M23 Massacres Undermine DRC Peace Process: Africa File, August 21, 2025

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Key Takeaways:

• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—M23. M23 has increased the tempo and scale of an indiscriminate counterinsurgency campaign against anti-M23 militia groups—including legitimate military targets, such as Hutu extremist militants—in the eastern DRC with Rwandan backing. M23’s campaign likely violates M23’s and Rwanda’s commitments under the US-backed peace framework, however, and has allegedly involved a high degree of systematic violence against civilians, which may violate international humanitarian law.
• DRC—Ituri. Fighting between Ugandan-linked rebel group and the Congolese army has escalated in the eastern DRC since early August, as the group tries to capture key areas on the Lake Albert coastline and secure greater local backing and support from Uganda.
• Sudan. Growing tensions between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and regional power players, including the United Arab Emirates, could challenge US-led peace talks. The SAF chief has launched some structural reforms to the SAF, likely in part to address international concerns over Islamist influence and human rights abuses, however.
• Chad. Chad continues to grow ties with the Alliance of Sahel States, which could facilitate greater cooperation between Chad and Russia.
• Nigeria. Nigerian forces arrested two prominent Salafi-jihadi leaders in northwestern Nigeria, which will likely degrade the Salafi-jihadi networks in northwestern Nigeria temporarily.
• Mali. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate has escalated the rate of its attacks against Chinese worksites in Mali since late July as part of an attack campaign against foreign companies.

Figure 1. Africa File, August 21, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Assessments:

Democratic Republic of the Congo—M23

Authors: Yale Ford and Liam Karr

Rwandan-backed M23 has increased the tempo of its counterinsurgency operations against anti-M23 militia groups in M23-controlled Rutshuru district in North Kivu since mid-July. M23 has conducted several large-scale operations against suspected Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) militants and allied pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters across Rutshuru. M23 has clashed regularly with FDLR and Wazalendo fighters in 2025 but began increasing attacks in the Bwisha chiefdom in eastern Rutshuru around July 9.[1] M23 then escalated attacks against these militias in the Bwito chiefdom in western Rutshuru around July 17.[2] M23 has tried to clear and hold insurgent strongholds areas—particularly in Bwito—as part of the campaign in Rutshuru but has faced significant resistance from militia fighters.[3] The fighting in both chiefdoms has led to the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians and disrupted the local economy.[4]

Figure 2. M23 Counterinsurgency Operations Against Extremist Hutu Militias in M23-Controlled North Kivu

Source: Yale Ford.

M23 and its Rwandan backers likely seek to clear Hutu extremist militants from their strongholds in Rutshuru and prevent attacks on M23 positions and logistic routes. Rutshuru district has been M23’s center of gravity and rear supply base since the rebel group resurged in late 2021. Anti-M23 militia fighters entrenched themselves in Bwito and repeatedly attacked M23 positions after M23 decreased its presence in these areas in 2024.[5] M23 launched the recent campaign in Bwisha after the group reportedly thwarted a Wazalendo attempt to capture a key town north of the Rutshuru district capital in early July.[6] CTP assessed previously that operations against anti-M23 militias also aim to prevent attacks on logistics routes in Rutshuru and Masisi districts.[7]

M23 has targeted FDLR strongholds and possibly a distinct Wazalendo faction called Collectif des Mouvements pour le Changement-Forces de Défense du Peuple (CMC-FDP) in the campaign. Congolese media reported frequently in July and early August that M23 explicitly targeted villages in Bwito and Bwisha under FDLR-CMC-FDP control or suspected of harboring enemy fighters that embed into local populations and launch attacks on M23.[8] The Rwandan foreign minister blamed increased M23-related insecurity in Rutshuru on CMC-FDP on social media on August 11.[9]

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has disputed that CMC-FDP fighters were explicit M23 targets and said that the July operations focused on an FDLR splinter faction, however.[10] HRW reported that the splinter faction controls areas on the edge of the Virunga National Park near the Binza group in Bwisha. HRW cited local sources who said that they had “rarely seen” militants from the main FDLR faction and CMC-FDP in the conflict zone since late 2024.[11]

