Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 4, 2025

May 4, 2025, 4:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11am ET on May 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that Russia maintains the initial objectives of its war in Ukraine, which are tantamount to Ukraine's surrender, despite ongoing negotiations with the United States. Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published a documentary on Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1 about Putin on May 4, in which Putin claimed that Russia has enough manpower and materiel to bring the war in Ukraine to its "logical conclusion with the result that Russia needs."[1] Putin also claimed that Russian reconciliation with the Ukrainian part of the Russian people is "inevitable." Putin has repeatedly claimed that the Ukrainian people are simply a subset of Russians rather than a distinctly separate nation to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the occupation of Ukrainian territory and people.[2] Russian state media notably highlighted that Putin has previously made the false claim that Russians and Ukrainians are one people.[3] Putin’s statements indicate that Russia continues to assess that it can achieve its original objectives of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which include demilitarizing Ukraine, installing a pro-Russian government in Ukraine, forcing Ukraine to abandon its aspirations to join NATO and other security blocs, and forcing Ukraine to make massive territorial concessions to Russia, including parts of Ukraine that Russia does not currently occupy.[4] These demands amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation. Russia will likely continue efforts to achieve these goals through military and diplomatic means, as Russian officials continue attempts to leverage battlefield gains to strengthen their negotiating position.

Putin highlighted domestic support for the war and promoted the ideal of sacrifice on the frontline and the home front, likely in an effort to prepare Russian society for a longer war in Ukraine and potential future confrontations with the West. Putin told Zarubin that Russian society reacted positively to the invasion of Ukraine and that each citizen realized that "he is the state" and Russia's survival depends on each individual.[5] Putin stated that Russia is a country of "moral and ethical values" and that the basis of the Russian conscience is "the family, the state, and the future of Russia."[6] Putin is notably attempting to frame the Russian public's support for the war through shared values despite the Kremlin's reliance on financial incentives to recruit the majority of its military personnel and to maintain its war effort.[7] Putin accused the West once again of "deceiving" Russia following the 2015 Minsk agreements, likely in an effort to convince the Russian domestic audience that Russia cannot negotiate with the West and needs to continue the war.[8]

Putin's statements throughout the documentary indicate that Putin likely does not intend to slow offensive operations or transition to defensive operations in Ukraine and instead is attempting to ideologically prepare domestic Russian society for a long war. ISW has previously assessed that Russian officials are setting conditions to maintain a long war and to justify future aggression against Ukraine and NATO.[9] Russian officials have also consistently intensified efforts to militarize Russian society since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, further indicating that Russia is preparing for a protracted conflict. Russian officials are engaged in long-term efforts to consolidate control over Russia’s veteran civil society and elevate a cadre of loyal veterans to positions in Russia's regional and federal government.[10] Putin officially declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland," following the launch of myriad militaristic initiatives in 2023 and 2024 to provide veterans with social and financial support and reinforce the Russian state narrative that veterans are the new "elite" class[11] Russia is also investing heavily in military-patriotic education for Russia’s youth, demonstrating the Kremlin's interest in creating a new generation of militarized, loyal citizens in the medium to long term[12]

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov provided new details on May 4 about the report that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone on May 2. Budanov reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two Russian Su-30 fighter jets over the Black Sea with AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles fired from Magura-7 naval drones.[13]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that Russia maintains its initial objectives of its war in Ukraine, which are tantamount to Ukraine's surrender, despite ongoing negotiations with the United States.
• Putin highlighted domestic support for the war and promoted the ideal of sacrifice on the frontline and the home front, likely in an effort to prepare Russian society for a longer war in Ukraine and potential future confrontations with the West.
• Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov provided new details on May 4 about the report that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone on May 2.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Toretsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.   

• Alleged Ceasefire Violation
• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Limited fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 3 and 4 as Russian forces continue efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the area.[14]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[15]

Russian milbloggers claimed on May 3 and 4 that Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence in northwestern Belgorod Oblast near Popovka and Demidovka (both northwest of Belgorod City).[16]

Ukrainian forces likely struck a Russian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprise in Bryansk Oblast on May 4.

