1 day ago

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 19, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on May 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a phone call on May 19 to discuss ceasefire and peace negotiations regarding Russia's war in Ukraine. Trump stated that he and Putin agreed that Russia and Ukraine will immediately begin bilateral negotiations about both a ceasefire and a peace agreement.[1] Trump also said that he called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen after his conversation with Putin and informed them that bilateral negotiations will begin immediately. Trump stated that the Vatican is "very interested in hosting the negotiations." Trump also expressed interest in reviving US–Russian trade after Ukraine and Russia agree to a peace deal and said that Ukraine could also benefit from trade during the reconstruction process. Putin spoke to journalists following the call on May 19 and stated that he and Trump agreed that Russia would present Ukraine with a "memorandum" detailing conditions and timing for a future peace treaty as the two countries move toward conducting bilateral negotiations.[2] Putin also stated that Russia’s "main" concern is the elimination of the war’s "root causes," reiterating a long-standing Kremlin narrative calling for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a Russian proxy government and Ukraine's commitment to neutrality.[3] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov told journalists on May 19 that Trump and Putin also discussed a possible nine-for-nine US–Russian prisoner exchange.[4]

Zelensky stated that he spoke with Trump before Trump's call with Putin and spoke with Trump, Macron, Meloni, Merz, Stubb, and von der Leyen following the Trump–Putin call.[5] Zelensky reaffirmed Ukraine's readiness for a full unconditional ceasefire as Trump has previously proposed. Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready for direct negotiations with Russia "in any format" and offered Turkey, the Vatican, or Switzerland as possible venues for talks. Zelensky called for the negotiation process to involve both American and European representatives "at the appropriate level." Russia must break its pattern of protracting negotiations and failing to offer any meaningful concessions to Ukraine in order for legitimate and good-faith negotiations to lead to a lasting and sustainable end to its war against Ukraine.

Russia must explicitly acknowledge the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and constitution and Ukraine's sovereignty in order to engage in meaningful, good-faith negotiations. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly falsely claimed that Zelensky is the illegitimate leader according to the Ukrainian Constitution and that all Ukrainian governments since 2014 are also illegitimate.[6] Ukraine's Constitution and law explicitly state that Ukraine cannot hold elections while martial law is in place and that Ukrainian authorities cannot lift martial law while "the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity" remains.[7] Russia and Ukraine cannot engage in meaningful negotiations so long as Russia refuses to recognize the negotiating authority of Ukraine. Russian officials have forwarded the narrative about the Ukrainian government's alleged illegitimacy as recently as May 17, and ISW continues to assess that this Russian effort is aimed at setting conditions for Russia to renege on any future Ukrainian–Russian agreements at a time of Russia's choosing.[8] Any future peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and constitution.

Russia must agree that ceasefire negotiations must precede peace settlement negotiations. The United States, Ukraine, and Europe have repeatedly called for the establishment of a ceasefire to allow for diplomatic talks to end Russia's war in Ukraine to proceed.[9] Russia has consistently rejected this sequence of events as part of efforts to hold any ceasefire talks hostage to extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the West.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russia is committed to prolonging peace negotiations so as to continue making battlefield advances.[11] Peace talks ahead of an established ceasefire would allow Russia to continue to make advances in Ukraine, which Russia would likely try to leverage in Ukrainian–Russian talks to extract further concessions. Any future ceasefire will require Russia and Ukraine to engage in separate negotiations to agree on the necessary robust monitoring mechanisms, and conflating ceasefire talks with peace settlement talks will likely delay the implementation of a ceasefire.

Russia must show its willingness to make concessions of its own in any future bilateral negotiations, especially as the Kremlin appears to be setting conditions to expand its list of demands amid the peace talks.[12] Russian officials have called for Ukraine to cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — even the areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy — before Russia can agree to a ceasefire.[13] Territorial demands are typically the subject of war termination negotiations, not ceasefire talks. Russia has reportedly already started to increase its demands, with Western and Ukrainian sources reporting that the Russian delegation threatened to seize Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts — two oblasts that Russia has not illegally annexed or claimed — during the May 16 talks in Istanbul.[14] This tactic suggests that Russia will make additional, more extreme territorial demands during war termination talks should Ukraine agree to Russia's ceasefire preconditions.

