Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 29, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on May 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian officials continue to dictate the terms and timing of peace negotiations with Ukraine and are attempting to obfuscate the current state of negotiations. Russian officials are setting conditions to falsely accuse Ukraine of delaying negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on May 28 that Russia is prepared to present its memorandum on terms for peace negotiations during the next bilateral meeting with Ukraine and suggested that Russian and Ukrainian representatives should meet in Istanbul on June 2.[i] Lavrov claimed that Russia's memorandum proposes how to "reliably" overcome the Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Lavrov has previously defined the root causes of the war in Ukraine as NATO's eastward expansion following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and Russian culture.[ii] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the last Russian delegation in Istanbul, claimed on May 28 that he spoke with Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and proposed a date for Russia and Ukraine to exchange their memoranda.[iii] Umerov responded to the Russian proposal on May 28 and stated that Ukraine is ready for a ceasefire and further negotiations and that Ukraine has already presented its memorandum to Russia.[iv] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on May 29 that Russia has not received a copy of Ukraine's memorandum and that Ukraine has not responded to Lavrov's proposal, however.[v]

Russia is forcing Ukraine to make concessions on the timing, terms, and location of negotiations. Russian President Vladimir Putin initially suggested on the night of May 10 to 11 "resuming" the 2022 bilateral peace negotiations in Istanbul but later rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation for an in-person, one-on-one meeting in Istanbul.[vi] Ukraine's willingness to attend the May 15 to 16 talks in Istanbul with Russian officials was itself a significant concession, as holding the talks in Istanbul fit into Putin's narrative that the current talks are a resumption of the 2022 Istanbul Protocols in which Russia demanded that Ukraine effectively capitulate to Russia.[vii] US President Donald Trump previously suggested that Russia and Ukraine could move peace talks to the Vatican, but Russian officials rejected this offer and continue to suggest meetings in Istanbul.[viii] Putin unilaterally announced Easter and Victory Day ceasefires in April and May 2025, and Russia is now again unilaterally imposing timelines and terms on Ukraine.[ix] Ukraine, the United States, and European states have repeatedly called for Russia to agree to a renewable ceasefire in Ukraine before Russia and Ukraine begin negotiations for an enduring peace, calls that the Kremlin has repeatedly rejected. Russian officials are instead demanding that negotiations address both a ceasefire and long-term peace agreement in Ukraine. Russian forces will continue to press along the frontline until Ukraine accepts Russia's terms or they are no longer able to do so, and Russian officials will attempt to leverage any additional battlefield gains to extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the West during negotiations.

ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war. Medinsky stated after the May 16 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul that the two delegations agreed to "write...down in detail" the terms for peace and present a memorandum for a possible future ceasefire in the future, but did not specify a deadline.[x] Putin told journalists on May 19 that Russia would present Ukraine with a "memorandum" detailing conditions and timing for a future peace treaty as the two countries move toward conducting bilateral negotiations, but also did not specify a deadline.[xi] Lavrov claimed on May 23 that Russia would present its memorandum to Ukraine as soon as Russia and Ukraine completed their large-scale prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 25.[xii] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated on May 23 that Ukraine expected Russia to present a draft proposal for an unconditional ceasefire agreement after the third and final POW exchange on May 25.[xiii] US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg told Fox News on May 27 that the United States received Ukraine’s memorandum of conditions and timelines for a potential peace treaty and is waiting for Russia to submit its version to begin reconciling the two countries’ positions.[xiv] Russian officials appear to be withholding their memorandum and may attempt to withhold the memorandum until the June 2 meeting. Russian officials may assess that Ukraine will refuse to attend the June 2 meeting if Russia does not provide its memorandum in advance as Ukraine has done and likely intend to seize on Ukraine's refusal to blame Ukraine for stalling peace negotiations.

Western reporting indicates that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasing drone deliveries to Russia while reducing sales to Ukrainian and Western buyers, further demonstrating China's increasingly overt support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on May 29 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently stated that the PRC stopped selling DJI Mavic quadcopter drones, which Russian and Ukrainian forces have used for surveillance and strike missions, to Ukraine and other European countries while continuing to sell the quadcopters to Russia.[xv] Zelensky stated that Russia has domestic DJI Mavic production lines, and that "Chinese representatives" are present at these production facilities. An unnamed European official told Bloomberg that Zelensky's statements are consistent with European assessments and stated that the PRC appears to have reduced deliveries of some drone components to Western buyers while simultaneously increasing deliveries to Russia. ISW has observed recent reporting that Russian forces are fielding Chinese-made equipment, that the PRC is likely aware of and choosing not to stop Russian military recruitment efforts of PRC citizens, and that Russia has established joint production lines with PRC manufacturers for Shahed-like long range strike drones, underscoring the extent of the PRC's support for Russia's war effort.[xvi]

