Israel Recognizes Somaliland; US ISIS Strikes in Nigeria; JNIM Attacks US Gold Mine in Mali: Africa File, January 8, 2026

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Key Takeaways:

• Somaliland. Israel became the first state to formally recognize the Somali breakaway region Somaliland. Israel’s controversial move is likely intended to develop Israeli strategic depth in the Red Sea region and furthers the divide between the Israeli-Emirati axis and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
• Nigeria. The United States conducted missile strikes against IS-linked militants in northwestern Nigeria on December 25 and plans to continue supporting Nigerian-led strikes in the future.
• Mali. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) attacked a US-backed gold mining project in southwestern Mali as part of its ongoing economic warfare campaign in southwestern Mali.
• Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and its allies have intensified their sieges of key towns in south-central Sudan, increasing pressure on the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and threatening the civilian population. Continued RSF gains in south-central Sudan would set conditions for a decisive battle for el Obeid, a strategically vital crossroads town that hosts SAF’s headquarters in central Sudan.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwandan-backed M23 rebels reportedly still control Uvira town in South Kivu and are showing no signs of handing it over to pro-Congolese government forces, despite declaring a unilateral withdrawal in mid-December.
• Central African Republic. Central African Republic (CAR) President Faustin-Archange Touadéra won a third term in late December elections. Touadéra’s reelection preserves Russian interests in the CAR despite turmoil in his relationship with the Kremlin amid the switch from the Wagner Group to Africa Corps, which has led him to balance and diversify partnerships away from Russia.

Figure 1. Africa File, January 8, 2026

Source: Liam Karr.

Somaliland

Authors: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo

Israel became the first state to recognize Somaliland, a breakaway region of northern Somalia that has been de facto independent since 1991. Israel and Somaliland announced the recognition on December 26 and have since quickly strengthened diplomatic ties.^[1] The recognition involves establishing formal diplomatic relations, including appointing ambassadors and Somaliland joining the Abraham Accords.^[2] Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar met with Somaliland President Abdirahman Abdullahi (Irro) in Hargeisa—Somaliland’s capital—on January 6, reaffirming the recognition.^[3] Sa’ar stated that Irro accepted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s invitation to visit Israel.^[4] Israel also said it aimed to expand cooperation with Somaliland in agriculture, economics, health, and technology.^[5]

Somalia denounced the recognition as undermining its sovereignty. The Somali Federal Government (SFG) considers Somaliland to be one of seven federal member states (FMSs). Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud called the recognition illegal under international law, saying that Somalia is committed to upholding its territorial integrity.^[6] Mohamud also said that the recognition risks destabilizing the Horn of Africa and strengthening Salafi-jihadi groups like al Shabaab.^[7] Somali Foreign Minister Abdisalem Abdi Ali stated that Somalia will respond diplomatically and demanded that Israel withdraw the recognition.^[8] Mohamud held a “consultative meeting” with Somali political leaders and opposition figures, including former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, on December 27.^[9] Mohamud also met with the prime minister and FMS presidents within his political coalition on December 28, which resulted in a joint statement denouncing the recognition.^[10]

Figure 2. Somali States Align Against Mogadishu

Source: Michael DeAngelo.

The move has drawn widespread disapproval from around the world, including most countries in the broader Red Sea region, almost a dozen African countries, China, the European Union, Iran, and Russia. The African Union (AU), EU, and Gulf Cooperation Council all released statements either explicitly or implicitly condemning Israel’s move and reaffirming their support for Somalia’s sovereignty.^[11] Twenty-one countries also released a separate multilateral statement, including Egypt, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Turkey.^[12] Russia spoke out against Israel’s move at an emergency UN Security Council meeting on the recognition on December 29.^[13]

China has strongly condemned the move, in line with its Taiwan policy, and increased diplomatic contact with the SFG to show its support. China has compared Somaliland’s push for recognition to Taiwan’s, which it vigorously opposes as a threat to China’s sovereignty.^[14] China’s ambassador to Somalia spoke with Ali on December 26, expressing “strong” opposition to the recognition.^[15] China’s ambassador to the UN reaffirmed China’s support for Somalia’s territorial integrity and opposition to the recognition at an emergency UN Security Council meeting.^[16] China’s foreign ministry spokesperson stated, “No country should aid and abet separatism in other countries for selfish gains.”^[17] Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi will visit Somalia by January 12, which will be the first time a Chinese foreign minister has visited Somalia since the fall of Siad Barre’s regime, in 1991.^[18]

