Fresh M23 Offensives amid Trump DRC Peace Talks; Guinea-Bissau Coup; Sudan-Russia Naval Base: Africa File, December 4, 2025

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Contributors: Anping Zhu and Alexandria Johnson

Key Takeaways:

• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Rwandan-backed M23 rebels have violated their ceasefire commitments and launched several offensives in South Kivu province in the eastern DRC since mid-November. Fighting between M23 and pro-Congolese government forces will almost certainly continue despite the Congolese and Rwandan presidents signing a US-brokered peace agreement.
• Guinea-Bissau. The Bissau-Guinean military conducted a coup on November 26, which may have aimed to protect elite control over Bissau-Guinean narco-smuggling patronage networks. The change in governance is unlikely to alter Guinea-Bissau’s strategy to balance itself among China, Russia, and the West, but it could give Russia the chance to exploit the instability.
• Sudan—Russia. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are continuing to discuss a Red Sea naval base deal with Russia, likely to extract concessions from Russia and the United States amid regional peace efforts.
• Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured the last remaining population center held by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in west-central Sudan. The RSF and SAF will likely concentrate resources on the three-axis front line surrounding el Obeid, the SAF’s headquarters in central Sudan.
• Nigeria. The United States has resumed reconnaissance operations in Nigeria for the first time since withdrawing from Niger in 2024 as part a broader increase in US-Nigeria security cooperation.
• Somalia—Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS). Puntland and United States forces have significantly degraded ISS in northern Somalia as part of a yearlong counter-ISS campaign. ISS remains active, however, underscoring the need for continued pressure to prevent the group from reconstituting.
• Somalia—Al Shabaab. Somali forces are setting conditions to recapture a district capital in southern Somalia that al Shabaab has held for 16 years. Security force limitations and tensions between the Somali federal government and Jubbaland state government make a decisive offensive in al Shabaab’s heartland unlikely, however.
• Iran. Iranian officials met with several African counterparts over the last week as part of Iran’s continued efforts to bolster partnerships with African countries to break its international isolation.

Figure 1. Africa File, December 4, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford with Anping Zhu

Rwandan-backed M23 rebels have launched at least three separate offensives in South Kivu province in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since mid-November. M23 conducted attacks on pro-Congolese government forces—the Congolese army (FARDC), pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters, and Burundian army (FDNB) troops—in two frontline areas south of Bukavu, the South Kivu provincial capital, near the RN5 on December 2. The rebel group attacked pro-Congolese government forces in the Kaziba chiefdom in southern Walungu district and tried to break through to reportedly flank enemy positions on the RN5 to capture Luvungi village on the RN5.[i] M23 has partially controlled Kaziba since a late April offensive in southern Walungu. M23 simultaneously conducted attacks on government forces on Katagota village, which is about 35 miles south of Bukavu and three miles south of M23’s forward position in Kamanyola, on December 2.[ii] The front line between M23-controlled Kamanyola and Katagota has largely been frozen since March. M23 had reportedly reinforced its ranks with more troops and heavy weaponry in the days prior to launching the attacks in both areas.[iii]

Pro-Congolese government forces counterattacked and blocked M23’s attempt to advance further south on the RN5 toward Uvira.[iv] The FARDC bombed M23 positions in Kamanyola and Kaziba on December 2 and 3 and redeployed ground forces to frontline positions amid the fighting.[v] Luvungi is a key forward position for FARDC-Wazalendo fighters and FDNB forces on the RN5. M23 has been setting conditions to attack Uvira town—about 35 miles south of Luvungi on the RN5—for several months. Uvira is the second-most-populated city in South Kivu and a transportation hub with access to Lake Tanganyika and Burundi’s economic capital, Bujumbura, roughly 16 miles to the east. M23 had advanced as far as Sange town, which is about 20 miles north of Uvira, during its early 2025 offensive.[vi]

Figure 2. M23 and Allies Activity in South Kivu

Source: Yale Ford; Liam Karr; Anping Zhu.

M23 is conducting a separate offensive in South Kivu on the RN2 in Mwenga district. The group captured at least six villages as it advanced about 25 miles south along the RN2 and then took control of Mwenga town between November 23 and early December.[vii] FARDC soldiers and allied Wazalendo fighters reportedly abandoned several positions on the RN2 and fled south toward Kamituga.[viii] The offensive marks M23’s furthest advance in Mwenga district since it entered into South Kivu province earlier in 2025. The group had advanced as far as Kalama town in early March—22 miles north of Mwenga on the RN2—before halting its offensive in early March.[ix]

M23 is conducting a third offensive in Shabunda district along the RP503. M23 has clashed regularly with pro-Congolese government forces along the RP503 near the border between Shabunda and Walungu districts since M23 captured Nzibira town in late September. CTP assessed at the time that M23’s control of Nzibira would serve as a staging area for offensives on multiple axes toward the south-central DRC in the medium term.[x] The group’s first confirmed capture in Shabunda district occurred on November 16, when it took control of Mayimingi village—about 12 miles west of Nzibira.[xi] M23 then used its positions in Mayimingi to advance about 10 miles west and capture two villages on the RP503 on November 20.[xii]

Figure 3. M23 Advances Southward in South Kivu Province

Source: Yale Ford; Liam Karr; Anping Zhu.

