Congo War Security Review

Data Cutoff: October 21, 2026, at 10 A.M. EST

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Key Takeaway: Former DRC President Joseph Kabila officially joined the M23 rebellion as the political leader of a rebranded movement called the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN). Significant fighting took place between FRN and pro-Congolese government forces in the Walungu district highlands for nearly two weeks and spilled over into the foothills of the Ruzizi Plain in Uvira district in South Kivu. Mercenaries linked to US security tycoon Erik Prince reportedly took combat losses in the South Kivu highlands in mid-September. Burundian security services have reportedly arrested dozens of people in recent weeks whom authorities alleged have collaborated with FRN and Rwanda.

Kinetic Activity in Rutshuru & Eastern Masisi Districts

Pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on FRN in Rutshuru district in North Kivu. The Congolese army (FARDC) reportedly conducted a drone strike on an FRN position in Kalengera on October 12.[1] Kalengera is about nine miles south of Kiwanja on the RN2. Pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters then reportedly ambushed and clashed with an FRN contingent in Kiseguro in the Binza group in Bwisha chiefdom in eastern Rutshuru on October 13.[2] Kiseguro is about 10 miles north of Kiwanja.

Northern Axis: Lubero-Butembo-Beni-Bunia

Nothing significant to report.

Southern Axis: Bukavu-Uvira-Baraka-Kalemie

Significant fighting took place between FRN and pro-Congolese government forces in the Walungu district highlands for nearly two weeks and spilled over into the foothills of the Ruzizi Plain in Uvira district in South Kivu. Clashes reportedly broke out in Kabembe group in the Kaziba chiefdom, possibly southwest of Kaziba center, on October 11, when the FARDC and Wazalendo fighters launched an offensive against FRN.[3] Fighting reportedly resumed in Kaziba on the hills of Mitimbili in the Muhumba group east of Kaziba near the border with the Bafulero chiefdom in Uvira on October 12.[4] Fighting also reportedly took place on two other subaxes in Kaziba—the Kashozi and Butuzi groups—on October 11 and 12.[5] Clashes between FARDC-Wazalendo and FRN troops reportedly continued in these areas before spreading to others in Kaziba on October 13.[6] FRN’s political spokesperson, Lawrence Kanyuka, claimed in a statement on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks in Kaziba on October 13.[7] Fighting reportedly continued for a fourth day in Kaziba on October 14.[8] The Congolese media outlet Radio Manedeleo reported on October 14 that the outbreak in fighting caused hundreds of families to abandon their villages, with some heading west toward the Luhwindja chiefdom in the adjacent Mwenga district and others toward Nyangezi and Bukavu.[9] Fighting reportedly continued in Kaziba for the fifth consecutive day on October 15.[10] Fighting reportedly continued in Kaziba on October 16 and 17.[11] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed that fighting broke out further west toward Walungu town on October 16, when FRN elements attacked Wazalendo positions in Kacuba and Irega villages in the Luhago group in the Nindja chiefdom in Kabare district.[12] Congolese government-aligned media sources claimed on social media that an FARDC drone struck several FRN positions in Mitimbili in the Muhumba group in Kaziba on October 16.[13] FRN reportedly announced its intention to march on Uvira town and then Kalemie town in Tanganyika province further south during a local rally in Kamanyola on October 16.[14] Wazalendo fighters reportedly disrupted a separate local FRN meeting led by FRN South Kivu governor Patrick Nshombo Busu in Nyangezi, which is further north toward Bukavu, in an attack around October 16.[15] Congolese government-aligned journalist Byobe Malenga claimed that fighting broke out in the mountainous areas of Muhungu and Mugobe near Kamanyola on October 16.[16] Congolese government-aligned media sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces shot down three FRN drones over Munanira and Butuzi in Kaziba on October 18.[17] Fighting reportedly continued in Kaziba on October 19, as bombing occurred and pro-Congolese government forces reportedly shot down a drone over a Wazalendo camp near Nambula hill.[18] Fighting reportedly continued in Mitimbili, Muhumba, and Mwera in Kaziba for the tenth day on October 20.[19] Steve Mulindwa, a journalist for Radio Manedeleo, reported on social media on October 20 that no major movements had occurred in Kaziba but that FRN had dislodged Wazalendo fighters from several hills.[20] Mulindwa reported separately on October 20 that FRN had cleared Wazalendo fighters from several hills near Kaziba center, namely Namubula, Kahya, Mbwega, and Malinji.[21] Fighting then reportedly resumed to the east of Kaziba in the Munanira mountains, including in Mugobe, Kamonyi, Kalunga, in the Itara-Luvungi group in Uvira district near Kamanyola on October 20, when FRN attacked FARDC-Wazalendo positions in the area to southwest of Kamanyola in the mountains straddling Walungu and Uvira.[22] One unidentified source told the Congolese media outlet Libre Grand Lac on October 21 that FRN had attacked army positions in Kadeze in an attempt to advance and secure the passage of reinforcements toward Kaziba.[23] FRN-aligned sources claimed on social media that FRN took control of Munanira and Bideka after dislodging pro-Congolese government forces on October 20.[24] Congolese government-aligned sources on social media disputed this and said that the FARDC still controlled these positions.[25] The FARDC reportedly reinforced its positions in Luvungi and Lubarika on October 21, after recapturing Muhungu and holding back the FRN offensive.[26] The Congolese media outlet Actualite.cd reported on October 21 that the fighting in Kaziba had displaced more than 12,000 households.[27] Wazalendo fighters then reportedly attacked FRN positions in Kaniola near Walungu town on October 21.[28]