The FDLR and CMC-FDP are extremist Hutu groups that have long-standing connections to these areas, where large Congolese Hutu populations are present.[12] The CMC-FDP has “deep ties” to the FDLR, which itself is a Hutu extremist group with members connected with the 1994 Rwandan genocide.[13] The UN reported in July 2025 that “key commanders and combatants” from the FDLR had fled to the Binza cluster in Bwisha due to M23’s territorial advances in early 2025 and that FDLR combatants embedded into the CMC-FDP in at least one village cluster in Bwito.[14]

M23’s campaign against extremist Hutu militias aligns with Rwanda’s security objectives in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The July UN report said that M23 increasingly focused on decimating FDLR, which the UN assessed is part of M23’s further alignment with Rwanda’s “overt and covert objectives” in the eastern DRC.[15] Rwandan President Paul Kagame has labeled the FDLR’s presence in the eastern DRC as an “existential threat” to Rwanda and justified Rwanda’s unilateral military action in the DRC based on this threat.[16]

M23’s campaign—and alleged direct Rwandan involvement in the operations—violate multiple elements of the US-backed peace framework in the eastern DRC despite combating legitimate military targets. Rwandan troops reportedly participated in the Rutshuru campaign, which would violate the US-brokered June peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda. HRW cited several sources, including the UN, locals, and “military sources,” who said that Rwandan forces directly participated in M23’s campaign.[17] Rwanda committed to not “engage in, support, or condone any military incursions or other acts” in the eastern DRC as part of the US-brokered peace deal.[18]

Rwanda almost certainly at least tacitly supports the campaign, which further undermines the commitments it made in the June US-brokered peace framework. The June deal further committed Rwanda to “ensure that all armed groups” in North and South Kivu “cease engaging in hostilities.”[19] Rwanda likely has the leverage to pressure M23 to halt the campaign, given the July UN report said that Rwanda had thousands of troops deployed in the eastern DRC and maintained command and control over M23 military operations as of early 2025.[20]

The campaign further complicates security provisions of the US-backed peace framework, which committed the DRC to take lead on dismantling the FDLR in exchange for the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the eastern DRC.[21] The Rwandan foreign minister has reiterated Rwanda’s position on multiple occasions since late June that Rwanda will withdraw its troops only after the DRC successfully dismantles the FDLR.[22] CTP noted previously that the plan already has unclear benchmarks for success and that FDLR fighters are mostly located in M23-controlled territory, which could create obstacles to implementing the plan.[23] CTP also assessed previously that Rwanda has already set conditions to justify renewed Rwandan engagement with perceived failures around anti-FDLR operations.[24]

Figure 3. Peace Processes Multiply in the Great Lakes

Source: Yale Ford.

The current fighting undermines Qatari-mediated peace talks between the Congolese government and M23, which is aligned closely with the US-backed peace framework.[25] M23’s campaign violates a Qatari-mediated unconditional ceasefire that the group agreed to with the DRC in late July. The ceasefire provision prohibited new attacks or attempts to conquer new territory and committed both sides to “ensure that the ceasefire applies to all forces engaged in the conflict” in the eastern DRC.[26]

The DRC has failed to uphold its commitments in both the US- and Qatari-backed peace talks to rein in pro-Congolese government militias involved in the fighting. The DRC also agreed to “ensure that all groups” cease fighting as part of the US-backed agreement. The DRC agreed to the Qatari-brokered ceasefire that applied to all forces engaged in the conflict. Pro-government militias have continued their attacks on M23 in several areas in the eastern DRC, however. CTP previously warned that the DRC is likely unable to control these groups, and that they would continue attacks and undermine the peace process due to their exclusion from negotiations.[27]

M23 has reportedly used indiscriminate violence, collective punishment, and forcible relocation against civilians, which if confirmed, may amount to violations of international law, war crimes, and further violations of the US-backed peace framework. The UN cited “first-hand accounts” in early August that claimed that M23 operations in four villages in Rutshuru led to the death of at least 319 unarmed civilians, mostly Hutu farmers, from July 9 to July 21.[28] The UN did not specify the location of the villages but is likely referring to mass-casualty incidents that multiple Congolese media sources and HRW claimed occurred in the Binza cluster in Bwisha in July.[29] HRW reported in mid-August that M23 “summarily executed” over 140 civilians, mostly Hutu and some ethnic Nande—including women and children—in least 14 localities under M23 control near Binza between July 10 and July 30.[30] HRW reported that the total civilian death count in Rutshuru in July could amount to over 300, which aligns with the UN’s claim.[31]

