M23 Withdraws From Uvira; Saudi-UAE Red Sea Competition: Africa File, December 18, 2025

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Note: CTP will be pausing the Africa File the weeks of December 25 and January 1 due to the Christmas and New Years holiday seasons. The Africa File will resume on January 8.

Key Takeaways:

• Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwandan-backed M23 rebels withdrew unilaterally from Uvira town in South Kivu, a week after it captured the town with significant Rwandan backing. M23 and Rwanda are likely trying to manage international backlash while retaining the defensive advantages of capturing Uvira and gain additional concessions.
• Gulf States. Saudi Arabia is intensifying efforts to engage African and American partners to end the conflict in Sudan, stabilize the Horn of Africa, and contain Emirati-backed actors amid an increase in Emirati-linked arms shipments to Ethiopia. The Saudi-Emirati competition in the Horn of Africa is part of broader competition across the Red Sea, including Yemen, which increases the risk of horizontal escalation on both sides of the Red Sea.
• Somalia. Al Shabaab has increased the scale of its attacks on Somali federal government (SFG) facilities in Mogadishu in December amid rising tensions between the SFG and opposition over electoral reforms. These tensions could create gaps for al Shabaab to exploit, especially given that the group has consolidated its presence outside of Mogadishu despite SFG and partner force counterterrorism efforts.
• Sudan. The United Arab Emirates–backed Rapid Support Forces have very likely committed genocide in el Fasher since capturing the city in late October, killing at least an estimated 60,000 people.

Figure 1. Africa File, December 18, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford

Rwandan-backed M23 rebels withdrew unilaterally from Uvira town in South Kivu province, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), days after they captured the town with significant Rwandan army (RDF) support. M23 forces withdrew from the town on December 16 and 17.[1] Corneille Nangaa, the head of M23’s political branch, Alliance Fleuve Congo, had announced that the rebel group would leave Uvira in a statement on December 15.[2] Nangaa called the move a “unilateral trust-building measure” and a sign of its commitment to give Qatari-mediated peace talks “the maximum chance to succeed.”[3] The Congolese government and M23 had signed a Qatari-brokered peace framework agreement with another ceasefire commitment on November 15 but missed a deadline to reconvene talks in late November.[4] The Congolese communications minister called the withdrawal a “diversion” on December 16.[5]

M23 and RDF troops had conducted a large-scale offensive on pro-Congolese government forces to take Uvira in early December. M23 and the RDF launched the operation on the frontlines in South Kivu on December 1 and advanced about 50 miles to take control of the town on December 10.[6] The RDF reportedly deployed thousands of reinforcements, including special forces, and advanced military equipment to support the offensive.[7] The M23-appointed South Kivu governor claimed that M23 captured hundreds of Burundian army (FDNB) troops, 6,000 of whom had deployed to the front line in South Kivu in early December.[8] The UN reported that the escalation in fighting has displaced more than 500,000 people in South Kivu since December 1.[9]

Figure 2. Bukavu-Uvira Corridor on the RN5

Source: Yale Ford.

Increased US private and public pressure on M23 and Rwanda factored into the withdrawal. Rwanda violated its commitments under the recently signed Washington Accords peace framework by supporting M23’s Uvira offensive. US President Donald Trump had hosted the Congolese and Rwandan presidents to ratify the US-backed peace framework on December 4.[10] Rwanda committed not to “engage in, support, or condone any military incursions or other acts” in the DRC and to “take all possible measures to ensure that all armed groups within the conflict area cease engaging in hostilities” in the peace agreement.[11] The UN assessed in mid-2025 that Rwanda maintained command and control over M23 military operations, including “strategic-level decision-making on whether to seize, hold or relinquish territory.”[12] Rwanda has rejected the UN’s claims and denied backing M23, though it voices support for the group’s stated political causes.

