Africa File, May 8, 2025: RSF Drone Strikes on Port Sudan; Iran Exports Regime Security to Africa; Burkina Faso Looks for Additional Partners

Data Cutoff: May 8, 2025, at 10 a.m.

To receive the weekly Africa File or daily Congo War Security Review via email, please subscribe here. Follow CTP on X, LinkedIn, and BlueSky.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) began attacking Port Sudan with drones for the first time. These operations are part of the RSF campaign to disrupt Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) governance and logistics. This campaign, in turn, undermines the SAF’s ability to launch offensives against the RSF in western Sudan, effectively partitioning Sudan. The SAF could respond by retaliating against the RSF and its main backer, the United Arab Emirates, including RSF and Emirati targets in neighboring Chad.

Iran. Iran is trying to bolster its security partnerships with some African states, likely to increase its geopolitical influence and gain access to hard currency and natural resources. The Iranian law enforcement commander visited Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. The commander appears focused on using his background in oppression to support other authoritarian actors around the globe.

Burkina Faso. The Burkinabe junta is engaging external partners beyond the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) to stabilize its fragile regime. This comes after reports of a foiled coup plot in April 2025. The junta may seek greater cooperation with Iran and Chad in particular. Such cooperation could signal the capacity limits of the AES and Russia.

Assessments:

Sudan

Author: Kathryn Tyson

Contributor: Liam Karr

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) attacked Port Sudan with drones for the first time. The RSF launched drone attacks on Port Sudan daily from May 4 to 7, targeting major fuel storage facilities, ammunition depots, an army base, a major power station, and the airport.^[i] Sudanese authorities suspended air traffic to Port Sudan on May 5 and 6, and the attack on Port Sudan’s main power substation caused a city-wide blackout on May 6.[ii] The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) intercepted some drones.^[iii] The Sudanese navy commander and Red Sea Military Region head said on May 5 that the RSF launched one initial batch of drones to overwhelm SAF air defenses and then a second batch of “strategic drones” to strike SAF and civilian targets.^[iv] The RSF has not commented on the recent attacks, but RSF leader Mohammed “Hemedti” Dagalo threatened to attack Port Sudan in a speech on March 15 following major SAF advances against the RSF in Khartoum.^[v]

Port Sudan is a significant economic, military, and political target due to its role as the primary logistics hub of the SAF and de-facto capital of the SAF-aligned government. Port Sudan hosts Sudan’s only functioning international airport and Sudan’s main port on the Red Sea. These facilities include the Sudanese navy’s main base and an SAF airbase.^[vi] The SAF hosts international delegations in Port Sudan, and diplomatic missions are based in the city after moving from Khartoum when the civil war erupted in 2023.

The attacks on Port Sudan could worsen the humanitarian situation across Sudan. Around 250,000 Sudanese refugees displaced from the war reside in the Red Sea state, where Port Sudan is located.”^[vii] UN officials described Port Sudan as a “primary entry point for aid personnel, medical supplies, and other life-saving relief.^[viii]

The RSF drone attacks are an expansion of a preexisting RSF campaign to target critical infrastructure and thus undermine SAF governing capabilities and degrade the SAF supply lines. The campaign supports the RSF’s goal to effectively partition Sudan by undermining the SAF’s ability to launch an offensive on RSF-controlled western Sudan. The RSF has conducted a drone campaign targeting military and power infrastructure in northern Sudan since late 2024. The RSF conducted 50 drone attacks, targeting major infrastructure and logistic sites in SAF-controlled northern Sudan between October 2024 and March 2025.^[ix] Roughly half of these attacks targeted the Merowe Dam, Dongola Airport, and Atbara Airport.^[x]

Figure 1. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War

Source: Kathryn Tyson; Thomas van Linge

Attacks on civilian infrastructure undermine the SAF’s ability to effectively govern SAF-controlled eastern Sudan. Merowe Dam generates 40-60 percent of Sudan’s electricity and is the largest hydroelectric dam in the country.^[xi] RSF attacks on the dam have caused widespread blackouts in SAF-controlled areas, including Khartoum and Omdurman.^[xii] The blackouts undermine the SAF’s ability to provide public services to civilians and risk reducing SAF morale more broadly.^[xiii] The deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure amounts to possible war crimes.

The RSF attacks disrupt the SAF’s ability to reinforce and resupply the front lines in central and western Sudan.^[xiv] The SAF has resupplied SAF units in Khartoum and western Sudan by air and ground from its hub in Port Sudan.^[xv] The SAF receives military shipments at Port Sudan’s airport, and future closures will stall these shipments.^[xvi] The Atbara and Dongola airports sit on key SAF supply lines that connect Khartoum, Northern state, and Port Sudan.^[xvii] 

The strikes could lead the SAF to reallocate time and resources to securing Port Sudan instead of launching an offensive on western Sudan. These efforts could involve redeploying air defense assets from other areas and purchasing more air defense systems.^[xviii] Sudanese media reported in March 2025 that the SAF is in the process of purchasing air defense systems from China and Russia.^[xix]

