difficulties.[172] Congolese government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya cited “Congolese public opinion” on November 10 as reaffirmation that DRC was considering withdrawing from the organization if Mushikiwabo was reelected.[173]
Significant US-Backed Economic Activity
The United States and the DRC held the second meeting of the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) for the US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) in Paris. Senior US and Congolese officials met in Paris on November 5 for the JSC’s second meeting, co-chaired by Congolese economy minister Daniel Mukoko Samba and attended by the DRC’s minister for mines.[174] The readout said that the SPA was making progress since the inaugural JSC meeting in February, welcoming growing US private-sector interest in the Strategic Assert Reserve (SAR) and an expanding investment pipeline.[175] The readout said that the JSC received a briefing from the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) on its growing investment pipeline in the DRC.[176] The JSC highlighted progress on several priority initiatives, including the signing of a 30-year concession agreement with a Portuguese construction company to upgrade and manage a key railway section between a town on the DRC-Angola border and another town on the DRC-Zambia border in August, ongoing discussions surrounding the Grand Inga hydropower project, and potential opportunities for US firms in critical minerals processing, exports, and energy development.[177] The JSC also noted the DRC’s recent adoption of legislation setting tax and customs rules for projects under the agreement.[178] Samba said on November 6 that the DRC wants to see the partnership translate into tangible economic benefits, arguing that its success should be judged by completed projects.[179] The readout from the meeting outlined no new investment pledges or specific projects slated to receive financing.
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[25] https://x.com/johnsonhuit/status/2120162508623282406; https://x.com/michombero/status/2120168669632196718; https://x.com/YvesBuya1/status/2120169581826232367; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2120169965844062337; https://x.com/amluzayamo/status/2120170819925979447; https://x.com/simeonisako13/status/2120173249275318612; https://x.com/Wazalendos243/status/2120179638626349501; https://x.com/PatrickLokala_/status/2120185620223918236; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2120173625240121384; https://x.com/243Afro12253/status/2120189721926369638
[26] https://x.com/amluzayamo/status/2120187788674900176; https://x.com/Wazalendos243/status/2120193709853814935; https://x.com/Wazalendos243/status/2120194179753988285
[27] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/october-21-2026; https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/october-28-2026
[28] https://x.com/BishengaPeter/status/2116759883328467115; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2116879846076723570; https://x.com/maendeleo_radio/status/2116881424561197473; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2116897681033273832; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2116897806434578858; https://x.com/MulengeMediaNet/status/2116935851053621648; https://x.com/amluzayamo/status/2117133735078306114; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2117138588827517282; https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/2117264656070738249; https://x.com/johnsonhuit/status/2117294268448395703; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2117332368646439103; https://x.com/243Afro12253/status/2117516985802408084; https://7sur7 dot cd/2026/11/02/sud-kivu-situation-securitaire-instable-dans-la-plaine-de-ruzizi-pres-de-65-km-de-la; https://radiomaendeleo dot org/uvira-de-nouveaux-deplacements-de-population-signales-a-katogota-et-luvungi-apres-plusieurs-jours-de-tirs; https://radiomaendeleo dot org/sud-kivu-de-nouveaux-deplacements-de-population-signales-dans-la-plaine-de-la-ruzizi-apres-des-tirs-a-katogota; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2118015467398832297
[29] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2117935079641034769
[30] https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2118648919118725374; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2118688360034103350; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2118701345847005404; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2118708614244262129; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2118714722367246377; https://x.com/MeckyKayiranga/status/2118945588754387447; https://x.com/TheMwamiDRC/status/2119025408230207621; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2119058812388712881; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/06/rdc-les-combats-entre-les-rebelles-du-frn-et-larmee-se-generalisent-dans-plusieurs
[31] https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2118968858685968772; https://x.com/RutegaBin/status/2118982448537116737; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2119004827556413476; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2119058812388712881; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2119074449727054205; https://x.com/TopKivu/status/2119082014833836147; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2119095979383070870; https://x.com/Kivuinfo24/status/2119096555173019862; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2119098585472274478; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2119107271812935930; https://x.com/Hastalavista364/status/2119118953096032715; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/2119114868875808768; https://x.com/michombero/status/2119115727147835511; https://x.com/ClmentMuya2/status/2119130301917995341; https://x.com/kivunewstoday/status/2119144910972432454; https://x.com/Newsupdateer/status/2119136343234158803; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2119149681913798928; https://x.com/Newsupdateer/status/2119350204654567887; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/07/sud-kivu-kalonge-et-bitale-passent-sous-controle-des-rebelles-du-frn; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/09/rdc-kalehe-des-centaines-de-menages-de-deplaces-affluent-hombo-apres-loccupation-de; https://radiomaendeleo dot org/kalehe-de-violents-combats-et-de-nouveaux-deplacements-de-population-signales-sur-plusieurs-axes
