Congo War Security Review

Data Cutoff: November 10, 2026, at 1 P.M. EST*

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Key Takeaway: FRN conducted a major offensive through the Kahuzi-Biega National Park and on the RN3 to capture Bunyakiri town in Kalehe district in South Kivu. Officials from the Congolese, Burundian, and Rwandan governments attended the Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow in late October. Numerous Congolese army officers and fighters have reportedly defected to FRN since Joseph Kabila became its head on October 12. The United States and the DRC held the second meeting of the Joint Steering Committee for the US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement in Paris.

Kinetic Activity in Rutshuru & Eastern Masisi Districts

FRN clashed with pro-Congolese government Wazalendo and fighters from the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) in Rutshuru district in North Kivu. The FRN-aligned media outlet Kivu Morning Post reported that clashes occurred in the Tongo and Bambo groups in the Bwito chiefdom in western Rutshuru on November 2 as part of military operations that FRN carried out against Wazalendo and FDLR elements in the area near the Virunga National Park for several days.[1] Congolese government-aligned sources then claimed on social media on November 10 that Wazalendo fighters attacked FRN positions in Kakoro locality near Nyamilima town in the Binza group in Bwisha chiefdom in eastern Rutshuru close to the border with Uganda.[2]

Northern Axis: Lubero-Butembo-Beni-Bunia

Nothing significant to report.

Southern Axis: Bukavu-Uvira-Baraka-Kalemie

Fighting between FRN-aligned Twirwaneho fighters and pro-Congolese government fighters continued in the South Kivu highlands. A Twirwaneho-aligned media outlet claimed on social media that fighting broke out in the Kuwamabuye area on October 29 after pro-Congolese government forces attacked Twirwaneho positions.[3] Twirwaneho’s spokesperson, Fidèle Rugabo, and another Twirwaneho-aligned source claimed on social media that Twirwaneho had repelled the attacks in Kuwamabuye and that pro-Congolese government forces had shelled Nyamabuguma and Point Zéro on October 29.[4] Point Zéro is an operationally significant hilltop about 15 miles east of Minembwe on a local road. FRN reportedly targeted several Congolese army (FARDC) special force fighters further north of Minembwe in the area around the Bijombo group in Masango village in a drone strike on October 30, reportedly killing at least seven soldiers.[5] Masango is in the Basimukinji first group in the midlands northeast of Minembwe and has been the scene of significant fighting in recent months. One possible FARDC special force fighter claimed on social media that the strike may have been conducted by a Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2.[6] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed on social media that Twirwaneho commander Charles Sematama was present in Kuwamabuye around October 30 after several days of clashes.[7] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that fighting resumed on October 31 and November 1 and that pro-Congolese government forces took control of Kuwamabuye and three other operationally significant hills on the front line south of Minembwe, known as Natulonge, Kabanja, and Bissakara.[8] The Congolese media outlet Radio Maendeleo reported on social media on November 1 that the FARDC had captured several villages and consolidated their positions around Masango.[9] Rugabo denied that the FARDC captured the four hills south of Minembwe and Rugabo and Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed that Twirwaneho repelled pro-Congolese government force attacks on Kuwamabuye and Gipimo on November 2.[10] FRN’s political spokesperson, Lawrence Kanyuka, claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Wihene near Rugezi south of Minembwe and on Point Zéro on November 1 and 2.[11] Twirwaneho-aligned sources, Congolese journalist Héritier Munyampfura, and Congolese journalist Steve Mulindwa claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces continued conducting drone attacks on Wihene and Minembwe center, reportedly targeting Madegu center, Kakenge, and Irundu in two successive attacks, on November 3.[12] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted drone attacks on Minembwe center on November 3.[13] Rugabo denounced the attacks on Minembwe and Kakenge on social media on November 4.[14] The Congolese government-aligned media outlet Tazama RDC claimed on social media that the FARDC conducted the strike and had targeted a Twirwaneho military position.[15] Mulindwa reported on social media on November 4 that pro-Congolese government forces conducted new attacks on FRN in the Lulenge sector south of Minembwe near Lulimba at the crossroads of the RP1121 and RN5 since the weekend and had deployed several battalions to Lulenge.[16] Pro-Congolese government forces then reportedly conducted another drone attack on Kakenge on November 5, killing two children.[17] Rugabo denounced the attack on social media on November 5.[18] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly conducted attacks and clashed with Twirwaneho fighters on the Rugezi axis near Rugomero and Nyarurango and the Mukoko, Nyrauhinga, and Nyamabuguma areas east of Minembwe on November 6.[19] Kanyuka and Rugabo claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Point Zéro and Rugezi on November 8.[20] Rugabo claimed on social media that Twirwaneho repelled a pro-Congolese government force attack on the axis between Kuwamabuye and Kabanju on November 9, as fighting reportedly continued in the area.[21] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Point Zéro, Rugezi, Kimete, Nyarurango and Rugomero on November 9.[22] Rugabo claimed on social media that Twirwaneho dislodged pro-Congolese government forces and retook control control of Kimete and Kabanju on November 9.[23] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces then conducted attacks on the Ndondo area of Bijombo, particularly in Rubarati, Ruhuha, and Marimba to the northeast of Minembwe.[24] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces retook control of Kabanza, a hill above Kuwamabuye, and Kimete and Kashamata villages on November 10.[25] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted a drone strike that killed several Twirwaneho commanders near Kaziba on November 10.[26]

Clashes broke out briefly in the Ruzizi Plain. Significant fighting had broken out in the Kaziba chiefdom in southern Walungu and near the Ruzizi Plain in mid-October and continued in lower intensity into late October.[27] Clashes reportedly occurred briefly near Mino village between Luvungi and Katagota and Rwege, an area between Katogota and Lubarika, on November 1, as both sides continued to reinforce their positions.[28] Kanyuka claimed in a statement on social media on November 4 that FRN did not maintain the intention to march on Uvira.[29]

Northwest Axis: Masisi-Walikale-Lubutu-Kisangani

FRN conducted a major offensive through the Kahuzi-Biega National Park (PNKB) and on the RN3 to capture Bunyakiri town in Kalehe district in South Kivu. Clashes reportedly broke out in PNKB near Tshivanga on the edge of the park and the Kalonge cheifdom—serving as the junction between the RN3 in the PNKB and the Kabare district toward Cifunzi—as FRN launched the offensive on November 6.[30] Videos circulated on November 7 of FRN fighters reportedly in Bitale—roughly 20 miles west of Tshivanga on the RN3 through the PNKB—as FRN fighters reportedly advanced from the PNKB using drones and anti-air defense systems, took control of Cifunzi as the main center in Kalonge, and dislodged pro-Congolese government fighters from Bitale and several other villages on the second axis toward Bunyakiri.[31] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly conducted counterattacks on FRN positions and captured Katasomwa, Nyawaronga and a place called Checheni near the northern tip of the PNKB in the Mubugu highlands on November 8.[32] The Mbugu area connects further north toward the Ziralo group in northern Kalehe near the border with North Kivu through mountain trails. Radio Maendeleo reported on social media that FRN reinforced its position heavily in Bushaku, which is close to Katasomwa to the east toward the RN2, in a likely attempt to stop any Wazalendo advance from Katasomwa toward the RN2 on November 8, as some sources claimed that FRN had already recaptured Katasomwa.[33] Fighting reportedly resumed on the Bunyakiri axis on November 8, as pro-Congolese government forces attempted to halt the FRN advance around Bitale but failed as FRN consolidated their positions between Kalonge and the front line and captured Bulambika—about two miles from Bunyakiri center and three miles from the Kichanga airfield and supply center—on the second axis before capturing Bunyakiri center and continuing their advance on the RN3 toward Kambale.[34] Local civil society reportedly estimated that FRN advanced and took control of somewhere between 12 and 37 miles of the RN3 within just two days.[35] The distance between Tshivanga on the eastern side of the PNKB and Kambale is about 33 miles on the poorly maintained RN3. Bulambika is the largest town in the Kalima chiefdom in the Buhavu chiefdom in Kalehe.[36] Kichanga was the main supply center for all Wazalendo and FARDC troops operating throughout Kalehe and also used for operations in Kabare and Masisi.[37] Bulambika has administrative offices, a general hospital, a health zone office, a Catholic parish, and a central prison.[38] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly withdrew toward Irangi in the Hombo Sud sector after FRN captured Bulambika and Bunyakiri.[39] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces recaptured Katasomwa on November 8.[40] Rumors circulated that eco-guards from the PNKB and some FARDC officers on the RN3 supported the FRN’s capture of Bitale on November 7, which the eco-guards denied in a statement issued on November 9.[41] Some sources indicated that FRN had regained control of Katsomwa around November 9.[42] FRN reportedly stopped their advance at Kambale on November 9, although other sources reported that FRN had advanced a few miles further on the RN3 as far as Kambegeti.[43] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Katasomwa, Kidoveri, and Kalongi, the latter two likely in the highlands near the Ziralo group, on November 9.[44] The FARDC said on November 9 that it would mount a counteroffensive and retake positions that it lost on the Bunyakiri axis.[45] Fighting reportedly resumed near Kambale on November 9 as pro-Congolese government forces tried to retake lost positions.[46] Munyampfura reported on social media on November 9 that FRN fighters were deployed as far as Colobera on the Kalonge axis.[47] Radio Maendeleo reported on November 9 that the Kalonge chiefdom was almost entirely under FRN control and that the rebels had occupied a former camp that served as an FARDC headquarters and another camp considered a Wazalendo stronghold.[48] The FRN announced salongo in Bunyakiri and captured areas for November 14 around November 10.[49] FRN reportedly captured several localities around Katasomwa and the Bushaku area on November 10, including Kitendebwa, Kalongi, Kiduveri, Nyamugari, Mwamiwaijwi, and Mushunguti, after dislodging pro-Congolese government fighters.[50] Wazalendo fighters announced an offensive in Ziralo on November 10 with the aim to capture Numbi.[51] Wazalendo fighters then claimed that they retook Chambombo in Ziralo on November 10.[52] Fighting reportedly continued in Kambegeti on the RN3 on November 10 after pro-Congolese government fighters failed to conduct a counteroffensive on Kambale and were pushed back.[53] The FARDC denounced a disinformation campaign on November 10 that it said circulated accusations on social media that portrayed certain FARDC commanders as being in collusion with FRN.[54]