M23’s military actions undermine efforts to secure a durable ceasefire in the eastern DRC. The ceasefire provision from a Qatari-brokered preliminary agreement in late July prohibited new attacks or attempts to conquer new territory.[xiii] The Congolese government and M23 agreed to establish a ceasefire-verification mechanism on October 14.[xiv] The two sides reaffirmed their prior commitments and desire to achieve a permanent cessation of hostilities in a roadmap agreement from November 15.[xv] The verification mechanism is still not operational, however—convening for only one meeting in early November—and the DRC and M23 and Rwanda have continued to accuse each other repeatedly of unwarranted attacks and provocations.

M23 is meeting weaker resistance as it advances on the Mwenga and Shabunda fronts and advances toward the interior of the DRC, including mineral-rich areas. M23’s advance could enable it to degrade FARDC air capabilities, which has been a major vulnerability for the group. Kindu in Maniema province lies roughly 135 miles west of M23’s current position on the RP503 via Shabunda town. Kindu is the administrative and commercial capital of Maniema province and an important FARDC command center that houses FARDC air assets and the FARDC’s 31st Rapid Intervention Brigade.[xvi] Kindu is one of the two main airports and staging grounds in central DRC for the FARDC’s air and ground operations against M23 in the east. M23 regularly accuses the Congolese government of using Kindu to deploy foreign mercenaries in the conflict and conduct drone strikes on its positions and civilians.

M23’s uncontested control of Mwenga and Kamituga—17 miles further south—would allow the group to tax and control the production and trade of gold in the surrounding area. Kamituga has a population of 300,000 people and is an important gold-mining town in the area.[xvii] Kamituga produced 12–17 percent of South Kivu’s total gold output, according to figures from 2013.[xviii] The town is situated on a regional economic corridor via the RN2 that links to Bukavu, where traders from Kamituga go to sell gold.[xix]

M23’s control of Mwenga and Kamituga would set conditions for the group to advance further toward key commercial and administrative centers in south-central DRC, although the terrain presents major obstacles to future advances. The two towns are the Congolese government’s last major strongholds along the RN2 in South Kivu. The politically important Kasai provinces in south-central DRC are about 485 miles southwest from Mwenga town on the RN2. The RN2 is nearly impassable in some areas in South Kivu and further toward Kasai, however, which means that a sustained M23 advance would likely require significant effort and manpower.

The FARDC and Wazalendo fighters are likely trying to deny M23 other lines of advance to the DRC interior in North Kivu. The FARDC has increased airstrikes on M23 positions on the frontlines in western Masisi on the RP529 as fighting continues since late October.[xx] M23 has used its positions south of Masisi town and on the RP529 road near the border between Masisi and Walikale districts to capture multiple villages from pro-Congolese government forces since around November 14.[xxi] The FARDC conducted additional strikes on M23 near the RP529 on November 21 and 27 and December 2, as Wazalendo fighters simultaneously conducted ground attacks in multiple areas, including Nyabiondo—M23’s stronghold on the RP529—to maintain pressure on M23 forces.[xxii]

Airstrikes and ground attacks on advanced M23 positions in western North Kivu are likely aimed at blocking potential offensives on Walikale town on the RP529 and Pinga on the RP1030. Walikale is a key town because it has about 60,000 inhabitants and is the gateway between North Kivu province and the interior of the DRC along the RN3 road.[xxiii] Walikale district also has extensive gold, tantalum, and tin ore deposits that the group would benefit from.[xxiv] M23 advanced along the RP529 in March and held Walikale for 16 days before withdrawing in early April as part of US- and Qatar-backed negotiations.[xxv]

Wazalendo fighters recaptured a village from M23 north of Nyabiondo on a local road that leads to Pinga in late November, possibly to prevent M23 from advancing north to Pinga.[xxvi] Pinga is a key town due to its vital infrastructure and location as a potential launching pad for future M23 offensives into the DRC interior. Pinga hosts an airstrip, an army base, and a hospital.[xxvii] This infrastructure makes the town a favorable staging ground for M23 expansion deeper into mineral-rich Walikale territory or Maniema and Tshopo provinces. Holding Pinga would mark a notable expansion in M23’s areas of control given the town’s history as a contested stronghold.[xxviii]

Figure 4. M23 Advances Westward Toward DRC Interior

Source: Yale Ford; Liam Karr; Anping Zhu.

Fighting between M23 and pro-Congolese government forces will continue despite the Congolese and Rwandan presidents signing the US-brokered peace agreement. US President Donald Trump will host Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Washington, DC, to ratify the US-backed peace framework from late June and separate bilateral economic agreements with the United States on December 4.[xxix] The peace framework centers around a US-backed regional economic integration framework agreement from early November and a military plan to address some of the long-standing security issues in the eastern DRC but does not strongly address the role of proxy forces. US officials have reportedly invited the emir of Qatar and several African heads of state and leaders to witness the ceremony, including officials from the African Union, Angola, Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Togo, and Uganda.[xxx] Kenya and Burundi will reportedly be guarantors of the framework.[xxxi]

Figure 5. DRC Peace Roadmap

Source: Yale Ford.