[32] https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2119345156931363229; https://x.com/amluzayamo/status/2119370650297012729; https://x.com/maendeleo_radio/status/2119425457984614489; https://x.com/johnsonhuit/status/2119430330360672677; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/08/kalehe-katasomwa-repasse-sous-controle-de-larmee
[33] https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2119362517054947589; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2119362517054947589; https://x.com/maendeleo_radio/status/2119425457984614489; https://x.com/243Afro12253/status/2119454155039559898; https://x.com/Hastalavista364/status/2119467351712153979; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2119374744768167953; https://x.com/VolcansLes/status/2119381559459594437
[34] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2119387100424413218; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2119420651416985712; https://x.com/VolcansLes/status/2119428350888267854; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/2119428684339621916; https://x.com/maendeleo_radio/status/2119425457984614489; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2119444933408878626; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/2119446889267400994; https://x.com/michombero/status/2119448195835064726; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2119498665547194741; https://x.com/byobemalenga/status/2119509378264924492; https://x.com/VolcansLes/status/2119511274791006341; https://x.com/MeckyKayiranga/status/2119528294257156229; https://x.com/ClmentMuya2/status/2119549494572527864; https://laprunellerdc dot cd/kalehe-le-frn-m23-signale-en-progression-sur-plusieurs-axes-la-situation-securitaire-reste-confuse; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/09/kalehe-le-frn-prend-le-controle-de-bunyakiri-et-bulambika; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20261110-rdc-offensive-des-combattants-du-frn-au-sud-kivu-plusieurs-localit%C3%A9s-tombent-sous-leur-contr%C3%B4le; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/08/kalehe-reprise-des-affrontements-entre-rfn-et-fardcwazalendo-bitale; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/08/kalehe-les-rebelles-du-frn-prennent-le-controle-de-bulambika
[35] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2119498665547194741; https://x.com/michombero/status/2119641651215737177; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20261110-rdc-offensive-des-combattants-du-frn-au-sud-kivu-plusieurs-localit%C3%A9s-tombent-sous-leur-contr%C3%B4le
[36] https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2119421535907627009; https://x.com/maendeleo_radio/status/2119425457984614489
[37] https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2119421535907627009; https://x.com/maendeleo_radio/status/2119425457984614489; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/09/kalehe-le-frn-prend-le-controle-de-bunyakiri-et-bulambika; https://radiomaendeleo dot org/kalehe-de-violents-combats-et-de-nouveaux-deplacements-de-population-signales-sur-plusieurs-axes
[38] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/09/rdc-la-chute-de-bulambika-aux-mains-du-frn-fait-craindre-une-progression-vers-hombo-et
[39] https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2119443636173611498; https://x.com/michombero/status/2119448195835064726; https://infos-directes dot com/kalehe-apres-bitale-le-frn-prend-bunyakiri-et-bulambika-les-fardc-et-leurs-allies-se-replient-vers-irangi; https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/2119479386671907033; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/09/kalehe-le-frn-prend-le-controle-de-bunyakiri-et-bulambika
[40] https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2119500204386959456; https://x.com/Wazalendos243/status/2119508449889247445; https://x.com/IsralMutombo11/status/2119513996755681791; https://x.com/michombero/status/2119519742679544072; https://x.com/kivupulse1/status/2119523820126286304; https://x.com/simeonisako13/status/2119524770932789691; https://x.com/Cap_Brave/status/2119530198051799152; https://x.com/Wazalendos243/status/2119536882950492275; https://x.com/YvesBuya1/status/2119550435421818959; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2119659721456071087; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2119682626046906457
[41] https://x.com/michombero/status/2119641651215737177; https://x.com/7sur7_cd/status/2119780948329791653; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/09/prise-de-bitale-par-le-frn-le-parc-national-de-kahuzi-biega-dement-toute-implication-de
[42] https://laprunellerdc dot cd/kalehe-le-frn-m23-signale-en-progression-sur-plusieurs-axes-la-situation-securitaire-reste-confuse; https://x.com/byobemalenga/status/2119753243051868327
[43] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2119682626046906457; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2119687207220863007; https://x.com/ClmentMuya2/status/2119752289975980381; https://x.com/byobemalenga/status/2119753243051868327; https://x.com/michombero/status/2119803168447947012; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120050518839996709; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120072347193323990
[44] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2119788933609353497
[45] https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2119794954188861510; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/09/kalehe-larmee-annonce-une-contre-offensive-pour-reconquerir-les-zones-de-bunyakiri