Fighting continued around Minembwe town in the highlands in South Kivu. FRN-allied Twirwaneho’s spokesperson, Fidèle Rugabo, claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted drone attacks on Minembwe and Gipimo on October 9.[29] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces captured an operationally significant position known as Kamombo in Fizi district on October 9.[30] Clashes reportedly took place south of Minembwe in Timbyangoma and Rugezi villages on October 9.[31] Rugezi is about 30 miles south of Minembwe on local roads. Rugabo claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces attacked Gipimo on October 10.[32] Kanyuka and FRN-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted one-way drone (OWA) attacks on Point Zéro and the surrounding Minembwe area near Gipimo on October 9 and on Rugezi on October 10.[33] Point Zéro is an operationally significant hilltop about 15 miles east of Minembwe. Rugabo claimed on social media on October 11 that Twirwaneho had repelled pro-Congolese government attacks on the Gipimo and Rugezi axes.[34] Fighting reportedly continued in Kamimbi, Biziba, and Timbyangoma to the south of Minembwe and in Badinzi and Rugezi on October 11.[35] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed that pro-Congolese government forces took control of Timbyangoma and Rugezi on October 11.[36] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces bombed Rugezi and the Minembwe area on October 13.[37] Clashes reportedly continued in the highlands on October 14 and 15.[38] Kanyuka and FRN-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces bombed Rugezi and the Minembwe area using heavy artillery and OWA drones on October 16, as fighting reportedly resumed.[39] Kanyuka and FRN-aligned sources claimed that pro-Congolese government forces bombed Rugezi and the Minembwe area using heavy artillery and OWA drones on October 18.[40] The FRN-aligned investigative outlet Great Lakes Eye claimed in a report on October 18 that thousands of FARDC and Burundian army (FDNB) troops and Wazalendo fighters and a dozen mercenaries had deployed to reinforce positions to the south of Minembwe near Kabandja center on October 9.[41] The report claimed that another battalion of FARDC personnel, Wazalendo fighters, and Rwandan fighters from the FLN deployed to Shabunda district via Beni town to put pressure on Twirwaneho and FRN positions toward Luhago in Kabare and Nzibira in Walungu district.[42] Kanyuka and Rugabo claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted drone and artillery attacks on Rugezi and Gipimo on October 18 and 19, as fighting reportedly continued.[43] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed on social media on October 20 and 21 that fighting continued and that the Congolese government had acquired and used a Chinese-made CH-10 tilt-rotor drone in air attacks around Minembwe.[44]

Clashes also resumed in the Uvira district midlands north of Minembwe near Uvira town. The October 18 report from the Great Lakes Eye claimed that a second major reinforcement of pro-Congolese government troops occurred on October 10, when two FDNB battalions arrived in the Bijombo group in the midlands.[45] Fighting between FRN-allied Twirwaneho and RED-Tabara fighters and pro-Congolese government forces reportedly took place in Bijimbo in the Bavira chiefdom in Uvira, specifically around Magunda village, on October 10.[46] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that FRN conducted drone strikes on enemy positions in Bijombo on October 11.[47] Conflicting accounts on social media presented differing claims about which side regained or seized control of Rubarati, Masango, Malimba, and Bugogoma during clashes that occurred on October 12, with pro-Congolese government forces claiming control of the area.[48] The independent Burundian media outlet SOS Média Burundi reported on October 13 that pro-Congolese government forces had lost several positions in Bijimbo after they abandoned them following drone attacks attributed to FRN, however.[49] The report said that the strikes targeted pro-Congolese government positions in Magunda, Rubarati, Masango, and Ruhuha.[50] Rugabo claimed that FRN and Twirwaneho had retaken control of Rubarati and Ruhuha.[51]

Mercenaries linked to US security tycoon Erik Prince’s Vectus Global reportedly took combat losses in the South Kivu highlands in mid-September. FRN and Twirwaneho fighters reportedly killed and wounded at least 20 people, including US media personality and former Green Beret Tim Kennedy, in an ambush in the highlands as the operators were traveling between locations on September 17.[52] The casualties reportedly included Justin Conaglen, a New Zealander national and a former Special Forces operator.[53] New Zealand media first broke the story of Conaglen’s death on September 24.[54] Kennedy reportedly survived the attack and was evacuated to the United States, following stopovers in Bujumbura and Johannesburg.[55] Reuters cited a Congolese government source on October 9 who said that Rwandan forces might have tracked a surveillance drone back to their location before the ambush.[56] Rwandan state media cited a source who claimed to be familiar with the September 17 attack on October 18 and said that enemy forces had ambushed the contingent as they were attempting to cross Mulima center near Point Zéro as part of their deployments to surround Minembwe.[57] The New York Times cited an anonymous insider source and an incident report on October 9 that said that several Colombian mercenaries employed by Prince also died in a battle in the highlands in early September.[58] The New York Times cited several anonymous former and current officials from the United States, Europe, the DRC, other African countries, and the UN who said that Prince’s mercenaries have been deployed to Kalemie town for the past year.[59] The New York Times cited an adviser close to Tshieskedi who said that Prince and the Congolese government began negotiating a possible new $200 million contract for the protection of Congolese air force assets in September.[60] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported on October 8 that the contract specifically focuses on technical and logistical support and maintenance for the FARDC’s helicopters.[61] A source close to Vectus Global told Africa Intelligence that the possible contract is part of “wider capacity-building activities” the company is providing to the Congolese government in Kinshasa, the Congolese capital.[62] The New York Times reported that Prince had tried to contact the Belgian foreign ministry and sought Belgium’s assistance in securing the release of his drones impounded by Dutch customs and greenlighting the “export of guns and ammunition from a Belgian manufacturer” to the DRC in discussions with Belgian officials in January 2026.[63]

Northwest Axis: Masisi-Walikale-Lubutu-Kisangani

Fighting resumed in southern Masisi district in North Kivu. CTP reported in early October that the FARDC and Wazalendo fighters retook Remeka town and claimed control of other areas in southern Masisi district as significant fighting on this axis had continued.[64] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces took control of Katoyi center on October 7.[65] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly also took control of Kasake and Shovu in the Ufamandu group and Kawele and Nyakigano in the Kibabi group near Rubaya town after clashes with FRN around Ngungu and Kasaki on October 8.[66] Clashes then reportedly took place in Kibabi on October 8, with Congolese government-aligned sources claiming that pro-Congolese government forces retained control of their positions in Kibabi but not threatening Rubaya and FRN-aligned sources denying the reports of losing ground and claiming that FRN retook several positions.[67] The front lines reportedly fell largely calm on October 9 and 10.[68] Clashes reportedly resumed near Kanyaru, Kawele, Kasake, and Ngungu on October 11 and 12.[69] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Kashovu and Kumadepo and in Lumbishi in Kalehe district to the south in South Kivu on October 13.[70] FRN then reportedly bombed several pro-Congolese government positions in Ufamandu using OWA drones on October 15.[71]

Fighting also resumed on the RP529 near the Masisi-Walikale border in North Kivu. Wazalendo fighters reportedly launched an offensive and attacked FRN positions in Nyabiondo town on October 14.[72] The FARDC and Wazalendo fighters then reportedly attacked FRN positions further to the west in Kibati on the RP529 on October 16.[73] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government conducted heavy artillery attacks on Buhimba and Mahanga villages in Masisi district on October 16.[74] Buhimba and Mahanga are about 12 and 10 miles southwest of Nyabiondo, respectively. Fighting reportedly continued in Kibati for a third day on October 18.[75]

Southwest Axis: Bukavu-Kamituga-Shabunda-Kindu

Nothing significant to report.