US officials have openly criticized Rwanda’s role in the Uvira offensive and warned of consequences for violating the Washington Accords. Mike Waltz, US ambassador to the UN, condemned Rwanda for its direct participation in the offensive and said it was “leading the region towards increased instability and war” at the UN Security Council on December 12.[13] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau made separate statements threatening action and calling Rwanda’s military actions a “clear violation” of the Washington Accords and a “grave mistake” on December 13.[14] Lucy Tamlyn, the US ambassador to the DRC, said that the United States was weighing “all possible tools” to uphold the framework on December 15.[15] French state media cited diplomatic sources who said that the United States is considering new sanctions on Rwandan officials, and the United States withholding economic components of the Washington Accords would cost Rwanda billions of dollars in US investment, including from a recently signed $200 million health cooperation memorandum of understanding.[16] Nangaa said that M23 made the decision to withdraw in response to a request from the United States.[17]

M23 and Rwanda have conditioned their full disengagement from Uvira on security guarantees and further concessions from the Congolese government, including addressing DRC ceasefire violations and human rights abuses, despite the seizure of Uvira violating their respective peace agreements. Nangaa called on the United States and the “guarantors of the peace process” to “demilitarize” Uvira, protect locals and infrastructure, and deploy a “neutral force” that will monitor a ceasefire.[18] The M23 military spokesperson had told Reuters on December 16 that M23 was “ready to leave [Uvira], but our conditions have to be reviewed.”[19] Many M23 fighters withdrew from Uvira center and moved northward on the RN5, but the group reportedly deployed “dozens” of police officers in Uvira on December 17.[20]

M23 likely wants to retain the defensive advantages of capturing Uvira despite withdrawing. CTP assessed when Uvira fell that M23’s control of the city augmented M23’s political and military leverage, as it severely constrained Burundi’s ability to provide crucial military support to the Congolese army (FARDC) and cut off the FARDC’s main supply routes in South Kivu.[21] An M23 official told Reuters on December 16 that M23 would agree to withdraw “three miles” from Uvira to establish a buffer zone, preventing the redeployment of pro-Congolese government forces and effectively “demilitarizing” Uvira.[22] Nangaa did not specify the timetable or territorial extent of M23’s pullback, meaning that the group could keep Uvira encircled with its positions to the south in Fizi district and west in the highlands above Uvira, while retaining control of areas that it captured during the offensive, namely the RN5—a major roadway atop the Ruzizi Plain—by withdrawing only from Uvira center. M23 reopened the RN5 to civilian traffic between Bukavu and Uvira on December 17 after 10 months of no access.[23]

Figure 3. M23 and Allies Activity in South Kivu

Source: Yale Ford; Liam Karr; Anping Zhu

M23 also likely wants to secure additional concessions in exchange for its withdrawal, including addressing previous grievances with DRC ceasefire violations and human rights abuses against ethnic communities that it claims to protect. The framing of the withdrawal announcement reinforces the group’s claims that it conducted the offensive in “self-defense” and wants international guarantees to ensure the protection of civilians. CTP assessed that M23 likely launched the Uvira offensive in part to break an FDNB-Wazalendo siege that trapped at least 170,000 people in the South Kivu highlands, where many ethnic Banyamulenge—a Tutsi subgroup—live.[24] M23 and Rwanda had repeatedly accused the DRC coalition of launching ground attacks and airstrikes from Uvira and Bujumbura—its rear base 16 miles east of Uvira in Burundi—on M23 positions and civilians in violation of previous airstrike moratorium agreements and US- and Qatari-brokered ceasefires. An M23 official told the French magazine Jeune Afrique that the Congolese government agreed to halt air attacks on M23 and resume peace talks after the group said it would leave Uvira.[25] Nangaa said that the “neutral force” should prevent the FARDC and its allies from “taking advantage” of previous M23 withdrawals by retaking territory and punishing civilians who the government perceived as allies of the movement.[26]

M23 gained concessions from the DRC the last time it captured and then withdrew from a significant population center. M23 conducted an offensive deep into Walikale district in North Kivu, advancing roughly 85 miles and capturing Walikale town on March 19.[27] M23 held the town for 16 days, before the DRC and Rwanda negotiated M23’s withdrawal and the suspension of Congolese army air attacks on M23 position. The Congolese president then conceded to direct Qatari-mediated peace talks with M23, which he had repeatedly ruled out as a red line.