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on May 4 that unspecified drones struck the Strela Plant in Suzemka, Bryansk Oblast.[17] Kovalenko reported that the Strela Plant produces electronic components and radar equipment for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).[18] Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed on May 4 that Ukrainian drone strikes caused a fire at an industrial enterprise in Suzemka.[19] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that drones previously struck the Strela Plant in December 2023 and November 2024.[20]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Fighting continued north of Sumy City near Bilovody and Vodolahy and northeast of Sumy City near Loknya.[21]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz "Kashtan" Detachment, Russian 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]), and Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Company of the 15th Tank Regiment (reportedly 69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[22]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 4 but did not advance.
 
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on May 3 and 4.[23] 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[24]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Novoosynove and south of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka on May 3 and 4.[25]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Bereznyky, Chuhunivka (both northeast of Kupyansk), and Novovasylivka (north of Kupyansk).[26]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and west of Borova near Kopany and Tverdokhlibove on May 3 and 4.[27]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Zelena Dolyna, Olhivka, Lypove, Ridkodub, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on May 3 and 4.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked along the Nove-Zelena Dolyna line (northeast of Lyman).[29]

A Ukrainian National Guard servicemember stated on May 4 that Russian forces are conducting motorized assaults on motorcycles in the Lyman direction.[30] The servicemember reported that motorcycles typically carry two Russian soldiers — a driver and a gunner — and that Russian soldiers will continue attacking even if Ukrainian drones successfully strike one Russian soldier.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Ivano-Darivka on May 3 and 4.[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar toward Mayske, south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on May 3 and 4.[32]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 4 that Ukrainian forces recently struck the command post of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) in Bakhmut (west of Chasiv Yar in the Russian forces' rear).[33]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Novospaske (west of Toretsk).[34]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk).[35]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Oleksandropil, north of Berezivka, and east of Tarasivka (all southwest of Toretsk).[36] A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced toward Romanivka (southwest of Toretsk).[37]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk; west of Toretsk near Druzhba; north of Toretsk near Dachne, Dyliivka, and Krymske; and southwest of Toretsk near Zelene Pole, Tarasivka, and Yelyzavetivka and toward Oleksandropil, Stara Mykolaivka, Romanivka, Hnativka, and Nova Poltavka on May 3 and 4.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoolenivka (west of Toretsk).[39]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Novoolenivka.[40] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in near Toretsk.[41] Drone operators of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating between Toretsk and Pokrovsk.[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk).[43]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske, Myrolyubivka, and Promin and toward Malynivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Novoserhiivka, Udachne, and Kotlyne on May 3 and 4.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kotlyne and Udachne.[45]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are constantly rotating troops in the Pokrovsk direction and drawing down reserves.[46] Trehubov stated that Russian forces have been deploying heavy equipment less frequently since the start of 2025 but are compensating for this by using 10 to 100 motorcycles during assaults. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces recently pulled up reinforcements and are trying to take the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway under fire control.[47] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are first deploying freshly recruited and poorly trained personnel, former convicts, and debtors into assaults.  A captain in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces launch attacks using motorcycles and small infantry groups under the cover of vehicles with electronic warfare (EW) systems.[48] The captain stated that Russian forces have started using motorcycles more frequently due to improving weather conditions and that the motorcyclists appear to have undergone training. The captain stated that motorcycle columns contain EW systems in the front, center, and rear. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces suspended active offensive operations near Lysivka and are transferring additional forces to the area, possibly to increase offensive operations in the future.[49]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a Shahed drone strike against Ukrainian positions near Volodymyrivka (northeast of Pokrovsk in the Ukrainian near rear).[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) seized Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) after using a ladder to cross a deep ditch, with one milblogger speculating that Russian forces may have seized the settlement.[52] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced 900 meters toward Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka).[53]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske and Bohdanivka on May 3 and 4.[54]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Novopavlivka direction.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on May 3 and 4.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and Odradne.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 140th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 29th CAA, EMD) and 43rd Spetsnaz Company (reportedly also of the 29th CAA) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced into northern Vesele (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) after successful counterattacks.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into Malynivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka), northwest of Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka), and near Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Vesele.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) returned to the front after rest and force restoration, and advanced near Pryvilne (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Novosilka.[61]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Fedorivka, Pryvilne, Shevchenko, Vesele, and Burlatske; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and toward Zelene Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil and toward Novopil on May 3 and 4.[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Malynivka, Fedorivka, Dniproenerhiya (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), and Vesele.[63]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[64] Elements of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Novosilka.[65] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Zelene Pole.[66]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Vysoke (formerly Chervone) on May 4 but did not advance.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Orikhiv near Novopokrovka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Pyatykhatky; and west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on May 3 and 4.[68]