CTP continues to assess that the long-term success of the US-backed peace deal hinges on separate DRC-M23 talks that have largely stalled. The Congolese government and M23 signed a Qatari-brokered peace framework agreement on November 15.[xxxii] The agreement was a prerequisite to finalizing the US-backed peace agreement in the head of state ceremony. The resolution of the M23 conflict is reportedly central to significant investment from US companies in the DRC-Rwanda border region.[xxxiii] Most key provisions of the framework remain unresolved, face many challenges, and are far from implementation, however—including a durable ceasefire. The two sides were supposed to convene by late November to restart negotiations but have reportedly yet to do so. CTP assessed in November that negotiations to finalize and implement the roadmap deal will almost certainly remain fragile and drag well into 2026, especially given that neither side has much incentive to abandon their maximalist positions.[xxxiv] M23 leaders have reportedly said privately that they want to intensify military operations before the end of 2025.[xxxv] CTP assessed on several occasions in 2025 that all sides will use any “ceasefire” and lull in fighting to reset militarily and set conditions for future offensives.[xxxvi]

Guinea-Bissau

Author: Miles Charles

The Bissau-Guinean military orchestrated a coup on November 26, marking the eighth coup in West Africa since 2020 and the second African coup in 2025. Junta spokesperson Brigadier General Denis N’Canha announced through state media channels on November 26, that the army had deposed President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and seized control of the country.[xxxvii] N’Canha cited general instability and attempts to manipulate the results of the November 23 presidential and legislative elections as justification.[xxxviii] The army had detained Embaló on November 26 before allowing him to flee to Senegal on November 27.[xxxix] The Nigerian government granted opposition candidate Fernando Dias asylum in the Nigerian embassy.[xl]

The junta formed a transitional government with a one-year mandate titled the Military High Command for the Restoration of National Security and Public Order (MHC) on November 26.[xli] The MHC named Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Major General Horta Inta-a (N’Tam) as president.[xlii] The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union suspended the government indefinitely on November 28 in response.[xliii] ECOWAS then sent a remediation mission to Guinea-Bissau on December 1 but announced on December 2 that no progress was made.[xliv]

The military likely orchestrated the coup to prevent the opposition from taking power following recent elections. French and local media reported following the coup that Fernando Dias and the opposition were expected to have won both the November 23 elections.[xlv] The National Electoral Commission (NEC) planned to announce the results on November 27, the day after the coup, but has remained unable to do so due to armed men attacking the NEC headquarters, seizing the regional tally sheets, and destroying the server on which the results had been saved.[xlvi] The West African Elders Forum reported that officials conducted the elections fairly with no incidents of fraud.[xlvii] Embaló and Dias both claimed to have won the election.[xlviii]

Embaló himself may have supported the coup. Embaló’s inner circle has taken control of senior leadership within the transitional government. Embaló appointed junta leader General Inta-a (N’tam) and junta spokesperson General N’Canha as chief of staff of the armed forces and head of the military office of the presidency, respectively.[xlix] Embaló had also promoted N’Canha to the rank of general in 2021.[l] The MHC named Embaló’s head of presidential security, General Tomas Djassi, as the new chief of staff of the armed forces.[li] The MHC also appointed Embaló’s finance minister and campaign manager, Illidio Vieira Té, to prime minister.[lii] Ranking military members within the junta visited the presidential palace in the days leading up to the coup.[liii]

Figure 6. Senior Junta Leadership Linked to President Embaló

Source: Miles Charles.

Election observers, regional politicians, and the opposition have all denounced the coup as fake. Former Nigerian president Jonathan Goodluck, an election observer for the Council of Elders, called the coup ceremonial on November 28.[liv] Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko reiterated this to the Senegalese National Assembly the same day, stating that “what happened in Guinea-Bissau [was] a scheme.”[lv] The opposition also claimed that Embaló had fabricated the coup to avoid defeat in the November elections.[lvi]

Embaló has repeatedly used coup claims to consolidate control since 2023. Embaló dissolved the parliament in 2023 for the second time in two years in response to an alleged coup attempt.[lvii] The alleged attempt constituted clashes between the opposition-controlled national guard and presidential forces over the rearrest of two ministers charged with corruption.[lviii] The parliament is tasked with appointing cabinet members, a responsibility Embaló seized after the parliament’s dissolution in 2023, filling his cabinet with loyalists such as Vieira.[lix] The parliament has remained closed since 2023 but was expected to resume following the 2025 elections.[lx] Embaló used another alleged coup in October 2025 to purge senior military leadership.[lxi]

The junta may have orchestrated the coup in part to protect elite control over Bissau-Guinean narco-smuggling used to fund patronage networks. Guinea-Bissau is an important logistics and redistribution hub for maritime and aviation drug smuggling networks linking Colombia and Venezuela to Europe.[lxii] Bissau-Guinean narco-networks facilitate the smuggling of an estimated 75 percent of the 40 tons of cocaine that moves through West Africa toward Europe each year.[lxiii] These 40 tons account for 20 percent of all cocaine trafficked to Europe.[lxiv] A portion of the drugs smuggled through Guinea-Bissau are moved overland through the Sahel, where Sahelian Salafi-jihadi insurgents tax drug smugglers using the trafficking routes.[lxv]

