Tshisekedi's Power Play: Africa File Special Edition

Contributor: Liam Karr

Key Takeaway: Democratic Republic of the Congo President Félix Tshisekedi is coup-proofing his inner circle and trying to co-opt his political opponents to strengthen his position against threats to his presidency in the short term as he centralizes control over state and party structures and sets conditions for himself and his majority to stay in power for years to come. Tshisekedi may be seeking to strengthen his position against a coup plot or a potential collapse in peace talks with Rwandan-backed M23 rebels through military reshuffles in the short term. Tshisekedi is trying to placate the political opposition and sideline his rivals whom he cannot co-opt to control a proposed national dialogue in the medium term. These efforts simultaneously support his long-term goal to extend his tenure in power beyond his term expiration in 2028, which he has also pursued by consolidating power within his ruling coalition and setting conditions to replace the Congolese constitution.

Assessment:

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Félix Tshisekedi may be seeking to strengthen his position against a coup plot in the short term by reshuffling his security establishment. Rwandan-backed M23’s early 2025 capture of Goma and Bukavu, the North and South Kivu provincial capitals, respectively, sparked persistent rumors of a possible military-led coup in Kinshasa, the Congolese capital.[1] Tshisekedi has since reshuffled high-ranking security personnel in the Congolese army (FARDC) and in his inner circle, particularly since mid-2025. The Congolese government has purged dozens of senior military and intelligence officers, some of whom were reportedly suspected of plotting a coup, including in Tshisekedi’s office.[2] Tshisekedi has also replaced several senior intelligence officials in the DRC’s lead national security agency—the Agence nationale de renseignements (ANR)—since August.[3]

These arrests could have the added effect of improving the FARDC’s combat effectiveness, which would stem discontent over the security crisis in the eastern DRC. The Congolese government arrested General Franck Ntumba, the head of Tshisekedi’s security operations and architect of the DRC’s military strategy in the eastern DRC, in mid-July.[4] M23’s early 2025 offensive exposed deep flaws in the DRC’s military capabilities and ability to deal with external threats, particularly from Rwanda. FARDC units in the eastern DRC have historically been ineffective because the Congolese government has prioritized loyalty over competency to preserve patronage networks and coup-proof the FARDC.

Tshisekedi is separately trying to placate the political opposition, likely to control or delay a proposed national dialogue in the medium term. Tshisekedi reshuffled the government and tried to co-opt the opposition into a unity government after M23’s offensive put significant political pressure on his administration. He ultimately made minimal concessions to the opposition, however, and retained about 75 percent of the appointees in his previous government.[5] Tshisekedi named the new government in early August and appointed a small number of opposition and civil society members to notable positions.[6]

Tshisekedi failed to co-opt the opposition after months of negotiations, however. Most of the major opposition figures, including Martin Fayulu and Moïse Katumbi, rejected his overture and conditioned their participation in the government on the opening of a national dialogue.[7] Both Fayulu and Katumbi are veteran opposition leaders and former presidential candidates who have challenged Tshisekedi in national elections. Many outside election observers believe that Fayulu beat Tshisekedi in the 2018 presidential election.[8] French media assessed that Katumbi’s refusal to join the new government in August further signaled a “deep rift” between him and Tshisekedi.[9] Fayulu had expressed an openness to joining Tshisekedi in June but then refused to take part.[10]

Tshisekedi likely tried to mollify the opposition to control a national dialogue or promise reforms under a unity government in place of a dialogue. Tshisekedi has held numerous meetings with opposition leaders, Congolese religious officials, and African Union (AU) mediators who have pressured him to initiate a dialogue in 2025. The political opposition, civil society groups, and the Catholic Church have been important counterweights to successive Congolese administrations, particularly since the early 2000s.[11] Tshisekedi has agreed in principle to the AU-backed dialogue but slow-walked the process for months and set conditions to control its outcome.[12] The religious leaders presented Tshisekedi with a roadmap for him to initiate a dialogue in late August but are still waiting for his response.[13]

Tshisekedi likely views the dialogue as a threat to power because it would include his political and military enemies, such as former DRC President Joseph Kabila and M23, and aim to reorganize government institutions across the DRC. The proposed dialogue takes inspiration from the Sun City dialogue from 2002 and aims to work toward establishing a transitional government in the DRC.[14] CTP assessed in June 2025 that Kabila likely aims to use his position and tacit alliances with M23 and the political opposition to be a powerbroker in a national dialogue.[15] Tshisekedi has stipulated that any dialogue must take place under the purview of his government and said he would never dialogue with “Congolese people subservient to foreign countries” and “emissaries of aggressors,” in reference to Kabila and M23.[16]

A more unified government under Tshisekedi’s control would be more insulated against internal division and demands from the opposition. French media reported that Tshisekedi likely reshuffled the government to “reduce frustrations” and meet demands within patronage networks in his majority.[17] Senior majority officials told French media in August that they expect opposition pressure for a dialogue to create an upcoming “turbulent period.”[18]