Ukrainian Volunteer Army's Southern Group of Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk reported on May 4 that Russian forces have not advanced after reaching the Shcherbaky - Lobkove line in March 2025, and that Ukrainian forces have destroyed significant amounts of manpower, vehicles, and motorcycles of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army ([CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) in this direction.[69]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment’s (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) “Nemets” group and elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[70]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks east of Kherson City near the Antonivka Road Bridge and on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta near Kizomyz (southwest of Kherson City) on May 3 and 4.[71]

Ukrainian sources reported on May 4 that Russian forces increased activity in the Kherson direction and are primarily conducting reconnaissance operations against Ukrainian defenses to gain a foothold on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta to then advance to the west (right) bank.[72] Bratchuk reported that Russian forces are not resupplying or evacuating infantry that used boats to land on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[73] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are trying to establish a foothold on an island of the Dnipro River Delta in an effort to shell and strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[74]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Smuglyanka” detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Burhunka and Beryslav (northeast of Kherson City).[75]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 165 strike and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Prymorsk, Zaporizhia Oblast.[76] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 69 Shahed and other drones over eastern, northern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 80 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian infrastructure and commercial infrastructure in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Cherkasy, and Kyiv oblasts.[77]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://tass dot com/politics/1952663; https://ria dot ru/20250504/putin-2014872731.html; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/05/04/v-2014-godu-nachat-svo-bylo-nerealistichno-strana-ne-byla-gotova-k-protivostoyaniyu-s-zapadom; https://smotrim dot ru/brand/71557

[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66181; https://tass dot ru/politika/13955467; https://tass dot ru/politika/23847373; https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/2025/05/04/20980988.shtml

[3] https://tass dot ru/politika/13955467; https://tass dot ru/politika/23847373; https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/2025/05/04/20980988.shtml

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525

[5]  https://t.me/tass_agency/313271

[6] https://tass dot ru/politika/23848271; https://t.me/tass_agency/313273; https://t.me/tass_agency/313276

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030325

[8] https://t.me/tass_agency/313278

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-20-2024

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725; 

https://isw.pub/UkrWar030325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123124; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122124; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625

[13] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5795 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/97347 ; https://www.twz.com/news-features/two-russian-su-30-flankers-downed-by-aim-9s-fired-from-drone-boats-ukrainian-intel-boss ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/mi-gotovi-yaknajshvidshe-hoch-vidsogodni-perehoditi-do-pripi-97529 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2025

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0auLbzG22dLmTVGFrKtnknxx9nXBnfL4kUPZ83n8ZNMRvxZn7JjgEuWyD4CpvbuuJl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tYJuHQyrpeqFJ4iAfUrujoSb8frCrxvTdzZMNi2rsQj4MrdsvKJAbiqGTwN597qvl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23830

[15] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163432

[16] https://t.me/rybar/70104 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70478

[17] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9192

[18] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9192

[19] https://t.me/avbogomaz/12068

[20] https://t.me/astrapress/80409

[21] https://t.me/wargonzo/26305 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70478

[22] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5689

[23]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tYJuHQyrpeqFJ4iAfUrujoSb8frCrxvTdzZMNi2rsQj4MrdsvKJAbiqGTwN597qvl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0auLbzG22dLmTVGFrKtnknxx9nXBnfL4kUPZ83n8ZNMRvxZn7JjgEuWyD4CpvbuuJl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23830 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9364 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9364

[24] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9057; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1603515846976978&rdid=70htZ3OtCWWTjSRk

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tYJuHQyrpeqFJ4iAfUrujoSb8frCrxvTdzZMNi2rsQj4MrdsvKJAbiqGTwN597qvl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0auLbzG22dLmTVGFrKtnknxx9nXBnfL4kUPZ83n8ZNMRvxZn7JjgEuWyD4CpvbuuJl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23830 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9353

[26] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163384

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0auLbzG22dLmTVGFrKtnknxx9nXBnfL4kUPZ83n8ZNMRvxZn7JjgEuWyD4CpvbuuJl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tYJuHQyrpeqFJ4iAfUrujoSb8frCrxvTdzZMNi2rsQj4MrdsvKJAbiqGTwN597qvl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23830 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9353

