Kabila’s Return to the DRC: Africa File Special Edition

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Key Takeaway: Former Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Joseph Kabila has reentered Congolese politics to capitalize on the eastern DRC crisis and regain power by positioning himself as the leader of a broad opposition bloc that includes Rwandan-backed M23 rebels. The Kabila-M23 partnership is opportunistic and transactional, which is one of many reasons that Kabila is unlikely to use M23 to topple Tshisekedi militarily. Kabila’s reemergence risks convoluting the domestic peace process, which is necessary for long-term peace and stable economic investment in the DRC.

Assessment:

Former Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Joseph Kabila has reentered Congolese politics amid the eastern DRC crisis after a multiyear hiatus. Kabila remained outside of the DRC for more than a year and kept a low profile until he began remobilizing his political networks to “organize his return to the forefront” in late 2024.^[i] Kabila wrote to the French magazine Jeune Afrique in early April that he decided to relaunch his career after consulting widely with “several heads of state, former presidents, and ‘national and foreign political and social figures.’”^[ii] Kabila dispatched a longtime ally and “architect” of his return, Kikaya Bin Karubi, to Washington, DC, to lobby on Kabila’s behalf in mid-June.^[iii]

Kabila returned to the DRC in late May through M23-controlled Goma for the first time in over a year and gave his first public address since he left office in 2019. Kabila blamed the security crisis in the eastern DRC on DRC President Félix Tshisekedi, said that regime change was necessary for peace, and declared that he would “play his part” to “put an end to the [Tshisekedi] dictatorship.”^[iv] Kabila has held numerous closed-door meetings in Goma, the North Kivu provincial capital, with close associates, M23 cadres, and local and regional officials to formulate his political agenda.^[v] Corneille Nangaa, head of M23’s political branch, “welcomed the arrival” of Kabila who he said “made a good choice” to travel to Goma “rather than remain in forced exile.”^[vi] Kabila visited Bukavu, the M23-controlled South Kivu provincial capital, and held meetings with local figures in late June.[vii] Karubi has said that Kabila returned to the DRC not to take charge of M23 but to collaborate with “anyone who can contribute to putting an end to tyranny and dictatorship.”^[viii]

Kabila likely seeks to capitalize on Rwandan-backed M23’s advantageous position to strengthen his own political influence and lead a unified opposition bloc—which includes M23—as a vehicle to regain power. Kabila’s carefully orchestrated return comes as M23’s growing political and military clout over the DRC government has reached new highs. M23 captured the two provincial capitals of Goma and Bukavu, which has given it considerable political leverage, weakened Tshisekedi politically, and forced the Congolese government to recognize it as a legitimate party to peace negotiations.^[ix] M23 operates in a geographical area in the eastern DRC that spans about 5,800 square miles with five million people—about half the size of Belgium with the population of Ireland.^[x] The conflict has drawn major international interest, with the United States and Qatar both mediating negotiations between the various parties.

Figure 1. M23 Advances in Eastern DRC

Source: Yale Ford; Liam Karr.

Kabila likely aims to leverage his residual political capital to unite a fragmented opposition bloc that could challenge Tshisekedi’s ruling coalition and reclaim power. Kabila’s allies have told media outlets repeatedly that Kabila wants to position himself as mediator for both “armed and civilian” opposition.^[xi] Kabila’s political party said that Kabila could influence the course of the eastern DRC conflict as one of the “major political players” in the DRC who “knows all the players, the game, and the issues.”^[xii] Congolese media has speculated that Kabila seeks to “forge circumstantial agreements” and entice opposition politicians to back his agenda.^[xiii]

Kabila and Tshisekedi are now vying for the support of several prominent opposition figures. Tshisekedi tried to restructure the DRC government and form a “government of national unity” with the political opposition in late February.^[xiv] The move aimed to strengthen Tshisekedi’s position after he suffered the loss of Goma and Bukavu but failed after most opposition politicians rejected it.^[xv] Kabila has held separate meetings and back-channel discussions with veteran opposition figures, including Moïse Katumbi, Martin Fayulu, and Delly Sesanga, to try to “restructure the political opposition” into a broad anti-Tshisekedi bloc since late 2024.^[xvi] Fayulu, Katumbi, and Sesanga signed off on a rare joint statement with Kabila in late April.^[xvii] Fayulu previously aligned with Kabila, but Fayulu switched sides despite his turbulent relationship with Tshisekedi and called Kabila a “traitor” for his alliance with M23 and expressed support for a new “homeland camp” coalition under Tshisekedi in early June.^[xviii]

Figure 2. Congolese Opposition Networks

Source: Yale Ford.