Several obstacles will likely complicate the Congolese government and international mediators’ ability to implement these conditions in the short term. An agreed-upon Congolese peacekeeping force is almost certainly not likely to take shape quickly. The Congolese government and M23 had agreed to establish “transitional security arrangements” in affected areas under the framework agreement, but CTP assessed previously that this pillar is far from implementation and could take months to negotiate.[28]

An external peacekeeping force is also unlikely to form quickly due to a lack of willing outside actors that are mutually acceptable to the DRC and M23-Rwanda. Burundi and Kenya, the two guarantors of the US peace framework, had previously deployed troops under an East African Community (EAC) regional force to help freeze the frontlines and facilitate the handover of M23 territory to the government, but the DRC requested that the force withdraw due to perceived Kenyan bias toward M23 and Rwanda.[29] The Washington Accords called on the DRC and Rwanda to support multilateral peacekeeping, but tensions between the DRC and Kenya remain and Burundi is now a war party, diminishing the viability of another joint regional force.[30] M23 forced Southern African Development Community (SADC) troops to withdraw from the eastern DRC after M23-RDF’s early 2025 offensive, partially due to perceived bias toward the DRC.[31] CTP assessed previously that all of these issues make a joint EAC-SADC force deployment capable of enforcing a ceasefire and securing M23-held areas is likely politically infeasible for all parties involved.[32] UN forces, whom M23 has labeled a defeated and belligerent force in the eastern DRC, withdrew from South Kivu in mid-2024.[33] Angola deployed a force to the DRC after it brokered a truce in 2023 but ultimately withdrew as mediator in early 2025.

The Congolese government could attempt to retake Uvira. The FARDC spokesperson told Reuters on December 16 that the DRC rejected the proposal of a buffer zone, something it has repeatedly refused to observe on the front lines since at least July.[34] The Congolese government has sent a significant number of reinforcements and military equipment to the front lines south of Uvira town on the RN5 and said that it will “do everything in our power to reclaim [Uvira] and secure it.”[35]

M23’s withdrawal lowers the immediate risk of a regional war. M23 launched its Uvira offensive after relations with Burundi collapsed, which had heightened the risks of a regional war. M23’s control of Uvira and key areas along the Burundi-DRC border cuts off Burundi from DRC territory and poses a major security and economic risk to the Burundian government. Burundi and Rwanda are rivals in the eastern DRC, and both view their competition as potentially existential. Burundian media reported that the RDF and FDNB have both deployed additional troops and heavy weaponry to their sides of the border in recent days.[36]

M23’s withdrawal from Uvira town and its efforts to defuse tensions allow for Rwanda and Burundi to deconflict again. M23 had halted their first southward advance along the Burundian border in South Kivu in February, which CTP assessed was the result of Burundi and Rwanda likely reaching a deal to deconflict in the eastern DRC.[37] Senior M23 officials said that the group does not have territorial claims on Burundi on December 9.[38] M23 began facilitating the return of some FDNB troops who were deployed on the frontlines on the Ruzizi Plain and the middle plateaus to Burundi at Burundi’s request on December 10.[39] M23 officials said that they would not allow Burundian rebel groups to use territory that M23 controls in South Kivu as rear bases for attacks on Burundi on December 15.[40]

Gulf States

Authors: Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr

Saudi Arabia held meetings with the heads of state of Eritrea and Sudan and the US senior adviser for African affairs to further its bilateral partnerships in the Horn of Africa and advance US-backed peace efforts in Sudan. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) met with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, on December 10.^[41] Eritrea’s Ministry of Information said that the two discussed “developments in the Nile River Basin, the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf.”^[42] Afwerki called for a larger Saudi role in “promoting peace and stability in the wider region, and in Eritrea’s immediate neighborhood,” presumably referring to increased tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the civil war in neighboring Sudan.^[43] Afwerki stated in an interview with a Sudanese news outlet on December 14 that he discussed external backers of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan with MBS, presumably referring to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and possibly Ethiopia.^[44]