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0auLbzG22dLmTVGFrKtnknxx9nXBnfL4kUPZ83n8ZNMRvxZn7JjgEuWyD4CpvbuuJl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tYJuHQyrpeqFJ4iAfUrujoSb8frCrxvTdzZMNi2rsQj4MrdsvKJAbiqGTwN597qvl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23830 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9353 

[29] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63985

[30] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/04/kumedni-plashhi-ta-nezgrabni-bajkery-lymanskyj-napryamok-poligon-nevdalyh-eksperymentiv-armiyi-rf/

[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tYJuHQyrpeqFJ4iAfUrujoSb8frCrxvTdzZMNi2rsQj4MrdsvKJAbiqGTwN597qvl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0auLbzG22dLmTVGFrKtnknxx9nXBnfL4kUPZ83n8ZNMRvxZn7JjgEuWyD4CpvbuuJl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9364

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tYJuHQyrpeqFJ4iAfUrujoSb8frCrxvTdzZMNi2rsQj4MrdsvKJAbiqGTwN597qvl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0auLbzG22dLmTVGFrKtnknxx9nXBnfL4kUPZ83n8ZNMRvxZn7JjgEuWyD4CpvbuuJl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23830; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9364; https://t.me/wargonzo/26305

[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23847

[34] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1919014963399503986; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1919015174951866564; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9060; https://t.me/razvedkavperedZ/945

[35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9059; https://t.me/D109ObrTroZsu/1727

[36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91061; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35332; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35296; https://t.me/dva_majors/70478

[37] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35335

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tYJuHQyrpeqFJ4iAfUrujoSb8frCrxvTdzZMNi2rsQj4MrdsvKJAbiqGTwN597qvl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0auLbzG22dLmTVGFrKtnknxx9nXBnfL4kUPZ83n8ZNMRvxZn7JjgEuWyD4CpvbuuJl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23830; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9353; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9364; https://t.me/dva_majors/70479

[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/70478

[40] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35296

[41] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13751

[42] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91105

[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35296; https://t.me/dva_majors/70478

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tYJuHQyrpeqFJ4iAfUrujoSb8frCrxvTdzZMNi2rsQj4MrdsvKJAbiqGTwN597qvl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0auLbzG22dLmTVGFrKtnknxx9nXBnfL4kUPZ83n8ZNMRvxZn7JjgEuWyD4CpvbuuJl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23830 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9353; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9364; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91061; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35296; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91061; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35272; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35294; https://t.me/dva_majors/70478; https://t.me/dva_majors/70479; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163475

[45] https://t.me/wargonzo/26305

[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/04/logika-vijny-proty-logiky-paradu-shho-stoyit-za-riznymy-napryamkamy-rosijskyh-atak-na-shodi/

[47] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1009219-vijska-rf-namagautsa-vzati-pid-vognevij-kontrol-trasu-pavlograd-pokrovsk-dani-59-brigadi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc

[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/04/motoczykly-fpv-i-svizha-pihota-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-ataky-ale-vorog-vtrachaye-bilshe-nizh-zdobuvaye/

[49] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163475

[50] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163383

[51] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35294

[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91062; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35280; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91062; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35333

[53] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163479https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163479

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tYJuHQyrpeqFJ4iAfUrujoSb8frCrxvTdzZMNi2rsQj4MrdsvKJAbiqGTwN597qvl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0auLbzG22dLmTVGFrKtnknxx9nXBnfL4kUPZ83n8ZNMRvxZn7JjgEuWyD4CpvbuuJl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23830 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9353; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9364; https://t.me/dva_majors/70478 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63979; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35290; https://t.me/wargonzo/26305; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163479

[55] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91060

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tYJuHQyrpeqFJ4iAfUrujoSb8frCrxvTdzZMNi2rsQj4MrdsvKJAbiqGTwN597qvl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0auLbzG22dLmTVGFrKtnknxx9nXBnfL4kUPZ83n8ZNMRvxZn7JjgEuWyD4CpvbuuJl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23830 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9353; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9364; https://t.me/wargonzo/26305; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163479; https://t.me/dva_majors/70478