Major Political Developments

Former DRC President Joseph Kabila officially joined the M23 rebellion as the political leader of a rebranded movement called the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN). Kabila and several senior officials from M23 and its now-former political wing, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), announced the launch of FRN from Goma, the North Kivu provincial capital, on October 12.[76] Claude Ibalanky, a former special envoy and diplomat for DRC President Félix Tshisekedi who had joined M23 in early 2026, presented the group’s political declaration at a press conference.[77] FRN denounced Tshisekedi’s regime and said that the movement aims to “coordinate all resistance forces to end tyranny by all means, including force” and rebuild the state.[78] FRN designated Kabila as its president and Corneille Nangaa and Bertrand Bisimwa, who were the two most senior political figures in AFC, as vice presidents, with several senior AFC officials taking other political posts.[79] Sultani Makenga, a veteran military commander, retained the position of chief of staff of M23’s army.[80] Tshisekedi convened a defense council meeting in Kinshasa to assess the situation and issued “precise instructions” to the FARDC on October 14.[81] The Congolese defense minister issued an order on October 15 following the October 14 meeting that indefinitely suspended FARDC officers from traveling abroad without prior authorization.[82] CTP assessed on October 15 that FRN is more likely a political rebranding of the AFC-M23 than an extensive restructuring of the rebellion, as it formalizes an uneasy alliance of convenience between Kabila and M23 that remains constrained by internal power dynamics and diverging strategic objectives.[83]

Burundian security services have reportedly arrested dozens of people in recent weeks whom authorities alleged have collaborated with FRN and Rwanda. Africa Intelligence reported on October 15 that security services are carrying out an arrest campaign across towns and rural areas in Burundi, targeting people affiliated with or belonging to the Congolese Banyamulenge community residing in Burundi and accusing them of collaborating with FRN and Rwanda, ahead of Burundi’s 2027 elections.[84] The report said that Burundian authorities have arrested and held incommunicado several Christian pastors from well-known churches among the community, accusing them of maintaining ties with “young people and political organizers” close to FRN and collecting intelligence for FRN and Rwanda.[85] Burundian authorities presented 13 “suspects” to the press, most of them reportedly Banyamulenge refugees and including several pastors with a regional following whom the authorities accused of passing intelligence to Rwanda, at the headquarters of Burundi’s intelligence service in Bujumbura on October 8.[86] The spokesperson for Burundi’s ministry of state security called on the population to “monitor” the activities of all members of the Banyamulenge community and to “stop renting houses to them, especially in Bujumbura.”[87] Africa Intelligence reported that an alleged network operates through intermediaries in several East African countries and uses local nationals to “infiltrate” churches.[88] The report said that Burundian security services also have alleged that some pastors arranged for the transfer of Twirwaneho fighters injured in the eastern DRC to Burundi to receive medical care.[89] Africa Intelligence reported that Burundian security services are seeking to dismantle these networks in part by using “young Burundian and Congolese deserters” from FRN or allied groups.[90] Burundian authorities are also reportedly monitoring cross-border movements.[91] The Burundian interior minister had banned entry to Burundi for people arriving from areas controlled by FRN or transiting through them in early October.[92] The arrest campaign has extended into the ruling party’s own ranks, as Africa Intelligence reported that several members of the party’s youth wing and intelligence officers have “disappeared in recent weeks after responding to calls from individuals presented as allies.”[93] Africa Intelligence had reported in August 2026 that a previous arrest campaign that began in March 2026 may have been part of an effort to purge the ruling party ahead of the elections, amid what party members had described as an “atmosphere of mutual surveillance” in which members are encouraged to denounce anyone seen as “potentially subversive.”[94] CTP assessed in early September that Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye is jockeying to keep and consolidate power within the ruling party ahead of the 2027 elections as domestic challenges exacerbated by the Burundian government’s war costs in the eastern DRC continue to mount.[95]

African Union (AU) mediators for the DRC peace process met with Tshisekedi in Kinshasa as part of their regional tour. CTP reported in early October that three of the AU mediators had visited Goma and Kigali, the Rwandan capital, in early October.[96] The panel of facilitators except for former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo arrived in Kinshasa on October 8 for a three-day visit to meet with Tshisekedi and Congolese stakeholders.[97] French state media reported on October 8 that facilitators are planning to attend a meeting between the parties in Doha for late October, although FRN-aligned journalist Steve Wembi reported that it may not take place following the creation of the FRN, adding that the panel could return to Goma before the end of 2026 and that another meeting was planned for December in Tanzania.[98] The visit to Goma was the first step under a six-month roadmap that the facilitators had adopted during a summit focused on peace in the eastern DRC in late July.[99]

Rwanda repatriated over 350 refugees from the DRC. The Rwandan government said that it voluntarily repatriated 369 people from the DRC via Goma and Bukavu on October 8.[100] The last reported repatriation was in early September.[101] At least 3,000 refugees have returned to Rwanda this year, and Rwanda and the DRC reportedly agreed to repatriate 10,000 refugees in the second half of 2026 in line with the Washington Peace Accords.[102]