Pro-Congolese government forces launched an offensive against FRN near the RP529 around Kazinga town in North Kivu. Wazalendo fighters reportedly conducted attacks on and clashed with FRN on the hills of Burubi near Muhanga between Kibati and Kashebere on October 30.[55] Fighting reportedly broke out further south in Kazinga on October 31, as pro-government forces launched attacks on FRN positions around the town and then claimed control of it.[56] Fighting then reportedly moved toward Mahanga center and Kilongo on November 3 as pro-Congolese government forces continued their offensive.[57] Mahanga is roughly 10 miles southwest of Nyabiondo. Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Mahanga, Buhimba, and Kazinga on November 3.[58] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly attacked and claimed control of Mirindano village, which is about five miles south of Mahanga on a local road, on November 3 and 4.[59] The FARDC reportedly then took control of Mahanga, Kilongo, and Kibanda, from FRN on November 4, after two days of combat.[60] Fighting reportedly resumed in Kibati on the RP529 on November 5, after FARDC-Wazalendo fighters conducted attacks on FRN positions.[61] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Mahanga and Buhimba on November 6.[62] Clashes reportedly continued in Mahanga and Buhimba on November 6, as the two sides split control of Mahanga and FRN attempted to recapture full control of the town.[63] Actualite.cd reported that clashes continued in Kibati for the second day on November 6 as the two sides continued to share control of the area.[64] Actualite.cd reported on November 7 that pro-Congolese government forces repelled the FRN counterattacks on Mahanga.[65] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on FRN position further south in southern Masisi in Muhayirwa and Katoyi on November 7 and 8.[66] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Mahanga and Buhimba on November 8.[67] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Kazinga and Mahanga on November 9.[68]

Fighting reportedly briefly broke out on the RP1030 near the Masisi-Walikale border in North Kivu. Actualite.cd reported that FRN targeted Wazalendo and FARDC positions in Minjenje in drone attacks on November 4.[69] Actualite.cd reported separately that fighting then broke out on November 7 after FRN attacked pro-Congolese government positions in Malemo.[70]

Southwest Axis: Bukavu-Kamituga-Shabunda-Kindu

Pro-Congolese government fighters attacked FRN in several areas near the RP503 on the Nzibira axis in the Walungu district highlands southwest of Bukavu in South Kivu. Wazalendo fighters had conducted an incursion in Kaniola near Walungu town and clashed with FRN on October 21.[71] Radio Maendeleo reported that clashes between FRN and Wazalendo fighters in several villages in the Kamisimbi group, which is about six miles south of Bukavu center near the RN2, on November 3.[72] Fighting reportedly resumed on November 5, when Wazalendo fighters clashed with FRN in Nzibira, Luntukulu, Nyamargehe, Kishadu, and Kaniola, likely initiated by Wazalendo elements.[73] Kaniola is about six miles west of Walungu town. Luntukulu is about 10 miles south of Nzibira in the Luindi chiefdom in northern Mwenga. Kishadu is about six miles west of Nzibira on the RP503. Nyamarhege is about six miles from Nzibira. Tazama RDC claimed on social media that fighting also took place in several remote localities in the Luhago group, which is about eight miles north of Nzibira on a local road in the Ninja chiefdom in southern Kabare district, on November 5.[74] Congolese-government aligned sources also claimed that Wazalendo fighters attacked FRN positions in Chulwe and Nzibira on November 5.[75] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Nyamarhege, Lulaba, and Chulwe in the Nzibira area on November 5.[76] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that Wazalendo fighters took control of Chulwe on November 6, as fighting reportedly continued on the RP503 axis and between Nzibira and Luntukulu.[77] Local sources told Actualite.cd on November 6 that the FARDC and its allies had launched an offensive against FRN.[78]

Pro-Congolese government fighters likely also attacked FRN on the front line on the RN2 in Mwenga district in South Kivu. Fighting reportedly broke out in Kasika village, which is the seat of Luindi about 14 miles north of the government-controlled town of Mwenga on the RN2, and Kidasa, Kalambi, Kionvu, and Kigongo villages on November 5.[79] Kidasa and Kalambi are about three and six miles further south of Kasika on the RN2, respectively. Kionvu is a small village to the east of Kalambi off the RN2.[80] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces initiated the engagements in Kasika.[81] Kanyula claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Kasika again on November 6.[82] Fighting reportedly continued around Kasika on November 6, with both sides largely maintaining their positions.[83]

Major Political Developments

Officials from the Congolese, Burundian, and Rwandan governments attended the Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow in late October. Russian President Vladimir Putin co-chaired the third Russia-Africa Summit with Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye as African Union chair in Moscow on October 28 and 29.[84] DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan Prime Minister Justin Nsengiyumva also attended the summit.[85] Tshisekedi said that he was seeking Russian support to enforce UN resolutions related to the war in the eastern DRC.[86] Rwanda and Russia’s Rosatom signed a memorandum of understanding to advance the assessment and development of Rwanda’s nuclear infrastructure, including plans for a small modular reactor, on October 28.[87] The DRC and Russia signed three bilateral agreements that included formalizing the creation of an intergovernmental commission.[88] Ndayishimiye held a bilateral meeting with Putin on October 29.[89] Tshisekedi held bilateral talks with Putin at the Kremlin on October 30.[90] Tshisekedi told Putin that the Washington and Doha peace processes had failed to deliver, sought increased bilateral cooperation, and urged him to help secure an extension of MONUSCO’s mandate.[91] Putin said that the DRC was one of Russia’s “most promising partners in Africa.”[92] Tshisekedi and Ndayishimiye also received honorary doctorates from a university in Moscow.[93]

Tshisekedi held a press conference with a Congolese diaspora audience in Moscow to discuss a range of issues on October 30.[94] Tshisekedi said that Russia will become an “even more important” partner for the DRC.[95] Tshisekedi dismissed the judicial investigation launched by Belgian authorities into alleged corruption involving his family as a “plot” concocted by his “enemies” and a “fake lawyer who has been dealing with Rwandans for 30 years” and said that he had directed his lawyers to “counterattack.”[96] The searches of several properties in Belgium linked to Tshisekedi’s initiated by Belgian authorities in October had required an independent judicial assessment of the allegations.[97] Tshisekedi claimed that former DRC President Joseph Kabila had once remarked to him when they were on good terms that he was not fond of Rwanda, claiming again that Kabila was a puppet president serving Rwandan interests.[98] Tshisekedi reiterated the DRC’s position that the FDLR issue was a “pretext” used by Rwanda and claimed that the Congolese government had begun gathering FDLR members in Kitona, pending their transfer to host countries or voluntary repatriation to Rwanda.[99] Tshisekedi claimed further that an unnamed African head of state had agreed to host them but was subsequently threatened by Rwandan President Paul Kagame who warned against assisting the DRC.[100] The French magazine Jeune Afrique reported that Congolese regional integration minister Floribert Anzuluni had considered Togo and Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé as a potential host country for demobilized FDLR fighters.[101] The report said that Togo had “politely declined” to host FDLR members, however, and cited two sources who said that the decision was not due to pressure from Rwanda.[102] An unnamed source close to Togolese mediation told Jeune Afrique that Togolese authorities were “surprised” that the Congolese government was unilaterally advancing the demobilization plan and “acting as the mouthpiece for the FDLR.”[103] Tshisekedi also announced on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa summit that a Congolese national dialogue was making progress but the government would only include those who have “nothing to do with Rwanda.”[104] Tshisekedi explained why he was “combatting” the current Congolese constitution, referring to issues with the current constitution and sovereignty-related concerns.[105] Tshisekedi also reiterated the government’s position that the death of Manassé Lomboto, a bodyguard for opposition leader Prince Epenge who was likely killed by militants linked to Tshisekedi’s political party during protests in Kinshasa in mid-September, was due to “illness” and defended Epenge’s arrest for comments he made related to Lomboto.[106] The Congolese political opposition denounced Tshisekedi’s remarks on Lomboto and accused the president of trying to influence and coopt the justice system.[107]