Tshisekedi has tried to sideline and intimidate his political rivals whom he cannot co-opt as part of his efforts to control any potential dialogue. Tshisekedi has reportedly tried to exclude Kabila, M23, and other major opposition figures from the AU-backed dialogue.[19] The Congolese government tried to prevent several opposition leaders still residing in the DRC from attending informal talks around an internal dialogue in South Africa in late August.[20] The Congolese government denied visas and held up travel for several opposition delegations slated to participate in these talks.[21]

Tshisekedi has targeted Kabila since he reentered Congolese politics in 2025. The top Congolese military court convicted and sentenced Kabila to death in absentia for his alleged ties to M23 on September 30.[22] Human Rights Watch characterized the trial as having “all the trappings of a political vendetta.”[23] The conviction followed an aggressive legal campaign against Kabila and his allies that began in early 2025, when Kabila staged his political comeback and returned to the DRC through M23-controlled territory.[24] Tshisekedi and Kabila had agreed to share power in rigged elections in 2018, but the deal collapsed and Tshisekedi pushed Kabila’s coalition out of power in the legislative levels of government in 2021.[25]

Tshisekedi has tried to intimidate Katumbi and other members of the opposition. Congolese security forces have reportedly harassed and searched Katumbi’s properties in “acts of intimidation,” according to local non-government organizations, for his alleged ties to M23 on multiple occasions since late 2024.[26] Military and intelligence services, including from the ANR, reportedly arrested and briefly detained another member of the political opposition as he returned from Kenya, where Kabila launched a new political platform in mid-October.[27] An anonymous security source told the French magazine Jeune Afrique that the deputy prime minister and interior minister ordered the interrogation of all political opponents who attended the meeting in Kenya.[28] The Belgium-based Egmont Institute assessed in March 2025 that Tshisekedi maintains power through an “apparatus of repression” directed by his inner circle that has “proven to be efficient to block any dissident opinion.”[29]

The potential collapse of DRC-M23 peace talks would likely lead M23 to launch a new offensive, which would increase the risk of a coup or opposition pressure for dialogue. Qatar brokered a preliminary peace agreement between the DRC and M23 in late July that included a formal ceasefire and confidence-building measures that both sides were to implement before new talks aimed at sealing a final deal.[30] Subsequent rounds of negotiations have stalled over these procedural steps and solidifying the ceasefire, however, which both sides have violated. The Congolese government and M23 officials have signaled a continued unwillingness to make concessions on the larger issue of M23’s control of significant portions of North and South Kivu, which CTP assessed previously makes a sustainable long-term unlikely.[31]

M23 has set conditions to attack Uvira—the DRC’s provisional seat of government in South Kivu and an important regional economic and logistic hub—if talks collapse. M23 has maintained a maximalist position and described its posture toward the negotiations in Doha, the Qatari capital, as “Doha or nothing.”[32] The group began consolidating control over key positions around Uvira in August.[33] Senior M23-appointed officials in South Kivu told locals on the frontline in early October that M23 aims to capture Uvira soon.[34] M23 claimed to have added nearly 17,000 new fighters to its ranks since mid-September—more than doubling its fighting force since early 2025.[35]

Figure 1. M23 Advances in the Eastern DRC

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

A successful M23 offensive on Uvira could cause a legitimacy crisis for Tshisekedi, which would further increase the risk of a coup or pressure for dialogue. M23 would still not pose an existential military threat from Uvira, as it would have to travel roughly 500 miles to reach the DRC’s economic engine in the mineral-rich Katanga region and nearly 1,000 miles to Kinshasa across poor roads. Tshisekedi has pledged repeatedly to his base that he would stabilize the eastern DRC, however, and take a hardline approach against external aggression from Rwanda. Tshisekedi already faced criticism from opposition figures and some among his base who pointed to M23’s expanding territorial control as evidence of his weak leadership in early 2025. Another potentially successful M23 offensive would further expose Tshisekedi’s inability to roll back M23’s and Rwanda’s gains or resolve the crisis through military or diplomatic solutions.

Tshisekedi’s moves to control the opposition and dialogue simultaneously support his long-term goal to extend his tenure in power beyond his term expiration in 2028, which he has also pursued by consolidating power within his ruling coalition and setting conditions to replace the Congolese constitution. Tshisekedi centralized control of administrative structures in the presidential majority, the Union sacrée, in August and September. Tshisekedi met with the coalition’s leadership on numerous occasions to draft a new charter and establish an executive secretariat, make membership more exclusive, and appoint more positions to the presidium—the executive council that plans and implements the platform’s agenda.[36] The move reportedly aimed to reorganize and reform the coalition now “supervised and monitored at the highest level” and quash doubts that Tshisekedi was not paying enough attention to daily business.[37]