The RSF has advanced other military and political campaigns to consolidate control over western Sudan in recent months. The RSF has increased the rate and scale of attacks targeting the SAF’s last strongholds in western Sudan, where the RSF has its traditional bases of support, over the past month.^[xx] The RSF has simultaneously furthered a political campaign to consolidate and legitimize its control of western Sudan. The RSF created a parallel government to administer areas under RSF control on April 16.^[xxi]

The SAF could respond to the recent attacks by striking bases in Sudan and neighboring Chad, where the RSF and its main sponsor—the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—ship and base drones. The UAE has sent dozens of weapons shipments, including drones, to the RSF via an airstrip in Amadjrass, eastern Chad, since April 2023, according to the United Nations.^[xxii] The New York Times reported in 2024 that the UAE was operating Chinese drones based in Amdjarass to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support for the RSF in Sudan.^[xxiii] The SAF in March 2025 threatened to attack RSF hubs in Chad.^[xxiv] Chad purchased two Chinese-made air defense systems from the UAE in April, possibly to defend against potential SAF attacks.^[xxv]

Figure 2. RSF Supply Lines into Darfur from Neighboring Countries

Source: Kathryn Tyson; Thomas Van Linge, United Nations Security Council.

The SAF has already attempted to disrupt the main RSF logistics hub at Nyala Airport in South Darfur state, Sudan, with numerous airstrikes since December 2024.^[xxvi]  The SAF conducted airstrikes targeting a UAE cargo plane and weapons depots at the Nyala Airport in western Sudan on May 4, according to Sudanese media.^[xxvii] The SAF last targeted Nyala Airport in March 2025 and has launched at least 14 airstrikes targeting the airport since the civil war began, 12 of which have occurred since December 2024, according to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.^[xxviii] RSF supply lines are currently stretched in North and West Darfur, where fighting has intensified between RSF and SAF-aligned forces since late 2024.^[xxix] Nyala is relatively close to the frontlines in Darfur, which allows the RSF to deliver supplies more quickly to its forces compared to the longer land routes from southern Libya and eastern Chad.^[xxx]

The SAF cut ties with the UAE and threatened further retaliation in the aftermath of the attacks on Port Sudan. SAF leader Abdel Fattah al Burhan said in a speech on May 6 that “the hour of retribution will come” to “those who have attacked the Sudanese people.”^[xxxi] An SAF spokesperson said on May 4 that the UAE provided the drones used in the attack on Port Sudan.^[xxxii] The Sudanese navy commander on May 5 accused the UAE of launching the drones at Port Sudan from bases in northern Somalia, without providing evidence.^[xxxiii] The SAF-aligned Transitional Sovereignty Council called the UAE an “enemy state” on May 6, when it cut diplomatic ties with the UAE.^[xxxiv]

The UAE has backed the RSF to protect its economic and political influence in Sudan and the Red Sea through its ties with the RSF leader. Read more about the UAE’s goals in Sudan as well as other external actors in CTP’s brief on external involvement in the Sudanese civil war, “Sudan’s Civil War: Global Stakes, Local Costs.”

The SAF is reportedly acquiring new fighter jets, which could support SAF airstrikes against the RSF. The SAF received the first batch of fighter jets from a “friendly country” in early March 2025.^[xxxv] The deal is likely with Egypt, which trained SAF pilots early in the war and has provided Turkish drones to the SAF.^[xxxvi] Egypt also delivered fighter jets to Sudan for a military exercise at Merowe Airbase in March 2023, but CTP has not observed fighter jet sales from Egypt to Sudan during the current war.^[xxxvii] The RSF leader claimed in October 2024 that Egypt was involved in airstrikes against the SAF, but the SAF and Egypt denied the accusation regarding the participation of Egyptian aviation in the war. [xxxviii]

Iran

This section is adapted from “Iran Update, May 6, 2025”

Authors: Ben Rezaei and Liam Karr

Iran is trying to bolster its security partnerships with some African states likely, increase its geopolitical influence and gain access to hard currency and natural resources. Iranian Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan visited Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 6.[xxxix] Radan signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ethiopian Federal Police to expand bilateral cooperation in counterterrorism, cybercrime, drug and human trafficking, and arms smuggling. Radan separately visited Burkina Faso on May 6 to advance bilateral police cooperation and share security expertise.[xl] 

Iran may have offered to help Ethiopia and Burkina Faso with internal oppression. The Burkinabe junta has aggressively and systemically cracked down on opposition and political dissent since it took power in 2022 by adding prominent critics to terror lists and forcibly conscripting journalists and critics into military service.[xli] The Ethiopian government has similarly detained politicians and journalists who are critical of the government.[xlii] Freedom House graded Burkina Faso and Ethiopia a two and three out of 12, respectively, in the political pluralism and participation category due to these repressive measures that deny groups their political rights to freely organize and gain power through fair elections.[xliii] Each country also received a one out of four in subcategories on media rights and freedom of personal expression.[xliv] Iran has extensive experience in suppressing dissent, digital surveillance, and organized crackdowns and could impart this experience and expertise onto other authoritarian actors.