Numerous FARDC officers and fighters have reportedly defected to FRN since Kabila became its head on October 12. The Congolese defense minister had instructed the FARDC chief of staff to issue an indefinite ban on FARDC officers from leaving the country without prior authorization on October 15 after a defense council meeting that Tshisekedi chaired on October 14.[108] A copy of the order was sent to the Maison Militaire, Congolese military intelligence, and the DRC’s directorate of migration.[109] Kanyuka claimed on October 18 that more than 120 “compatriots who came from Kinshasa” had joined FRN.[110] FARDC Brigadier General François Kamanzi, commander of military operations in Kongo Central province, reportedly defected from the FARDC and joined FRN by transiting through Angola in late October.[111] Kamanzi is reportedly a Congolese Tutsi from Rutshuru district in North Kivu and previously served in other Tutsi-led movements in the eastern DRC.[112] Kanyuka had also claimed on October 27 that two other FARDC officers had defected to FRN.[113] Manzi Willy, the FRN vice governor of North Kivu, claimed on social media on October 27 that Lieutenant Arnold Lemba Lula from the Garde républicaine (GR) had defected to join FRN.[114] Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu, a military and security analyst, said on social media on October 27 after Kamanzi’s defection that several other FARDC general and senior officers were also preparing to join FRN in the coming weeks.[115] FARDC Colonel Ghislain Umba Ndolo, the deputy commander for operations and intelligence of an infantry brigade based in Tanganyika province, reportedly defected around October 28.[116] FARDC Major Jean Twite Kumwimba, a member of the GR, reportedly then defected and arrived in Goma.[117] FRN-aligned sources claimed on October 30 that Germain Katanga, a former FARDC Brigadier General, joined FRN.[118] An unverified report from Rwandan media outlet KT Press on October 30 claimed that these officers and more than 600 FARDC soldiers had joined FRN.[119] The outlet cited regional accounts that claimed that 635 FARDC soldiers, led by seven officers, crossed into FRN-controlled territory through Nzibira in South Kivu on October 28.[120] The FARDC’s spokesperson claimed in early November that Kamanzi was a double agent and had several AFC-M23 military officers killed by providing information on their positions when he was in the army.[121]

The International Contact Group for the Great Lakes (ICG) expressed concern over the creation of FRN and urged all parties to remain committed to the Washington and Doha process in its first statement since August. The ICG, which France chairs and which includes the United States, Canada, the European Union, and several other European countries, released a statement on October 30 encouraging all parties to remain committed to a “peace resolution of the conflict and to fulfill their obligations without delay.”[122] The ICG said that it “categorically rejects the pursuit of political objectives through the use of violence,” a position directed at the newly formed FRN.[123] The statement did not call for FRN’s exclusion from a political settlement or explicitly rule out negotiations with its representatives. The group reiterated the need for all parties to “respect the rule of law” and the Congolese constitution, noting the “importance of a peaceful and inclusive inter-Congolese dialogue involving all key Congolese stakeholders as an essential prerequisite for lasting peace in the DRC.”[124] Tshisekedi had said on October 24 in a meeting with his political coalition that he “did not like” the constitution, a day after the National Assembly had adopted the law for organizing a referendum on constitutional revision.[125] The group also noted that the rule of law and the “protection of fundamental rights is crucial to ensure that all political parties and civil society organizations can freely exercise their role.”[126] ICG recalled its previous statement on the FDLR demobilization plan and called on Congolese authorities to present an “action plan and timeline” for the protocol.[127]

Envoys representing Tshisekedi and Kabila reportedly attempted to broker some form of understanding shortly before Kabila formally launched the FRN in mid-October. The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported on November 11 that Kabila envoy Jean Mbuyu Luyongola initiated a mediation effort with Tshisekedi adviser Fortunat Biselele a few weeks before Kabila announced the FRN on October 12.[128] The report said that Kabila conveyed through Luyongola that he wanted to establish a channel of communication with Tshisekedi.[129] The report said that Luyongola then met with Bisele and Tshisekedi in Tshisekedi’s office in Kinshasa for two hours.[130] The report said that Luyongola raised the issue of the death sentence that the government leveled on Kabila in September 2025.[131] Tshisekedi reportedly said the sentence could be discussed if Kabila left Goma, condemned Rwanda, and cut all ties with the rebels.[132] Kabila said through Luyongola that the outcome of the discussions and any commitments made by the Congolese government must be put in writing.[133] The report said that the effort came to nothing, and Kabila announced the formation of the FRN on October 12.[134] Kabila denied through M23-aligned journalist Steve Wembi on social media on November 2 that Kabila had dispatched an envoy to meet with Tshisekedi.[135] Exiled Congolese journalist Pero Luwara said on social media on November 2 that a “rapprochement” between the two heavyweights’ envoys, including by François Muamba on Kabila’s side, was a “rumor” and offered an alternative explanation of the fiasco.[136] Luwara claimed that around early October Biselele and Eberande Kolongele, a Tshisekedi security adviser, had brought in Luyongola from his home “almost by force of arms” to deliver a message to Kabila that he wanted to establish a channel of communication.[137] Luwara claimed that Kabila rejected the overture and indicated that he had “nothing to say” to Tshisekedi, ending the matter.[138] Kabila’s close associates accused Tshisekedi of disseminating a “truncated” version of the affair.[139]

The United States announced that it would terminate Rwanda from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade preference program. US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said on November 2 that the United States would exclude Rwanda and South Africa for “engaging in practices that are inconsistent with AGOA’s eligibility criteria” beginning in January 2027.[140] Greer’s office said that these practices included those that “pose a threat to US national security and foreign policy interests” in Africa.[141] Greer said that the Trump administration was concerned about “trade and investment barriers, rule of law, political pluralism, internationally recognized worker rights, human rights, and threats to US national security and foreign policy interests” in Rwanda.[142] The United States has significantly increased diplomatic and political pressure on Rwanda related to the war in the eastern DRC since early 2026. Rwandan or M23-linked persons and entities account for 15 of the 16 individuals and entities sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in the Great Lakes region in 2026.[143] The United States has framed these actions as enforcement measures to support the implementation of the Washington Peace Accords (WPA). Cameron Hudson, former State Department and National Security Council official on Africa, told the French outlet Le Monde on November 4 after Rwanda’s exclusion from AGOA that the United States has “only one strategic interest in the DRC: to get its hands on the minerals. Its entire policy in the region serves this objective.”[144]

MONUSCO head James Swan traveled to Goma to meet with senior FRN officials in early November. Swan and a delegation of senior UN officials arrived in Goma on November 2 and met with Kabila and other senior FRN officials on November 3.[145] This is the first exchange between senior UN officials and Kabila since he launched FRN. The exchanges reportedly focused on the ceasefire, the peace process, the debate on changing the Congolese constitution, and MONUSCO’s mandate.[146] MONUSCO framed the trip as part of Swan’s regular consultations in the eastern DRC.[147] Swan also met with officials from the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism.[148] Bertrand Bisimwa, one of the FRN vice presidents, said after the meeting with Swan that FRN was not in favor of the renewal or expansion of MONUSCO’s mandate but recognized the role that it plays under the Doha process to support the ceasefire verification mechanism.[149] Bisimwa claimed that FRN inherited AFC-M23’s commitments to the Doha process and remain committed to them.[150] Bisimwa said the FRN views the Doha agreements as based on the current constitutional order, arguing that any challenge to it would erode the trust necessary for their implementation and risk the “collapse” of the Doha process.[151] These comments effectively place the constitutional question at the center of international mediators’ concerns, rather than framing it solely as an internal Congolese dispute.[152] FRN demanded an “official clarification” from the Congolese government regarding the referendum law and Tshisekedi’s October 24 and 30 remarks on the constitution and requested that the issue be included on the agenda for the next round of talks in a November 1 letter to Qatari mediators.[153]