Saudi Arabia hosted the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) head and the leader of Sudan’s government, Abdel Fattah al Burhan, in Riyadh on December 15 to discuss the ongoing Sudanese civil war.^[45] MBS, the Saudi foreign and defense ministers, and the Saudi national security adviser met with Burhan.^[46] Saudi Arabia has backed the SAF politically throughout the civil war and during US-led Quad peace efforts, which also involve SAF-aligned Egypt and the RSF-aligned UAE.^[47] Saudi Arabia reportedly sent Burhan’s invitation during Afwerki’s visit, which is notable given Eritrea’s close ties with Sudan.^[48] Eritrea has facilitated arms shipments to the SAF, potentially including drones.^[49]

US Senior Adviser for Africa Massad Boulos, who is spearheading Quad peace efforts, also traveled to Riyadh to meet with Burhan and Saudi officials. ^[50] The meeting may have aimed to repair Boulos’s relationship with Burhan, which has been one of many recent obstacles in the Quad process. A local news outlet reported that Boulos’s team sent the SAF an incorrect Quad peace roadmap in November that the SAF deemed favorable to the RSF and UAE.^[51] Burhan then accused Boulos of being biased in favor of the RSF and UAE in a November 23 speech in which he also rejected the Quad process.^[52] Boulos also met with the Saudi foreign and defense ministers and national security adviser to discuss the Sudan peace efforts and US-Saudi bilateral ties.^[53]

The meetings come amid a likely increase in Emirati-linked arms shipments to Ethiopia. Flight tracking data shows at least seven IL-76 cargo flights from the UAE to the Addis Ababa area, landing at the Addis Ababa international airport or possibly Harar Meda Airbase—the main air base for the Ethiopian Air Force—since November 2. The flights include three UK-based Zebu Air flights, three Russia-based Gelix Airlines flights, and one Kyrgyzstan-based Fly Sky Airlines flight.[54] At least four other Fly Sky cargo flights with the same callsign departing from the UAE have traveled along the same flight path in December, but transponder cuts prevent CTP from confirming their destinations.[55] Fly Sky was previously involved in Emirati weapons shipments to Ethiopia during the Tigray war, which included the provision of Chinese-made drones, and Gelix has been involved in Russian weapons shipments, including to Iran.^[56] Rubystar—a US specially-designated Belarusian cargo company previously linked with Russian weapon shipments to UAE-backed forces in eastern Libya—has also made six flights from Abu Dhabi over the Gulf of Aden along the same flight path since November 28, although transponder cuts indicate they alternatively may have been flying to Emirati bases in northern Somalia.[57]

Fly Sky, Gelix, and Zebu are part of the wider Emirati-linked weapons trafficking network in the Horn of Africa, which has involved hundreds of flights to the Horn of Africa in the last six months, mostly related to Emirati weapons shipments to the RSF via rear bases near the Chadian and Libyan border with western Sudan. Flight tracking data shows hundreds of likely weapons shipments involving Fly Sky Airlines, Kyrgyzstan-based New Way Cargo Airlines and Sapsan Airlines, and US-sanctioned Russian cargo company Aviacon Zitotrans throughout 2025 that have appeared along a flight path that links Abu Dhabi to Bossaso, northern Somalia, and al Kufra—a known RSF-linked rear base in southwestern Libya, and other reports claim that Gelix and Zebu have also flown shipments.[58] In many cases, flight transponders were presumably turned off to obscure their origin and arrival points. Multiple organizations and outlets have reported that the UAE has used positions in Libya and northern Somalia as conduits to ship weapons to the RSF in Sudan throughout 2025.[59] Some flights departed from Benghazi, which is the capital of the UAE-backed eastern Libyan government and the destination of hundreds of Emirati-linked flights from Abu Dhabi involving Aviacon Zitotrans, Fly Sky, New Way Cargo, and Skyline Airlines, to reach al Kufra.[60] Several other partial flight paths indicate that some cargo flights likely departed from al Kufra to Benghazi and flew over the Red Sea, stopped at Emirati airbases in northern Somalia, and then continued over the Ethiopia-Somalia border, presumably back toward al Kufra to complete the loop.[61]

Figure 4. Emirati-Linked Weapons Shipments in the Horn of Africa

Source. Liam Karr; Flightradar24 and Middle East Eye.