[46] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2119815566143746387; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2119828332728725994; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2119846354889699771; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2119843320814076086; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2120049084702568643; https://x.com/amluzayamo/status/2120051351472296082; https://x.com/Officier243/status/2120097722170556444; https://x.com/afrikarabia/status/2120082457647104331
[47] https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2119828332728725994
[48] https://radiomaendeleo dot org/kalehe-de-violents-combats-et-de-nouveaux-deplacements-de-population-signales-sur-plusieurs-axes
[49] https://x.com/RutegaBin/status/2120061251623497915; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120050518839996709
[50] https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/10/sud-kivu-plusieurs-localites-de-kalehe-passent-sous-le-controle-du-frn; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2120095303114334430; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2120099248867778839; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2120119310790140302; https://x.com/Kivuinfo24/status/2120146448394137770; https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/2120148636063445386
[51] https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2120081158717177938
[52] https://x.com/michombero/status/2120110407666835729; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2120110466051572188; https://x.com/michombero/status/2120112792556691472; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2120120979607150764; https://x.com/243Afro12253/status/2120140030136238214; https://x.com/VolcansLes/status/2120142237803708784; https://x.com/Cap_Brave/status/2120156252865016039; https://x.com/johnsonhuit/status/2120163290080788866; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2120174289429119279; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2120178005515415566
[53] https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2120163451834368455; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2120166250823246138; https://x.com/243Afro12253/status/2120190447423553678
[54] https://www.radiookapi dot net/2026/11/10/actualite/securite/larmee-denonce-une-campagne-de-desinformation-visant-ses-officiers
[55] https://x.com/KivuAlerte24/status/2116078568438407541; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2116079362030059540; https://actualite dot cd/2026/10/30/walikale-des-combats-signales-depuis-tot-le-matin-sur-les-collines-de-burubi-pres-de; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/10/30/walikale-violents-combats-entre-le-frn-et-les-fardc-a-burubi; https://actualite dot cd/2026/10/31/walikale-accalmie-precaire-burubi-pres-de-kashebere-apres-les-affrontements-entre
[56] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2116395047071482223; https://x.com/243Afro12253/status/2116407040507826414; https://x.com/amluzayamo/status/2116412084535664723; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2116414916466794608; https://x.com/johnsonhuit/status/2116432451627073564; https://x.com/michombero/status/2116459035201540428; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2116475495613128733; https://x.com/Officier243/status/2116475963647348873; https://x.com/DRCNewsToday/status/2116559811370185003; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2116607874252087459; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2116790644299485304; https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2116813587620475258; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2116829461710557470; https://x.com/VolcansLes/status/2116830358146543991; https://x.com/johnsonhuit/status/2116837836183810411; https://x.com/Wazalendos243/status/2116850970575372381; https://x.com/ClmentMuya2/status/2116856414652043326; https://x.com/michombero/status/2116867912237494640; https://x.com/amluzayamo/status/2116871180091105300; https://x.com/Officier243/status/2116872393633517769; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2116874967354908959; https://x.com/ClmentMuya2/status/2116916715904700707; https://x.com/Newsupdateer/status/2116919805714575751; https://x.com/243Afro12253/status/2116924358434402742; https://x.com/243Afro12253/status/2116939763785879778; https://x.com/amluzayamo/status/2116940151070888115; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2026/10/31/actualite/securite/les-fardc-annoncent-avoir-repris-deux-positions-du-frn-lors-de; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/01/masisi-larmee-reprend-le-controle-de-lagglomeration-strategique-de-kazinga-apres-des; https://x.com/Cap_Brave/status/2117244649798553829
[57] https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2117567789233823935; https://x.com/kivunewstoday/status/2117609556817633459; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2117661659758276826; https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2117685355910455600; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/03/masisi-violents-combats-a-mahanga-et-kazinga-entre-le-frn-et-les-fardc; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/2117624637932658848; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2026/11/04/actualite/securite/au-moins-quatre-civils-tues-dans-des-affrontements-entre-les-fardc-et
[58] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2117576120383979996; https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2117685355910455600; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2117570087339340056