Russia reportedly continues to expand its military infrastructure along its border with Finland and Estonia, likely in preparation for future aggression against NATO. The New York Times (NYT) reported on May 19 that recent satellite imagery, which NATO officials confirmed, shows that Russia is building bases and military infrastructure near the Finnish and Estonian borders.[15] The NYT reported that Russian forces are building and renovating tents, vehicle storage warehouses, fighter jet shelters, and helicopter bases at Olenya and Alakurtti air bases in Murmansk Oblast, Kamenka Air Base in Komi Republic, and Petrozavodsk Air Base in the Republic of Karelia. A senior NATO official stated that Russia will likely redeploy troops further north when its war in Ukraine ends and that Russia assesses that its access to the Arctic is key for its great power status. The NYT stated that Finnish defense officials predict that it will take Russia roughly five years to build up its forces to threatening levels after the war in Ukraine is over, possibly tripling the number of Russian forces on the Finnish border. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) similarly reported in April 2025 that Western military and intelligence officials stated that Russia is expanding military bases near Petrozavodsk and upgrading railway lines and other infrastructure along Russia's western border with NATO.[16] Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev recently used narratives similar to those that the Kremlin has used to justify its invasions of Ukraine to threaten Finland.[17]

Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on May 18 and confirmed the provision of Abrams tanks to Ukraine, and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) reported on May 19 that the first of 49 Abrams tanks are en route to Ukraine.[18] Denmark announced on May 17 a military aid package for Ukraine worth 4.2 billion Danish kroner (about $632 million) for 2025–2028 that includes artillery systems and ammunition, equipment for fighter jets, and funding for Ukrainian Air Force training facilities.[19] The Finnish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on May 19 that it signed an agreement with the European Commission to supply Ukraine with materiel and heavy ammunition worth 90 million euros (about $101 million) using the profits from Russian frozen assets.[20]

Key Takeaways:

  • US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a phone call on May 19 to discuss ceasefire and peace negotiations regarding Russia's war in Ukraine.
  • Russia must explicitly acknowledge the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and constitution and Ukraine's sovereignty in order to engage in meaningful, good-faith negotiations.
  • Russia must agree that ceasefire negotiations must precede peace settlement negotiations.
  • Russia must show its willingness to make concessions of its own in any future bilateral negotiations, especially as the Kremlin appears to be setting conditions to expand its list of demands amid the peace talks.
  • Russia reportedly continues to expand its military infrastructure along its border with Finland and Estonia, likely in preparation for future aggression against NATO.
  • Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

  • Alleged Ceasefire Violation
  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

 

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the southern outskirts of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[21]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the international border checkpoint southeast of Tetkino.[22]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked toward Tetkino and Novyi Put (southwest of Glushkovo and east of Tetkino).[23]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 19 that North Korean forces are no longer conducting assaults in the Kursk direction and that the Russian military only deploys them "episodically" on Russian territory.[24]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near the Kursk Oblast border area.[25] Elements of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[26]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 19.

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 275th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) participated in repelling recent Ukrainian attacks near Popovka and Demidovka (both northwest of Belgorod City).[27]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 19, but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 19 that Russian forces seized Marine, Sumy Oblast (just across the international border from Demidovka, Belgorod Oblast).[28] A Russian source claimed that the seizure of Marine will support Russia's effort to create a buffer zone near the international border.[29] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 19 that elements of the Russian 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 106th Airborne (VDV) Division advanced to the road between Bilovody and Vodolahy (both northeast of Sumy City) and reached the outskirts of Vodolahy.[30]