Israel likely views a partnership with Somaliland as an opportunity to develop strategic depth in the Red Sea and address other objectives, such as relocating Palestinians. Numerous reports since 2024 have said that recognition negotiations included Somaliland granting Israel a Red Sea base, although Somaliland officials have denied these reports repeatedly.^[19] An Israeli base in Somaliland would expand Israel’s ability to monitor threats in the southern Red Sea near the vital Bab el Mandeb choke point. One-quarter of Israel’s maritime trade flows through the Port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba, making protecting Red Sea shipping lanes a vital interest.^[20] Threats include the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen and Iranian weapons shipments that transit through these sea lanes to the Levant and Yemen.

Several news outlets reported throughout 2025 that Israeli and US officials had also discussed resettling forcibly removed Gazans with both Somaliland officials as part of recognition negotiations.^[21] Israeli officials told CNN in August that Somaliland was one of five countries in talks to accept displaced Palestinians in exchange for “significant financial and international compensation.”^[22] The Palestinian Authority and SFG reiterated these accusations in the aftermath of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland.^[23] Israeli and Somaliland officials have denied these accusations.^[24]

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland also further aligns its regional policy with Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Israeli officials told Axios that the UAE facilitated Israeli recognition of Somaliland, and the UAE has condemned the move other than affirming its support for Somalia’s sovereignty in a bilateral statement with the AU on January 6.^[25] Israel and the UAE have become major defense partners since signing the Abraham Accords, with both countries working to strengthen their strategic depth to address shared threats, such as Red Sea security and countering Iranian influence. Israeli and pro-Turkish media have published various uncorroborated reports that Israel and the UAE have discussed joint bases or jointly-funded bases in Socotra—the Yemeni island between Yemen and Somalia’s northern coast—and Somaliland to help counter the Houthis.^[26] The UAE is also a major investor in Somaliland, where the UAE has established a free trade zone and Emirati shipping conglomerate DP World has invested $400 million to modernize and operate Somaliland’s Berbera port.^[27]

Ethiopia—another major Israeli and Emirati partner—has also flirted with recognizing Somaliland in recent years as part of its quest for sea access. The UAE had previously brokered a deal to gain Ethiopia commercial sea access via Berbera in 2018, but the deal collapsed due to Ethiopian financial constraints amid the Tigray war in 2022.^[28] The UAE has invested billions in Ethiopia and increased defense cooperation since Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took power in 2018, including critical Emirati shipments of Chinese drones during the Tigray war.^[29] Israel has also increased defense cooperation since 2020 and provided technological expertise as part of Emirati investments.^[30] The UAE—and now possibly Israel—partially decided to invest in Somaliland to pivot away from their bases in Eritrea, which is Ethiopia’s archrival, and strengthen ties with Ethiopia.^[31] Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Hessebon met with UAE Minister of State Shakboot bin Nahyan al Nahyan on January 6, resulting in a joint statement reaffirming Ethiopia and the UAE’s “comprehensive and strategic partnership.”[32]

Ethiopia was one of the first countries to attempt to recognize Somaliland in 2024, when it signed memorandum of understanding (MOU) to recognize Somaliland in exchange for access to Somaliland’s coastline.^[33] The agreement caused a diplomatic dispute that impacted regional counterterrorism efforts and only ended in late 2024, when Turkish mediation brokered a deal between Ethiopia and the SFG that implicitly killed the deal and granted Ethiopia sea access via southern Somalia.^[34] Neither Ethiopia nor Somaliland has rescinded the MOU, however, and the Turkish-brokered agreement with the SFG has reportedly broken down due to feasibility issues.^[35] Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed spoke with Mohamud on December 28 but did not comment on Somaliland.^[36]

Figure 3. Emerging Blocs in the Red Sea Arena: Axis of Revisionists vs. Status Quo Axis

Source: Liam Karr.