Senior Bissau-Guinean government and military officials exploit the drug smuggling to fund extensive patronage networks. Security and political figures work with drug traffickers in exchange for a protection fee, including supporting import logistics, providing narcotics storage, and offering legal and physical protection.[lxvi] Officials then use the revenue from these fees to maintain patronage networks, buying the loyalty of lower-level soldiers, government officials, and communities.[lxvii] Bissau-Guinean officials dedicate an estimated 60 percent of the revenue from drug smuggling toward maintaining patronage networks.[lxviii]

The opposition had promised leading up to the November 23 elections to crack down on drug smuggling and hold public officials involved accountable, threatening the patronage networks of Embaló and aligned officials in the new junta. Dias publicly criticized the president in November for the growth of illicit trade during his presidency, claiming Embaló was directly involved.[lxix] Dias then announced the day of the election that he would “fight against drug trafficking, especially when it concerns public authorities.”[lxx] Opposition candidate Domingos Simões Pereira and his coalition, the Inclusive Alliance Platform–Terra Ranka (PAI), compiled evidence and worked with a UN-accredited nongovernmental organization in 2025 to hold the Bissau-Guinean government accountable for its involvement in the drug trafficking.[lxxi] Pereira and the PAI were the leading opposition figures in 2025 until the Bissau-Guinean supreme court barred both from running in the elections in mid-2025.[lxxii]

The change in governance is unlikely to significantly alter Guinea-Bissau’s foreign policy strategy to balance between China, Russia, and the West. Guinea-Bissau is recipient of extensive Chinese investments with 139 ongoing or completed projects totaling $284 million.[lxxiii] China designated Guinea-Bissau as a comprehensive strategic cooperative partner—the highest partnership grouping outside of a handful of special accolades—in July 2024.[lxxiv] China has financed major Bissau-Guinean infrastructure projects such as the government palace, the justice building, the parliament, and the recently renovated fishing port in Bandim.[lxxv] The Chinese ambassador also met with the Bissau-Guinean government in September 2025 to discuss port construction and maritime security.[lxxvi] China then delivered security inspection equipment to Guinea-Bissau in October 2025 as part of the Global Security Initiative.[lxxvii]

Guinea-Bissau has significantly grown its defense cooperation with Russia since 2021. Bissau-Guinean President Umaro Sissoco Embaló has met with Russian President Vladimir Putin four times since 2022.[lxxviii] CTP assessed in May 2024 that Embaló might be seeking greater security cooperation with Russia after the alleged 2023 coup attempt.[lxxix] Embaló agreed in 2024 to send Bissau-Guinean troops for joint training exercises at the Russian University of Special Forces Chechnya, and Russia has already trained more than 5,000 officers.[lxxx] The two presidents raised the annual number of Guinean officers who will study at Russian military colleges during their most recent meeting in 2025.[lxxxi]

Embaló has also maintained bilateral partnerships with pro-western states as a counterbalance to Russia and China.[lxxxii] Embaló met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in 2022 to discuss economic cooperation and the possibility of a Ukraine-Africa summit.[lxxxiii] Bissau-Guinean security forces have participated in training programs led by US Africa Command, the US Army, and the US National Guard since 2023.[lxxxiv] Guinea-Bissau also signed a defense agreement with the US in 2023 that provided a legal framework for security cooperation, training, and defense aid.[lxxxv] Embaló attended a US-Africa summit hosted by President Donald Trump in Washington from July 9 to 11 to discuss critical minerals, security, and trade.[lxxxvi]

Russia may capitalize on international backlash to increase cooperation with the military junta, a tactic it has employed across the Sahel. Russia has traditionally partnered with isolated military governments, exchanging regime protection for cash payments and access to natural resources.[lxxxvii] Harsh international sanctions and fears of external military intervention have pushed many West African juntas further into Russia’s orbit after their coups.[lxxxviii] Russia could offer the Bissau-Guinean junta leaders the regime security package it has provided to other pro-Russian authoritarian regimes in Africa, but it is unclear whether the new military leaders fear a countercoup.[lxxxix]

Sudan—Russia

Author: Michael DeAngelo

Sudan is continuing to discuss a naval base deal with Russia, which would be Russia’s first base on the Red Sea. Officials from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)-led government presented a plan to Russian counterparts in October in which Russia would gain port and mining rights in exchange for supplying the SAF with antiaircraft systems and additional weapons, potentially including fighter jets.^[xc] Russia would secure a 25-year lease and the ability to station 300 troops and four warships, including nuclear-powered ones.^[xci] Sudan and Russia have discussed this deal since 2017.^[xcii] The two countries signed a preliminary agreement in 2019, but political instability and Sudanese officials have stalled implementation.^[xciii] SAF officials reviewed the agreement after the 2021 coup and have claimed since that a currently non-existent legislature must first ratify the deal.^[xciv]

The SAF-led government is likely dangling the prospect of a Russian base to extract concessions from both Russia and the United States amid regional peace efforts. The SAF’s stated intention to defeat the RSF and SAF challenges countering RSF drone attacks make Russian weaponry appealing.^[xcv] The SAF has sought increased support from other external backers since the fall of el Fasher, especially Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey.^[xcvi] The SAF has yet to achieve air superiority over the RSF due to the group’s use of jamming technology to disrupt SAF air operations and drones to strike SAF positions and infrastructure.^[xcvii]