Uncorroborated reports from Congolese media outlets and government officials have accused M23 of systematically perpetrating several other mass-casualty attacks on civilians in Rutshuru and other areas in the eastern DRC since the alleged July massacre. A local magazine in Goma claimed that M23 killed 123 people across Goma and Rutshuru district over two weeks from July 25 to August 5.[32] The Congolese army claimed that M23 killed 80 civilians in Kalehe district in northern South Kivu on August 4.[33] Congolese media reported that M23 killed over 50 civilians during operations in Binza group in the first week of August.[34] A Bwito official told Congolese media on August 16 that M23 has killed more than 30 civilians in the Mutanda group in August.[35] Locals told Congolese media that there has been a surge in human rights abuses linked to M23 in villages around the Masisi district capital since mid-August.[36] M23 declared several of these areas “operational zones” before carrying out attacks, indicating the alleged atrocities are part of a premediated campaign.[37]

The alleged massacres fit a yearslong, “systematic” M23 campaign that involves collective punishment against civilians. The UN has reported on multiple occasions since June 2023 that M23 operations targeting FDLR strongholds have involved killing and punishing civilians suspected of supporting or being related to FDLR or other anti-M23 militias, particularly when M23 encountered local dissent and resistance to its territorial authority.[38] The Fourth Geneva Convention defines collective punishment as violence, harassment, or other sanctions taken against a group in retaliation for an act committed by individuals who are considered to form part of the group.[39] Collective punishment acts violate both the 1949 Geneva Conventions and subsequent international legal protocols, which prohibit collective punishment on the basis that such attacks target people who are not responsible for criminal conduct and that criminal responsibility can be attributed only to individuals, not a group.[40]

M23’s campaign has also used indiscriminate violence—another war crime—to intimidate civilians. The UN first reported a “shift in tactics” in June 2023, when M23 initially increased indiscriminate violence against civilians.[41] The UN reported in July 2025 that M23 attacks civilians for being present near M23 patrol routes, attempting to flee, or any other perceived resistance during operations.[42] The July UN report said that these abuses are a “widespread and systematic campaign of intimidation and repression.”[43] Indiscriminate violence and collective punishment against civilians clearly violates prohibitions from the 1949 Geneva Conventions against murder, mutilation, cruel, humiliating and degrading treatment, and torture against noncombatants.[44]

M23 has also forcibly relocated civilians as part of anti-FDLR operations, which violates the Geneva Convention and is a war crime. HRW reported in June that M23 and Rwanda had “forcibly transferred” thousands of Congolese citizens and Rwandan refugees with suspected FDLR ties to Rwanda throughout 2025.[45] Some of the transfers were done under UN oversight, but the UN told HRW that the screening was “done under pressure”—presumably from M23 or Rwanda—and that the refugees had no other choice.[46] The Geneva Convention prohibits forcible transfers within a country and deportations from occupied territory to other countries irrespective of motive. The Convention explicitly notes that transfers must be “voluntary and not given under coercive conditions.”[47]

Confirmed breaches of international law would be another violation of the US-backed peace deal. The DRC and Rwanda both agreed to protect civilians and comply with international humanitarian law as part of the US-brokered peace agreement.[48]

M23 and Rwanda have both denied these various allegations. M23 officials disputed the UN’s claim about the massacre in Binza and characterized it as “baseless” and “politically motivated.”[49] The Rwandan government also denounced the UN report, denied any responsibility or involvement for the alleged killings, and claimed that anti-M23 militia fighters were responsible for the civilian fatalities.[50] The M23 military spokesperson told the Associated Press that the HRW report was “military propaganda.”[51] The Washington Post cited a Binza resident in Bwisha chiefdom who claimed that a local M23 commander said in late July that the victims from the July massacre were Wazalendo fighters, not unarmed civilians.[52] M23 and Rwanda claimed that the UN report relied primarily on testimony from a Wazalendo spokesperson and CMC-FDP sources.[53]