The Congolese interior minister threatened to take legal action against Article 64 Coalition (C64) members who travel to FRN-controlled areas to discuss an inclusive national dialogue. C64 members had met in Italy in late October for their first-in person meeting the coalition’s creation in May.[154] The C64’s five leaders, Martin Fayulu, Jean-Marc Kabund, Moïse Katumbi, Augustin Matata Ponyo, and Delly Sesanga, said in a statement on October 27 that they rejected both constitutional change and armed rebellion and would seek to meet Tshisekedi and Kabila separately “to find a Congolese solution to the crisis” and agree to a “genuine inclusive national dialogue.”[155] C64 leaders then met with European officials in Brussels on October 29 and Paris on November 2.[156] Moïse Katumbi reaffirmed the coalition’s opposition to constitutional revision and armed rebellion in an interview with Jeune Afrique on November 3 and said that its leaders planned to travel to Togo, Kenya, South Africa, Angola, Uganda, and Ethiopia.[157] Katumbi said that C64 would begin the tour to promote an inclusive national dialogue with a meeting with Tshisekedi in Kinshasa but that he and former DRC Prime Minister Matata Ponyo would not attend.[158] Katumbi said that C64 members would then all travel to Goma to meet with Kabila publicly.[159] Katumbi argued that “Goma is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Kabila is Congolese,” and that the Congolese government is negotiating with FRN directly in Doha.[160] Katumbi said that he had no intention of meeting with Kagame and recalled that he and Tshisekedi had met with Kagame when they were both in the opposition.[161] Jacquemin Shabani, the DRC Deputy Prime Minister for the Interior, responded to Katumbi’s remarks in his own interview with Jeune Afrique on November 4, threatening that any political figure traveling to Goma to meet with Kabila would face “criminal penalties” similar to the death penalty issued against Kabila.[162]

The Congolese government is reportedly trying to formulate a more assertive diplomatic campaign within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) against Eswatini and other member states it views as sympathetic to Kabila. Africa Intelligence reported on November 6 that the Congolese government is trying to counter the influence of Eswatini, which issued Kabila a diplomatic passport, and other SADC member states, including South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, that maintain close ties with Kabila.[163] The report said that Tshisekedi’s government views Eswatini as Kabila’s primary diplomatic ally in SADC and is strengthening its diplomatic efforts to counter Eswatini and Kabila’s other supporters in the bloc.[164] The report noted that Eswatini officials and other regional leaders and diplomats are displeased with the Tshisekedi government’s treatment of Kabila, particularly the death penalty conviction in 2025.[165] The report said that the DRC’s national security council, Floribert Anzuluni, and the Congolese ambassador to Botswana and permanent representative to SADC are “closely monitoring” the issue with Eswatini.[166]

The Congolese government is threatening to withdraw from the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) if Rwanda’s Louise Mushikiwabo wins a third term as the organization’s secretary-general at an upcoming summit. Leaders of the OIF’s 53 member states will choose the next secretary-general at a summit in Cambodia on November 15 and 16.[167] The DRC nominated Juliana Amato Lumumba, who is the daughter of Congolese independence leader Patrice Lumumba, in early 2026 to challenge Rwandan Louise Mushikiwabo, a former Rwandan foreign minister who has led the OIF since January 2019. The Congolese government has long accused Mushikiwabo and the OIF of failing to adequately criticize Rwanda’s alleged actions, describing the organization under her leadership as a “second Rwandan embassy” in Paris.[168] Rwandan officials have rejected attempts to frame the election as a bilateral dispute and defended Mushikiwabo’s candidacy on the basis of her record as OIF head.[169] Jeune Afrique reported that Tshisekedi told the French foreign minister during a meeting on October 2 in Kinshasa that the DRC could withdraw from the OIF if Mushikiwabo secured a third term, prompting French officials to increase diplomatic efforts between the DRC and Rwanda to avoid the DRC’s withdrawal, including a reported proposal by French President Emmanuel Macron to delay the election by one or two years while retaining Mushikiwabo—which Tshisekedi rejected—among other stopgap measures.[170] The Congolese government is still reportedly considering leaving the OIF if Mushikiwabo is reelected.[171] Most observers see the race as primarily a contest between Mushikiwabo and Romania’s Dacian Cioloș, as Lumumba is less well-known and her campaign has lost momentum following multiple difficulties.[172] Congolese government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya cited “Congolese public opinion” on November 10 as reaffirmation that DRC was considering withdrawing from the organization if Mushikiwabo was reelected.[173]

Significant US-Backed Economic Activity

The United States and the DRC held the second meeting of the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) for the US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) in Paris. Senior US and Congolese officials met in Paris on November 5 for the JSC’s second meeting, co-chaired by Congolese economy minister Daniel Mukoko Samba and attended by the DRC’s minister for mines.[174] The readout said that the SPA was making progress since the inaugural JSC meeting in February, welcoming growing US private-sector interest in the Strategic Assert Reserve (SAR) and an expanding investment pipeline.[175] The readout said that the JSC received a briefing from the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) on its growing investment pipeline in the DRC.[176] The JSC highlighted progress on several priority initiatives, including the signing of a 30-year concession agreement with a Portuguese construction company to upgrade and manage a key railway section between a town on the DRC-Angola border and another town on the DRC-Zambia border in August, ongoing discussions surrounding the Grand Inga hydropower project, and potential opportunities for US firms in critical minerals processing, exports, and energy development.[177] The JSC also noted the DRC’s recent adoption of legislation setting tax and customs rules for projects under the agreement.[178] Samba said on November 6 that the DRC wants to see the partnership translate into tangible economic benefits, arguing that its success should be judged by completed projects.[179] The readout from the meeting outlined no new investment pledges or specific projects slated to receive financing.

* CTP will publish the next Congo War Security Review on November 11 *

Data Cutoff: October 28, 2026, at 10 A.M. EST

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Key Takeaway: The United States imposed sanctions on the Rwandan Ministry of Defense and a financial institution in Kigali. The DRC, Rwanda, and observer nations convened for the seventh Joint Security Coordination Mechanism meeting under the Washington Peace Accords. Clashes continued in the southern Walungu highlands and along the foothills of the Ruzizi Plain in Uvira district in South Kivu, with no operationally significant changes on the ground. Political leaders of the Congolese opposition’s Article 64 Coalition met in Italy for their first in-person meeting since the coalition’s creation in May.

Kinetic Activity in Rutshuru & Eastern Masisi Districts

Pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters attacked FRN in Rutshuru district in North Kivu. Wazalendo fighters reportedly ambushed an FRN convoy that was moving toward Kabizo in the Bwito chiefdom in western Rutshuru on October 26.[1] Kabizo is about 25 miles northeast of Kitchanga on the RP1030 in Masisi district. CTP reported previously that Wazalendo fighters and the Congolese army (FARDC) had conducted attacks on FRN in the adjacent Bwisha chiefdom in Rutshuru in mid-October.[2]

Northern Axis: Lubero-Butembo-Beni-Bunia

Nothing significant to report.

Southern Axis: Bukavu-Uvira-Baraka-Kalemie

Clashes continued in the southern Walungu highlands and along the foothills of the Ruzizi Plain in Uvira district in South Kivu, with no operationally significant changes on the ground. CTP reported previously that significant fighting between FRN and pro-Congolese government forces broke out in the Kaziba chiefdom in southern Walungu and near the Ruzizi Plain in mid-October.[3] FRN’s spokesperson, Lawrence Kanyuka, claimed on social media on October 22 that pro-Congolese government forces reinforced their positions with troops and military equipment in Luvungi and Lubarika.[4] FRN forces reportedly attacked and clashed with pro-Congolese government forces in Kifune, which is about 18 miles south of Kaziba center in the Uvira mountains, on October 23.[5] Clashes reportedly resumed on October 23, and Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces captured Kadezi village, which is reportedly near Kaziba and the Munanira mountains.[6] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that clashes continued in Kaziba and near the Ruzizi on October 24.[7] Clashes reportedly continued in Kaziba and the Uvira midlands on October 26.[8] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Mitimbili and Munanira in Kaziba on October 26.[9] Congolese government-aligned journalist Daniel Michombero claimed on social media that FRN forces retook Kadezi on October 26 after pro-Congolese government forces withdrew.[10] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly conducted several strikes on the hills between the Bafuliru chiefdom in Uvira near the Ruzizi and Kaziba, specifically near Munanira and Ndolera, on October 26.[11] Ndolera is about eight miles west of Luvungi on the RN5 on a local road.