Israeli recognition of Somaliland also further solidifies the growing divide between the Emirati-Israeli axis and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and especially Turkey in the broader Red Sea arena. Turkey and Somalia were already major partners, but their partnership has grown as the SFG has looked to respond to the growing attempts to recognize Somaliland in recent years. Turkey and Somalia signed defense and economic deals in February 2024, which CTP assessed that the SFG signed to counter Ethiopia’s port deal with Somaliland and suspected Emirati complicity, although Somali officials denied the two were connected at the time.^[37] Turkey agreed to deploy an unspecified number of forces to Somalia to protect Somali territorial waters and essentially rebuild the defunct Somali navy.^[38] Turkey framed the deployment as an opportunity to increase its geopolitical influence in the broader Horn of Africa–Red Sea region by combating piracy, illegal fishing, and other multilateral issues.^[39] Turkey also signed a separate deal to build a spaceport in Somalia to test missiles as part of ballistic missile and space programs and began construction in at the end of 2025.^[40]

The UAE and Turkey have long been competing for influence in Africa for more than a decade, taking opposing sides on the Libyan and Sudanese civil war and now competing for influence in Somalia. The UAE to cut its security assistance in Somalia in 2017, when it viewed the previous Somali administration as too pro-Turkish.^[41] The UAE reengaged in Somalia following UAE-Turkey rapprochement in 2022 and the return of President Mohamud for a second term in 2023.^[42] The SFG’s deals with Turkey in 2024 fractured any rapprochement in Somalia and caused a return to zero-sum competition, as Emirati and Somali officials had been discussing a similar set of deals prior to the SFG choosing Turkey over the UAE.^[43]

Israel views Turkish influence as a major obstacle to Israeli strategic depth, including in the Horn of Africa. The two countries have been competing to shape the balance of power in Syria since the fall of Bashar al Assad in late 2024. Turkey’s partnerships in Libya, Sudan, and Somalia threaten to contain Israeli efforts to strengthen its strategic depth and project power into key shipping lanes in the eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean, respectively.

Egypt has emerged as a strong supporter of the SFG as part of its efforts to counter Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa. Egypt’s opposition to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in particular has caused it to bolster relations with other countries in the region, especially Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan. Egypt signed a bilateral defense cooperation agreement with Somalia in August 2024, which paved the way for Egypt to contribute troops to the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).^[44] Egypt sent 1,000 troops and ammunition and arms to Somalia soon after.^[45] Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al Sisi, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, and Mohamud held a summit in Eritrea in October 2024 to coordinate action on issues related to security in the Horn, forming an informal anti-Ethiopia bloc.^[46] Egypt and Somalia then elevated their relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in January 2025, emphasizing the economic, political, and security domains.^[47] Egypt is preparing to send over 1,000 troops to AUSSOM in addition to those deployed as part of the bilateral relationship.^[48]

Saudi Arabia is increasingly aligned with Egypt and Turkey in Somalia due to its growing rivalry with the UAE and the UAE’s perceived negative impact on regional stability. Saudi Arabia views regional instability as a major threat due to its long Red Sea coastline and ambitious domestic economic reforms. Instability in Africa threatens to cause an influx of refugees, arms trafficking, and other illicit activity along the Saudi Red Sea coast. This insecurity would jeopardize its Vision 2030 domestic agenda, which is the Kingdom’s primary objective as it seeks to diversify its economy from an overreliance on oil to becoming a manufacturing, tech, tourism, and trade hub.^[49]

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have aligned their responses to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and signaled they could increase regional coordination to counter the move. Egypt’s foreign minister held phone calls with his Somali and Turkish counterparts to coordinate their response on December 26.^[50] Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey signed onto a joint statement with 18 other countries opposing the recognition on December 27.^[51] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hosted Somali President Mohamud on December 30 and denounced the recognition as illegal and destabilizing for the region.^[52] Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister Faisal bin Farhan hosted Somali Foreign Minister Ali on January 4, reaffirming Saudi support for Somalia’s sovereignty.^[53] Egyptian President Sisi and Farhan met on January 5 and called for the preservation of countries’ territorial integrity, including Somalia’s, and called their stances on regional issues in Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen “identical.”^[54]