The SAF is likely simultaneously pressuring the United States to take a more favorable stance in Quad negotiations. SAF head and government leader Abdel Fattah al Burhan accused US Senior Adviser for Africa Massad Boulos, who is leading US peace efforts, of favoring the RSF and United Arab Emirates (UAE)—the RSF’s primary backer—in a November 23 speech.^[xcviii] Burhan alleged that the Quad—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the US—recently proposed a peace agreement that would allow the RSF to remain operational while requiring the SAF to demobilize, although the latter stipulation is highly unlikely given that Egypt has consistently supported the SAF militarily and in Quad talks.^[xcix] Burhan has since reiterated that the RSF withdraw from population centers before any peace talks and that a peace agreement must demobilize the RSF.^[c]

Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Liam Karr and Alexandria Johnson

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured the last remaining population center held by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in west-central Sudan after a nearly two-year siege. The RSF overran the SAF’s 22nd Infantry Division Headquarters in Babanusa on December 1 after intensified air and ground attacks following its capture of el Fasher in late October.^[ci] The RSF advanced from multiple axes to assault the headquarters, which was the final remaining key SAF position in the town.^[cii] The SAF denied that Babanusa had fallen, but RSF fighters posted videos of themselves in the headquarters.^[ciii]

The RSF’s capture of Babanusa further consolidates its de facto partition of Sudan, hampering US-led peace efforts. The RSF now controls the entirety of West Kordofan region, with the exception of the Heglig oil fields and surrounding localities on the border with South Sudan. The capture of el Fasher and Babanusa since October directly contrasts with the SAF’s demands that the RSF withdraws from population centers in advance of any peace talks.^[civ] US President Donald Trump stated on November 19 that he will focus on ending the war, but the RSF and SAF have only intensified fighting with backing from external sponsors in recent months.^[cv] These sponsors include the United Arab Emirates for the RSF and Egypt for the SAF, both of which are in the “Quad” body meant to broker peace, along with Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The RSF and SAF will likely concentrate their resources on the main front lines around el Obeid, the SAF’s headquarters in central Sudan. The RSF will be able to redeploy forces from Babanusa to pressure the SAF-controlled Dilling-Kadugli pocket on el Obeid’s southern axis in South Kordofan region. A 200 mile stretch of RSF-controlled highway connects the two areas. The SAF was only able to partially break the RSF’s one-and-a-half-year siege of Dilling and Kadugli—the South Kordofan state capital—in February 2025 by connecting the 90-mile stretch of road between the two towns.^[cvi]

The RSF and SAF have traded control of Kazgil—an area off the main north–south highway 95 miles north of Dilling and 30 miles south of SAF-controlled el Obeid—multiple times in 2025.^[cvii] Several sources claimed that the SAF captured Kazgil on November 15, while two mappers still show the RSF as controlling it.^[cviii] The RSF and the allied Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) al Hilu militia have continued to intermittently shell and clash with the SAF in the Dilling-Kadugli pocket, including on November 17 near Kadugli and November 27 near Dilling.^[cix] The SAF conducted drone strikes on SPLM-N al Hilu camps in Kauda—the SPLM-N al Hilu headquarters located approximately 85 miles east of Kadugli—for the first time on November 29, although the strikes also reportedly hit civilian targets outside of the town, killing dozens.^[cx]

The SAF is attempting to stymie a potential RSF offensive on el Obeid along the central axis while preparing its own counteroffensive. The SAF has recently conducted drone strikes on RSF positions in the West Kordofan capital an Nahud and al Khawai, which is a key town located on the main east–west highway in Kordofan region only 30 miles west of the central axis frontlines at SAF-controlled um Sumeima.^[cxi] The RSF stations fighters and equipment in both towns.^[cxii] Local news outlet Darfur24 claimed to have obtained an RSF document planning an assault on el Obeid from the west, although the report remains unverified.^[cxiii] The SAF has declared its own intention to retake territory west of um Sumeima and sent reinforcements, reportedly including senior officers, to el Obeid since late October.^[cxiv]

The SAF is attempting to strengthen supply lines on the northern axis between el Obeid and Khartoum. The RSF and SAF have traded control of Bara—located approximately 40 miles north of el Obeid on the road to Khartoum—multiple times in 2025, with the RSF recently capturing it on October 25.^[cxv] The SAF launched a counterattack and entered Bara on November 17, but the RSF repelled the advance.^[cxvi] The SAF reportedly conducted drone strikes on an RSF supply convoy heading toward Bara on November 29.^[cxvii]

Figure 7. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Kordofan Region

Source: Liam Karr; Michael DeAngelo.