Belgian police reportedly raided several properties belonging to members of Tshisekedi’s inner circle in Belgium in mid-October as part of a money-laundering investigation. Lawyers representing civil society groups from Katanga and four former executives of Congolese state mining company Gécamines had filed a complaint with Belgium’s federal prosecutor in July 2025 against nine members of Tshisekedi’s family, including first lady Denise Nyakeru Tshisekedi, several of his brothers, and at least one of his sons.[103] The complaint accused them of corruption tied to the plundering of mining sites in Haut-Katanga and Lualaba provinces in the southern DRC and named only family members who are Belgian citizens.[104] The plaintiffs alleged that Tshisekedi’s relatives acquired Gécamines mining residues for a nominal price and obtained subcontracts related to those residues.[105] Belgian police reportedly carried out searches in Brussels and Flemish and Walloon Brabant on October 14, including at Tshisekedi’s family residence, as part of what the Belgian federal prosecutor’s office said was a money-laundering investigation opened in response to complaints filed in July 2025.[106] A lawyer for the plaintiffs told Le Monde on October 17 that the sums allegedly embezzled amounted to billions of dollars.[107] The Congolese foreign minister reportedly received the Belgian ambassador to the DRC on October 15 for what the Congolese foreign ministry characterized as an “an exchange on the state of bilateral relations,” but the French magazine Jeune Afrique reported on October 16 that the meeting was directly linked to the raids.[108] Tshisekedi’s chief of staff issued a circular on October 15 prohibiting presidential staff from contact with the Belgian embassy unless authorized by the foreign ministry.[109] An official in Tshisekedi’s office said that the circular was an internal measure to coordinate communication, and the Belgian foreign minister said on October 16 that “no situation justifies” prohibiting contact with the embassy and that he hoped the measure would be “extremely temporary.”[110] Nyakeru Tshisekedi denied the accusations on October 15 and said that she would cooperate with Belgian authorities.[111]

Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Congolese health authorities said in mid-October that more than $700 million in international donor funding for the DRC’s Ebola response is unaccounted for. Africa CDC Director-General Jean Kaseya said at a press conference in Kinshasa on October 14 that donors had disbursed about $962 million directly to organizations implementing the response, rather to the Congolese government, and that the roughly one-third of implementing partners that shared financial information with the Congolese health ministry reported receiving $228 million.[112] Kaseya told Reuters on October 15 that it was premature to allege embezzlement but called the discrepancy a “major transparency and financial reporting problem.”[113] Africa CDC said in a statement on October 16 that it was working with the Congolese government to reconcile the funds.[114] The DRC’s national public health authority said on October 20 that around 30 partners had declared funding commitments totaling $250 million to $300 million, of which approximately $200 million had been received and just over $100 million spent.[115] Bloomberg reported on October 20 that Ebola cases in the DRC have stopped declining, as elevated transmission rates in North Kivu threaten to reverse progress made in the outbreak’s original epicenter in Ituri province.[116]

Congolese central bank documents reportedly show that Tshisekedi received salary payments well above his official base salary and that his office recorded more than $100 million in travel expenses in 2025. Africa Intelligence reported on October 15 that Congolese central bank documents show that Tshisekedi received at least $420,000 in “salary supplements” in 2025, well above the roughly $140,000 annual base salary set in that year’s finance law.[117] Tshisekedi’s office told Africa Intelligence on October 15 that Tshisekedi had “taken significant measures to mobilize state resources for the war effort” and that the president himself was “making considerable financial sacrifices.”[118] Africa Intelligence reported separately on October 21 that central bank accounts show that Tshisekedi and his staff recorded about $122 million in 2025 for mission and travel expenses, nearly a third of the presidency’s revised budget of about $373 million, which the presidency exceeded, with spending rising to more than $1 billion.[119] One trip to Tanganyika province in late 2024 cost $1.78 million alone, according to the report.[120] Tshisekedi’s office told Africa Intelligence on October 21 that the war in the eastern DRC “requires extensive security arrangements for the president's and first lady’s travel.”[121]

A $17.6 million transfer from a Congolese government-affiliated bank account to a US defense firm is reportedly at the center of a Trump administration investigation into a feud between two Trump allies. Former Trump lawyer Alina Habba Mildon reportedly accused Richard Grenell, a top Trump adviser, on October 9 of misallocating funds she claimed that her now-husband, Turkish businessman Turhan Mildon, had sent at Grenell’s direction in May 2025.[122] Habba Mildon’s account of the dispute reportedly shifted over time, but she now claims that most of the money was for a business transaction and that Turhan Mildon believed that $5.6 million of the transfer would go to the Kennedy Center in Washington, DC, which Grenell then ran.[123] Trump reportedly directed White House Counsel Will Scharf to investigate and look into Habba Mildon’s claims.[124] Habba Mildon reportedly first told the White House that the money came from Turhan Mildon, but The New York Times reported on October 17 that the initial documents that his lawyer submitted had redacted the sender’s name.[125] A Trump administration official told Axios on October 19 that the funds were wired from the Congolese Ministry of Finance in Kinshasa, where the official noted Mildon has “business and access to finances,” rather than from Mildon’s bank as indicated initially by Habba Mildon.[126] The recipient of the transfer reportedly was TX-AT, a Texas defense and security firm, which Grenell has acknowledged that he consulted for in 2024.[127] Axios reported on October 19 that Habba Mildon and Mildon’s attorneys told the White House that the deal involved a Houston-based defense company’s software and the DRC, and that Mildon alleges that the payment was meant to be split between a deal related to the DRC and a donation to the Kennedy Center.[128] Axios also reported on October 19 that a May 2025 text message purportedly sent from Grenell to Mildon, which also discussed the software for the DRC, promised Mildon access to exclusive events, administration officials, and even Trump himself once the money reached “the company” and Grenell arranged the Kennedy Center donation.[129] The New York Times reported on October 17 that a June 2025 text message purportedly from Grenell appeared to ask about a payment related to a “software system.”[130] The purpose and details of the underlying deal reportedly remains unclear, aside from the reported link to the software.[131] Grenell reportedly denies sending the texts, receiving any payment from Mildon, or having any ties to TX-AT at the time of the transfer.[132] Grenell also told The New York Times on October 15 that he never solicited payments on the firm’s behalf.[133] The New York Times noted on October 17 that Mildon has acknowledged through a spokesperson that he advises Tshisekedi and holds a Congolese diplomatic passport.[134] Mildon’s company, Milvest, has won at least a dozen major Congolese government construction projects, including the Kinshasa Financial Center, facilitated by the backing of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and endorsed by Tshisekedi, and several senior Congolese politicians and one of Tshisekedi’s sons reportedly attended the Mildons’ wedding in New York in September.[135] Scharf and several other senior Trump administration officials also reportedly attended the wedding.[136] Africa Intelligence had reported in March 2026 that Milvest secured a $67 million contract from the Congolese government to build a drone launch base in Kisangani in the central DRC for use in the war against FRN and Rwanda.[137] It remains unclear whether the $17.6 million was tied to a contract separate from the major projects already awarded to Mildon’s companies, and whether Mildon was the payer, as he has claimed, or an intermediary for Congolese government funds. Mildon and Grenell reportedly grew close in late 2024 and early 2025 over mutual interests in Venezuela, where Grenell was Trump’s special envoy at the time and Mildon has extensive business holdings, including a contract to operate state-owned cement plants awarded by Alex Saab, a confidant of then-Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro with ties to Russia, Iran, and Turkey.[138] The May 2025 text purportedly from Grenell also reportedly said that he wanted to make Mildon the “American face” in Venezuela.[139] Saab, who previously was Venezuela’s industry minister, reportedly had met with a Congolese delegation in Caracas that included one of Tshisekedi’s sons ahead of Maduro’s January 2025 inauguration, and The New York Times reported on October 12 that Saab had awarded Mildon the cement contract two months later.[140] Both men were reportedly sidelined after Secretary of State Marco Rubio took a harder line on Venezuela that culminated in Maduro’s capture in January 2026, and the two later reportedly fell out.[141] US authorities arrested Saab in May 2026 after Venezuela deported him to the United States, and the US Department of Justice charged him over what it called “a sprawling international money laundering conspiracy” involving a Venezuelan government food program and state-owned oil.[142]