The United States has reaffirmed its support for Somalia’s territorial integrity but not denounced the recognition, which comes amid recent high-level meetings between US and Somaliland officials. US President Donald Trump said on December 26 that the United States would not immediately recognize Somaliland, although it would “study” Israel’s proposal.^[55] Trump had said in August 2025 that he was “looking into” recognizing Somaliland if it accepted Palestinians, and Somaliland is reportedly open to giving the United States port access.^[56] The US Department of State said that the United States had not changed its long-standing policy, which includes Somaliland as part of Somalia.^[57] The US deputy ambassador to the UN criticized the international community’s reaction to the recognition at the December 29 UN Security Council meeting, however.^[58] US Africa Command head General Dagvin Anderson met with Irro on November 26 to strengthen pre-existing US-Somaliland counterterrorism and maritime cooperation.^[59] Multiple Somali news outlets reported that high-level US officials met with Somaliland officials in late December, allegedly prompting Mohamud to hold an emergency cabinet meeting.^[60] A Somali news outlet claimed that the US is considering redeploying military resources from southern Somalia to Puntland and Somaliland.^[61]

Nigeria

Author: Liam Karr

The United States conducted missile strikes against IS-linked militants in northwestern Nigeria on December 25. US ships in the Gulf of Guinea fired more than a dozen Tomahawk cruise missiles targeting IS-linked camps in the Tangaza area of northwest Nigeria’s Sokoto state.[62] United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) released a statement saying that the strikes targeted ISIS terrorists and was carried out in coordination with Nigerian officials.[63] A local researcher said that at least 100 fighters were killed and 200 are missing, but there has been no independent or government confirmed casualty count.[64]

Figure 4. United States Targets IS in West Africa

Source: Liam Karr.

The strikes targeted the Lakurawa subgroup, linked to IS Sahel Province (ISSP). A Nigerian presidential spokesperson specified on December 27 that the strikes targeted “ISIS, Lakurawa, and bandits.”[65] CTP has previously reported that Lakurawa operates along the Niger-Nigeria border as a rear base and bridge between ISSP and IS West Africa Province (ISWAP) in northeastern Nigeria and has escalated its offensive operations on both sides of the border since the beginning of 2025.[66] Bandits and other jihadist-linked actors also operate in northwestern Nigeria and have connections with Lakurawa, however, which can make it difficult to disaggregate the specific affiliations of militants in the area.[67]

Nigerian and US officials plan for Nigeria to conduct future strikes with US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support.[68] The United States has heavily increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) flights in Nigeria since October, including several flights over Tangaza in the days before the Christmas Day strikes.[69] US forces have conducted at least two ISR overflights of ISWAP strongholds in the Sambisa Forest in northeastern Nigeria since the Christmas Day strikes.[70]

The lack of a permanent base in West Africa is still a challenge to ongoing US operations. US forces had been unable to conduct ISR operations since US forces withdrew from Niger in 2024, including Air Base 201 in Agadez, Niger, which hosted US drones.[71] US forces have primarily based recent flights over Nigeria from locations in neighboring Ghana. A US contractor has based flights from the Kotoka International Airport in Accra, which also serves as the central hub for AFRICOM’s West Africa Logistics Network.[72] US forces have used other airstrips in northern Ghana, however, which has caused tensions with locals. Local residents and security forces in Paga allegedly grounded a US aircraft on December 31 until higher level authorities intervened due to a miscommunication and lack of clarification on the aircraft’s activities.[73]

Mali

Author: Liam Karr

Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen attacked a US-backed gold mining project in southwestern Mali. JNIM militants raided the Morila mining site on January 3 in southern Mali’s Sikasso region.[74] Malian officials said that the attackers burned equipment but did not kill anyone and released the hostages that they took within 24 hours.[75] US mining company Flagship Gold Corporation signed an agreement with Malian state-owned SOREM to resume operations at Morila in October 2025.[76] The project aimed to have the miner operational by mid-2026, four years after it shut down due to economic feasibility concerns.[77] Mali’s mining ministry says that the mine still has an estimated 2.5 million ounces of gold reserves, which is worth approximately $11 billion.[78]

The attack is part of the group’s ongoing economic warfare campaign in southwestern Mali, which threatens to establish a racketeering network that extorts foreign companies and undermines the legitimacy of the Malian government. JNIM has attacked has escalated attacks on foreign companies across Mali since June 2025, when it threatened that all companies operating in Mali must secure permission from JNIM to continue operating.[79] JNIM has historically kidnapped foreigners to ransom them back to their governments and could demand taxes from foreign companies to avoid attacks as it does in local villages. There have been no public reports of ransom payments aside from a nearly $50 million dollar payment from the UAE for a member of the Dubai ruling family in October 2025.[80] The speedy return of other hostages indicates that some negotiations took place, however. The campaign against foreign companies is part of a broader economic warfare campaign, which includes its blockade of the Malian capital and other major cities in the southern half of Mali.[81]

Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and its allies have intensified their sieges of Dilling and Kadugli, two major frontline towns in south-central Sudan. The RSF captured Barno—a village located 20 miles southeast of the Dilling–Kadugli highway on a connecting road—on December 19.^[82] The RSF and Sudan’s People Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) militia fighters from the al Hilu faction then seized Kega, which is located on the Dilling–Kadugli highway approximately 35 miles north of Kadugli, on December 30.^[83] This seizure severed SAF supply lines between Dilling and Kadugli for the first time since February 2025, enabling the RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu to enforce a full siege of both towns.^[84] The RSF reportedly attempted to advance to al Kiwek—a village located approximately 20 miles north of Kadugli—on December 31, but the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) repelled the assault.^[85] SPLM-N al Hilu seized al Bardab—located 15 miles north of Kadugli—on January 4.^[86]

Figure 5. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Kordofan Region

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo; Suriyak and Sudan War Monitor.

The RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu have conducted almost daily artillery and drone strikes in Dilling and Kadugli since mid-December, mirroring their pre-assault, condition-setting tactics in previous towns such as Babanusa and el Fasher.^[87] The RSF conducted frequent artillery and drone strikes in Babanusa and el Fasher, weakening SAF defenses in advance of RSF ground operations.^[88] The RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu have conducted at least 18 attacks in Dilling and Kadugli since December 13, compared with 10 attacks over the previous three months.^[89] SPLM-N al Hilu called for the SAF to surrender on January 2 in advance of an expected RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu ground offensive.^[90]

Figure 6.  RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu Attacks in Dilling and Kadugli

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The RSF has largely countered SAF attempts to break the siege. The SAF advanced southward from the el Obeid area in North Kordofan state toward Dilling—located 100 miles south of el Obeid in South Kordofan—on December 31.^[91] The SAF captured al Riyash and Kazgil, which are located approximately 30 miles south of el Obeid.^[92] The SAF also claimed to seize al Uba, another village in the same area, but the RSF disputed the claim.^[93] The SAF advanced southward toward al Hamadi, which is 20 miles from Kazgil, but the RSF repelled the advance and reentered Kazgil on the same day, securing the area by January 5.^[94] The SAF attempted to relieve pressure around Dilling from the east on December 31 by assaulting Habila, which is 25 miles from Dilling, but the RSF repelled the assault.^[95] The SAF attacked using forces from Dalami, which is located approximately 40 miles east of Habila.^[96]

The RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu’s tightening siege and intensified fighting between them and the SAF have increased the burden on an already stressed civilian population and will likely lead to further violence against civilians. Kadugli and likely Dilling have experienced famine for months due to the partial siege, according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification.^[97] Conditions will worsen now that the RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu are imposing a full siege.^[98] Thousands of civilians have fled the Dilling-Kadugli area, with SPLM-N al Hilu reporting that over 58,000 are now in territory that it controls.^[99] SPLM-N al Hilu called for civilians to evacuate Dilling and Kadugli on January 2 in anticipation of increased fighting.^[100]

Increased fighting will likely cause mass civilian casualties given the RSF’s and SAF’s pattern of indiscriminate violence throughout the war. Artillery and drone strikes have recently caused several mass civilian casualty events in South Kordofan. The SAF conducted a drone strike on Kumo—located approximately 50 miles east of Kadugli—on November 29 that SPLM-N al Hilu claimed killed 45 people, mainly students.^[101] The RSF conducted a drone strike on a kindergarten and a double tap strike on the hospital that the victims were taken to in Kalogi—located approximately 85 miles east of Kadugli—on December 4, killing 114 people, including 63 children.^[102] The RSF conducted drone strikes on Dilling military hospital and multiple civilian areas on December 14, killing at least nine people and injuring 17, including medical staff.^[103] The SAF conducted a drone strike on Julud—located approximately 30 miles south of Dilling—on December 25 that SPLM-N al Hilu claimed killed 12 people and injured 19 at a Christmas celebration.[104]The RSF and SPLM-N al Hilu have frequently shelled residential neighborhoods in Dilling and Kadugli, including on December 18, when shelling killed 16 civilians in Dilling.^[105]