Democratic Republic of the Congo—Ituri

Author: Yale Ford

Fighting between a Ugandan-linked rebel group and the Congolese army (FARDC) has escalated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC’s) Ituri province since early August. Militants from the Convention pour la Révolution Populaire (CRP) launched attacks on FARDC positions near Bunia, the Ituri provincial capital, in Djugu district on August 7.[54] CRP is an ethnic Hema armed group led by Thomas Lubanga, a convicted war criminal and longtime Ugandan-backed warlord in Ituri.[55]

The attacks follow increased military pressure on CRP around Bunia in July.[56] The FARDC and another armed group in Ituri—Coopérative pour le développement du Congo (CODECO), a loose coalition of ethnic Lendu militias in conflict with Hema groups—escalated operations against CRP and Hema-linked armed groups in July after a late June peace agreement signed by six major armed groups in Ituri collapsed.[57] The UN reported on August 15 that fighting in Djugu has displaced more than 80,000 people since mid-July.[58]

The FARDC repelled most of the attacks in early August and launched a counteroffensive against CRP in several villages north of Bunia on the RN27 and west of Bunia on Lake Albert around August 13.[59] The FARDC reportedly collaborated with CODECO against CRP and indiscriminately attacked several refugee camps where CRP militants operate.[60] At least 15,000 civilians, mostly Hema, fled the fighting toward Bunia on August 13.[61]

Figure 4. Conflict Escalates in Ituri Province

Source: Yale Ford; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

CRP has targeted key areas along the Lake Albert coastline from the FARDC to gain influence over regional logistics networks and strengthen its supply lines. Congolese media reported that CRP fighters attacked FARDC positions in two villages on Lake Albert on August 7, including Nyamamba, where the FARDC has a naval base.[62] The group has conducted sporadic attacks on the FARDC in Nyamamba and other towns on a roughly ten mile stretch of coastline to secure control of these areas and seize military equipment since late February 2025.[63] The lakeside towns are on the northern outskirts of Tchomia, which is an administrative and commercial center about 30 miles southeast of Bunia.[64]

CRP establishing support zones along the coastline would give the group influence over regional logistic and transportation routes. The Tchomia area is a trading hub and chokepoint for lake crossings and maritime activity in the Lake Albert region. CRP could strengthen its supply lines and move weapons, goods, and commodities, such as gold and recruits, more easily in the region and across the maritime border with Uganda through support zones in this coastal area.

The CRP attacks may partially be a show of force to capitalize on ethnic strife and mobilize local support. The UN reported in July that CRP struggled to rally widespread public, including from some Hema leaders, in early 2025.[65] CRP conducted several retaliatory attacks against CODECO in August after CODECO targeted the refugee camps, despite Lubanga’s statement to Reuters in late July that CRP would not attack CODECO because the conflict would “risk taking an ethnic turn.”[66] CRP’s counterattacks play into narratives with Hema who claim that the FARDC is anti-Hema and fails to protect Hema from ethnically motivated attacks, mainly from CODECO.[67]

CRP additionally likely aims to secure further support from Uganda and other actors in Ituri by proving itself as a major player with its latest offensive. The UN report from July said that Lubanga received a “moral and passive endorsement” from the Ugandan government for his rebellion but that some Ugandan army officials conditioned substantial military and political support to the group on its “proven successes on the ground” and ability to secure key areas near Lake Albert.[68] French state media reported in mid-August that Lubanga recently recruited fighters from his old networks and other armed groups in Ituri, which gave CRP enough strength to take control of several areas near Bunia before the FARDC launched its August counteroffensive.[69]

Uganda tacitly supports CRP’s military activities to advance Ugandan interests in the eastern DRC. Uganda has historically advanced its interests in Ituri by simultaneously arming militia groups and supporting peace frameworks involving its proxies.[70] The UN reported on multiple instances that Uganda tacitly supported Lubanga launching CRP from Kampala, the Ugandan capital, where he declared publicly his goal to overthrow the Congolese government in January.[71] Congolese media cited locals near Nyamamba who expressed frustration that Ugandan forces based in the area did not assist the FARDC—their official allies—against CRP in the clashes in early August.[72] The Critical Threats Project continues to assess that Uganda likely aims to use its proxy groups to promote Ugandan interests in inter-Congolese dialogues, which risks complicating peace efforts.[73] Lubanga has participated in preliminary discussions with Congolese religious leaders and former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo—the African Union-designated facilitator for the peace process between the DRC, Rwanda, and Congolese armed groups—around an inter-Congolese dialogue that would restructure power-sharing in the DRC.[74]

Figure 5. Uganda Plays All Sides in the Eastern DRC

Source: Yale Ford.