[57] https://t.me/dva_majors/70478

[58] https://t.me/voin_dv/14737; https://t.me/voin_dv/14734

[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63983

[60] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35295; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63983; https://t.me/dva_majors/70478; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163457 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63981; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163424; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35284

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35284

[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tYJuHQyrpeqFJ4iAfUrujoSb8frCrxvTdzZMNi2rsQj4MrdsvKJAbiqGTwN597qvl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0auLbzG22dLmTVGFrKtnknxx9nXBnfL4kUPZ83n8ZNMRvxZn7JjgEuWyD4CpvbuuJl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23830; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9353 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9364; https://t.me/dva_majors/70478; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163479

[63] https://t.me/dva_majors/70478; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63983; https://t.me/dva_majors/70478; https://t.me/voin_dv/14744; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63981

[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/14733; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163424

[65] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35295

[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/14739

[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tYJuHQyrpeqFJ4iAfUrujoSb8frCrxvTdzZMNi2rsQj4MrdsvKJAbiqGTwN597qvl 

[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tYJuHQyrpeqFJ4iAfUrujoSb8frCrxvTdzZMNi2rsQj4MrdsvKJAbiqGTwN597qvl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0auLbzG22dLmTVGFrKtnknxx9nXBnfL4kUPZ83n8ZNMRvxZn7JjgEuWyD4CpvbuuJl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23830; https://t.me/dva_majors/70478

[69] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/04/ponad-300-vorozhyh-chovniv-na-dni-proval-ostrivnoyi-taktyky-okupantiv-na-pivdni-ta-yiyi-czina/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8GCx3PzK1I

[70] https://t.me/wargonzo/26303; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35282; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35305

[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0auLbzG22dLmTVGFrKtnknxx9nXBnfL4kUPZ83n8ZNMRvxZn7JjgEuWyD4CpvbuuJl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23830; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/04/chy-zmozhut-rosiyany-zaraz-forsuvaty-dnipro-vidpovily-u-sylah-oborony-pivdnya/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/04/ponad-300-vorozhyh-chovniv-na-dni-proval-ostrivnoyi-taktyky-okupantiv-na-pivdni-ta-yiyi-czina/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8GCx3PzK1I

[72] https://suspilne dot media/kherson/1009785-provodat-rozviduvalno-posukovi-zahodi-sob-pereviriti-ukrainsku-oboronu-recnik-sil-oboroni-pivdna-pro-dii-rf/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/04/ponad-300-vorozhyh-chovniv-na-dni-proval-ostrivnoyi-taktyky-okupantiv-na-pivdni-ta-yiyi-czina/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8GCx3PzK1I; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/04/chy-zmozhut-rosiyany-zaraz-forsuvaty-dnipro-vidpovily-u-sylah-oborony-pivdnya/

[73] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/04/ponad-300-vorozhyh-chovniv-na-dni-proval-ostrivnoyi-taktyky-okupantiv-na-pivdni-ta-yiyi-czina/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8GCx3PzK1I

[74] https://suspilne dot media/kherson/1009785-provodat-rozviduvalno-posukovi-zahodi-sob-pereviriti-ukrainsku-oboronu-recnik-sil-oboroni-pivdna-pro-dii-rf/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/04/minus-70-motoczykliv-za-dobu-zsu-kosyat-vidchajdushni-moto-shturmy-rf-na-shlyahu-do-dnipropetrovshhyny/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFvyCBahZ_k ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/04/chy-zmozhut-rosiyany-zaraz-forsuvaty-dnipro-vidpovily-u-sylah-oborony-pivdnya/

[75] https://t.me/dva_majors/70485

[76] https://t.me/kpszsu/33820

[77] https://t.me/synegubov/14141 ; https://t.me/slv_vca/25969 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14070 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1918936602174280115 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/04/grady-fpv-shahedy-kombinovanyj-udar-rf-po-dnipropetrovshhyni-poraneni-dvoye-policzejskyh/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/21319 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/04/troye-poranenyh-u-marganczi-rf-vdaryla-dronom-po-mistu-na-nikopolshhyni/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/04/udar-po-gurtozhytku-v-cherkasah-poranena-lyudyna-zrujnovani-kvartyry-pislya-nichnoyi-ataky-droniv/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/42306  ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/04/semero-poranenyh-dvoye-ditej-naslidky-nichnoyi-ataky-bpla-na-kyyiv-gorily-kvartyry-budynky-avto/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/42299