Clashes continued around Minembwe town in the South Kivu highlands, as FRN forces claimed control of several positions south of the town. Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks using one-way attack (OWA) drones and heavy artillery on Rugezi, which is south of Minembwe town, on October 21.[12] Clashes reportedly took place in Rugezi on October 24.[13] FRN-allied Twirwaneho’s spokesperson, Fidèle Rugabo, claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces attacked Rugezi on October 24.[14] Rugabo reiterated claims on social media that the Congolese government has deployed a CH-10 a Chinese-made CH-10 tilt-rotor drone for air attacks around Minembwe.[15] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed that pro-Congolese government forces conducted drone attacks on Biziba near Minembwe and in Gipimo and Rugezi to the south after clashes took place on October 24.[16] Rugabo claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces attacked on three lines of advance near Rugezi, from Wihene, Rugomero, and Nyakirango, on October 24.[17] Rugabo claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces attacked on three lines of advance near Kabanju, from Gipimo, Nzohaha, and Kasolokochi, on October 25.[18] Twirwaneho sources claimed on October 25 and 26 that heavy fighting took place in Rugezi, Gipimo, and Nyagishasha and that pro-Congolese government forces conducted drone attacks on Rugezi and Gipimo.[19] Rugabo claimed on social media on October 25 that Twirwaneho forces had repelled attacks by pro-government forces in Rugezi and Gipimo and inflicted casualties on enemy forces.[20] Heavy fighting reportedly continued in Wihene, Rugezi, and Point Zéro on October 26.[21] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted OWA and artillery attacks on Wihene, Rugezi, and Point Zéro around October 26.[22] Point Zéro is an operationally significant hilltop east of Minembwe. Rugabo claimed on social media on October 26 that Twirwaneho repelled pro-Congolese government attacks on Rugezi and Gipimo and inflicted losses on enemy forces.[23] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces bombed Biziba and Rugezi on October 26.[24] Rugabo claimed that Twirwaneho had repelled pro-Congolese government attacks on the Kabanju axis on October 26.[25] FRN-aligned sources and one anti-Burundian government source claimed on social media that Burundian army troops suffered notable losses near Rugezi against Twirwaneho around October 26.[26] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed on social media that clashes continued on several axes around Minembwe on October 27 as pro-Congolese government forces regrouped, and Rugabo claimed in two statements on social media that Twirwaneho forces had recaptured operationally significant positions around Kabanju and Rugezi, including Kuwamabuye, Nyarurango, and Rugomero.[27]

Northwest Axis: Masisi-Walikale-Lubutu-Kisangani

Fighting broke out again near the RP1030 in Walikale district in North Kivu as pro-Congolese government claimed control of a hilltop. Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly attacked FRN forces in Katobo in the Banamulindwa locality in the Kisimba group in Walikale on October 24 and captured Rushihe hill after dislodging FRN after three days of clashes.[28] Clashes resumed in Luola and near Chad hill overlooking Minjenje and Mpeti on October 27, when pro-Congolese government forces repelled FRN attacks in the area.[29]

Fighting reportedly resumed on the RP529 near Nyabiondo town in North Kivu. The Congolese media outlet Actualite.cd reported that clashes broke out in Kibati to the west of Nyabiondo on the RP529 on October 268, when pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on FRN positions in the village.[30]

Southwest Axis: Bukavu-Kamituga-Shabunda-Kindu

Nothing significant to report.

Major Political Developments

The United States imposed sanctions on the Rwandan Ministry of Defense (MoD) and a financial institution in Kigali. The US Treasury Department said on October 28 that it sanctioned the Rwandan MoD for providing support to FRN and deploying troops and military equipment to the eastern DRC.[31] The Treasury Department also imposed sanctions on Zigama Credit and Savings Society, which is a financial cooperative and bank headquartered in Kigali that serves Rwanda’s security and intelligence services.[32] The Treasury Department claimed that Zigama facilitated the transport of gold from FRN-controlled territory in the eastern DRC to Kigali and processed financial transactions worth tens of millions of dollars for FRN.[33] Zigama is the fourth largest bank in Rwanda by total assets and is known for offering competitive interest rates that are generally lower than conventional commercial banks in the region.[34] Rwandan or M23-linked persons and entities now account for 15 of the 16 individuals and entities sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in the Great Lakes region in 2026.[35] The United States has framed these actions as enforcement measures to support the implementation of the Washington Peace Accords (WPA).

The DRC, Rwanda, and observer nations convened for the seventh Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) meeting under the WPA. Military officials from the DRC and Rwanda, along with representatives from the African Union, the United States, and Qatar, met in Garmisch, Germany from October 20 to 22.[36] The sixth JSCM meeting was in Switzerland in mid-August.[37] The readout said that the delegations worked to finalize the draft Operations Order agreed upon at the sixth JSCM meeting for Congolese army operations against the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the eastern DRC.[38] The readout made no mention of the protocol that the Congolese government has advocated in recent months for the voluntary demobilization of the FDLR.

Political leaders of the Congolese opposition’s Article 64 Coalition (C64) met in Rome, Italy for their first in-person meeting since the coalition’s creation in May. The C64’s five leaders, Martin Fayulu, Jean-Marc Kabund, Moïse Katumbi, Augustin Matata Ponyo, and Delly Sesanga, met in Rome from October 25 to 27 and said in a statement on October 27 that they rejected both constitutional change and armed rebellion and would seek to meet DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and former DRC President Joseph Kabila separately “to find a Congolese solution to the crisis” and agree to a “genuine inclusive national dialogue.”[39] The coalition did not mention a timeline for the proposed meetings or indicate whether Tshisekedi and Kabila had agreed to participate. The statement accused the Congolese government of preparing a “constitutional coup” and separately condemned the use of force to seize power.[40] The coalition’s stance on Kabila was reportedly the main sticking point in the talks. One unnamed participant told French state media on October 27 that condemning Kabila could look like support for Tshisekedi, while not condemning him could be read as indirect support for Kabila.[41] Another source said the coalition agreed that both armed and unarmed actors should still participate in the dialogue under the mediation of the religious leaders.[42]

Congolese authorities reportedly had arrested an opposition figure who tried to attend the meeting in Rome. The DRC’s migration authority reportedly confiscated the passports of Fayulu, his deputy, and Prince Epenge, who is the spokesperson for Fayulu’s Lamuka coalition, before returning the passports belonging to Fayulu and his deputy.[43] Congolese intelligence officials reportedly detained Epenge after he refused to leave the airport in Kinshasa without his passport and transferred him to the intelligence service linked to Tshisekedi’s office.[44] The French magazine Jeune Afrique cited accounts from Epenge’s circle that claimed that intelligence agents from the Agence nationale de renseignements (ANR) “arrested him, confiscated his phones, and forced him into a 4x4 vehicle. His eyes were blindfolded with a piece of cloth.”[45] Authorities reportedly issued a provisional arrest warrant for Epenge and charged him with “spreading false rumors” over claims that Manassé Lomboto, who was part of Epenge’s security detail, had been assassinated.[46] Lomboto died during a mid-September march against constitutional change in Kinshasa, likely killed by militants linked to Tshisekedi’s party.[47] Epenge’s family accused the Congolese government of pressuring doctors who produced a medical report after his death toward a natural-death conclusion.[48] Congolese authorities then prevented Lomboto’s funeral from taking place on September 26.[49] Epenge claimed that 80 armed police blocked the hospital, where his body remains.[50] C64 called for Epenge’s release in their final statement on October 27.[51]

The UN’s mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) repatriated over 40 individuals to Rwanda. MONUSCO said on social media on October 28 that it had facilitated the voluntary repatriation of 42 individuals, including 10 FDLR members, to Rwanda in cooperation with the Congolese and Rwandan governments.[52]

Significant US-Backed Economic Activity

A US-backed minerals consortium is reportedly close to acquiring a stake in Glencore’s copper and cobalt mines in the DRC. Orion Resource Partners CEO Oskar Lewnowski told Bloomberg on October 23 that the Orion Critical Mineral Consortium (Orion CMC) was in the “final phases” of purchasing a 40 percent stake in Glencore’s interests in the Kamoto Copper Company and Mutanda Mining operations in Lualaba province in the southern DRC.[53] Glencore and Orion CMC had signed a nonbinding memorandum of understanding on the two mines in early February 2026.[54] Orion Resource Partners had established Orion CMC with the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and an Emirati sovereign wealth fund to strengthen critical mineral supply chains for the United States and its allies in October 2025.[55] Lewnowski also said that Orion CMC could still support Chemaf, a Congolese producer of copper and cobalt acquired by US company Virtus Minerals, but that the consortium’s short-term priority was wrapping up the Glencore deal.[56]

Data Cutoff: October 21, 2026, at 10 A.M. EST

To receive the Africa File and Congo War Security Review via email, please subscribe here.

Follow CTP on X, LinkedIn, and BlueSky for daily updates.

Read CTP’s latest analysis on the war in the eastern DRC in the weekly Africa File here. 

Key Takeaway: Former DRC President Joseph Kabila officially joined the M23 rebellion as the political leader of a rebranded movement called the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN). Significant fighting took place between FRN and pro-Congolese government forces in the Walungu district highlands for nearly two weeks and spilled over into the foothills of the Ruzizi Plain in Uvira district in South Kivu. Mercenaries linked to US security tycoon Erik Prince reportedly took combat losses in the South Kivu highlands in mid-September. Burundian security services have reportedly arrested dozens of people in recent weeks whom authorities alleged have collaborated with FRN and Rwanda.