[59] https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2117960043953844375; https://x.com/amluzayamo/status/2118007705818354148; https://x.com/Cap_Brave/status/2118014720623976839; https://x.com/Wazalendos243/status/2118020725336318359; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2118049668701528547; https://x.com/johnsonhuit/status/2118205050044428722; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/03/masisi-les-fardc-et-le-frn-saffrontent-mirindano; https://x.com/Wazalendos243/status/2117529641149739123; https://x.com/johnsonhuit/status/2117535158538502533; https://x.com/VolcansLes/status/2117560053712535628; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2026/11/04/actualite/securite/au-moins-quatre-civils-tues-dans-des-affrontements-entre-les-fardc-et
[60] https://www.radiookapi dot net/2026/11/05/actualite/securite/combats-masisi-les-fardc-reprennent-le-controle-des-villages-de; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2118233486469271788; https://x.com/amluzayamo/status/2118235609999270037; https://x.com/Wazalendos243/status/2118237973661495512; https://x.com/byobemalenga/status/2118238223465898292; https://x.com/michombero/status/2118247275952492638; https://x.com/johnsonhuit/status/2118251097873650120; https://x.com/betordc/status/2118271191697743954; https://x.com/mediacongo/status/2118272740067307824; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2118328963458007331; https://x.com/simeonisako13/status/2118330781181296885; https://x.com/Wazalendos243/status/2118344998974362044; https://x.com/Wazalendos243/status/2118344998974362044; https://x.com/xtr_africa/status/2118346785194217965; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2118364416735363105; https://x.com/FmRaso59031/status/2118387884625461611; https://x.com/ClmentMuya2/status/2118454689771479269; https://x.com/Newsupdateer/status/2118413643041706034; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/03/masisi-nouveaux-affrontements-entre-les-fardc-et-le-frn-mahanga-kibanda-et-kilongo; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/05/masisi-larmee-reprend-mahanga-et-kilongo-apres-deux-jours-dintenses-combats-contre-le
[61] https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/05/walikale-reprise-des-combats-entre-les-fardc-et-le-frn-a-kibati; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/11/05/walikale-des-habitants-fuient-les-combats-a-kibati-et-se-refugient-a-kashebere; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2118232147823603789; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2118238444451250371; https://x.com/VolcansLes/status/2118239967918833780; https://x.com/michombero/status/2118247275952492638; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/2118251927267889408; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/2118333127328198807; https://x.com/xtr_africa/status/2118346785194217965; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2118378029239910595; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2026/11/06/actualite/securite/les-combats-sintensifient-entre-les-fardc-et-le-frn-sur-laxe-kashebere; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/05/walikale-reprise-de-combats-entre-les-fardc-et-le-frn-kibati
[62] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2118614401708130331
[63] https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2118704438491689400; https://x.com/byobemalenga/status/2118722068715860314; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/2118724607998099501; https://x.com/Newsupdateer/status/2118773780243783808; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/06/masisi-nouveaux-affrontements-mahanga-les-rebelles-du-frn-tentent-de-reconquerir-le
[64] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/06/est-de-la-rdc-les-combats-entre-larmee-et-le-frn-se-poursuivent-kibati-walikale-pour-le; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/07/walikale-accalmie-precaire-kibati-apres-deux-jours-de-violents-combats-entre-les-fardc
[65] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/07/masisi-larmee-repousse-une-nouvelle-offensive-du-frn-mahanga; https://x.com/johnsonhuit/status/2119289672413151361
[66] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2119484093603684379
[67] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2119484093603684379
[68] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2119788933609353497
[69] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/05/walikale-les-positions-de-larmee-visee-par-des-frappes-de-drone-du-frn-mindjendje
[70] https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/09/walikale-retour-au-calme-mindjendje-apres-des-combats-entre-les-fardc-et-le-frn; https://x.com/VolcansLes/status/2119398880781672943
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[156] https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2115918525067915378; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2117307288805396745; https://x.com/pascal_mulegwa/status/2117317254371242315; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20261030-rdc-les-opposants-de-la-plateforme-c64-rencontrent-la-diplomatie-europ%C3%A9enne-%C3%A0-bruxelles; https://x.com/simeonisako13/status/2117499055777386994; https://x.com/YvesBuya1/status/2117405244564947103; https://congoactu dot cd/rdc-apres-rome-et-bruxelles-les-leaders-de-la-c64-portent-leur-demarche-politique-au-quai-dorsay; https://www.cable dot cd/2026/10/31/politique/rdc-la-c64-attendue-lundi-au-quai-dorsay-avant-des-rencontres-avec-ramaphosa-et-lourenco
[157] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1858778/politique/exclusif-moise-katumbi-nous-irons-a-goma-rencontrer-joseph-kabila; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2117956280635777090; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2117963040423334074; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2117995169907638420
[158] https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2117958604296716316
[159] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1858778/politique/exclusif-moise-katumbi-nous-irons-a-goma-rencontrer-joseph-kabila; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2117958604296716316; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2118305148371886567