The RSF could also launch an offensive on Heglig to destroy the final SAF pocket in the western half of Sudan, which would threaten key oil revenue streams for the SAF and South Sudan, although China’s stake in the Heglig facilities may deter the group. Heglig’s oil fields help supply a key pipeline providing Khartoum and Port Sudan with fuel.^[cxviii] The RSF frequently targets oil infrastructure to disrupt SAF operations and governance, including by striking Heglig, which is located 170 miles southeast of Babanusa.^[cxix] The RSF conducted drone strikes on Heglig facilities in August and November, forcing a temporary pause in pipeline operations.^[cxx] These attacks also affected South Sudan, as Heglig is a primary transit point for South Sudanese oil exports.^[cxxi] South Sudan is currently facing an economic crisis and escalating clashes between anti-government and pro-government factions, making any pipeline disruption highly destabilizing, as oil exports account for 90 percent of government revenue.^[cxxii] China possesses a 40 percent stake in the company operating the Heglig facilities, however, which increases the political cost of an offensive for the RSF.^[cxxiii]

Nigeria

Authors: Chris Dayton and Miles Charles

The United States has resumed reconnaissance operations in Nigeria for the first time since withdrawing from Niger in 2024 as part a broader increase in US-Nigeria security cooperation. The United States has conducted intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations over the Lake Chad Basin, along the Benin and Niger borders, and in northwest Nigeria from November 26 to December 3.[cxxiv] The US has surveilled IS West Africa Province (ISWAP), IS Sahel Province, Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen, and bandit strongholds in the area, launching operations from Accra, Ghana.[cxxv] The Kotoka International Airport in Accra serves as the central hub for the US Africa Command’s West Africa Logistics Network.[cxxvi] The US contracted Tenax Aerospace, a private US-based aviation company, to conduct the operations.[cxxvii] US forces had been unable to conduct ISR operations since US forces withdrew from Niger in 2024, including Air Base 201 in Agadez, Niger, which hosted US drones.[cxxviii]

Figure 8. US ISR Zones of Coverage in Nigeria

Source: Miles Charles; Chris Dayton.

The US operated ISR flights are part of a broader increase in US-Nigeria security engagement since November. US Africa Command drafted plans in late 2025 to target Salafi-jihadi groups in Nigeria at the behest of US President Donald Trump.[cxxix] The Nigerian government then sent a high-level delegation, led by the Nigerian national security adviser, to discuss security cooperation with US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and US Congressman Riley Moore on November 20.[cxxx] The special adviser to Nigerian President Bola Tinubu claimed on November 24 that President Trump had agreed to deepen security cooperation and intelligence sharing.[cxxxi] President Tinubu then approved the creation of a US-Nigerian Joint Working Group on November 27.[cxxxii] The framework will strengthen counterterrorism collaboration and reportedly allow the US to conduct UAV airstrikes and accelerate the delivery of 12 US military helicopters.[cxxxiii] The Nigerian national security adviser acknowledged on December 1 that the US, among other countries, was providing the Nigerian military with “technical support” to combat terrorism.[cxxxiv]

Increased US-Nigerian engagement comes as Nigeria faces rising security challenges from armed groups. Jihadist and bandit groups carried out several high-profile attacks in November. ISWAP militants ambushed and executed a brigadier general, the highest-ranking Nigerian military official to be killed in several years, on November 15.[cxxxv] Bandits then kidnapped over 300 children from a Christian school in Niger State on November 21 in the largest kidnapping in recent years.[cxxxvi]

The government has faced internal tensions as external pressure to quell the violence increases. President Tinubu replaced several ranking military commanders in October.[cxxxvii] This reshuffling followed the arrests of several officers rumored to have planned a coup.[cxxxviii] The government denied these rumors.[cxxxix] President Tinubu declared a state of emergency and ordered the Nigerian Armed Forces and police to recruit thousands of additional personnel in the following days after significant attacks by armed groups.[cxl] Nigeria’s minister of defense resigned several days later.[cxli]

Somalia—Islamic State Somalia Province

Authors: Michael DeAngelo and Hannah Ochs

Puntland and US forces conducted a joint operation against Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) leadership havens as they continue their counter-ISS campaign in northern Somalia. The United States supported Puntland forces with drone strikes and a helicopter assault during an operation targeting cave complexes in the Cal Miskaad mountains on November 25.^[cxlii] Unconfirmed reports claimed that Puntland and US forces killed an ISS leader and several other fighters.^[cxliii] Independent reports claimed that US special operations forces were involved in the ground raid on the complexes, although two US military officials denied the reports.^[cxliv] US participation in the ground raid would be the second instance of US forces operating on the ground during the yearlong counterterrorism campaign, known as Operation Hilaac. The first instance occurred in July, when US special operations forces captured ISS’s finance head.^[cxlv]

Puntland forces launched Operation Hilaac in November 2024 to uproot ISS bases in the mountainous Bari region of eastern Puntland in response to ISS’s growing prominence, both internationally and within Somalia. ISS displaced al Shabaab fighters from the Cal Miskaad mountains to become the predominant Salafi-jihadi group in northern Somalia in April 2024.^[cxlvi] ISS largely avoided holding population centers, instead establishing bases and training camps in the mountains and cave complexes.^[cxlvii]

ISS hosts senior IS central leadership and IS’s East Africa office, al Karrar, which facilitates logistics between the IS global network and regional affiliates, and supports external attack plots.^[cxlviii] The United Nations has assessed that ISS founder Abdul Qadir Mumin may be IS’s caliph or the head of the General Directorate of the Provinces, the IS body that oversees regional affiliates and coordinates external attacks.^[cxlix] ISS is primarily composed of foreign fighters, but the group has also served as an initial point of contact for foreign fighters from Africa, Europe, and the Middle East joining other regional IS affiliates, including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique.^[cl] ISS has generated millions through racketeering and has distributed funding and trainers across Africa and to global affiliates.^[cli] ISS has directly supported the Afghanistan-based IS Khorasan Province, which has conducted multiple high-profile attacks in Asia and Europe.^[clii]