Kinetic Activity in Rutshuru & Eastern Masisi Districts

Pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on FRN in Rutshuru district in North Kivu. The Congolese army (FARDC) reportedly conducted a drone strike on an FRN position in Kalengera on October 12.[1] Kalengera is about nine miles south of Kiwanja on the RN2. Pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters then reportedly ambushed and clashed with an FRN contingent in Kiseguro in the Binza group in Bwisha chiefdom in eastern Rutshuru on October 13.[2] Kiseguro is about 10 miles north of Kiwanja.

Northern Axis: Lubero-Butembo-Beni-Bunia

Nothing significant to report.

Southern Axis: Bukavu-Uvira-Baraka-Kalemie

Significant fighting took place between FRN and pro-Congolese government forces in the Walungu district highlands for nearly two weeks and spilled over into the foothills of the Ruzizi Plain in Uvira district in South Kivu. Clashes reportedly broke out in Kabembe group in the Kaziba chiefdom, possibly southwest of Kaziba center, on October 11, when the FARDC and Wazalendo fighters launched an offensive against FRN.[3] Fighting reportedly resumed in Kaziba on the hills of Mitimbili in the Muhumba group east of Kaziba near the border with the Bafulero chiefdom in Uvira on October 12.[4] Fighting also reportedly took place on two other subaxes in Kaziba—the Kashozi and Butuzi groups—on October 11 and 12.[5] Clashes between FARDC-Wazalendo and FRN troops reportedly continued in these areas before spreading to others in Kaziba on October 13.[6] FRN’s political spokesperson, Lawrence Kanyuka, claimed in a statement on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks in Kaziba on October 13.[7] Fighting reportedly continued for a fourth day in Kaziba on October 14.[8] The Congolese media outlet Radio Manedeleo reported on October 14 that the outbreak in fighting caused hundreds of families to abandon their villages, with some heading west toward the Luhwindja chiefdom in the adjacent Mwenga district and others toward Nyangezi and Bukavu.[9] Fighting reportedly continued in Kaziba for the fifth consecutive day on October 15.[10] Fighting reportedly continued in Kaziba on October 16 and 17.[11] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed that fighting broke out further west toward Walungu town on October 16, when FRN elements attacked Wazalendo positions in Kacuba and Irega villages in the Luhago group in the Nindja chiefdom in Kabare district.[12] Congolese government-aligned media sources claimed on social media that an FARDC drone struck several FRN positions in Mitimbili in the Muhumba group in Kaziba on October 16.[13] FRN reportedly announced its intention to march on Uvira town and then Kalemie town in Tanganyika province further south during a local rally in Kamanyola on October 16.[14] Wazalendo fighters reportedly disrupted a separate local FRN meeting led by FRN South Kivu governor Patrick Nshombo Busu in Nyangezi, which is further north toward Bukavu, in an attack around October 16.[15] Congolese government-aligned journalist Byobe Malenga claimed that fighting broke out in the mountainous areas of Muhungu and Mugobe near Kamanyola on October 16.[16] Congolese government-aligned media sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces shot down three FRN drones over Munanira and Butuzi in Kaziba on October 18.[17] Fighting reportedly continued in Kaziba on October 19, as bombing occurred and pro-Congolese government forces reportedly shot down a drone over a Wazalendo camp near Nambula hill.[18] Fighting reportedly continued in Mitimbili, Muhumba, and Mwera in Kaziba for the tenth day on October 20.[19] Steve Mulindwa, a journalist for Radio Manedeleo, reported on social media on October 20 that no major movements had occurred in Kaziba but that FRN had dislodged Wazalendo fighters from several hills.[20] Mulindwa reported separately on October 20 that FRN had cleared Wazalendo fighters from several hills near Kaziba center, namely Namubula, Kahya, Mbwega, and Malinji.[21] Fighting then reportedly resumed to the east of Kaziba in the Munanira mountains, including in Mugobe, Kamonyi, Kalunga, in the Itara-Luvungi group in Uvira district near Kamanyola on October 20, when FRN attacked FARDC-Wazalendo positions in the area to southwest of Kamanyola in the mountains straddling Walungu and Uvira.[22] One unidentified source told the Congolese media outlet Libre Grand Lac on October 21 that FRN had attacked army positions in Kadeze in an attempt to advance and secure the passage of reinforcements toward Kaziba.[23] FRN-aligned sources claimed on social media that FRN took control of Munanira and Bideka after dislodging pro-Congolese government forces on October 20.[24] Congolese government-aligned sources on social media disputed this and said that the FARDC still controlled these positions.[25] The FARDC reportedly reinforced its positions in Luvungi and Lubarika on October 21, after recapturing Muhungu and holding back the FRN offensive.[26] The Congolese media outlet Actualite.cd reported on October 21 that the fighting in Kaziba had displaced more than 12,000 households.[27] Wazalendo fighters then reportedly attacked FRN positions in Kaniola near Walungu town on October 21.[28]

Fighting continued around Minembwe town in the highlands in South Kivu. FRN-allied Twirwaneho’s spokesperson, Fidèle Rugabo, claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted drone attacks on Minembwe and Gipimo on October 9.[29] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces captured an operationally significant position known as Kamombo in Fizi district on October 9.[30] Clashes reportedly took place south of Minembwe in Timbyangoma and Rugezi villages on October 9.[31] Rugezi is about 30 miles south of Minembwe on local roads. Rugabo claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces attacked Gipimo on October 10.[32] Kanyuka and FRN-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted one-way drone (OWA) attacks on Point Zéro and the surrounding Minembwe area near Gipimo on October 9 and on Rugezi on October 10.[33] Point Zéro is an operationally significant hilltop about 15 miles east of Minembwe. Rugabo claimed on social media on October 11 that Twirwaneho had repelled pro-Congolese government attacks on the Gipimo and Rugezi axes.[34] Fighting reportedly continued in Kamimbi, Biziba, and Timbyangoma to the south of Minembwe and in Badinzi and Rugezi on October 11.[35] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed that pro-Congolese government forces took control of Timbyangoma and Rugezi on October 11.[36] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces bombed Rugezi and the Minembwe area on October 13.[37] Clashes reportedly continued in the highlands on October 14 and 15.[38] Kanyuka and FRN-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces bombed Rugezi and the Minembwe area using heavy artillery and OWA drones on October 16, as fighting reportedly resumed.[39] Kanyuka and FRN-aligned sources claimed that pro-Congolese government forces bombed Rugezi and the Minembwe area using heavy artillery and OWA drones on October 18.[40] The FRN-aligned investigative outlet Great Lakes Eye claimed in a report on October 18 that thousands of FARDC and Burundian army (FDNB) troops and Wazalendo fighters and a dozen mercenaries had deployed to reinforce positions to the south of Minembwe near Kabandja center on October 9.[41] The report claimed that another battalion of FARDC personnel, Wazalendo fighters, and Rwandan fighters from the FLN deployed to Shabunda district via Beni town to put pressure on Twirwaneho and FRN positions toward Luhago in Kabare and Nzibira in Walungu district.[42] Kanyuka and Rugabo claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted drone and artillery attacks on Rugezi and Gipimo on October 18 and 19, as fighting reportedly continued.[43] Twirwaneho-aligned sources claimed on social media on October 20 and 21 that fighting continued and that the Congolese government had acquired and used a Chinese-made CH-10 tilt-rotor drone in air attacks around Minembwe.[44]

Clashes also resumed in the Uvira district midlands north of Minembwe near Uvira town. The October 18 report from the Great Lakes Eye claimed that a second major reinforcement of pro-Congolese government troops occurred on October 10, when two FDNB battalions arrived in the Bijombo group in the midlands.[45] Fighting between FRN-allied Twirwaneho and RED-Tabara fighters and pro-Congolese government forces reportedly took place in Bijimbo in the Bavira chiefdom in Uvira, specifically around Magunda village, on October 10.[46] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that FRN conducted drone strikes on enemy positions in Bijombo on October 11.[47] Conflicting accounts on social media presented differing claims about which side regained or seized control of Rubarati, Masango, Malimba, and Bugogoma during clashes that occurred on October 12, with pro-Congolese government forces claiming control of the area.[48] The independent Burundian media outlet SOS Média Burundi reported on October 13 that pro-Congolese government forces had lost several positions in Bijimbo after they abandoned them following drone attacks attributed to FRN, however.[49] The report said that the strikes targeted pro-Congolese government positions in Magunda, Rubarati, Masango, and Ruhuha.[50] Rugabo claimed that FRN and Twirwaneho had retaken control of Rubarati and Ruhuha.[51]