Significant US-Backed Economic Activity

Burundi signed a $1.4 billion electricity partnership with a US-backed company. Weza Power, a subsidiary of Anzana Electric Group, signed a 25-year public-private partnership with the Burundian government on October 16 to expand and operate the electricity distribution network in half of Burundi, while a Burundian state-owned utility company will continue to operate the national transmission network and distribute power in the other half.[143] The readout said that the deal will mobilize $1.4 billion in financing, including from the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the US International Development Finance Corporation, and projected that electricity access in Burundi will rise from about 15 percent to more than 50 percent by 2030.[144] The US State Department said the deal will raise Burundi’s electrification rate from 12 percent to 70 percent over the next several years and could encourage additional US private sector investment.[145]

*Readers can explore CTP’s new interactive map documenting AFC-M23’s assessed area of operation in the eastern DRC here.*

Data Cutoff: October 7, 2026, at 1 P.M. EST

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Key Takeaway: DRC President Félix Tshisekedi’s special envoy undertook a regional tour to rally support for the DRC’s plan to demobilize the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR). Three of the African Union mediators for the DRC peace process visited Goma and Kigali to meet with regional stakeholders. Pro-Congolese government forces retook Remeka town and claimed control of other areas in southern Masisi district in North Kivu as significant fighting continued into early October. The US-backed Ruzizi hydropower plant project is reportedly back in limbo after a Chinese firm withdrew from the project’s consortium.

Kinetic Activity in Rutshuru & Eastern Masisi Districts

Nothing significant to report.

Northern Axis: Lubero-Butembo-Beni-Bunia

Pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters reportedly attacked M23 on the front line in Lubero district in North Kivu. M23’s political spokesperson, Lawrence Kanyuka, claimed in a statement on social media that pro-Congolese government forces operating from Kipese town shelled Mutondi village on September 28.[1] Mutondi is roughly four miles south of Kipese on a local road.[2] The Congolese media outlet Actualite.cd reported that Wazalendo fighters attacked and clashed with M23 in several villages in the Batangi chiefdom in south-central Lubero, including Kandole, Kirivu, Vyanze, between October 1 and 4.[3] The report from October 5 claimed that Wazalendo fighters had captured Kandole and Kirvu and advanced toward Mutondi, as M23 deployed reinforcements to Vyanze from Kitsombiro on the RN2 via Kasusa and Luvereya and before Wazalendo fighters then retreated.[4] Kandole and Vyanze are south of Kipese, closer to Lake Edward and roughly 20 and 14 miles east of Alimbongo on the RN2, respectively. Kanyuka claimed that a helicopter operated by pro-Congolese government forces dropped two explosives on Pitakongo in Lubero on October 3.[5] CTP is unable to verify the precise location of Pitakongo.

Southern Axis: Bukavu-Uvira-Baraka-Kalemie

Numerous villages changed hands between pro-Congolese government forces and M23 in the northern Kalehe district highlands in South Kivu in early October. Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that the Congolese army (FARDC) and Wazalendo fighters took control of several villages in the Ziralo group in northern Kalehe from M23, including Katale, Kafufula, Chambombo et Kudépôt, as early as October 3 after significant clashes with M23.[6] This represents the fourth pro-Congolese government offensive against M23 in northern Kalehe since late June. Pro-Congolese government forces then reportedly captured Lumbishi, Shanje, and several other localities in the area around October 5, before advancing on and capturing the mining town of Numbi on October 6 after M23 had withdrawn.[7] Clashes continued on October 7, and M23 reportedly recaptured Numbi, Shanje, and Kavumu near Numbi before advancing toward Chambombo.[8] Wazalendo fighters reportedly set fire to dozens of houses and shops in the public market and looted livestock belonging to locals in Shanje as they were withdrawing from the town between October 6 and 7.[9]

Fighting between M23-allied militia fighters and pro-Congolese government forces continued in the highlands and midlands in South Kivu. M23-allied Twirwaneho and reported RED–Tabara fighters reportedly clashed with pro-Congolese government forces in the midlands between September 24 and 27, capturing Magunda, Maheta, Kakuku, Mushojo, and Nanjale villages in the Basimukindji second group in the Itombwe sector in Mwenga district around September 26.[10] The Basimukindji second group is in a mountainous area northwest of Uvira town in the Bavira chiefdom. M23-allied fighters reportedly also captured Mibunda, which is a few miles north of Magunda on a rural road, around September 26.[11]