The Puntland-led, US-supported campaign has heavily degraded ISS as it nears its alleged completion. Puntland officials have stated that they will conclude Operation Hilaac in the coming weeks due to its success.^[cliii] Puntland President Saeed Abdullahi Deni said on September 28 that the campaign had degraded ISS by 95 percent, clearing ISS bases, seizing arms stockpiles, and forcing remaining fighters to scatter in small cells.^[cliv] Deni claimed on October 25 that Puntland forces have subdued many of the remaining fighters, who are concentrated in multiple valleys in the Cal Miskaad mountains.^[clv] ISS had an estimated 600 to 2,000 fighters at the beginning of Operation Hilaac.^[clvi] Puntland officials and local sources have claimed that Puntland forces have surrounded the last remaining ISS safe havens, capturing several mid-level ISS operatives since early November.^[clvii]

US air support coordinated with Puntland forces has played a vital supporting role in the campaign.^[clviii] The United States has conducted 59 airstrikes targeting ISS in 2025, compared to three in 2024.^[clix] The United States has also conducted supply airdrops to Puntland forces, which have helped Puntland forces gradually advance on ISS safe havens inaccessible to military vehicles.^[clx]

Figure 9. Puntland 2025 Counter-ISS Offensive

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

ISS is not totally defeated and remains active, however, highlighting the need for Puntland forces to sustain pressure to prevent ISS from reconstituting. ISS fighters have used the mountainous terrain and relationships with local residents to evade capture. Puntland forces conducted a multipronged assault on October 13 targeting ISS hideouts in Ceel il Abbal, where unconfirmed reports claimed that a senior and US-sanctioned ISS leader, Abdirahman Faahiye, was hiding.^[clxi] Deni stated on October 13 that Puntland forces were pursuing at least two ISS leaders who had evaded capture in earlier offensives but that difficult terrain was hindering efforts.^[clxii] Faahiye and Mumin are still at-large.^[clxiii] ISS fighters have integrated into the local population, and Puntland forces suspect that some residents provide shelter and support.^[clxiv] Puntland forces have arrested suspected ISS collaborators and ordered residents to evacuate areas near ISS safe havens in mid-November.^[clxv]

ISS has continued attacking Puntland forces, including in previously cleared areas.^[clxvi] ISS has conducted attacks in Darmadobe and Dhasan since September, despite Puntland forces overrunning an ISS command base in Darmadobe in February and clearing Dhasan six months ago.^[clxvii] ISS also attacked a Puntland forces base in Balaade valley on November 16, killing four troops.^[clxviii] ISS reportedly capitalized on Puntland forces’ withdrawal from Balaade valley to move into additional areas in mid-November.^[clxix] ISS attacked Puntland forces in Maraagade valley in late November after Puntland forces cleared it, leading to a series of clashes.^[clxx] Deni has acknowledged the continued threat, saying that he would station troops in Bari to prevent ISS reconstitution after the completion of Operation Hilaac.^[clxxi]

Figure 10. ISS Attacks in Somalia, June-November 2025

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Somalia—Al Shabaab

Author: Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr with Hannah Ochs

Somali federal government (SFG) and Jubbaland forces have advanced toward a district capital in southern Somalia that al Shabaab has held for 16 years. Somali forces—backed by US air support—have progressed along the Jubba River in Jamame district toward Jamame town since mid-November.^[clxxii] Security forces have cleared al Shabaab bases and disrupted the group’s supply lines, including agricultural and taxation operations, as they advance. ^[clxxiii] The forces reportedly advanced to the Araare bridge by late November, which is located approximately four miles southwest of Jamame town.^[clxxiv] Al Shabaab has reportedly bolstered its defenses around the bridge, as SFG and Jubbaland forces must cross the Jubba River to assault the town.^[clxxv] Al Shaabab controls much of Jumaame district, and its leaders are based nearby in Middle Juba region, where the group openly governs most of the territory.^[clxxvi]

Figure 11. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations in Jubbaland

Source: Hannah Ochs; Michael DeAngelo; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Fierce al Shabaab resistance makes it unlikely that security forces will be able to hold Jamame if it captures the town, much less permanently uproot al Shabaab from its almost two-decade heartland. Al Shabaab previously launched several large-scale attacks in 2023 to overrun forward operating bases that Somali forces planned to use for operations into Middle Jubba.^[clxxvii] Al Shabaab has similarly conducted large-scale attacks since 2022 to halt and eventually overturn a major Somali offensive in central Somalia, further away from its heartland where the group faces greater clan-related and logistic challenges.^[clxxviii] Somali forces have repeatedly demonstrated that they lack the capability to reliably withstand these large-scale attacks.