The arms shipments could support RSF in Sudan or an Ethiopian military buildup against Eritrea and the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia. Al Jazeera recently published a report in which SAF officials accused Ethiopia of arming the RSF and providing intelligence support to the group and aligned forces.^[63] The officials claimed that Ethiopia is supplying the RSF with artillery, jamming devices, and military vehicles through Assosa, the capital of Ethiopia’s Benisgangul-Gumuz region, which borders Sudan’s Blue Nile state.^[64] The UAE has provided the RSF with these supplies and other weaponry, including drones, throughout the war using similar cross-border supply lines through other African allies in Chad and Libya.^[65] Multiple reports have stated that Ethiopia has supported RSF by allowing the group to use Ethiopian territory for rear bases, although these reports are unverified.^[66]

SAF officials also alleged that Ethiopia has allowed the RSF to establish a training camp in Ethiopia near the Sudanese border, which would enable the RSF to open a new front on the SAF’s rear flank in eastern Sudan.^[67] The camp allegedly can accommodate thousands of RSF fighters and is overseen by an Ethiopian general.^[68] Ethiopian officials denied the camp’s existence, and independent reporting has not verified its presence.^[69] The officials further claimed that the Ethiopian military is sharing intelligence with the RSF and RSF-aligned Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) al Hilu militia, which controls the only existing pockets of RSF-aligned territory in eastern Sudan.^[70] SAF officials stated that the SAF was preparing for a campaign against RSF-aligned forces in eastern Sudan in response, although the RSF is pressuring the SAF in central Sudan after multiple victories since late October.^[71] The RSF has consolidated control over western and west-central Sudan and intensified an offensive on the frontlines around el Obeid, the SAF’s headquarters in central Sudan.^[72]

Figure 5. Alleged RSF Camp in Ethiopia

Source: Michael DeAngelo; Liam Karr.

Ethiopia also faces increased tensions with Eritrea and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which has led to growing militarization and threats of violence in northern Ethiopia. Ethiopia-Eritrea relations have deteriorated since the Pretoria Agreement peace process that ended the Tigray war. Ethiopia excluded Eritrea from the process despite their collaboration against the TPLF during the war.^[73] Ethiopia’s frequent claims to Eritrea’s port of Assab and Eritrea’s refusal to withdraw from Tigray have since escalated tensions.^[74] Ethiopian officials have left open the possibility of using force to annex Assab if Ethiopia cannot secure Red Sea access through peaceful means.^[75] These tensions led Ethiopia and Eritrea to mobilize forces on their respective sides of the shared border in early 2025.^[76]

Ethiopia-TPLF relations have continued to deteriorate in 2025 due to the contested implementation of the Pretoria Agreement. The TPLF launched a de facto coup against the federal government-backed Tigray Interim Administration in March and has continued to criticize the federal government’s approach.^[77] Ethiopian and Tigrayan officials have made multiple statements about their readiness for war since September.^[78] Tigrayan forces conducted an incursion into neighboring Afar region in early November to degrade an anti-TPLF rebel group that the TPLF accuses the federal government of backing.^[79] The federal government reportedly responded with its first drone strike on Tigrayan forces since signing the Pretoria Agreement.^[80]

Eritrea and the TPLF have likely responded to the increased tensions by pursuing rapprochement and aligning against the Ethiopian federal government. Senior Eritrean and TPLF officials have met multiple times in 2025.^[81] The federal government filed a complaint to the United Nations in October accusing Eritrea and the TPLF of supporting Amhara ethno-nationalist Fano militias waging an insurgency against the federal government.^[82] The Economist published a report on November 13 stating that Eritrean and TPLF officials recently met with Fano officials in Sudan regarding military collaboration.^[83]