Clashes continued further south around Minembwe town in the Fizi highlands. An independent Congolese journalist reported on social media that M23-Twirwaneho fighters conducted a drone attack on a pro-Congolese government position at Mulima near Point Zéro, which is an operationally significant hilltop east of Minembwe, on September 24.[12] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly intensified attacks on numerous villages, including Rugezi, Gipimo, and Wihene, to the south of Minembwe on September 26 and 27.[13] Kanyuka claimed on social media on September 27 that pro-Congolese government forces also attacked Point Zéro.[14] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed on social media on September 28 that Twirwaneho repelled the attacks on Rugezi and Gipimo.[15] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media on September 28 that pro-Congolese government forces shot down a drone, reportedly Ukrainian-made, over Rugezi.[16] One M23-aligned source claimed on social media that Bafulero fighters featured in videos that circulated after the drone was downed said that the drones belonged to pro-Congolese government forces.[17] The Burundian army (FDNB) spokesman, Brig. Gen. Gaspard Baratuza, confirmed at a press conference on September 29 that military authorities had arrested two FDNB officers in South Kivu in late August but denied that they were transferred to Kinshasa.[18] Baratuza also denied reports that have circulated since September 21 that Tanzanian troops entered Burundi and have deployed to the eastern DRC in FDNB military uniforms.[19] Fighting reportedly continued around Rugezi and Gipimo and in the Basimimbi group in the Lulenge sector on September 29 and 30.[20] Fighting also continued in an area known as Avocat, near Kanguli and close to Point Zéro, on September 30.[21] Congolese-government aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces captured Wihene on September 30 after clashes with M23-allied fighters.[22] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly conducted attacks on Nyaruhinga, Point Zéro, and other areas near Minembwe on September 30.[23] A Burundian human rights activist opposed to the Burundian government claimed on social media on October 2 that FDNB Captain Sylvestre Barutwanayo died fighting in combat at Rugezi in late September or early October.[24] M23-aligned sources claimed on social media that Twirwaneho repelled pro-Congolese government attacks on its positions in Gipimo on October 2.[25] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces bombed Wihene using one-way (OWA) attack drones on October 3.[26] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed that pro-Congolese government forces conducted drone attacks on Point Zéro and Mukoko on October 4.[27] Kanyula claimed that pro-Congolese government forces conducted OWA attacks on Rugezi on October 6 and 7.[28] The FARDC claimed on October 7 that 17 fighters from the M23 alliance surrendered near Abala, Nyaruhinga, and Kabanja on October 6.[29]

Fighting broke out near Katana town and the Kahuzi-Biega National Park (PNKB) in Kabare district in South Kivu. Wazalendo fighters reportedly clashed with M23 in Kabushwa village on the outskirts of Katana town on the RN2 and the edge of the PNKB on September 28.[30] Congolese-government aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces captured several positions overlooking Katana as early as September 30.[31] Fighting reportedly resumed in Kabushwa, Kahungu, and the Mbinga Sud group on October 6.[32]

Northwest Axis: Masisi-Walikale-Lubutu-Kisangani

The FARDC and Wazalendo fighters retook Remeka town and claimed control of other areas in southern Masisi district in North Kivu as significant fighting on this axis continued into early October. CTP last reported in late September that M23 reinforced its positions with troops and military equipment from Ngungu toward the front line and launched attacks to recapture operationally significant areas near Remeka town in the Ufamandu first group in southern Masisi.[33] M23 reportedly continued to reinforce its positions as clashes between the group and pro-Congolese government forces resumed in Remeka and Nkokwe on September 25.[34] M23 then reportedly recaptured Remeka, Nkokwe, and Muhororo on September 25, before the group advanced to and clashed with pro-Congolese government forces using drones in Kaleta and Miko hill, which is near Katuunda, on September 26.[35] Clashes reportedly resumed around Kaleta and Miko on September 27.[36] M23 reportedly targeted two Wazalendo positions in Kaleta and Bitoyi in Ufamandu using drones on September 28.[37] Significant fighting reportedly did not resume until October 3, when Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that the FARDC and Wazalendo fighters recaptured Remeka, Muhororo, Kamuhobe, Nyamiri, and Mihano after clashing with M23.[38] This is the fourth time that Remeka has changed hands since late August. Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that fighting resumed further west as Wazalendo fighters captured Mushongi village—near the Katoyi sector capital to the west of Remeka—as part of a Wazalendo effort to put pressure on Katoyi and Mitimingi, on October 4.[39] Congolese military authorities claimed on October 4 that pro-Congolese government forces captured 10 M23 fighters during recent clashes in Remeka, Mohololo, Biriko, and Miko.[40] Fighting resumed closer to Remeka on October 5, as pro-Congolese government forces claimed control of Nyakigano, Nkokwe and Kashovu villages near Kasake.[41] Wazalendo fighters reportedly also claimed control of Changayi, Ruseme, and Kasheke villages further north and closer to Katoyi in the Nyamaboko group in the Osso Banyungu sector on October 5.[42] Wazalendo fighters then claimed control of Mitimingi on October 5.[43] Clashes between the two sides reportedly resumed in several areas in southern Masisi on October 6 and 7, including Kasake, Katoyi, Kashovu, Burora.[44]

M23 reportedly conducted a drone attack on Pinga town, as clashes resumed on the RP1030 on the Masisi-Walikale district border in North Kivu. Actualite.cd reported that fighting between the FARDC and Wazalendo fighters and M23 resumed on the hills of Kazumba, Kasumba and Chad in the Kisimba group near Minjenje on the RP1030 on September 26.[45] Wazalendo fighters and possible militants from the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) reportedly infiltrated Burungu village, which is further south on the RP1030—about six miles south of Kitchanga town—in M23 uniforms and attacked M23 elements and civilians on September 26.[46] M23 then reportedly conducted a drone attack on an FARDC position at the Pinga airfield in the first reported M23 air attack on the town on September 28.[47] The Congolese representative to the UN claimed at a UN Security Council hearing on September 29 that the Rwandan army was responsible for the attack and used a Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2-type medium-altitude long-endurance drone.[48] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly recaptured several positions above Minjenje and Malemo on the RP1030 after clashes with M23 on September 28.[49]

Southwest Axis: Bukavu-Kamituga-Shabunda-Kindu

Nothing significant to report.