CRP support zones on Lake Albert could extend Uganda’s de facto influence over coastal areas near Bunia. The Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) expanded their area of operations to Tchomia and Sabe—two miles south of Nyamamba—in early June.[75] CRP and other Ugandan-linked Hema militias maintain a presence on a significant part of the coastline in Djugu district, and CRP support zones north of the Tchomia area could consolidate a coastal zone controlled by Ugandan proxy groups.[76]

Increased CRP-related insecurity has disrupted commercial flows between Ituri and Uganda, which undermines Ugandan economic interests and could weaken Ugandan support for the CRP, however. Fighting north of Bunia between the FARDC and CRP has disrupted traffic along the RN27, which is a major commercial corridor between Ituri and the Ugandan border.[77] Uganda began repairing roadways on key cross-border trade routes in late 2021 in order to export more to the DRC, which is Uganda’s second most important export market.[78] The UPDF had increased its military involvement in Ituri in early 2025 at least partially because CODECO attacks significantly disrupted trade on the RN27 and threatened Uganda’s economic interests.[79]

Sudan

Authors: Ellery White and Liam Karr

Growing tensions between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and regional power players could challenge US-led peace talks. The United States planned to hold peace talks in late July with the major external actors that are supporting Sudan’s warring sides—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), known alongside the United States as the Quartet. US officials postponed the talks until at least September, however, after last-minute disagreements between the UAE and Egypt.^[80] Diplomatic efforts have continued behind the scenes despite the delay. The United States and the United Kingdom discussed a new US proposal to expand the Quartet to include both the UK and Qatar on August 6, and US senior Africa adviser Massad Boulos met separately with the SAF and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leaders in mid-August.^[81]

Figure 6. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War

Source: Liam Karr; Vista Maps; Thomas van Linge; Kathryn Tyson.

Already-strained relations between the UAE and SAF have sharply deteriorated since early August. Sudan’s ruling council severed diplomatic ties with the UAE on May 6.^[82] The decision was in response to RSF drone strikes on the de facto SAF capital, Port Sudan.^[83] The UN and others have reported that UAE has been the primary sponsor of the RSF, and the SAF accused the UAE of being complicit in the drone attacks.[84]

Figure 7. RSF Drone Strikes Targeting the SAF

Source: Kathryn Tyson; Thomas van Linge.

Relations between the UAE and SAF worsened in August after the SAF conducted an airstrike against an Emirati plane at Nyala Airport on August 6 that the SAF claimed was carrying Columbian mercenaries and weapons for the RSF.^[85] The UAE retaliated by barring Sudanese airlines from using its airports and suspended maritime dealings.^[86] The SAF responded on August 11 by banning Emirati investments, canceling all preexisting agreements and contracts between Sudan and the UAE, and formally expelling Emirati mining companies operating in Sudan, most of which operate in RSF-controlled territory.^[87]

Islamist factions allied with the SAF are also causing tensions with Egypt—one of the SAF’s main allies. Egyptian authorities arrested Almesbah Abu Zeid Talha—commander of the SAF-aligned Islamist al Baraa bin Malik Brigade—at his residence in Alexandria, Egypt, on August 5.^[88] Egyptian sources claimed the arrest was to protect Talha from an assassination attempt, but Sudanese media claimed the arrest was due to “unauthorized religious activities.”^[89] Sudanese protestors gathered to demand his release outside the Egyptian embassy in Sudan on August 10.^[90] Talha was released from detention and shortly hospitalized before returning to Sudan on August 11.^[91]

The al Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade is one of the most powerful SAF-aligned Islamist paramilitary groups and is widely associated with the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood and former Islamist dictator Omar al Bashir.^[92] The Brigade fields an estimated 20,000 fighters.^[93] The group grew out of the Bashir-era Popular Defense Force and maintains the ideology and structure of Bashir’s Islamist National Congress Party (NCP).^[94] The former chairman of the NCP told Reuters that the SAF provides a route back to power for the NCP.^[95] The spokesman for the Brigade said they do not represent the NCP or any other political group in a separate interview and that the group will disband when they defeat the RSF.^[96]

These tensions could jeopardize SAF involvement in a peace process involving the Quartet. The US peace talks aim to mediate a deal involving the external actors fueling the conflict, thereby cutting support to the Sudanese factions and making it easier to pressure them into negotiations. The UAE would almost certainly demand concessions to protect its investments in the country as part of any negotiations involving the Quartet. The SAF may be unwilling to respect such concessions, however, given its acrimonious relationship with the UAE.