[160] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1858778/politique/exclusif-moise-katumbi-nous-irons-a-goma-rencontrer-joseph-kabila
[161] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1858778/politique/exclusif-moise-katumbi-nous-irons-a-goma-rencontrer-joseph-kabila; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2117995169907638420
[162] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1859109/politique/rdc-shabani-repond-a-katumbi-et-menace-la-c64-de-poursuites-si-elle-rencontre-kabila-a-goma; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2118049398248595523; https://x.com/OuraganCd/status/2118071551044038794; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2118088542463119394; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20261106-rdc-comment-le-ministre-de-l-int%C3%A9rieur-justifie-sa-mise-en-garde-sur-une-rencontre-entre-l-opposition-et-kabila; https://actualite dot cd/2026/11/04/jacquemin-shabani-personne-ne-peut-entrer-en-contact-avec-lennemi-sans-laccord-du
[163] https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2026/11/06/felix-tshisekedi-takes-on-joseph-kabila-s-networks-within-sadc,110915221-art
[164] https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2026/11/06/felix-tshisekedi-takes-on-joseph-kabila-s-networks-within-sadc,110915221-art
[165] https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2026/11/06/felix-tshisekedi-takes-on-joseph-kabila-s-networks-within-sadc,110915221-art
[166] https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2026/11/06/felix-tshisekedi-takes-on-joseph-kabila-s-networks-within-sadc,110915221-art
[167] https://x.com/oifrancophonie/status/2120256256443035897?a=cSHBG61lOlC4KWMCiIE&s=46
[168] https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2119495409596764585
[169] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260131-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda-se-pr%C3%A9parent-%C3%A0-une-bataille-diplomatique-autour-de-l-oif; https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/francophonie-une-election-lombre-des-tensions-rdc-rwanda-2844771; https://x.com/YolandeMakolo/status/2120183287293608360
[170] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1859707/politique/oif-comment-la-france-manoeuvre-pour-eviter-une-sortie-de-la-rdc; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1859223/politique/rien-nest-joue-malgre-les-doutes-kinshasa-veut-croire-en-juliana-lumumba-sa-candidate-pour-loif; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/2119495409596764585
[171] https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/francophonie-une-election-lombre-des-tensions-rdc-rwanda-2844771; https://x.com/jeune_afrique/status/2120103931934019732; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/podcasts/le-grand-invit%C3%A9-afrique/20261110-%C3%A9lection-t%C3%AAte-oif-rdc-fait-savoir-quitte-organisation-si-louise-mushikiwabo-reconduite
[172] https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/francophonie-une-election-lombre-des-tensions-rdc-rwanda-2844771; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/podcasts/le-grand-invit%C3%A9-afrique/20261110-%C3%A9lection-t%C3%AAte-oif-rdc-fait-savoir-quitte-organisation-si-louise-mushikiwabo-reconduite
[173] https://x.com/PatrickMuyaya/status/2120148130947580366
[174] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesman/2026/11/joint-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-joint-steering-committee-of-the-u-s-drc-strategic-partnership-agreement; https://x.com/AsstSecStateAF/status/2118817048143032780; https://x.com/AmbaRdcongoUsa/status/2118770598864118198; https://x.com/MinMinesRDC/status/2118694760844038616
[175] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesman/2026/11/joint-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-joint-steering-committee-of-the-u-s-drc-strategic-partnership-agreement
[176] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesman/2026/11/joint-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-joint-steering-committee-of-the-u-s-drc-strategic-partnership-agreement
[177] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesman/2026/11/joint-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-joint-steering-committee-of-the-u-s-drc-strategic-partnership-agreement; https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/august-28-2026
[178] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesman/2026/11/joint-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-joint-steering-committee-of-the-u-s-drc-strategic-partnership-agreement
* CTP will publish the next Congo War Security Review on November 11 *
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Key Takeaway: The United States imposed sanctions on the Rwandan Ministry of Defense and a financial institution in Kigali. The DRC, Rwanda, and observer nations convened for the seventh Joint Security Coordination Mechanism meeting under the Washington Peace Accords. Clashes continued in the southern Walungu highlands and along the foothills of the Ruzizi Plain in Uvira district in South Kivu, with no operationally significant changes on the ground. Political leaders of the Congolese opposition’s Article 64 Coalition met in Italy for their first in-person meeting since the coalition’s creation in May.

Kinetic Activity in Rutshuru & Eastern Masisi Districts
Pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters attacked FRN in Rutshuru district in North Kivu. Wazalendo fighters reportedly ambushed an FRN convoy that was moving toward Kabizo in the Bwito chiefdom in western Rutshuru on October 26.[1] Kabizo is about 25 miles northeast of Kitchanga on the RP1030 in Masisi district. CTP reported previously that Wazalendo fighters and the Congolese army (FARDC) had conducted attacks on FRN in the adjacent Bwisha chiefdom in Rutshuru in mid-October.[2]

Northern Axis: Lubero-Butembo-Beni-Bunia
Nothing significant to report.