Ukraine's Siversk Group of Forces Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk reported on May 19 that Russia is accumulating forces in Kursk Oblast and continues to attack in small infantry groups along the Sumy-Kursk Oblast international border.[31]

Order of Battle: Mashovets assessed that two battalions of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) likely redeployed back to southern Ukraine.[32] Mashovets stated that elements of the 18th and 72nd motorized rifle divisions (11th AC, LMD) are conducting most of the assaults in the Sumy direction and that likely elements of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are attacking toward Basivka-Loknya (northeast of Sumy City).[33] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 79th and 280th motorized rifle regiments and 11th Tank Regiment (all of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division) are likely operating in the Sumy direction.[34] Mashovets stated that elements of the 104th VDV Regiment and 7th VDV Division are operating between Tetkino (just across the border in Kursk Oblast, northwest of Sumy City) and Basivka (northeast of Sumy City).[35] Mashovets stated that Russian forces likely have four or five motorized rifle regiments from the mobilization reserve in the Sumy direction that are either attached to units in the Kursk Grouping of Forces or directly subordinated to the grouping.[36] Drone operators of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[37]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast on May 19 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 18 that Russian forces cleared residential areas within northeastern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and marginally advanced towards Vovchanski Khutory (immediately east of Vovchansk).[38]

Russian forces continued ground assaults near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on May 18 and 19.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 18 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[40]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen 204th “Akhmat” Spetsnaz Regiment's “Bati” Detachment are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Kupyansk direction on May 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Kupyansk along the international border near Stroivka and north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka on May 18 and 19.[42]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces decreased the size of their infantry assault groups from five to six personnel to two to three personnel and that Russian forces continue to prefer using buggies, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) over armored vehicles in assaults.[43] Ukrainian Kupyansk Raion Military Administration Head Andriy Kanashevich stated that Russian forces have increased the amount and scope of air and artillery strikes in Kupyansk Raion.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces used Shahed drones, which Russian forces normally use for long-range strikes against rear areas in Ukraine, to strike Ukrainian military targets in the Kupyansk direction.[45]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Serhiivka (east of Borova).[46]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces reached the southern outskirts of Hrekivka and advanced southwest of Makiivka (both southeast of Borova).[47]

Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka, east of Borova toward Kopanky, and southeast of Borova near Tverdokhlibove and Novoserhiivka and toward Olhivka on May 18 and 19.[48]

Geolocated footage published on May 19 shows that Russian forces conducted a roughly platoon-sized Russian mechanized and motorized assault northeast of Stelmakhivka (northeast of Borova in the Russian near rear) on the morning of May 14 with three motorcycles, two light armored vehicles, and one tank.[49]

Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Lyman direction on May 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced within Torske (east of Lyman).[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within Lypove and northeast of Novomykhailivka (both north of Lyman) and one kilometer in the area east of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[51]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Lyman toward Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, Lypove, Novyi Mir, Karpivka, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Hlushchenkove, Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske on May 18 and 19.[52]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction refuted Russian claims from May 15 that Russian forces seized Torske, reporting that Russian forces did not establish enduring positions within central Torske and that Ukrainian forces control all of the settlement.[53] The Ukrainian brigade commander reported that Russian forces attempt to enter Torske in assault groups of two to three soldiers and that Ukrainian forces kill or wound 80 to 90 percent of these groups.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[54]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 18 and 19.[55]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Chasiv Yar and southeast of Ozaryanivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[56]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself, northwest of Chasiv Yar toward Mayske, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ozaryanivka and Kurdyumivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and toward Stupochky on May 18 and 19.[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (both of the 98th VDV Division) reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar.[58]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the railway southeast of Dyliivka (northeast of Toretsk).[59]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Toretsk.[60]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Romanivka (southwest of Toretsk).[61] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced between Druzhba and Krymske (both northeast of Toretsk); southwest of Zorya; south and west of Hnativka; north of Nova Poltavka; north of Myrne (all southwest of Toretsk); near Novoolenivka; to the western outskirts of Yablunivka; and to the southern outskirts of Popiv Yar and Poltavka (all west of Toretsk).[62]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Druzhba; southwest of Toretsk near Nova Poltavka and Stara Mykolaivka and toward Shevchenko Pershe and Zorya; and west of Toretsk near Novospaske and toward Yablunivka and Popiv Yar on May 18 and 19.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stara Mykolaivka and Hnativka.[64]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 19 that Russian forces recently seized Novoolenivka (west of Toretsk), but ISW observed geolocated footage indicating Russian forces seized the settlement as of May 16.[65]