Congolese political analysts believe that winning over the opposition and key political figures, particularly Katumbi and Vital Kamerhe—the president of the DRC’s National Assembly—is key for Kabila to galvanize the Congolese opposition against Tshisekedi.^[xix] The opposition has been at odds with Tshisekedi but have been unable to form a common front. Kamerhe, a former ally of Kabila and whose constituency is Bukavu, is formally aligned with Tshisekedi but has had public disputes with Tshisekedi and his inner circle since Tshisekedi’s first term.[xx] Great Lakes expert Kristof Titeca assessed that opposition politicians may not declare public support for M23 but tacitly align themselves with the rebel group “as a means to an end—a convenient force that could help dislodge the current regime.”^[xxi]

Kabila likely aims to use his position to regain power in some form through a national dialogue. The Congolese opposition has increased calls to address long-standing issues in the DRC through an inclusive peace conference, which could reconfigure political power from the national to local levels. A coalition of Congolese religious leaders has spearheaded an effort to find solutions to DRC’s multiple crises and initiate a dialogue since early 2025. The religious leaders have met with Congolese officials and opposition politicians, several African heads of state, European and Arab leaders, and M23 leaders, who have expressed support for the initiative.^[xxii] The draft US-brokered peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda requires the DRC to allow M23 to participate in a dialogue “on equal footing with other DRC non-state armed groups.”[xxiii]

The proposed dialogue reportedly would take inspiration from the Sun City dialogue from 2002 and work toward establishing a transitional government in the DRC.^[xxiv] Kabila and his allies have expressed support for a national dialogue repeatedly, and Kabila characterized the M23 conflict in the eastern DRC as “a Congolese affair above all” in his public address in late May.^[xxv] The political opposition has supported the religious leaders’ effort but refused to participate under Tshisekedi’s auspices, while Tshisekedi’s administration has slow-walked the process and criticized the measure as “political subversion” to displace him from power.^[xxvi] Tshisekedi met with the religious leaders on June 21 and committed to explore the initiative but remained skeptical, criticizing them for meeting with M23 in early 2025 and demanding that the initiative exclude Kabila, Katumbi, and Nangaa, whom Tshisekedi allegedly called “Swahili-speaking traitors.”[xxvii] Tshisekedi reportedly demanded that opposition politicians who engage in the dialogue must be part of Fayulu’s “homeland camp” and must denounce Kabila’s presence in M23-controlled Goma.[xxviii]

Kabila may have hastened his return to the DRC after the Congolese government began to retaliate against his networks in early 2025. Kabila built an extensive patronage network in the DRC and abroad that enabled him to exert formal and informal control over the government during his presidency from 2001 to 2019.^[xxix] The Congolese government has aggressively targeted Kabila and his political party—the Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (PPRD)—since the PPRD relaunched its activities and Kabila announced his imminent return to the DRC in early April.^[xxx] The DRC has targeted Kabila’s family and his and his allies’ personal assets, arrested and questioned military officials and government ministers with suspected links to Kabila, and restricted the political activities, communications, and movements of the PPRD across the DRC since mid-April.^[xxxi] Congolese authorities tied to Tshisekedi’s office have targeted Kabila “sleeper cells” in the DRC government and sought to dismantle Kabila’s financial networks.[xxxii] The Congolese Senate formally revoked Kabila’s immunity as a former senator and enabled the Congolese military justice system to prosecute him on charges of treason on May 22.^[xxxiii] A former minister for Kabila told Jeune Afrique that Kabila’s return to the DRC intended to shift the “balance of power” in Congolese politics toward Kabila and his camp.^[xxxiv]