The SAF may be unable or unwilling to sideline Islamist factions, which would additionally undermine a peace deal that tries to sideline Islamist elements.^[97] The SAF is working with several other Islamist brigades that consist of former Bashir-era army, police, and intelligence personnel.^[98] The members of the Quartet are all strongly anti-Islamist and will presumably push for a peace deal that marginalizes the role of these factions. Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia all few Islamism as a threat to their regimes, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia have both arrested Talha despite their pro-SAF ties.^[99] The United States designated Sudan’s former Islamist regime as a state sponsor of terrorism because of its support for al Qaeda in the 1990s and has more recently taken steps to classify the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.^[100]

The SAF chief has launched some structural reforms to the SAF, likely in part to address international concerns over Islamist influence and human rights abuses, however. Burhan issued a decree on August 17 that formally placed all allied armed groups under his authority, including Islamist brigades and other rebel and civilian movements aligned with the SAF. Burhan said that the move aimed “to emphasize the rule of law and tighten command and control.”[101] Members of the Baraa Brigade said the move was a formality and insisted that they were already operating under the SAF’s command.^[102]

General Abdel Fattah al Burhan made new appointments to key military positions that may be partially aimed at addressing international concerns over SAF human rights abuses. Burhan announced the retirement of several long-serving officers on August 17, including some who the European Union had sanctioned for indiscriminate aerial bombings.^[103] Burhan then appointed a new inspector general, which had been vacant since the RSF captured the former inspector general at the beginning of the war.^[104] Burhan also appointed new deputy chiefs of staff for logistics, training, operations, and a new head of military intelligence.^[105]

Chad

Authors: Miles Charles with Liam Karr

Chad continues to grow ties with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which could facilitate greater cooperation between Chad and Russia. Nigerien media reported that Chad is considering hosting an AES coordination center in N’Djamena to provide 24-hour border surveillance, intelligence sharing, and rapid response to cross-border threats on August 14.[106] President Mahamat Déby had reiterated his support for AES—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—and their fight against terrorism on August 10.

This proposal follows an uptick in bilateral activity between Chad and AES members in late July and early August. Chad signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Burkina Faso on mining and geological surveying on July 20. Déby then met with the Nigerien President Abdourahmane Tchiani to discuss bilateral cooperation on August 6.^[107] The two leaders agreed to strengthen security cooperation in the Lake Chad Basin, accelerate negotiations on the Niger-Chad oil pipeline, collaborate on the Salkadamma coal plant, and expand visa exemptions.^[108]

The heightened cooperation builds on a growing relationship between Chad and the AES since the AES originated in 2023. Chad initially served as a mediator between Niger and the Economic Community of West African States following Niger’s coup in 2023.^[109] Chadian officials then expressed interest in joining AES during a visit to Mali in April 2024, and Chadian forces participated in joint AES military exercises the following month.^[110] AES and Chadian officials have maintained regular dialogue, and Burkinabe junta leader Ibrahim Traoré reportedly asked Chad to send 200 soldiers to reinforce his protection force in May 2025 following an alleged coup attempt.^[111]

CTP continues to assess that closer Chadian ties with the pro-Russian AES bloc could facilitate Chad’s already-growing cooperation with Moscow.[112] Moscow has sought to establish military ties with Chad since at least 2017, when the two countries signed a military-technical cooperation agreement.^[113] The Kremlin reset strained relations with Chad in 2024 after subsuming control of the Wagner Group, which had ties with Chadian rebels.^[114] CTP noted in April 2024 that Chad’s growing alignment with Russia and AES provided a regime-security alternative to the West, allowing it to end its longtime defense cooperation with France in 2025.^[115] Déby has stated his intention to expand economic cooperation with Russia since 2024.^[116]

Nigeria

Author: Liam Karr

Nigerian forces arrested two prominent Salafi-jihadi leaders who lead Salafi-jihadi splinter cells across Nigeria. Nigerian officials announced that security forces arrested high-ranking Salafi-jihadi leaders Mahmud Muhammed Usman and Mahmud al Nigeri, known as Abu Bara’a and Mallam Mahmuda, respectively.[117] Nigerian officials said that Bara’a and Mahmuda were key leaders in coordinating sleeper cells, engage in financing schemes, and organizing attacks across Nigeria.