Mercenaries linked to US security tycoon Erik Prince’s Vectus Global reportedly took combat losses in the South Kivu highlands in mid-September. FRN and Twirwaneho fighters reportedly killed and wounded at least 20 people, including US media personality and former Green Beret Tim Kennedy, in an ambush in the highlands as the operators were traveling between locations on September 17.[52] The casualties reportedly included Justin Conaglen, a New Zealander national and a former Special Forces operator.[53] New Zealand media first broke the story of Conaglen’s death on September 24.[54] Kennedy reportedly survived the attack and was evacuated to the United States, following stopovers in Bujumbura and Johannesburg.[55] Reuters cited a Congolese government source on October 9 who said that Rwandan forces might have tracked a surveillance drone back to their location before the ambush.[56] Rwandan state media cited a source who claimed to be familiar with the September 17 attack on October 18 and said that enemy forces had ambushed the contingent as they were attempting to cross Mulima center near Point Zéro as part of their deployments to surround Minembwe.[57] The New York Times cited an anonymous insider source and an incident report on October 9 that said that several Colombian mercenaries employed by Prince also died in a battle in the highlands in early September.[58] The New York Times cited several anonymous former and current officials from the United States, Europe, the DRC, other African countries, and the UN who said that Prince’s mercenaries have been deployed to Kalemie town for the past year.[59] The New York Times cited an adviser close to Tshieskedi who said that Prince and the Congolese government began negotiating a possible new $200 million contract for the protection of Congolese air force assets in September.[60] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported on October 8 that the contract specifically focuses on technical and logistical support and maintenance for the FARDC’s helicopters.[61] A source close to Vectus Global told Africa Intelligence that the possible contract is part of “wider capacity-building activities” the company is providing to the Congolese government in Kinshasa, the Congolese capital.[62] The New York Times reported that Prince had tried to contact the Belgian foreign ministry and sought Belgium’s assistance in securing the release of his drones impounded by Dutch customs and greenlighting the “export of guns and ammunition from a Belgian manufacturer” to the DRC in discussions with Belgian officials in January 2026.[63]

Northwest Axis: Masisi-Walikale-Lubutu-Kisangani

Fighting resumed in southern Masisi district in North Kivu. CTP reported in early October that the FARDC and Wazalendo fighters retook Remeka town and claimed control of other areas in southern Masisi district as significant fighting on this axis had continued.[64] Congolese government-aligned sources claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces took control of Katoyi center on October 7.[65] Pro-Congolese government forces reportedly also took control of Kasake and Shovu in the Ufamandu group and Kawele and Nyakigano in the Kibabi group near Rubaya town after clashes with FRN around Ngungu and Kasaki on October 8.[66] Clashes then reportedly took place in Kibabi on October 8, with Congolese government-aligned sources claiming that pro-Congolese government forces retained control of their positions in Kibabi but not threatening Rubaya and FRN-aligned sources denying the reports of losing ground and claiming that FRN retook several positions.[67] The front lines reportedly fell largely calm on October 9 and 10.[68] Clashes reportedly resumed near Kanyaru, Kawele, Kasake, and Ngungu on October 11 and 12.[69] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government forces conducted attacks on Kashovu and Kumadepo and in Lumbishi in Kalehe district to the south in South Kivu on October 13.[70] FRN then reportedly bombed several pro-Congolese government positions in Ufamandu using OWA drones on October 15.[71]

Fighting also resumed on the RP529 near the Masisi-Walikale border in North Kivu. Wazalendo fighters reportedly launched an offensive and attacked FRN positions in Nyabiondo town on October 14.[72] The FARDC and Wazalendo fighters then reportedly attacked FRN positions further to the west in Kibati on the RP529 on October 16.[73] Kanyuka claimed on social media that pro-Congolese government conducted heavy artillery attacks on Buhimba and Mahanga villages in Masisi district on October 16.[74] Buhimba and Mahanga are about 12 and 10 miles southwest of Nyabiondo, respectively. Fighting reportedly continued in Kibati for a third day on October 18.[75]

Southwest Axis: Bukavu-Kamituga-Shabunda-Kindu

Nothing significant to report.

Major Political Developments

Former DRC President Joseph Kabila officially joined the M23 rebellion as the political leader of a rebranded movement called the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN). Kabila and several senior officials from M23 and its now-former political wing, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), announced the launch of FRN from Goma, the North Kivu provincial capital, on October 12.[76] Claude Ibalanky, a former special envoy and diplomat for DRC President Félix Tshisekedi who had joined M23 in early 2026, presented the group’s political declaration at a press conference.[77] FRN denounced Tshisekedi’s regime and said that the movement aims to “coordinate all resistance forces to end tyranny by all means, including force” and rebuild the state.[78] FRN designated Kabila as its president and Corneille Nangaa and Bertrand Bisimwa, who were the two most senior political figures in AFC, as vice presidents, with several senior AFC officials taking other political posts.[79] Sultani Makenga, a veteran military commander, retained the position of chief of staff of M23’s army.[80] Tshisekedi convened a defense council meeting in Kinshasa to assess the situation and issued “precise instructions” to the FARDC on October 14.[81] The Congolese defense minister issued an order on October 15 following the October 14 meeting that indefinitely suspended FARDC officers from traveling abroad without prior authorization.[82] CTP assessed on October 15 that FRN is more likely a political rebranding of the AFC-M23 than an extensive restructuring of the rebellion, as it formalizes an uneasy alliance of convenience between Kabila and M23 that remains constrained by internal power dynamics and diverging strategic objectives.[83]

Burundian security services have reportedly arrested dozens of people in recent weeks whom authorities alleged have collaborated with FRN and Rwanda. Africa Intelligence reported on October 15 that security services are carrying out an arrest campaign across towns and rural areas in Burundi, targeting people affiliated with or belonging to the Congolese Banyamulenge community residing in Burundi and accusing them of collaborating with FRN and Rwanda, ahead of Burundi’s 2027 elections.[84] The report said that Burundian authorities have arrested and held incommunicado several Christian pastors from well-known churches among the community, accusing them of maintaining ties with “young people and political organizers” close to FRN and collecting intelligence for FRN and Rwanda.[85] Burundian authorities presented 13 “suspects” to the press, most of them reportedly Banyamulenge refugees and including several pastors with a regional following whom the authorities accused of passing intelligence to Rwanda, at the headquarters of Burundi’s intelligence service in Bujumbura on October 8.[86] The spokesperson for Burundi’s ministry of state security called on the population to “monitor” the activities of all members of the Banyamulenge community and to “stop renting houses to them, especially in Bujumbura.”[87] Africa Intelligence reported that an alleged network operates through intermediaries in several East African countries and uses local nationals to “infiltrate” churches.[88] The report said that Burundian security services also have alleged that some pastors arranged for the transfer of Twirwaneho fighters injured in the eastern DRC to Burundi to receive medical care.[89] Africa Intelligence reported that Burundian security services are seeking to dismantle these networks in part by using “young Burundian and Congolese deserters” from FRN or allied groups.[90] Burundian authorities are also reportedly monitoring cross-border movements.[91] The Burundian interior minister had banned entry to Burundi for people arriving from areas controlled by FRN or transiting through them in early October.[92] The arrest campaign has extended into the ruling party’s own ranks, as Africa Intelligence reported that several members of the party’s youth wing and intelligence officers have “disappeared in recent weeks after responding to calls from individuals presented as allies.”[93] Africa Intelligence had reported in August 2026 that a previous arrest campaign that began in March 2026 may have been part of an effort to purge the ruling party ahead of the elections, amid what party members had described as an “atmosphere of mutual surveillance” in which members are encouraged to denounce anyone seen as “potentially subversive.”[94] CTP assessed in early September that Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye is jockeying to keep and consolidate power within the ruling party ahead of the 2027 elections as domestic challenges exacerbated by the Burundian government’s war costs in the eastern DRC continue to mount.[95]

African Union (AU) mediators for the DRC peace process met with Tshisekedi in Kinshasa as part of their regional tour. CTP reported in early October that three of the AU mediators had visited Goma and Kigali, the Rwandan capital, in early October.[96] The panel of facilitators except for former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo arrived in Kinshasa on October 8 for a three-day visit to meet with Tshisekedi and Congolese stakeholders.[97] French state media reported on October 8 that facilitators are planning to attend a meeting between the parties in Doha for late October, although FRN-aligned journalist Steve Wembi reported that it may not take place following the creation of the FRN, adding that the panel could return to Goma before the end of 2026 and that another meeting was planned for December in Tanzania.[98] The visit to Goma was the first step under a six-month roadmap that the facilitators had adopted during a summit focused on peace in the eastern DRC in late July.[99]

Rwanda repatriated over 350 refugees from the DRC. The Rwandan government said that it voluntarily repatriated 369 people from the DRC via Goma and Bukavu on October 8.[100] The last reported repatriation was in early September.[101] At least 3,000 refugees have returned to Rwanda this year, and Rwanda and the DRC reportedly agreed to repatriate 10,000 refugees in the second half of 2026 in line with the Washington Peace Accords.[102]