Major Political Developments

DRC President Félix Tshisekedi’s special envoy undertook a regional tour to rally support for the DRC’s plan to demobilize the FDLR. Floribert Anzuluni, the Congolese Minister of Regional Integration, traveled to Togo and met with Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé in Lomé to discuss the plan on September 29.[50] Gnassingbé is the designated mediator for the African Union (AU) in the DRC peace process. Anzuluni and Sumbu Sita Mambu, who oversees the M23 file in Tshisekedi’s office, then traveled to Brazzaville in the Republic of the Congo and met with President Denis Sassou Nguesso to discuss the plan on September 30.[51] Anzuluni and Sita Mambu traveled to Luanda in Angola on the same day and met with Angolan President João Lourenço to discuss the plan.[52] Anzuluni then traveled to Bujumbura in Burundi to meet with Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye on October 1.[53] Ndayishimiye currently serves as Chairman of the African Union. Anzuluni and Sita Mambu then traveled to Entebbe in Uganda and met with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni on October 5.[54] Tanzanian President Samia Hassan then received Anzuluni and Sita Mambu in Dar es Salaam on October 6.[55] The Congolese Ministry of Regional Integration said that the meeting with Hassan focused on “significant progress” made in the process since Anzuluni conducted a previous regional tour to rally support for the plan and the Congolese government publicly revealed it in late July.[56]

Three of the AU mediators for the DRC peace process visited Goma and Kigali to meet with regional stakeholders. The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported on September 30 that the panel of AU facilitators plans to visit Goma, Kigali, and Kinshasa by mid-October.[57] A delegation that included three of the facilitators—former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, former Botswanan president Mokgweetsi Masisi, and former Ethiopian President Sahle-Work Zewde— and accompanied by the Togolese deputy foreign minister and a senior AU official met with the senior leadership of Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)–M23 at the Serena Hotel in Goma on October 5.[58] The two other facilitators, former Central African Republic President Catherine Samba-Panza and former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, were reportedly absent due to health reasons and separate diplomatic efforts related to the war in the Horn of Africa, respectively.[59] The facilitators then met with representatives from the UN’s mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in Goma.[60] The delegation also met with UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism.[61] The panel then traveled to Kigali, and Kenyatta met with Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe on October 6.[62] The facilitators called for all sides to respect the ceasefire and resume engagement under the Doha process in a statement on October 7.[63] The facilitators then met with Rwandan President Paul Kagame on October 7.[64]

Burundi banned entry to individuals from M23-controlled areas. The Burundian interior minister, Léonidas Ndaruzaniye, announced on October 1 that the Burundian government would henceforth refuse entry to people coming from areas controlled by M23 or transiting through them.[65] Ndaruzaniye said that the ban also applies to UN personnel in these areas.[66] Ndaruzaniye said he had received “numerous calls from people asking him to reverse his decision” but reportedly said that he stayed the policy because Burundi was “Kinshasa’s ally,” according to the independent Burundian media outlet SOS Médias Burundi in a report on October 2.[67]

New reporting adds detail to the US-DRC security memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed in December 2025. The US military and the FARDC had held limited technical exchanges in July 2025, a few weeks after the United States brokered the June 2025 DRC-Rwanda peace agreement, and reportedly began negotiating the details of a security partnership around September 2025.[68] These negotiations culminated in the signing an MOU an expanded security partnership under the Washington Peace Accords in early December 2025.[69] CTP assessed in early 2026 that the security partnership had already led to greater defense cooperation and could materialize into a formalized defense agreement, which would reportedly entail US training support, arms transfers, and intelligence sharing.[70] The French state media outlet Radio France Internationale (RFI) reported on the contents of the MOU in a report on October 3.[71] The report said that one of the partnership’s main aims is to protect the DRC’s territorial integrity and Congolese mineral assets and infrastructure.[72] RFI reported that the partnership aims to strengthen the Congolese army in what would be the “largest professional military training program in Central Africa,” specifically mentioning training in intelligence, logistics, and military engineering.[73] The report said that the memorandum also provides for cooperation on border control and information sharing, while US assistance for modernizing the DRC’s armed forces would be contingent on progress in military professionalization, human rights, and accountability, with no funding guaranteed.[74] The report said that the five-year memorandum is non-binding and that additional agreements would establish specific implementation.[75]

Significant US-Backed Economic Activity

The US-backed Ruzizi hydropower plant project is reportedly back in limbo after a Chinese firm withdrew from the project’s consortium. CTP reported previously that the Ruzizi III hydropower dam in the tri-border area, which is the flagship project under the US-brokered Regional Economic Integration Framework, has faced delays since mid-2025, in part due to the Congolese government’s refusal to support a demilitarized zone around the project.[76] The project, which is developed as a public-private partnership between the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi, will cost $760 million and benefit about 30 million people across the Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda.[77] The United States formally asked the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi to move forward with the project amid delays and designate it as a confidence-building measure in mid-March.[78] CTP reported in late June 2026 that the project had made recent progress, with development finance institutions expected to release funding after the DRC’s water and energy minister began advocating in May for government measures to advance the project.[79] Africa Intelligence reported on September 28 that the project is now in jeopardy again, however, after the Chinese government instructed Chinese firm Dongfang Electric Corp., which was responsible for a key construction component, to pull out of negotiations with the project’s consortium.[80] The report said that a contract setting prices with the project’s contractors, including Dongfang, was expected to be awarded by the end of August, but an announcement is now not expected until the end of the year or possibly early 2027.[81] The report said that the US decision to include the project among confidence-building measures intended to support peace on the ground may have influenced the Chinese firm’s decision to pull out.[82]

* CTP will now publish the Congo War Security Review every Wednesday for the foreseeable future. The next brief is scheduled for October 7, 2026. * 

Readers can explore CTP’s new interactive map documenting AFC-M23’s assessed area of operation in the eastern DRC here.

Data Cutoff: September 25, 2026, at 12:30 P.M. EST

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Read CTP’s latest analysis on the war in the eastern DRC in the weekly Africa File here. 

Key Takeaway: M23 military and intelligence officials reportedly quelled an internal leadership mutiny involving figures from the group’s political wing. The Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+) said that it conducted a ceasefire verification mechanism in North Kivu in early September. Pro-Congolese government forces and M23-allied Twirwaneho fighters continued to engage around Minembwe town in the South Kivu highlands. Fighting continued in southern Masisi district in North Kivu as the offensive by pro-government forces stalled along a line of advance toward Ngungu town.

Kinetic Activity in Rutshuru & Eastern Masisi Districts

Nothing significant to report.

Northern Axis: Lubero-Butembo-Beni-Bunia

Nothing significant to report.