The Saudi-UAE competition in the Horn of Africa is part of broader competition across the Red Sea, including Yemen, which increases the risk of horizontal escalation on both sides of the Red Sea. The UAE’s continued support for the RSF has heightened tensions with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which are competing with the UAE for influence across the region.^[84] Egypt and Saudi Arabia both view the Sudanese war and resulting displacement crisis as detrimental to their domestic stability and priorities given their proximity to Sudan.^[85] Both countries support the SAF due to long-standing ties with the SAF and the belief that the SAF is more capable of ensuring stability than the RSF.^[86] The UAE has backed the RSF due to its ties with RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and concerns over Islamist influence within the SAF, although Egypt and Saudi Arabia are also anti-Islamist and have pressured the SAF on this issue.^[87]

Saudi Arabia has responded to recent RSF advances by escalating peace efforts, which has resulted in greater international pressure on the UAE to halt support for the RSF. MBS met with US President Donald Trump in Washington on November 18 and asked him to become personally involved in Sudan peace efforts.^[88] Trump publicly committed to working on ending the war on November 19, citing his meeting with MBS.^[89] The United States has since put more pressure on the UAE, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio twice speaking with the Emirati foreign minister about Sudan.^[90] Saudi Arabia followed up on MBS’s meeting with Trump by facilitating the December 15 meeting between Burhan and Boulos in Riyadh.^[91]

The UAE has since strengthened its position in its proxy battle with Saudi Arabia for influence in southern Yemen, which may have been a form of horizontal escalation given the timing in relation to Sudan peace talks, and increases the risk of an escalation cycle across the Red Sea. The UAE’s Yemeni proxy, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), seized the two remaining southern Yemeni provinces that Saudi Arabia’s Yemeni proxies had historically dominated in early December.^[92] The STC’s move threatens to diminish Saudi proxies’ influence and effectively end the fragile 2022 power-sharing deal between the two sides.^[93] Saudi and Emirati military officials met in Aden on December 12 to ease related tensions, but Saudi Arabia has reiterated its support for Yemen’s internationally recognized government and called for the STC to withdraw and allow Saudi proxies to reassume security responsibilities.^[94] The STC has refused to withdraw and doubled down on its intention to create a breakaway state in southern Yemen.^[95]

Somalia

Author: Michael DeAngelo

Al Shabaab has escalated the scale of its attacks on Somali federal government (SFG) facilities in Mogadishu, the Somali capital, in December. The group carried out suicide bombings on two separate military bases in Mogadishu on December 10. Somali forces shot a suicide bomber outside the General Dhagabadan base, causing their vest to detonate.^[96] Al Shabaab claimed that the attack killed 23 soldiers, while the SFG stated that there were only injuries.^[97] Another fighter detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) at the Xero Nacnac base.^[98] Al Shabaab claimed that the attack killed 18 soldiers, while the SFG and Somali media reported that seven soldiers died.^[99]

The bombings are the first major Al Shabaab attacks on SFG facilities in Mogadishu since a prison break in early October.^[100] The base attacks were part of at least seven attacks that al Shabaab conducted against SFG facilities from December 10 to 13.^[101] The SFG has reportedly responded to continued threats on SFG facilities by tightening security measures, including checkpoints along key roads.^[102]

Figure 6. Al Shabaab Attacks Against SFG Facilities in Mogadishu

Source: Michael DeAngelo.

Growing tensions over upcoming federal elections could create additional security gaps and high-publicity targets for al Shabaab to exploit. The SFG’s implementation of a one-person, one-vote direct election system in advance of a planned federal presidential election in 2026 has led to increased anti-SFG coordination between the Somali opposition and Jubbaland and Puntland state governments, who have joined together in the Somali Future Council coalition.^[103] The coalition’s priority is to prevent the implementation of the direct election system, which threatens to dilute their influence by eliminating the current clan-based quota parliamentary system.^[104] The Somali Future Council held a summit in Kismayo, Jubbaland beginning on December 18 to discuss an elections roadmap.^[105] One coalition member stated that the Somali Future Council would consider forming a parallel government if SFG continued to implement the new system, which aligns with a previous report from a local source.^[106]