A Ukrainian defense manufacturer and official announced that Ukraine has fielded a long-range drone with sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI). Forbes reported on May 26 that Ukrainian startup company Strategy Force Solutions Chief Technology Officer "Andrii" stated that Ukrainian forces fielded the company's artificial intelligence (AI) powered "mothership" drone – the GOGOL-M – on autonomous missions against Russian military targets for the first time.[xvii] The GOGOL-M mothership drone can reportedly deploy two first-person-view (FPV) drones with automated target acquisition and strike capabilities, and the mothership drone reportedly has a range of 300-kilometers for one-way operations and a range of 100-kilometers to return for reuse.[xviii] The GOGOL-M mothership and compatible FPV drones reportedly use Strategy Force Solutions' SmartPilot system that leverages a combination of advanced sensors and AI to self-orient and execute predefined missions autonomously. The mothership and FPV drones notably do not rely on global positioning systems (GPS), thereby optimizing their electronic warfare (EW) resistance. "Andrii" told Forbes that Strategy Force Solutions is able to produce up to 50 GOGOL-M mothership drones and up to 400 compatible FPV drones per month. Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov confirmed on May 29 that Ukraine fielded the GOGOL-M mothership drone for the first time.[xix]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to dictate the terms and timing of peace negotiations with Ukraine and are attempting to obfuscate the current state of negotiations. Russian officials are setting conditions to falsely accuse Ukraine of delaying negotiations.
• Russia is forcing Ukraine to make concessions on the timing, terms, and location of negotiations.
• ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war.
• Western reporting indicates that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasing drone deliveries to Russia while reducing sales to Ukrainian and Western buyers, further demonstrating China's increasingly overt support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine.
• A Ukrainian defense manufacturer and official announced that Ukraine has fielded a long-range drone with sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, and Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on May 29 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[xx]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk Oblast on May 28 and 29.[xxi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked towards Tetkino and Glushkovo (northeast of Tetkino).[xxii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino, and drone operators of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue operating in the Tetkino direction[xxiii]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 29.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on May 29 that Russian forces seized Kostyantynivka and Volodymyrivka (both north of Sumy City).[xxiv] Mashovets credited elements of the Russian 155th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) with seizing the settlements.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City), toward Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City), up to Novomykolaivka (north of Sumy City), and entered Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[xxv]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City toward Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on May 29.[xxvi]

Ukraine’s Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko reported on May 29 that the Russian military command has concentrated enough forces in Kursk Oblast to conduct offensive operations further into Sumy Oblast.[xxvii]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the 76th and 106th airborne (VDV) divisions are operating near Loknya and Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City); elements of the 11th VDV Brigade and the 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division) are operating near Oleshnya (east of Loknya); elements of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th AC, LMD) are attacking between Bilovody and Vodolahy; and elements of the 9th and 150th motorized rifle regiments (18th Motorized Rifle Division) are operating near Volodymyrivka and Novomykolaivka.[xxviii] Mashovets noted that the 76th and 106th VDV divisions make up the majority of Russia's Kursk Grouping of Forces.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Zernova Street in northern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxix]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsia and Vovchansk on May 28 and 29.[xxx]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported that Russian forces are attempting to mitigate the threat of Ukrainian drones by attacking on motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to outmaneuver the drones, but that Russian forces are struggling to hear the sound of approaching drones over the vehicle engine noise.[xxxi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 29 shows Russian forces raising a flag in the southwestern outskirts of Stroivka (northeast of Kupyansk along the international border), indicating that Russian forces likely seized the settlement.[xxxii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces seized Stroivka.[xxxiii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Stroivka and east of and into Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk).[xxxiv]

Russian forces continued ground assaults north of Kupyansk near Doroshivka and northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and along to the international border near Stroivka and Kamyanka on May 28 and 29.[xxxv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dovhenke (north of Kupyansk).[xxxvi]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated that Russian forces are attempting to transfer equipment to the west (right) bank of the Oskil River near Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) to intensify offensive operations in the area but that Ukrainian forces are striking Russian pontoon bridges and equipment attempting to cross the river.[xxxvii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 28 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Hrekivka (southeast of Borova).[xxxviii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces further advanced south of Hrekivka.[xxxix]

Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka, Zahryzove, and Zeleny Hai; east of Borova near Nadiya and Zeleny Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on May 28 and 29.[xl]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 29 shows a Russian soldier raising a Russian flag in western Ridkodub (north of Lyman), indicating that Russian forces likely seized the settlement.[xli] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces seized Ridkodub.[xlii]