Southern Axis: Bukavu-Uvira-Baraka-Kalemie

Pro-Congolese government forces and M23-allied Twirwaneho fighters continued to engage around Minembwe town in the South Kivu highlands. CTP last reported in mid-September that Twirwaneho and pro-Congolese government forces clashed in several operationally significant areas around Minembwe.[1] The Congolese government and its allies had launched a new offensive against Twirwaneho around August 17.[2] A Congolese government-aligned source claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces attacked Twirwaneho in Biziba and Irumba villages, which are about two miles south of Minembwe center, on September 18.[3] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly clashed with and bombed Twirwaneho and M23-allied fighter positions in the Basimunyaka South group southwest of Minembwe on September 19.[4] One Twirwaneho source claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces attacked Twirwaneho positions in Gipimo on September 19.[5] Gipimo may control access to Biziba to the north closer to Minembwe. Fighting in Basimunyaka South, including around Rugezi—about 20 miles south of Minembwe—has escalated since mid-September, when pro-Congolese government forces increased attacks on Twirwaneho.[6] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly conducted attacks on Point Zéro using heavy artillery and one-way attack (OWA) drones on September 19.[7] Point Zéro is an operationally significant hilltop about 15 miles east of Minembwe on a local road. Congolese government-aligned media sources claimed that pro-Congolese government forces captured Natulonge, Nagishasho, and Timbyangoma villages in Basimunyaka South on September 19.[8] Twirwaneho claimed in a statement on social media on September 19 that pro-Congolese government forces had escalated attacks on its positions using heavy artillery and OWA drones for the past two days, including on Biziba, from forward positions to the south.[9] Twirwaneho fighters reportedly retaliated against recent pro-Congolese government force attacks and pushed coalition fighters back from Gipimo and other nearby villages on September 19.[10] Twirwaneho’s spokesperson, Fidèle Rugabo, claimed on social media on September 20 that pro-Congolese government forces continued conducting attacks on Twirwaneho positions with drones and artillery fire in the highlands.[11] Fighting reportedly continued on several axes around Minembwe in Mukoko, Nyaruhinga, Nyabibuye, Gipimo, Nzohaha, Rugezi, Nyagishasha, Timbyangoma and Biziba areas on September 21.[12] Several M23-aligned sources claimed on social media on September 21 and 22 that pro-Congolese government forces were reinforcing their positions in the highlands with more troops and military equipment ahead of planned ground operations.[13] One Congolese government-aligned source claimed on social media on September 22 that pro-Congolese government forces had blocked all roads around Minembwe.[14] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly conducted attacks on M23-allied fighters in four villages, including Magunda, near the Masango area in the Basimukinji first group in the midlands northeast of Minembwe on September 24.[15] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed that Twirwaneho conducted a drone attack on pro-Congolese government positions at Mulima near Point Zéro around September 24.[16] A Twirwaneho source claimed on social media on September 24 that a rebel-operated OWA drone attacked pro-Congolese government coalition positions in Kabanja and Gipimo on September 24.[17]

Northwest Axis: Masisi-Walikale-Lubutu-Kisangani

Fighting continued in southern Masisi district in North Kivu as the offensive by pro-government forces stalled along a line of advance toward Ngungu town. CTP last reported in mid-September that pro-Congolese government forces reportedly made notable gains against M23 in an offensive on a key line of advance toward Ngungu town in southern Masisi.[18] Clashes between M23 and pro-Congolese government forces reportedly continued on at least two axes toward Katoyi and Ngululu towns between September 20 and 22.[19] Wazalendo fighters reportedly tried to retake control of Mitimingi, which is southwest of Katoyi and northwest of Remeka town, but M23 launched counterattacks and retained control of the area.[20] The Congolese army (FARDC) accused M23 and Rwanda of violating ceasefire commitments in attacks in Masisi and Walikale districts in North Kivu on September 22.[21] The Congolese government-aligned media outlet Tazama RDC reported on social media on September 22 that M23 still controlled several villages on the outskirts of Ngungu and that pro-Congolese government forces had not exerted significant pressure on M23’s control of Ngungu or Minova town, despite repeated reports and claims from DRC-aligned media sources and actors in recent days.[22] M23 reportedly reinforced its positions with troops and military equipment from Ngungu toward the front line and launched attacks to recapture at least one village—Muhororo—on the outskirt of Remeka, which is about 10 miles from Ngungu, from pro-Congolese government forces around September 24.[23] The FARDC and a coalition of pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters had captured Remeka and several other villages in southern Masisi in mid-September.[24] Congolese government-aligned media sources claimed on social media that fighting also took place further west in Mukohwa, Mirindano, and Ndete villages in the Nyamaboko first group closer to the border with Walikale on September 24.[25]

Southwest Axis: Bukavu-Kamituga-Shabunda-Kindu

Nothing significant to report.

Major Political Developments

M23 military and intelligence officials reportedly quelled an internal leadership mutiny involving figures from the group’s political wing. The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported on September 23 that M23 thwarted an internal “conspiracy,” as described by M23 military and intelligence officials cited by the outlet, allegedly led by Théo Binamungu and involving several political figures and military personnel who planned to oust M23 military chief Sultani Makenga and redistribute political and military posts among the plotters.[26] Théo Binamungu is an adviser to Corneille Nangaa, the head of M23’s political wing, and the North Kivu provincial coordinator for Moïse Katumbi’s political party. Africa Intelligence reported that the plot had been in the works since early 2026 but that the plotters recently had been finalizing the details and presented the plan to “members of Rwanda’s security apparatus.”[27] The report said that Makenga and his associates arrested Binamungu in late August and that M23 intelligence services began conducting a discreet investigation led by M23’s military intelligence chief, John Nzenze, into the plot.[28]

The Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+) said that it conducted a ceasefire verification mechanism in North Kivu in early September. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region said in a press release on September 20 that the EVJM+ completed a ceasefire verification field mission to Masisi district between September 10 to 12.[29] The EJVM+ is a ceasefire monitoring mechanism established in October 2025 and supported by the UN that consists of an equal number of representatives from the Congolese government and M23, along with members from the African Union, Qatar, and the United States. The EVJM+ had conducted its first mission to Minembwe in South Kivu on August 24 to 25.[30] James Swan, the head of the UN mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), visited Goma and met with M23 officials and EVJM+ personnel from September 21 to 22.[31] Officers from the FARDC and M23 held a working session under the EVJM+ in Goma on September 24.[32]

Significant US-Backed Economic Activity

Nothing significant to report.