A Russian milblogger claimed on May 19 that Russian forces operating near Romanivka interdicted Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying Ukrainian forces in Zorya, Hnativka, and Stara Mykolaivka.[66] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces operating in the pocket between Novoolenivka and Toretsk can only conduct logistics via a dirt road from Oleksandro-Kalynove.

Order of Battle: Drone and artillery elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Druzhba.[67]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced north and southwest of Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk).[68]

Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Yelyzavetivka, east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Novotoretske, southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske and Zvirove, and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Kotlyne on May 18 and 19.[69]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[70]

 

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka).[71]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced further north of Kotlyarivka, near Novooleksandrivka, and toward Muravka (both northeast of Novopavlivka).[72]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka and toward Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske and Horikhove on May 18 and 19.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novomykolaivka and Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Oleksiivka, northwest of Bahatyr (both west of Kurakhove), and east of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[75]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on May 18 and 19.[76] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Odradne and Bahatyr.[77]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on May 19 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Bahatyr and have pushed Russian forces back to the H-15 Bahatyr-Komar road south of Bahatyr.[78] Ukrainian Vuhledar Tactical Group Spokesperson Oleksiy Belsky stated on May 19 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Bahatyr, Kostyantynopil, Andriivka (west of Kurakhove), and Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove) despite the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) claimed seizures of these settlements.[79] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with recently seizing Bahatyr.[80]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern and southern Zelene Pole and Novopil (both southwest of Velyka Novosilka), near Vilne Pole, and east of Fedorivka (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[81]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Velyka Novosilka toward Komar; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne, Vilne Pole, and Shevchenko; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil, Novopil, and Zelene Pole on May 18 and 19.[82] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zelene Pole and Novopil.[83]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, EMD) and 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[84] Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) are reportedly operating near Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka in Russia's near rear).[85]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on May 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv toward Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka, southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, and northwest of Orikhiv toward Lukyanivkse on May 18 and 19.[86]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-11 “Kuban” Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[87] Elements of the "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly operating near Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[88] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division and the "Nemets" group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[89]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on May 18 and 19 but did not advance.[90]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on May 18 and 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 112 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[91] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 76 drones over northern, eastern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 35 drones were "lost." Ukrainian official sources reported that Russian drones struck Kharkiv, Sumy, Donetsk, Cherkasy, and Kirovohrad oblasts.[92]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114535693441367601

[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76953

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052824

[4] https://tass dot ru/politika/23985999

[5] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1924545178997551182

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052824

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050125

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061424; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625; https://x.com/olliecarroll/status/1923371616227979459; https://t.me/oleksiihoncharenko/47144

[15] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/19/world/europe/russia-finland-border.html

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025

[18] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1924133485754613832 ; https://www.abc.net dot au/news/2025-05-19/us-officials-frustrated-australia-sending-tanks-to-ukraine/105308996

[19] https://www.fmn dot dk/da/nyheder/2025/ny-donationspakke-sikrer-artillerisystemer-og-materiel-til-ukraines-flyvevaben/; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/denmark-announces-new-military-aid-package-for-ukraine-including-f-16-support-and-training-infrastructure/

[20] https://www.defmin dot fi/en/topical/press_releases_and_news/finland_to_supply_ammunition_to_ukraine_by_using_proceeds_from_frozen_russian_assets.15035.news#dfdee12d