Kabila’s relationship with M23 is transactional and opportunistic, which makes him unlikely to use M23 to seize power militarily. Kabila’s aim for regime change is aligned with M23 and Rwanda. Nangaa is a former high-ranking Congolese official who fell out with Tshisekedi after he claimed to have engineered a power sharing agreement between Tshisekedi and Kabila in 2018.^[xxxv] Nangaa has since called Tshisekedi a “crook” and said that M23 would “keep fighting” until Tshisekedi is overthrown or no longer in power.^[xxxvi] Kabila’s allies have said that both Kabila and M23 “disagree on a number of things with Tshisekedi” and share the “same objective: to end the regime of Félix Tshisekedi.”^[xxxvii] Rwanda is likely in favor of regime change—should the opportunity arise—given that Tshisekedi strained bilateral relations with Rwanda after he won reelection on a harsh anti-Rwandan platform and threatened multiple times to go to war.^[xxxviii] Officials in central and southern Africa told The Africa Report in late January that “Tshisekedi has proved too mercurial and unpredictable” for Rwandan President Paul Kagame and that Kabila is likely “favored by Rwanda as bilateral relations were more solid under his presidency.”^[xxxix]

M23 gains legitimacy from Kabila’s support, as Kabila’s backing undermines the DRC government’s narrative that M23 is a foreign Rwandan problem. The DRC government has long labeled M23 as a “terrorist” organization that serves solely as a conduit for Rwandan interests in the eastern DRC. M23’s alliance with Kabila means that the conflict has taken on more of an internal Congolese character, however. Kabila’s support, as a former Congolese president and enemy of M23 and previous Rwandan-backed rebellions, shifts focus away from Rwanda and gives weight to M23’s claims as a Congolese movement with valid grievances against the DRC government, regardless of Kabila’s self-interested reasons to align with M23.

Kabila and his allies have distanced Kabila from M23 repeatedly, however. Kabila’s camp has denied the DRC government’s accusation that he intends to join forces with M23 or assume a leadership role in the Rwandan-backed insurgency.^[xl] A Kabila associate told Jeune Afrique that Kabila’s local consultations in Goma are designed to “consolidate his legitimacy as a mediator” in the eastern DRC “while avoiding direct affiliation with the rebellion.”^[xli] Kabila has inferred that he has not provided consequential military backing to M23, stating that “if I were complicit with M23, things would look very different.”^[xlii] The PPRD claimed that Kabila traveled to Goma to “talk with those who have weapons” and “make his contribution by talking with them.”^[xliii]

Kabila has a checkered past with M23 and Rwanda that will likely limit their relationship. Kabila backed an armed anti-Tutsi extremist group, refused to implement a 2013 peace deal with M23, and allegedly wanted to target M23’s military chief during M23’s first iteration when Kabila was president in the early 2010s.^[xliv] Kabila had relatively smoother relations with Rwanda than Tshisekedi or his father, Laurent Kabila, but still accused Rwanda of trying to destabilize the DRC.^[xlv] Jeune Afrique cited “regional observers” in the Great Lakes in late June who said that Rwanda and other countries in the region may not prefer Kabila over the current administration due to Kabila’s unfavorable reputation.[xlvi]

M23 is likely unprepared for a renewed military campaign to topple Tshisekedi as it has been focused primarily on consolidating control over areas that it occupies in recent months. M23 has faced capacity and supply challenges since mid-March that have limited its ability to consolidate military control over its area of operations and made it unlikely that the rebel group could sustain an offensive outside the eastern DRC.^[xlvii] Pro-Congolese government militia groups have exploited supply line vulnerabilities that M23 faces the further it gets from its center of gravity in the eastern Kivu provinces and its rear supply base in Rwanda.^[xlviii] M23 has even lacked the capacity to fully secure its strongholds in Goma and Bukavu and their surrounding areas.^[xlix] M23 would likely be unable to stage a large offensive without a major contribution from Rwandan troops who have significantly decreased their direct engagement in the eastern DRC since US- and Qatari-mediated negotiations accelerated in late March.^[l] Rwanda is unlikely to launch or support an offensive on Kinshasa because it would be widely unpopular, risk more international sanctions on Rwanda, and threaten the internationally backed peace processes that Rwanda stands to benefit from economically.