Tshisekedi then united the two opposing factions in his political party ahead of a party conference in late 2025. Tshisekedi’s party—the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UPDS)—dominates the Union sacrée, but it has been divided loosely into two main camps since August 2024. The leaders the two factions, Augustin Kabuya and Déo Bizibu, have both claimed leadership of the party. Tshisekedi intervened personally to put an end to the feud in September.[38] Kabuya and Bizibu reconciled and called for unity behind Tshisekedi in a rare joint statement issued on September 30, ahead of a major UPDS congress to take place by mid-December.[39]

Tshisekedi has likely laid the groundwork for nimbler and more cohesive party and coalition structures that can last until the next elections in 2028.[40] The Union sacrée has a sizable majority in parliament but has not acted in total unison due to factional divides and party competition.[41] Union sacrée officials said that the August restructuring aimed in part to consolidate unity among the ranks and “avoid an inflation of actors” who are opportunistic and have no real sway in parliament.[42] Tshisekedi has said that he wants to transform the Union sacrée into a “true political machine” that can “remain in power for a long time with a single vision.”[43] UPDS officials told Jeune Afrique after the Kabuya-Bizibu rapprochement that internal divisions risked future challenges and could play into the hands of opposing camps who are “preparing to take our place in 2028.”[44]

Tshisekedi has set conditions to replace the Congolese constitution. Tshisekedi formally declared his intention to alter the constitution he said is “outdated” in October 2024 and said he would appoint a commission in 2025 tasked with drafting the text of a new constitution, although this has not happened officially amid the turmoil in the eastern DRC.[45] The current 2006 constitution was the result of peace efforts from the Congo Wars, limiting Congolese presidents to a maximum of two five-year terms. Article 220 of the constitution states that the number and length of terms the Congolese president is permanent and cannot be subject to a constitutional amendment.[46]

Tshisekedi may be seeking to replace or alter the constitution to extend his tenure in power beyond his term expiration in 2028. Tshisekedi allegedly aims to either replace the constitution entirely or repeal Article 220 to then force through a term-limit amendment. Both options allow him to reset his term limit and establish a seven-year, renewable term to be elected indirectly by the parliamentary majority, similar to Angola and South Africa.[47] Tshisekedi would also allegedly abolish the post of prime minister and appoint a vice president, cementing himself as the center of power.[48] Tshisekedi has not explicitly stated that he aims to serve another term or made any major announcements on the project in 2025 due to the security situation in the eastern DRC, but it remains a priority in his inner circle.[49] Tshisekedi-aligned officials claimed in September and early October that the Congolese government may not legally be allowed to hold elections in 2028 due to the war in the eastern DRC.[50]

Tshisekedi and his allies likely removed the president of the National Assembly, stalwart Tshisekedi ally Vital Kamerhe, at least partially to bolster these long-term efforts to keep Tshisekedi in power. Over 260 members of parliament (MPs), most from the majority, signed petitions propagated by a UPDS member that targeted Kamerhe and other high-ranking parliament officials for impeachment.[51] The MPs formally accused Kamerhe of “opaque management” of parliament and failing to disperse adequate appropriations and financial benefits to the legislators, among other trivial complaints. Kamerhe then resigned abruptly before the National Assembly could vote on the measure to dismiss him from the presidency.[52] The MPs reportedly used measures to oust Kamerhe that were illegal, including bribes to sign petitions and forged signatures.[53]

Tshisekedi may have directed or personally approved efforts to remove Kamerhe. UPDS officials oversaw every step of the impeachment process.[54] The Congolese government reportedly arrested over a dozen pro-Kamerhe MPs who were collecting signatures for a counterpetition in support of Kamerhe in early September.[55] Kamerhe then met with Tshisekedi to seek his support and request that he block the petition.[56] The petition only gained steam after the meeting, however, and several majority MPs told Jeune Afrique in mid-September that Tshisekedi’s cousin and the presidential liaison to parliament directed the MPs to follow through with it.[57] Tshisekedi denied any responsibility for Kamerhe’s resignation and said that he was still an ally.[58]

Tshisekedi’s inner circle likely viewed Kamerhe as a key opponent to replacing the constitution and keeping Tshisekedi in power. Tshisekedi’s camp has reportedly been “irritated” with Kamerhe’s influence and proximity to Tshisekedi for several years.[59] These fissures widened in late 2024 and 2025 as majority officials suspected Kamerhe of preparing a run for president and accused him of disloyalty and contradicting the party line with his public positions.[60] Congolese political analysts have noted that Tshisekedi’s camp likely viewed Kamerhe as increasingly less aligned with Tshisekedi and a key obstacle to the constitution project given Kamerhe’s ambivalent stance on the issue in 2024.[61] Jeune Afrique reported that the petition to remove Kamerhe was likely not a “coordinated operation” but cited a senior Union sacrée official who said that Tshisekedi’s inner circle supported his ouster.[62]

Data Cutoff: October 22, 2025, at 10 a.m. ET

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.