Radan appears especially focused on using his background in oppression to cultivate relationships across the globe. That in turn could grant Iran greater geopolitical influence and access to certain resources in exchange for its internal security support.[xlv] Iranian law enforcement commanders have traditionally traveled abroad very little, but Radan has led high-level security engagements since 2023 with China, Iraq, Malaysia, Russia, Tajikistan, and Vietnam, all of which resulted in agreements focused on intelligence sharing and training programs.[xlvi] These efforts could lay the foundation for Iran to export regime oppressive techniques and expertise and build trust while simultaneously opening new avenues for economic partnerships and revenue streams. Burkina Faso is a major gold producer and has shown receptivity to resources-for-security partnerships through its engagement with Russia.[xlvii] Iran has used weapons sales in Africa as a pitch to try to gain access to uranium in Niger and Zimbabwe and to try to secure a naval base in Sudan.[xlviii]

Iran has separately intensified its economic engagement with African countries through expanded trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives. The Third Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Summit, held in Iran from April 27 to May 1, featured over 700 African traders from 38 countries and senior officials from 29 nations, according to Iranian media.[xlix] Iran has previously struggled to follow through on aspirational cooperation goals with African countries, but Iranian officials explicitly reorganized the 2025 summit to focus on four priority sectors—mining, agriculture, petrochemicals, and medical equipment—to ensure the summit remained “outcome-driven.”[l] Iranian officials announced plans to increase annual trade with Africa to $10 billion, backed by projects to construct industrial parks, build refineries, and develop air and sea routes to improve logistics.[li] Iran also signed multiple commercial and investment deals with African partners during the summit and emphasized expanding joint chambers of commerce, trade centers, and financing mechanisms, including a €2 billion credit line and a new Iran-Africa development fund.[lii]

Burkina Faso

Author: Liam Karr

The Burkinabe junta is engaging external partners to stabilize its fragile regime after another alleged coup attempt in April. Burkinabe officials claimed on April 22 that they had foiled a coup plot against junta leader Ibrahim Traoré earlier in April.[liii] The junta said the plotters were based in Côte d’Ivoire, which has a tenuous relationship with the junta because it hosts exiled opposition figures.[liv] The French outlet Le Monde reported that the junta arrested members of elite Burkinabe units in connection with the coup plot, including members of Traoré’s protection force­—the Republican Security and Protection Group—and Traoré’s elite Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) brigades. Traoré, who came to power when he overthrew the previous coup regime in 2022, has already survived at least three rumored coup attempts across 2023 and 2024.[lv]  

The junta has expanded its reliance on external backers to stabilize regime security since the coup. Le Monde reported that Traoré asked Chad to send 200 soldiers to reinforce his protection force.[lvi] The Iranian law enforcement commander visited Burkina Faso as part of a multi-stop visit to Africa on May 6 to “share security expertise.”[lvii] An estimated 100 Russian Africa Corps troops are already in Burkina Faso, where they mostly focus on training Traoré’s protection and BIR units.[lviii] Russia also runs pro-Traoré information operations, which have bolstered Traoré’s image significantly in pan-Africanist circles worldwide despite the deteriorating security situation and increase in civilian deaths in Burkina Faso since he took power.[lix]

Traoré’s cooperation with countries such as Chad and Iran in the aftermath of the coup attempt—instead of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and its primary external backer, Russia—could signal capacity limits among the AES and a possible effort to increase burden sharing with AES-friendly partners. Russia and Mali sent reinforcements to the Burkinabe capital in the aftermath of the coup attempt in June 2024.[lx] An anonymous officer from one of the AES countries claimed the juntas in Mali and Niger—the other two countries in the alliance—offered “direct support” to Traoré if needed amid the June 2024 coup rumors.[lxi] There have been no reports of such reinforcements or support after the latest coup attempt.

Iran and Russia can cooperate to share knowledge and technological expertise on repression techniques to bolster regime security in Burkina Faso and the rest of the AES. Iran and Russia have cooperated bilaterally in this area already. This cooperation includes exchanges of anti-riot equipment, facial recognition software and cyber capabilities, eavesdropping devices, lie detectors, and internet censorship and surveillance, all of which help crack down on internal dissent.[lxii]

Chad has signaled interest in increasing security cooperation with the AES states and Russia. AES and Chadian officials have maintained regular dialogue, and Chad participated in joint military exercises with the AES militaries in 2024.[lxiii] AES officials have claimed that Chadian officials have shown interest in formally joining the AES.[lxiv] CTP noted in April 2024 that Chad’s growing relationship with the AES and Russia provided Chad with a regime security alternative to France and the West.[lxv] Chad annulled its defense agreements with France in November, and French troops withdrew by the end of January 2025.[lxvi] Some Chadian officials have publicly stated that Chad aims to balance ties with the West, however, and Chad’s pro-AES positions could be part of this effort to position itself between Russia and the West.[lxvii]