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Africa File, May 22, 2025: SAF Advances Across Sudan Despite RSF Drone Strikes

Data Cutoff: May 22, 2025, at 10 a.m. EST

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The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have made incremental progress against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in several areas of Sudan since mid-May despite RSF counterattacks and the RSF’s drone campaign against Port Sudan. The SAF renewed attacks against the RSF in central Sudan along a key highway linking central and western Sudan and made gains in northern Sudan. These operations are part of a broader effort by the SAF to set conditions to advance into RSF-controlled western Sudan. The SAF has also cleared the RSF from the capital, Khartoum, and appointed new government officials to boost its international legitimacy. The RSF has responded to its loss of Khartoum by escalating a drone attack campaign to prove that it can contest the SAF across Sudan, make SAF-controlled territory ungovernable, and disrupt SAF logistics.

Assessments:

Sudan

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) renewed attacks against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) along a key highway in central Sudan in order to set conditions to advance into RSF-controlled western Sudan. The SAF recaptured al Khawai and other areas along a key east–west highway in mid-May.[1] Al Khawai is approximately 60 miles northeast of al Nahud--a key town that serves as an administrative hub and gateway into western Sudan.[2] The SAF previously captured both towns in February as it advanced toward western Sudan from al Obeid—the state capital of North Kordofan in central Sudan—but the RSF launched a counteroffensive and recaptured the towns in early May.[3] Al Nahud is approximately 215 miles east of al Fasher--the North Darfur state capital--where the RSF has besieged the SAF since April 2024, along the main east–west highway connecting western Sudan and the rest of the country.[4] Al Nahud is also on a series of smaller roads that the SAF could use to push into Darfur from multiple directions.[5] Al Nahud has been the administrative capital of West Kordofan for the SAF since June 2024 and has a domestic airport.[6] The airstrip there is subject to vehicle traffic and online flight tracking data, but there have been no documented flights to or from the airport for at least a year.[7]

Figure 1. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

The SAF also advanced south from al Obeid to within 32 miles of Dilling in South Kordofan on May 13.[8] The SAF partially broke the RSF siege on Dilling from the south in February 2025 and seeks to fully break the siege with its latest advance from the north.[9] The SAF breaking the two-year RSF siege on Dilling would enable the SAF to use Dilling as a staging ground for another line of advance westward to relieve besieged forces in West Kordofan and eventually Darfur.[10]

Figure 2. Control of Terrain in the Kordofan Region, Central Sudan

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

The SAF has advanced against RSF positions in northern Sudan as the RSF has prioritized countering the SAF in central Sudan in recent weeks. The SAF and SAF-aligned Joint Force recaptured al Atrun in North Darfur from the RSF on May 18 after advancing west from the Dabba region.[11] Sudan War Monitor assessed that attack patterns around Darfur suggested that the RSF may have redeployed some of its forces from northern Sudan to central Sudan in May, which may have allowed the SAF to recapture areas in northern Sudan without a fight.[12] The Civil Administration of the RSF in West Kordofan declared a state of emergency and called all troop commanders and fighters to the front line as part of a general mobilization on May 18.[13]

Figure 3. RSF Supply Lines into Darfur from Neighboring Countries

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

The SAF capture of al Atrun undermines RSF logistics and hinders RSF efforts to expand attacks against the SAF in northern Sudan. The capture disrupts some RSF supply lines from southern and western Darfur as well as from neighboring countries such as Libya and Chad.[14] The RSF smuggles weapons, vehicles, and fuel through Libya and Chad, using the porous borders and connections with armed groups and smugglers.[15] The RSF used an airport near al Atrun to receive supplies and launch drone attacks against SAF-controlled cities.[16] Al Atrun is also located on a key highway linking North Darfur to Northern State, making the SAF capture of al Atrun both a possible buffer zone against RSF attacks in northern Sudan as well as a launching pad for an SAF offensive toward Darfur.[17] The SAF has reportedly stationed a large force of recruits and Joint Forces along the border between North Darfur and Northern State.[18] Al Atrun is 525 miles north of al Fasher, however, and in March the RSF captured al Mahla, which is 110 miles north of al Fasher and a more feasible staging ground.[19]

The SAF established control over the entirety of Khartoum state on May 20 and appointed new political officials to the SAF-aligned transitional government, bolstering the SAF’s domestic and international legitimacy.[20] The SAF captured the RSF’s last military base in Omdurman on May 19.[21] The SAF retook the other areas in the capital area—Khartoum, Khartoum North (Bahri), and East Nile (Sharq al Nile)—in early 2025 and began to advance in Omdurman in April.[22]

The SAF’s military gains coincide with the SAF advancing its efforts to present a functioning civilian-led administration to gain international legitimacy and support. Burhan said during a speech in February 2025 that the SAF would form a technocratic government to establish a constitution and prepare for elections after it captured Khartoum.[23] SAF lead Abdel Fattah al Burhan selected former UN official Kamil Idris as prime minister on May 19.[24] Burhan also appointed two women as members of the SAF-led Transitional Sovereignty Council and stripped the council of its oversight over the cabinet to demonstrate progress toward civilian rule.[25] The Paris-based Sudanese outlet Sudan Tribune reported that the moves are part of an SAF action plan to regain their African Union membership, which the AU suspended after the joint RSF-SAF coup in 2021.[26] The African Union welcomed Idris’s appointment and urged Sudanese stakeholders to “restore constitutional order and democratic governance,” but Sudan Tribune said that AU sources were still skeptical that the AU is close to lifting Sudan’s suspension.[27]

The RSF has responded to the loss of Khartoum by escalating a drone campaign to prove that it can contest the SAF across Sudan, make SAF-controlled territory ungovernable, and disrupt SAF logistics. The RSF initially escalated drone attacks targeting critical infrastructure in SAF-held territory in early 2025, including attacks on the Merowe Dam, Dongola Airport, and Atbara Airport.[28] The RSF then expanded its drone campaign and targeted Port Sudan—the SAF’s de facto capital—in early May for the first time since the Sudanese civil war started.[29] The RSF launched drone attacks on Port Sudan at least nine days since May 4, targeting major fuel storage facilities, ammunition depots, an army base, a power station, and the airport.[30] The RSF also conducted drone strikes targeting a prison in al Obeid on May 10 and three power stations in Omdurman on May 14.[31] Attacks on civilian infrastructure undermine the SAF’s ability to govern SAF-controlled eastern Sudan. The RSF attacks on Port Sudan, which is the SAF’s primary logistics hub, additionally disrupt the SAF’s ability to reinforce and resupply the front lines in central and western Sudan.[32]

Figure 4. RSF Drone Campaign Against SAF-Controlled Infrastructure