Somali forces likely lack holding force capacity, further compounding their ability to hold any cleared terrain. Somali forces in central Somalia have relied on local militias as holding forces, but the SFG does not have this option in southern Somalia, where clan ties and grievances against al Shabaab have not mobilized locals to combat the group.^[clxxix] African Union forces do not have the capacity to expand their operations to newly liberated areas, as their numbers are still in flux following the haphazard rollout of the new African Union Support and Stabilization Mission at the beginning of 2025.^[clxxx]

Tensions between the SFG and Jubbaland state government could also undermine the offensive. Clan-based tensions have historically worsened tensions between the SFG, Jubbaland government, and local militias, especially during elections.^[clxxxi] SFG and Jubbaland forces have recently clashed over disputed 2024 Jubbaland elections, straining counterterrorism cooperation.^[clxxxii] The SFG has refused to recognize the election results, in which Jubbaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam—known as Madobe—won a third term.^[clxxxiii] Infighting between Jubbaland and SFG broke out in late 2024 and July 2025, with both parties mobilizing forces, particularly in Gedo region.^[clxxxiv]

The continuing political tensions are poised to escalate in the immediate term with upcoming 2026 federal elections. Madobe has aligned with the anti-SFG Somali Salvation Forum and Puntland state government since September, repeatedly meeting with officials to coordinate opposition to the SFG’s election reforms.^[clxxxv] Madobe will host opposition leaders and the Puntland president in Kismayo on December 10.^[clxxxvi] The SFG has responded to Madobe’s posture by declaring that it will create a rival Jubbaland administration based in Gedo.^[clxxxvii] The regional commander of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)—the SFG’s primary intelligence agency with secondary paramilitary capabilities—has met with local clan elders and security officials, reportedly gaining their support for the plan.^[clxxxviii] The SFG deployed 45 NISA officers to Gedo in late November, which prompted Jubbaland officials to accuse the SFG of meddling and warn that they would block future unapproved deployments.^[clxxxix]

Iran

Author: Liam Karr

Iranian officials met with several African counterparts over the last week to discuss greater defense and economic ties. Iranian Director General for African Affairs Akbar Khosravinejad met with the three foreign ministers of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—in Burkina Faso on November 28.[cxc] The officials discussed ways to expand cooperation broadly. Iran has grown cooperation with the AES since the anti-Western bloc formed in 2023, and Iranian officials have met with their Sahelian counterparts on numerous occasions.[cxci] Iran has signed various agreements with Burkina Faso and Niger on energy, finance, health, industry, mining, and engineering, although CTP has observed little implementation.[cxcii]

The Iranian deputy foreign minister for economic diplomacy led an Iranian delegation to Uganda on December 2, marking at least the second Iranian delegation to Uganda in 2025.[cxciii] Iranian media emphasized that the trip aimed to strengthen economic ties and specifically noted that the two sides discussed bilateral relations, preparing for the upcoming joint economic and technical commission, and holding sectoral meetings with Ugandan business leaders to expand trade and investment ties.[cxciv] Iran and Uganda have a decades-long partnership rooted in anti-colonial political allyship and agricultural ties.[cxcv] The previous three Iranian presidents visited Uganda during their terms, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has visited Iran several times.[cxcvi]

Iran seeks to bolster partnerships with African countries as part of its continued effort to break its international isolation, including through growing its geopolitical influence and increasing trade, hard currency acquisition, and natural resource access, such as uranium, to mitigate sanctions. Iran has used defense ties as a foundation to strengthen partnerships, including its pursuit of Red Sea and uranium access.[cxcvii] Iran has sent Ababil-3 and Mohajer-6 multi-role drones to Ethiopia, Sudan, and Western Sahara since 2021.[cxcviii] The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) rejected an Iranian request for a naval base or dual-use port on Sudan’s Red Sea Coast in exchange for continued aid and a helicopter-carrying ship.[cxcix] The Nigerien junta similarly turned down an Iranian offer of drones and surface-to-air missiles in exchange for uranium yellowcake in 2024.[cc] CTP also assessed that Iran likely aimed to secure access to Zimbabwe’s rich uranium deposits through increased defense engagement with Zimbabwe in 2024.[cci]

Iran has used internal oppression and regime security assistance to bolster its partnerships with some African states, including Burkina Faso. The Iranian Law Enforcement commander visited Burkina Faso and Ethiopia in May.[ccii] CTP previously assessed that this is likely part of a broader Iranian effort to build partnerships and simultaneously open new avenues for economic partnerships and revenue streams.[cciii] Uganda’s authoritarian regime could be open to similar support, especially as an aging Museveni considers passing power to his son.[cciv]

Iran has separately sought to expand trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives in Africa, in line with its latest moves in Uganda. Iran held the Third Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Summit in April 2025, where it signed multiple commercial and investment deals with African partners and emphasized expanding joint chambers of commerce, trade centers, and financing mechanisms.[ccv] Iran has previously struggled to follow through on aspirational cooperation goals with African countries, but Iranian officials explicitly reorganized the 2025 summit to focus on four priority sectors—mining, agriculture, petrochemicals, and medical equipment—to ensure the summit remained “outcome-driven.”[ccvi] Greater bilateral trade with Africa helps Iran to increase its capital inflows to prevent economic collapse under Western sanctions and normalizes economic cooperation with non-Western countries despite sanctions. Iran-Africa trade remains a tiny portion of its overall gross domestic product, however, and CTP has previously assessed that increased trade with Africa will not solve the problems that cause Iran’s economic instability.[ccvii]

Africa File Data Cutoff: December 4, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.