The RSF and SAF have committed atrocities during past operations. The SAF and allied forces committed mass killings of civilians during their offensive in al Jazirah state in early 2025.^[106] The forces labeled some civilians as RSF collaborators, but the killings also occurred in predominantly Kanabi areas, a non-Arab ethnic group that the Sudanese government has historically repressed.^[107] The RSF very likely committed genocide in el Fasher—the capital of North Darfur state—after capturing the city in late October 2025, killing at least an estimated 60,000 mostly non-Arab people.^[108] The RSF has also committed mass killings of civilians suspected of collaborating with the SAF in Bara—located in North Kordofan—since recapturing the town in October.^[109]

The fall of Dilling and Kadugli would further solidify the front lines for a decisive battle for el Obeid, the partially besieged SAF headquarters in central Sudan. RSF control of Dilling and Kadugli would eliminate the final SAF-controlled pocket around el Obeid. Local news outlet Darfur24 claimed in November that the RSF is planning an offensive on el Obeid from the west using reinforcements from western Sudan.^[110] The RSF has redeployed forces from western Sudan and stationed them along the main east—west highway in Kordofan region, including West Kordofan capital an Nahud and al Khawai, which is located only 30 miles west of the central axis front line at um Sumeima.^[111] The SAF announced a general mobilization in eastern Sudan after the fall of el Fasher and has reportedly sent reinforcements and senior commanders to el Obeid.^[112]

The RSF’s tactics in Babanusa, Dilling, el Fasher, and Kadugli indicate that a siege will likely precede an offensive. The RSF is already partially besieging el Obeid from the north.^[113] The RSF captured Bara—located 40 miles north of el Obeid—on October 25 and has since tried to reinforce its position amid SAF attempts to retake the town.^[114] The RSF’s capture of Bara reportedly cut off 40 percent of el Obeid’s water supply.^[115] The RSF already controls the roads to the south and west of el Obeid, which has impeded the important agricultural trade, particularly gum Arabic and peanuts.^[116] The Khartoum state governor reportedly banned supply transports from Khartoum to RSF-controlled western Sudan in late December, further isolating el Obeid given its status as a transit hub.^[117]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford

Rwandan-backed M23 rebels reportedly still control Uvira town in South Kivu, despite declaring a unilateral withdrawal in mid-December. M23 had conducted a large-scale offensive on Uvira in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with significant Rwandan army support in early December.[118] M23’s political chief, Corneille Nangaa, announced a unilateral withdrawal from the town only days later, however, and the group claimed that it withdrew military equipment and most of its troops from the town around December 17 and 18.[119] CTP assessed at the time that increased US private and public pressure on M23 and Rwanda factored into the withdrawal announcement, as Rwanda violated its commitments under the recently signed Washington Accords peace framework by supporting M23’s offensive.[120] The UK news outlet Financial Times cited an insider source in mid-December who said that the M23 withdrawal came after the United States made a “high-level” call to Rwandan President Paul Kagame.[121]

Figure 7. M23 and Allies Activity in South Kivu

Source: Yale Ford; Liam Karr; Anping Zhu

M23 still de facto controls the town, however, and is showing no sign of handing it over to pro-Congolese government forces. Nangaa said that M23 would withdraw to support peace efforts but called on the United States and the “guarantors of the peace process” to block the Congolese government from reoccupying the town and deploy a “neutral force” that will monitor a ceasefire.[122] CTP assessed that M23’s withdrawal was conditional and premised upon the group and its Rwandan backers securing the full withdrawal of Burundian troops from South Kivu, retaining the defensive advantages of capturing Uvira, and securing additional concessions.[123]

Troops from the M23’s military branch pulled back from Uvira center, but the group reportedly installed military and political personnel in the town.[124] M23 personnel still in Uvira include “interim” civil authorities, police forces, and civilian cadres that M23 calls “local defense” forces. Some of these security forces are armed and have been patrolling the town and holding key points, including the Uvira’s port and the Burundi-DRC border, since the group “withdrew” and called for a peacekeeping force. M23 has already rhetorically justified an extended presence in Uvira, accusing pro-Congolese government forces of reoccupying Uvira and “exploiting the withdrawal of our forces” to launch attacks on January 2.[125] The DRC and Burundi have conducted numerous airstrikes on M23 positions around Uvira and accused Rwanda of maintaining troops and deploying new battalions on Congolese soil.[126] A senior US official told Western media in late December that the Trump administration was “not satisfied” that M23 has fully withdrawn, citing the group’s continued deployment around the town.[127]