Southern Axis: Bukavu-Uvira-Baraka-Kalemie
Clashes continued in the southern Walungu highlands and along the foothills of the Ruzizi Plain in Uvira district in South Kivu, with no operationally significant changes on the ground. CTP reported previously that significant fighting between FRN and pro-Congolese government forces broke out in the Kaziba chiefdom in southern Walungu and near the Ruzizi Plain in mid-October.[3] FRN’s spokesperson, Lawrence Kanyuka, claimed on social media on October 22 that pro-Congolese government forces reinforced their positions with troops and military equipment in Luvungi and Lubarika.[4] FRN forces reportedly attacked and clashed with pro-Congolese government forces in Kifune, which is about 18 miles south of Kaziba center in the Uvira mountains, on October 23.[5] Clashes reportedly resumed on October 23, and Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces captured Kadezi village, which is reportedly near Kaziba and the Munanira mountains.[6] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that clashes continued in Kaziba and near the Ruzizi on October 24.[7] Clashes reportedly continued in Kaziba and the Uvira midlands on October 26.[8] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Mitimbili and Munanira in Kaziba on October 26.[9] Congolese government-aligned journalist Daniel Michombero claimed on social media that FRN forces retook Kadezi on October 26 after pro-Congolese government forces withdrew.[10] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly conducted several strikes on the hills between the Bafuliru chiefdom in Uvira near the Ruzizi and Kaziba, specifically near Munanira and Ndolera, on October 26.[11] Ndolera is about eight miles west of Luvungi on the RN5 on a local road.
Clashes continued around Minembwe town in the South Kivu highlands, as FRN forces claimed control of several positions south of the town. Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks using one-way attack (OWA) drones and heavy artillery on Rugezi, which is south of Minembwe town, on October 21.[12] Clashes reportedly took place in Rugezi on October 24.[13] FRN-allied Twirwaneho’s spokesperson, Fidèle Rugabo, claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces attacked Rugezi on October 24.[14] Rugabo reiterated claims on social media that the Congolese government has deployed a CH-10 a Chinese-made CH-10 tilt-rotor drone for air attacks around Minembwe.[15] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed that pro-Congolese government forces conducted drone attacks on Biziba near Minembwe and in Gipimo and Rugezi to the south after clashes took place on October 24.[16] Rugabo claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces attacked on three lines of advance near Rugezi, from Wihene, Rugomero, and Nyakirango, on October 24.[17] Rugabo claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces attacked on three lines of advance near Kabanju, from Gipimo, Nzohaha, and Kasolokochi, on October 25.[18] Twirwaneho sources claimed on October 25 and 26 that heavy fighting took place in Rugezi, Gipimo, and Nyagishasha and that pro-Congolese government forces conducted drone attacks on Rugezi and Gipimo.[19] Rugabo claimed on social media on October 25 that Twirwaneho forces had repelled attacks by pro-government forces in Rugezi and Gipimo and inflicted casualties on enemy forces.[20] Heavy fighting reportedly continued in Wihene, Rugezi, and Point Zéro on October 26.[21] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted OWA and artillery attacks on Wihene, Rugezi, and Point Zéro around October 26.[22] Point Zéro is an operationally significant hilltop east of Minembwe. Rugabo claimed on social media on October 26 that Twirwaneho repelled pro-Congolese government attacks on Rugezi and Gipimo and inflicted losses on enemy forces.[23] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces bombed Biziba and Rugezi on October 26.[24] Rugabo claimed that Twirwaneho had repelled pro-Congolese government attacks on the Kabanju axis on October 26.[25] FRN-aligned sources and one anti-Burundian government source claimed on social media that Burundian army troops suffered notable losses near Rugezi against Twirwaneho around October 26.[26] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed on social media that clashes continued on several axes around Minembwe on October 27 as pro-Congolese government forces regrouped, and Rugabo claimed in two statements on social media that Twirwaneho forces had recaptured operationally significant positions around Kabanju and Rugezi, including Kuwamabuye, Nyarurango, and Rugomero.[27]


Northwest Axis: Masisi-Walikale-Lubutu-Kisangani
Fighting broke out again near the RP1030 in Walikale district in North Kivu as pro-Congolese government claimed control of a hilltop. Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly attacked FRN forces in Katobo in the Banamulindwa locality in the Kisimba group in Walikale on October 24 and captured Rushihe hill after dislodging FRN after three days of clashes.[28] Clashes resumed in Luola and near Chad hill overlooking Minjenje and Mpeti on October 27, when pro-Congolese government forces repelled FRN attacks in the area.[29]
Fighting reportedly resumed on the RP529 near Nyabiondo town in North Kivu. The Congolese media outlet Actualite.cd reported that clashes broke out in Kibati to the west of Nyabiondo on the RP529 on October 268, when pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on FRN positions in the village.[30]

Southwest Axis: Bukavu-Kamituga-Shabunda-Kindu
Nothing significant to report.