Al Shabaab has previously increased activity in Mogadishu amid political tension, including elections. Al Shabaab conducted more suicide bombings in Mogadishu in January 2022 than the four months prior, an escalation that coincided with political infighting due to delayed SFG presidential elections.^[107] Infighting diverts resources from securing population centers as security force factions clash with each other, which happened in Jubbaland in 2020 and 2024, Galmadug state in 2021, and Mogadishu in 2021.^[108]

Al Shabaab has threatened to target election sites as the SFG has rolled out the direct election system for Mogadishu’s municipal elections in late December 2025.^[109] The SFG has had to repurpose educational facilities into mass voter registration and identification centers across Mogadishu and deploy security forces to secure the sites.^[110] Al Shabaab has threatened educational administrators against hosting election activities at their facilities.^[111] Al Shabaab detonated an improvised explosive device at a school election center in Mogadishu’s Daynile district on December 11.^[112]

Al Shabaab has consolidated rear support zones outside of Mogadishu despite earlier SFG and African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) gains in the lower Shabelle River valley in 2025. SFG and AUSSOM forces conducted an offensive from June to October to regain control of key towns linking al Shabaab-controlled areas of the Shabelle River valley in southern Somalia to Afgoi, a district capital located on the outskirts of Mogadishu.^[113] SFG and AUSSOM forces captured Awdheegle, Barire, and Sabiid, key towns southwest of Afgoi that served as forward operating bases for al Shabaab to cross the Shabelle River and pressure Mogadishu.^[114]

Figure 7. Battle for the Mogadishu Outskirts

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Al Shabaab has remained active and reportedly bolstered its presence in areas in Mogadishu and its immediate vicinity near Afgoi, however. A local source reported that al Shabaab is patrolling parts of the Daynile, Heliwa, and Yaaqshiid districts of Mogadishu at night.^[115] Somali security forces conducted a raid on al Shabaab bases in Jambaluul—located only two miles northeast of Agfoi—on December 10.^[116] The Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency reported that its forces had killed a local al Shabaab leader and 11 other fighters, with local sources also reporting civilian casualties.^[117] Al Shabaab has reportedly continued activity around Jambaluul despite the raid.^[118] Al Shabaab is also active has a presence in Basra—located approximately 10 miles northeast of Afgoi—and allegedly moves easily on the road to Afgoi.^[119]

Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The United Arab Emirates–backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have very likely committed genocide in el Fasher, Sudan since capturing the city in late October. The United Nations defines genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.”^[120] The RSF systematically targeted non-Arab civilians, prioritizing operations in non-Arab neighborhoods and conducting house-to-house mass killings.^[121] Sudan War Monitor reported that the RSF prevented non-Arab RSF-aligned fighters from participating in these operations.^[122] 52 of 150 potential body clusters are located in Daraja Oula neighborhood, the primary neighborhood that sheltered non-Arab civilians, according to satellite Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab’s satellite imagery analysis.^[123] The RSF has continued disposing of bodies in mass graves located across el Fasher, including in Daraja Oula.^[124] Up to 150,000 of the 250,000 heavily non-Arab population living in el Fasher before the RSF’s takeover remained unaccounted for as of early December.^[125] A UK Parliament briefing reported out a conservative estimate that the RSF had killed 60,000 people in el Fasher by late November.^[126]

Figure 8. RSF Atrocities in el Fasher

Source: Michael DeAngelo

CTP previously assessed that the RSF would likely commit mass crimes against humanity, including ethnic violence that may constitute genocide, if it captured el Fasher.^[127] The RSF’s predecessor, the Janjaweed, was responsible for the Darfur genocide in the early 2000s.^[128] El Fasher would be the second documented genocide perpetuated by the RSF in the Sudanese civil war, as the RSF committed a genocide against the Massalit ethnic group in el Geneina from April to November 2023.^[129]

Africa File Data Cutoff: December 18, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.