Central African Republic

Authors: Yale Ford and Liam Karr

Central African Republic (CAR) President Faustin-Archange Touadéra won a third term in late December elections. Touadéra ran against six opponents and won over 76 percent of the vote for a new seven-year term in the December 28 presidential election, which took place without large-scale violence.[128] The main opposition coalition had boycotted the election and criticized it as flawed and illegitimate.[129] CAR’s Western partners reportedly viewed the voting process as “generally fair,” though Touadéra had used state institutions and resources to disrupt opposition campaigns and secure the continuity of power.[130] Touadéra ran his campaign on security gains after increasing the government’s territorial control, weakening and then signing peace deals with three rebel groups with the support of Chad and Russian paramilitary networks in April and November, and securing the lifting of a UN arms embargo and a separate diamond exports embargo in 2024.[131] Touadéra had taken power in 2016 and fended off a rebel offensive that threatened to thwart his re-election in 2020 with significant Russian paramilitary and Rwandan support.

Touadéra’s reelection preserves Russian interests in the CAR, even amid turmoil in his relationship with the Kremlin amid the switch from the Wagner Group to Africa Corps. Touadéra invited Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries into the CAR in 2018, trading political and regime protection for access to natural resource revenue streams.[132] Wagner is generating about $60 million per year from gold and is also exploiting diamonds and timber in the CAR.[133] Touadéra invited Russian President Vladimir Putin for a state visit to the CAR after his reelection and told Russian state media on January 7 that he wants Russia to invest in several CAR sectors and open a joint drone operator training center in the country.[134]

The Kremlin began transitioning control of military operations in Africa to the Africa Corps after the Wagner mutiny and death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023. Africa Corps replaced Wagner in Libya and Mali in the subsequent years, with Russian soldiers signing contracts placing them under the command of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD), and MOD officials leading coordination with African partners.[135] The Kremlin was unable make the between 1,500 to 2,000 Wagner operatives in the CAR sign new contracts with the MOD in 2024, however, and Wagner has remained deeply entrenched in CAR security and trade networks, including with Touadéra’s personal security.[136] Touadéra himself pushed back against replacing Wagner, at least until the December elections, which led to several rounds of negotiations with Putin and other Russian officials throughout 2025.[137] The Kremlin discussed increasing the number of troops and establishing a Russian military base in the CAR in January 2025 as part of these negotiations.[138] The Kremlin has since demanded that Touadéra agree to replace Wagner in early 2026 and begin paying up to $180 million annually—more than half of the CAR’s annual budget—for Africa Corps services, which is the same arrangement the MOD has arranged in other countries with Africa Corps personnel.[139]

Touadéra has maintained ties with Russia amid the dispute but is trying to diversify his economic and security partnerships, especially with Western countries, however. Touadéra told the Financial Times in September 2025 that he would welcome “any country that wants to collaborate with us” in development efforts and in the mineral sector.[140] Touadéra met with the Italian president and foreign minister to strengthen ties and seek diplomatic support in September.[141] The CAR mining minister signed an agreement with a Canadian mining company to expand cooperation and develop CAR’s uranium, coltan, copper, gold, and nickel reserves in late November.[142] Touadéra asked Rwandan President Paul Kagame to provide increased security for the presidential election considering Wagner’s uncertain future in November 2025.[143]

Touadéra has also turned to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which could have implications on the civil war in neighboring Sudan. French media reported that Touadéra asked the UAE to pay for Africa Corps in exchange for allowing the UAE to use an airport in northern CAR near the border with Sudan as a logistics hub for the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces in the Sudanese civil war.[144] Such a deal would be similar to the transactional Emirati partnership with Chad, which received a $1.5 billion Emirati loan days before the UAE began sending arms shipments to the RSF via Chad in 2023.[145] The arrangement could cause tensions with Russia, however, which has shifted its support in the Sudanese civil war to the rival Sudanese Army Forces despite Wagner’s ties with the RSF. Wagner forces clashed with the RSF near the CAR-Sudan border in early January, although the clash was likely related to the RSF infringing on Wagner control of the cross-border trade networks.[146]

Africa File Data Cutoff: January 8, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.