Bara’a and Mahmuda were high-ranking leaders within Ansaru and Darul Salam, respectively, two prominent Salafi-jihadi splinters that operate outside of the main Salafi-jihadi hotspot in northeastern Nigeria. Darul Salam is a Boko Haram-linked splinter group based primarily in the Kainji reserve area in Kwara and Niger states.^[118] Ansaru is an al Qaeda–linked Boko Haram offshoot that reemerged in northwestern Nigeria in 2022 after years of dormancy.^[119] The group has gone back underground since 2022 but retains a presence around northwestern Nigeria, including Bara’a’s faction in Kogi state.[120]

The arrests will likely degrade the Salafi-jihadi network in northwestern Nigeria temporarily. The arrests could cause these cells to fragment. Ansaru and Darul Salam both have ties with various bandit groups and have opportunistically collaborated with bandits for economic purposes.^[121] The leaders of the groups must navigate the tensions that these relationships cause between more materially motivated bandits and jihadist fighters with ideological purists.^[122] New leadership or leadership vacuum risks disrupting the delicate balancing act holding the cells together. More materially motivated fighters have previously defected to bandit groups.

The arrests could degrade the cohesion of loosely connected Salafi-jihadi cells operating across Nigeria. The various Salafi-jihadi factions operating outside of northeastern Nigeria have fluid ties.^[123] Cells linked with many different groups, including Ansaru, Darul Salam, al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate, and IS-linked fighters, all use the Kainji reserve as a sanctuary.^[124] CTP has previously assessed that Darul Salam likely has ties with al Qaeda– and IS-linked fighters in West Africa.^[125] Individual leaders and human networks play an outsized role in shaping these connections, which means that their arrest will likely impact these relationships.^[126]

Figure 8. Salafi-Jihadi Militants Infiltrate Northwestern Nigeria

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Ansaru and Darul Salam have likely played roles in major IS-linked attacks across Nigeria. Researchers believe that Ansaru and non-jihadist bandit factions played various roles in attacks on the Kuje prison near Abuja in and Wawa cantonment in northwestern Nigeria in 2022.^[127] IS claimed the attack on Kuje, and Nigerian security officials also believe the group was behind the Wawa attack.^[128] Darul Salam has a presence in both areas, although it is unclear whether Darul Salam supported the attacks.

Mali

Authors: Miles Charles and Liam Karr

Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jam’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) has escalated the rate of its attacks against Chinese companies in Mali since late July as part of its attack campaign against foreign companies. JNIM threatened that all companies operating in Mali must secure permission from JNIM to continue operations on June 7.^[129] The group has since attacked foreign worksites seven times, six of which targeted Chinese worksites.^[130] JNIM had only attacked foreign companies in 2025 two other times, when it attacked Chinese-owned mines in May 2025.^[131] JNIM has particularly escalated its campaign over past three weeks, attacking Chinese worksites three times and abducting 11 Chinese citizens.^[132] The campaign has focused on more economically sensitive areas in southern and western Mali, although JNIM attacked a Chinese company in central Mali for the first time during the campaign on August 6.^[133]

Figure 9. JNIM Attacks Foreign Mining Companies in Mali

Source: Liam Karr.

The campaign threatens to undermine business ties with one of Mali’s largest economic partners. Chinese private investment in Mali totaled $1.6 billion from 2009 to 2024, while the Chinese government has invested $1.8 billion across 137 projects since 2000.^[134] CTP previously assessed that the campaign could allow JNIM to establish a racketeering network that extorts foreign companies and undermines the legitimacy of the Malian government.^[135] JNIM has historically kidnapped foreigners to ransom them back to their governments. JNIM may also attempt to force businesses to pay a bribe or a form of zakat for protection from JNIM attacks.

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