Belgian police reportedly raided several properties belonging to members of Tshisekedi’s inner circle in Belgium in mid-October as part of a money-laundering investigation. Lawyers representing civil society groups from Katanga and four former executives of Congolese state mining company Gécamines had filed a complaint with Belgium’s federal prosecutor in July 2025 against nine members of Tshisekedi’s family, including first lady Denise Nyakeru Tshisekedi, several of his brothers, and at least one of his sons.[103] The complaint accused them of corruption tied to the plundering of mining sites in Haut-Katanga and Lualaba provinces in the southern DRC and named only family members who are Belgian citizens.[104] The plaintiffs alleged that Tshisekedi’s relatives acquired Gécamines mining residues for a nominal price and obtained subcontracts related to those residues.[105] Belgian police reportedly carried out searches in Brussels and Flemish and Walloon Brabant on October 14, including at Tshisekedi’s family residence, as part of what the Belgian federal prosecutor’s office said was a money-laundering investigation opened in response to complaints filed in July 2025.[106] A lawyer for the plaintiffs told Le Monde on October 17 that the sums allegedly embezzled amounted to billions of dollars.[107] The Congolese foreign minister reportedly received the Belgian ambassador to the DRC on October 15 for what the Congolese foreign ministry characterized as an “an exchange on the state of bilateral relations,” but the French magazine Jeune Afrique reported on October 16 that the meeting was directly linked to the raids.[108] Tshisekedi’s chief of staff issued a circular on October 15 prohibiting presidential staff from contact with the Belgian embassy unless authorized by the foreign ministry.[109] An official in Tshisekedi’s office said that the circular was an internal measure to coordinate communication, and the Belgian foreign minister said on October 16 that “no situation justifies” prohibiting contact with the embassy and that he hoped the measure would be “extremely temporary.”[110] Nyakeru Tshisekedi denied the accusations on October 15 and said that she would cooperate with Belgian authorities.[111]

Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Congolese health authorities said in mid-October that more than $700 million in international donor funding for the DRC’s Ebola response is unaccounted for. Africa CDC Director-General Jean Kaseya said at a press conference in Kinshasa on October 14 that donors had disbursed about $962 million directly to organizations implementing the response, rather to the Congolese government, and that the roughly one-third of implementing partners that shared financial information with the Congolese health ministry reported receiving $228 million.[112] Kaseya told Reuters on October 15 that it was premature to allege embezzlement but called the discrepancy a “major transparency and financial reporting problem.”[113] Africa CDC said in a statement on October 16 that it was working with the Congolese government to reconcile the funds.[114] The DRC’s national public health authority said on October 20 that around 30 partners had declared funding commitments totaling $250 million to $300 million, of which approximately $200 million had been received and just over $100 million spent.[115] Bloomberg reported on October 20 that Ebola cases in the DRC have stopped declining, as elevated transmission rates in North Kivu threaten to reverse progress made in the outbreak’s original epicenter in Ituri province.[116]

Congolese central bank documents reportedly show that Tshisekedi received salary payments well above his official base salary and that his office recorded more than $100 million in travel expenses in 2025. Africa Intelligence reported on October 15 that Congolese central bank documents show that Tshisekedi received at least $420,000 in “salary supplements” in 2025, well above the roughly $140,000 annual base salary set in that year’s finance law.[117] Tshisekedi’s office told Africa Intelligence on October 15 that Tshisekedi had “taken significant measures to mobilize state resources for the war effort” and that the president himself was “making considerable financial sacrifices.”[118] Africa Intelligence reported separately on October 21 that central bank accounts show that Tshisekedi and his staff recorded about $122 million in 2025 for mission and travel expenses, nearly a third of the presidency’s revised budget of about $373 million, which the presidency exceeded, with spending rising to more than $1 billion.[119] One trip to Tanganyika province in late 2024 cost $1.78 million alone, according to the report.[120] Tshisekedi’s office told Africa Intelligence on October 21 that the war in the eastern DRC “requires extensive security arrangements for the president's and first lady’s travel.”[121]

A $17.6 million transfer from a Congolese government-affiliated bank account to a US defense firm is reportedly at the center of a Trump administration investigation into a feud between two Trump allies. Former Trump lawyer Alina Habba Mildon reportedly accused Richard Grenell, a top Trump adviser, on October 9 of misallocating funds she claimed that her now-husband, Turkish businessman Turhan Mildon, had sent at Grenell’s direction in May 2025.[122] Habba Mildon’s account of the dispute reportedly shifted over time, but she now claims that most of the money was for a business transaction and that Turhan Mildon believed that $5.6 million of the transfer would go to the Kennedy Center in Washington, DC, which Grenell then ran.[123] Trump reportedly directed White House Counsel Will Scharf to investigate and look into Habba Mildon’s claims.[124] Habba Mildon reportedly first told the White House that the money came from Turhan Mildon, but The New York Times reported on October 17 that the initial documents that his lawyer submitted had redacted the sender’s name.[125] A Trump administration official told Axios on October 19 that the funds were wired from the Congolese Ministry of Finance in Kinshasa, where the official noted Mildon has “business and access to finances,” rather than from Mildon’s bank as indicated initially by Habba Mildon.[126] The recipient of the transfer reportedly was TX-AT, a Texas defense and security firm, which Grenell has acknowledged that he consulted for in 2024.[127] Axios reported on October 19 that Habba Mildon and Mildon’s attorneys told the White House that the deal involved a Houston-based defense company’s software and the DRC, and that Mildon alleges that the payment was meant to be split between a deal related to the DRC and a donation to the Kennedy Center.[128] Axios also reported on October 19 that a May 2025 text message purportedly sent from Grenell to Mildon, which also discussed the software for the DRC, promised Mildon access to exclusive events, administration officials, and even Trump himself once the money reached “the company” and Grenell arranged the Kennedy Center donation.[129] The New York Times reported on October 17 that a June 2025 text message purportedly from Grenell appeared to ask about a payment related to a “software system.”[130] The purpose and details of the underlying deal reportedly remains unclear, aside from the reported link to the software.[131] Grenell reportedly denies sending the texts, receiving any payment from Mildon, or having any ties to TX-AT at the time of the transfer.[132] Grenell also told The New York Times on October 15 that he never solicited payments on the firm’s behalf.[133] The New York Times noted on October 17 that Mildon has acknowledged through a spokesperson that he advises Tshisekedi and holds a Congolese diplomatic passport.[134] Mildon’s company, Milvest, has won at least a dozen major Congolese government construction projects, including the Kinshasa Financial Center, facilitated by the backing of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and endorsed by Tshisekedi, and several senior Congolese politicians and one of Tshisekedi’s sons reportedly attended the Mildons’ wedding in New York in September.[135] Scharf and several other senior Trump administration officials also reportedly attended the wedding.[136] Africa Intelligence had reported in March 2026 that Milvest secured a $67 million contract from the Congolese government to build a drone launch base in Kisangani in the central DRC for use in the war against FRN and Rwanda.[137] It remains unclear whether the $17.6 million was tied to a contract separate from the major projects already awarded to Mildon’s companies, and whether Mildon was the payer, as he has claimed, or an intermediary for Congolese government funds. Mildon and Grenell reportedly grew close in late 2024 and early 2025 over mutual interests in Venezuela, where Grenell was Trump’s special envoy at the time and Mildon has extensive business holdings, including a contract to operate state-owned cement plants awarded by Alex Saab, a confidant of then-Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro with ties to Russia, Iran, and Turkey.[138] The May 2025 text purportedly from Grenell also reportedly said that he wanted to make Mildon the “American face” in Venezuela.[139] Saab, who previously was Venezuela’s industry minister, reportedly had met with a Congolese delegation in Caracas that included one of Tshisekedi’s sons ahead of Maduro’s January 2025 inauguration, and The New York Times reported on October 12 that Saab had awarded Mildon the cement contract two months later.[140] Both men were reportedly sidelined after Secretary of State Marco Rubio took a harder line on Venezuela that culminated in Maduro’s capture in January 2026, and the two later reportedly fell out.[141] US authorities arrested Saab in May 2026 after Venezuela deported him to the United States, and the US Department of Justice charged him over what it called “a sprawling international money laundering conspiracy” involving a Venezuelan government food program and state-owned oil.[142]

Significant US-Backed Economic Activity

Burundi signed a $1.4 billion electricity partnership with a US-backed company. Weza Power, a subsidiary of Anzana Electric Group, signed a 25-year public-private partnership with the Burundian government on October 16 to expand and operate the electricity distribution network in half of Burundi, while a Burundian state-owned utility company will continue to operate the national transmission network and distribute power in the other half.[143] The readout said that the deal will mobilize $1.4 billion in financing, including from the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the US International Development Finance Corporation, and projected that electricity access in Burundi will rise from about 15 percent to more than 50 percent by 2030.[144] The US State Department said the deal will raise Burundi’s electrification rate from 12 percent to 70 percent over the next several years and could encourage additional US private sector investment.[145]