Kabila is positioned to support M23 economically and politically—not address M23’s military capacity challenges—even if limiting factors do not meaningfully constrain their partnership. Kabila commands a large network of influence and resources, but his contribution would likely be more political, economic, and logistic than direct military mobilization. Kabila’s return to M23-controlled Goma could inspire defections from the Congolese army or aligned militias.^[li] Kabila’s track record as president is not viewed fondly in some parts of the eastern DRC, however, and it remains unclear if he could effectively use his status to augment M23’s position on the ground.^[lii]

M23 has devoted its primary effort to consolidating control over areas that it occupies in recent months—not continued expansion. M23 expanded its well-organized parallel administration in the eastern DRC and largely replaced the DRC government since late February. The rebel group has instituted its own leadership structures from the provincial to the district and local levels in the Kivu provinces and is preparing thousands of civil service employees to administer areas that it occupies.^[liii] M23 has allocated significant attention and resources to provide basic services, establish an alternative financial system, impose taxes, adjudicate social and legal matters, and facilitate local and regional transportation and trade, among other measures. M23 has tried to reduce crime and insecurity in areas that it controls and conducted raids and policing operations against suspected criminals and militia fighters.[liv] M23’s ability to strengthen its territorial control is key to Rwanda’s goal to establish a security buffer zone in the eastern DRC and M23’s raison d’être to bring prosperity and stability to the Kivu region, protect marginalized groups, and govern more competently than the DRC government.[lv]

Kabila’s reemergence risks convoluting the domestic peace process, which is necessary for long-term peace and stable economic investment in the DRC. Kabila is one of many actors whom multilateral peace processes will need to consider. The DRC government’s actions against Kabila were reportedly a “source of tension” in Qatari-mediated DRC-M23 talks in late April.^[lvi] The talks in Qatar have reportedly made minimal progress in recent weeks.^[lvii]

Kabila and the political opposition have demanded that a national dialogue take place before a US-led agreement between the DRC and Rwanda is implemented. Kabila and the opposition bloc—with the recent exception of Fayulu, who highlighted the US-led agreement’s “positive points”—have said that a national dialogue is a prerequisite to peace and labeled the US- and Qatari-led peace processes as exclusionary and ineffective as a “sufficient basis for a definitive and lasting solution” to the internal political and security crises in the DRC.[lviii] French media assessed that Kabila and the opposition’s hostility toward internationally-backed peace processes and support for a national dialogue with Kabila as a mediating figure is likely due to Kabila’s lack of formal influence over those processes and the opposition’s “fear of being marginalized” from the economic and political benefits of the deal.[lix] Jeune Afrique quoted an insider source to the US-led negotiations who said that a finalized US-DRC partnership would isolate Kabila and strengthen Tshisekedi by allowing the US to “sanction anyone who undermines the contract that binds them with the DRC.”[lx]

Military conflict in the eastern DRC will almost certainly continue in the absence of an internal peace arrangement. Pro-Congolese government militia groups—known as Wazalendo—have attacked M23 positions repeatedly across the eastern DRC since March despite progress in the DRC-Rwanda peace deal. The Wazalendo fighters are formally allied to the Congolese army by law but are not a party to Qatari-mediated efforts between the DRC and M23.[lxi] M23 has conducted an arrest campaign and launched several offensives in North Kivu and South Kivu to root out Wazalendos and anti-Tutsi militia fighters from population centers and key roads since mid-April.[lxii] CTP assessed previously that the Wazalendo militias will likely continue to be a challenge to peace efforts in the immediate and long term—regardless of DRC-Rwanda peace efforts—because the militias are not involved in the DRC-M23 talks and the DRC is likely unable to control the militias.[lxiii]

Data Cutoff: June 24, 2025, at 10 a.m. ET

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