Major Political Developments
The United States imposed sanctions on the Rwandan Ministry of Defense (MoD) and a financial institution in Kigali. The US Treasury Department said on October 28 that it sanctioned the Rwandan MoD for providing support to FRN and deploying troops and military equipment to the eastern DRC.[31] The Treasury Department also imposed sanctions on Zigama Credit and Savings Society, which is a financial cooperative and bank headquartered in Kigali that serves Rwanda’s security and intelligence services.[32] The Treasury Department claimed that Zigama facilitated the transport of gold from FRN-controlled territory in the eastern DRC to Kigali and processed financial transactions worth tens of millions of dollars for FRN.[33] Zigama is the fourth largest bank in Rwanda by total assets and is known for offering competitive interest rates that are generally lower than conventional commercial banks in the region.[34] Rwandan or M23-linked persons and entities now account for 15 of the 16 individuals and entities sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in the Great Lakes region in 2026.[35] The United States has framed these actions as enforcement measures to support the implementation of the Washington Peace Accords (WPA).
The DRC, Rwanda, and observer nations convened for the seventh Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) meeting under the WPA. Military officials from the DRC and Rwanda, along with representatives from the African Union, the United States, and Qatar, met in Garmisch, Germany from October 20 to 22.[36] The sixth JSCM meeting was in Switzerland in mid-August.[37] The readout said that the delegations worked to finalize the draft Operations Order agreed upon at the sixth JSCM meeting for Congolese army operations against the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the eastern DRC.[38] The readout made no mention of the protocol that the Congolese government has advocated in recent months for the voluntary demobilization of the FDLR.
Political leaders of the Congolese opposition’s Article 64 Coalition (C64) met in Rome, Italy for their first in-person meeting since the coalition’s creation in May. The C64’s five leaders, Martin Fayulu, Jean-Marc Kabund, Moïse Katumbi, Augustin Matata Ponyo, and Delly Sesanga, met in Rome from October 25 to 27 and said in a statement on October 27 that they rejected both constitutional change and armed rebellion and would seek to meet DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and former DRC President Joseph Kabila separately “to find a Congolese solution to the crisis” and agree to a “genuine inclusive national dialogue.”[39] The coalition did not mention a timeline for the proposed meetings or indicate whether Tshisekedi and Kabila had agreed to participate. The statement accused the Congolese government of preparing a “constitutional coup” and separately condemned the use of force to seize power.[40] The coalition’s stance on Kabila was reportedly the main sticking point in the talks. One unnamed participant told French state media on October 27 that condemning Kabila could look like support for Tshisekedi, while not condemning him could be read as indirect support for Kabila.[41] Another source said the coalition agreed that both armed and unarmed actors should still participate in the dialogue under the mediation of the religious leaders.[42]
Congolese authorities reportedly had arrested an opposition figure who tried to attend the meeting in Rome. The DRC’s migration authority reportedly confiscated the passports of Fayulu, his deputy, and Prince Epenge, who is the spokesperson for Fayulu’s Lamuka coalition, before returning the passports belonging to Fayulu and his deputy.[43] Congolese intelligence officials reportedly detained Epenge after he refused to leave the airport in Kinshasa without his passport and transferred him to the intelligence service linked to Tshisekedi’s office.[44] The French magazine Jeune Afrique cited accounts from Epenge’s circle that claimed that intelligence agents from the Agence nationale de renseignements (ANR) “arrested him, confiscated his phones, and forced him into a 4x4 vehicle. His eyes were blindfolded with a piece of cloth.”[45] Authorities reportedly issued a provisional arrest warrant for Epenge and charged him with “spreading false rumors” over claims that Manassé Lomboto, who was part of Epenge’s security detail, had been assassinated.[46] Lomboto died during a mid-September march against constitutional change in Kinshasa, likely killed by militants linked to Tshisekedi’s party.[47] Epenge’s family accused the Congolese government of pressuring doctors who produced a medical report after his death toward a natural-death conclusion.[48] Congolese authorities then prevented Lomboto’s funeral from taking place on September 26.[49] Epenge claimed that 80 armed police blocked the hospital, where his body remains.[50] C64 called for Epenge’s release in their final statement on October 27.[51]
The UN’s mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) repatriated over 40 individuals to Rwanda. MONUSCO said on social media on October 28 that it had facilitated the voluntary repatriation of 42 individuals, including 10 FDLR members, to Rwanda in cooperation with the Congolese and Rwandan governments.[52]
Significant US-Backed Economic Activity