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 1st and 15th motorized rifle regiments (2nd Motorized Ridle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) advanced about 1.2 to 1.5 kilometers in the Lypove-Karpivka direction (north of Lyman) from May 27 to 29. Mashovets stated that elements of the 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) likely bypassed Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman) to the north and south and are preparing to seize the settlement.[xliii] Mashovets stated that elements of the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA) advanced up to one kilometer west of Novomykhailivka (north of Lyman). A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized a fishery in Torske (east of Lyman), but another milblogger suggested that Russian forces do not yet have enduring positions at the fishery.[xliv]

Russian forces continued ground assaults northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Ridkodub and Lypove and toward Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, Seredyne, and Novyi Mir; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; and east of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area and Torske on May 28 and 29.[xlv]

Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division resumed offensive operations west of the Zherebets River after the 144th Motorized Rifle Division conducted a short pause for rotations.[xlvi] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are advancing in the Lyman direction due to a significant manpower advantage and that additional elements of the 144th and 3rd motorized rifle divisions and 4th Tank Division (1st GTA) recently redeployed to the area.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 28 and 29 but did not advance.[xlvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 29 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Zaliznyanske (northeast of Chasiv Yar) and in central Chasiv Yar.[xlviii]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; northwest of Chasiv Yar near Markove; south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and Stupochky and toward Bila Hora; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on May 28 and 29.[xlix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 737th Anti-Tank Artillery Division (reportedly of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[l] Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and its 331st VDV Regiment are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[li]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toresk direction on May 29 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Minister of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) with seizing Hnativka (southwest of Toretsk).[lii] ISW assessed that Russian forces likely seized the settlement as of May 25.[liii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Rusyn Yar (northwest of Torestk).[liv]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, Krymske, and Druzhba; and northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, Zorya, and Yablunivka and toward Pleshchiivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove on May 28 and 29.[lv] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces counterattacked southwest of Toretsk near Zorya, Oleksandropil, and Stara Mykolaivka.[lvi]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) and 1436th Motorized Rifle Regiment (132nd Motorized Rifle Division, 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are operating near Zorya, Oleksandropil, and Stara Mykolaivka and that elements of the 255th and 33rd motorized rifle regiments (both 20th Motorized Rifle Division) are operating in the Novoolenivka-Yablunivka and Oleksandropil-Yablunivka areas (southwest of Torestk).[lvii] Drone operators of the Russian 346th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating west of Toretsk.[lviii] Drone operators of the Russian 163rd Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[lix]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[lx]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 29 that Russian forces seized Shevchenko Pershe (northeast of Pokrovsk).[lxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Myrne, Myrolyubivka, and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on May 28 and 29.[lxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) recently advanced up to one kilometer near Troitske and Horikhove (east of Novopavlivka).[lxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka and east of Novopavlivka near Troitske, Kotlyarivka, and Horikhove on May 28 and 29.[lxiv] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 29 that Ukrainian forces recently counterattacked between Novomykolaivka and Kotlyarivka.[lxv]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated on May 29 that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are attacking near Novomykolaivka and Kotlyarivka.[lxvi]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northeastern Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[lxvii]

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) advanced up to one kilometer northeast of Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[lxviii]

Russian forces continued assaults west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Kostyantynivka, Bahatyr, and toward Oleksiivka and Odradne on May 28 and 29.[lxix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recently unsuccessfully counterattacked from Novoukrainka (northwest of Kurakhove).[lxx]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction reported on May 29 that fiber optic drones are a significant impediment to movement along the frontline and that Russian forces can operate fiber optic drones up to 20 kilometers from their positions.[lxxi]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are attacking near Bahatyr and Odradne along the H-15 Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City highway.[lxxii] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Zelenyi Kut (west of Kurakhove).[lxxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Komar and toward Vesele and Voskresenka; west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and Novodarivka on May 28 and 29.[lxxiv] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 29 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar, Zelene Pole, and Novopil.[lxxv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating near Komar and Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[lxxvi] 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on May 29.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 35th Radiation, Biological, and Chemical Protection Regiment (35th Combined Arms Army (CAA), Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Polohy (Hulyaipole) direction.[lxxvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 29 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces may have advanced near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[lxxviii]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka and Robotyne, and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Shcherbaky on May 28 and 29.[lxxix] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mala Tokmachka and Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[lxxx]

An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported that Russian forces are fielding drones with increased ranges and are striking targets between 20 and 30 kilometers behind the frontline.[lxxxi]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on May 28 and 29 but did not advance.[lxxxii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 28 to 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 90 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast and Oryol and Kursk cities.[lxxxiii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 10 drones and that 46 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems.[lxxxiv] The Ukrainian Air Force noted that the strike mainly targeted frontline areas, which is unusual as long-range Russian strike drones typically target rear Ukrainian cities.

Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vitaly Kim reported on May 29 that Russian forces struck Horokhiv with an unspecified number of ballistic missiles during the day.[lxxxv]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.