A US-backed minerals consortium is reportedly close to acquiring a stake in Glencore’s copper and cobalt mines in the DRC. Orion Resource Partners CEO Oskar Lewnowski told Bloomberg on October 23 that the Orion Critical Mineral Consortium (Orion CMC) was in the “final phases” of purchasing a 40 percent stake in Glencore’s interests in the Kamoto Copper Company and Mutanda Mining operations in Lualaba province in the southern DRC.[53] Glencore and Orion CMC had signed a nonbinding memorandum of understanding on the two mines in early February 2026.[54] Orion Resource Partners had established Orion CMC with the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and an Emirati sovereign wealth fund to strengthen critical mineral supply chains for the United States and its allies in October 2025.[55] Lewnowski also said that Orion CMC could still support Chemaf, a Congolese producer of copper and cobalt acquired by US company Virtus Minerals, but that the consortium’s short-term priority was wrapping up the Glencore deal.[56]
[1] https://actualite dot cd/index.php/2026/10/26/rutshuru-les-activites-champetres-paralysees-kabizo-et-katovu-apres-une-embuscade-contre; https://x.com/Newsupdateer/status/2114785419254501849
[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/october-21-2026
[3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/october-21-2026; https://x.com/maendeleo_radio/status/2113185216726523928; https://radiomaendeleo dot org/kaziba-reprise-timide-des-activites-apres-pres-de-six-jours-de-combats; https://radiomaendeleo dot org/plaine-de-la-ruzizi-reprise-des-mouvements-dans-un-climat-de-calme-precaire-apres-les-combats
[4] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2113198562108420133
[5] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2113517085879947678; https://x.com/byuku_senge/status/2113608091891585026;
https://x.com/MulengeMediaNet/status/2113599866567868869; https://x.com/Newsupdateer/status/2113676177109893374
[6] https://radiomaendeleo dot org/kaziba-reprise-timide-des-activites-apres-pres-de-six-jours-de-combats; https://x.com/byondo99/status/2113569261562232979; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2113522451338436942; https://x.com/michombero/status/2113562046147023232; https://x.com/ALahatane/status/2113572371948789999; https://x.com/243Afro12253/status/2113580477638664252; https://x.com/ClmentMuya2/status/2113600806486233447; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2113604650893029723; https://x.com/johnsonhuit/status/2113612805811183637; https://x.com/byondo99/status/2113571711392051205
[7] https://x.com/johnsonhuit/status/2113952306001539499; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2113966968826904803; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2113938559098900542; https://x.com/FaithNtako65514/status/2114056564822753597
[8] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/2114715432082960777; https://x.com/michombero/status/2114663613948457391; https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2114709592592502881; https://x.com/Ruvunamiheto/status/2114753460428267985; https://x.com/Hastalavista364/status/2114750981514883317; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2114820054835446250; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2114721012319125714; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2026/10/27/actualite/securite/sud-kivu-des-combats-signales-entre-les-fardc-et-le-frn-dans-les
[9] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2114709592592502881
[10] https://x.com/michombero/status/211466361394845739
[11] https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/2114721012319125714; https://x.com/maendeleo_radio/status/2114726543654047976; https://radiomaendeleo dot org/sud-kivu-des-bombardements-signales-a-munanira-et-ndolera-la-situation-reste-tendue-dans-les-moyens-plateaux-duvira; https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2115087899657966048; https://x.com/maendeleo_radio/status/2115093149227811177
[12] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2113198562108420133; https://x.com/Fidelrugabo/status/2112965294679630249
[13] https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2113917388907294927; https://x.com/ByiringiroFaus/status/2113926394971320805
[14] https://x.com/Fidelrugabo/status/2113852112383693103; https://x.com/Fidelrugabo/status/2113909179576369348; https://x.com/ByiringiroFaus/status/2113926394971320805; https://x.com/ByiringiroFaus/status/2114037677091668034; https://x.com/ClmentMuya2/status/2114063927050981747
[15] https://x.com/Fidelrugabo/status/2113909179576369348; https://x.com/ClmentMuya2/status/2114063927050981747
[16] https://x.com/ByiringiroFaus/status/2114037677091668034; https://x.com/MulengeMediaNet/status/2114080841966211550; https://x.com/ClmentMuya2/status/2114063927050981747; https://x.com/IntareZamweziGi/status/2114308007781621792
[17] https://x.com/Fidelrugabo/status/2114780965373395091
[18] https://x.com/Fidelrugabo/status/2114780965373395091
[19] https://x.com/MulengeMediaNet/status/2114356428634792159; https://x.com/ByiringiroFaus/status/2114391732527739193; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2026/10/26/sud-kivu-nouveaux-combats-a-gipimo-entre-le-frn-et-les-fardc
[20] https://x.com/Fidelrugabo/status/2114346198756647141
[21] https://x.com/mulikuza_jordan/status/2114820054835446250; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2026/10/27/actualite/securite/sud-kivu-des-combats-signales-entre-les-fardc-et-le-frn-dans-les
[22] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/2114709592592502881
[23] https://x.com/Fidelrugabo/status/2114606164977590547
[24] https://x.com/ByiringiroFaus/status/2114641393310105714; https://x.com/byondo99/status/2114661820187197896; https://x.com/ByiringiroFaus/status/2114645921359069682
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