[21] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9183; https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd/1301  

[22] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28285; https://t.me/pentagonkh/253  

[23] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91909; https://t.me/dva_majors/71457; https://t.me/dva_majors/71460; https://t.me/wargonzo/26628

[24] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2746

[25] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91926

[26] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91939

[27] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2747

[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/52868 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52870

[29] https://t.me/tass_agency/315724

[30] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2746

[31] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/19/formuyut-shturmovi-pidrozdily-na-pivnichnomu-prykordonni-vorog-pragne-rozshyryty-zonu-bojovyh-dij/

[32] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2745

[33] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2746

[34] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2747

[35] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2747

[36] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2746

[37] https://t.me/dva_majors/71469

[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28834

[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24401; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10271; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10271; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24404

[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28834

[41] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5736

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24401; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10271; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10271; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24404

[43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/19/shturmy-mayut-hvylepodibnu-systemu-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-atakuyut-na-rarytetah/

[44] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1021525-kerivnik-kupanskoi-rva-sposterigaemo-sistemnu-robotu-zi-zneskodzenna-mista-kupanska/

[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28875

[46] https://t.me/endspiell/941;https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1924234380886823295

[47] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64382; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165248

[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24401; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10271; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10271; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24404

[49] https://www.facebook.com/77oaembr/videos/718387530724457/; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1924363978261627223; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1924369578190110836

[50] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64382; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28829

[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28829; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64382

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24435; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24404; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24401; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64382; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28829; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10271

[53] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/15Svytg4fo/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/19/pomahaly-praporamy-i-zdohly-z-golodu-kombryg-pro-fikcziyu-rosijskogo-vzyattya-torskogo/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2025

[54] https://t.me/dva_majors/71466

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24435; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24404; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24401; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10271

[56] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1924180752402366781; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1923755846766559330; https://t.me/official24ombr/1066; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28276; https://t.me/BBpS_28/831

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24435; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24404; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24401; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10271; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64378

[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28847

[59] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1924231434094448656; https://t.me/ecologists_donbass/5126

[60] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1924457998274920752; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1108

[61] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64395; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28867; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31601; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36127; https://t.me/lost_armour/5292; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165287

[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64378; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28838; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64395; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36127; https://t.me/dva_majors/71460; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31604; tps://t.me/yurasumy/23049; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64398

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24435; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24404; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24401; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10271; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64395; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165279

[64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28838

[65] https://t.me/mod_russia/52869 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52870; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025

[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64398

[67] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13823

[68] https://t.me/rybar/70501

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24435; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24404; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24401; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10271; https://t.me/dva_majors/71460

[70] https://t.me/sashakots/53751

[71] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28288; https://t.me/BlackWings59/39; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9178

[72] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64383; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31610; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64383

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24435; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24404; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24401 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10271 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71460; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64383

[74] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64383

[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28840; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28840; https://t.me/voin_dv/15039;

[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24435; https:/; /t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24404 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24401; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10271; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28840

[77] https://t.me/dva_majors/71460; https://t.me/wargonzo/26628

[78] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1021039-sili-oboroni-kontroluut-selo-bagatir-na-doneccini-recnik-osuv-hortica/

[79] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/19/vorog-atakuvav-z-kilkoh-napryamkiv-potim-zminyv-taktyku-u-tgr-vugledar-rozpovily-detali-bytvy-za-bagatyr/

[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/52872

[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/15039; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64380; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165248

[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24435; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24404 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24401; https://t.me/dva_majors/71460; https://t.me/voin_dv/15039; https://t.me/wargonzo/26628; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165248

[83] https://t.me/voin_dv/15039

[84] https://t.me/voin_dv/15025

[85] https://t.me/voin_dv/15031

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24435; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24404; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24401

[87] https://x.com/franfran2424/status/1924138169290600752; https://x.com/franfran2424/status/1924138873958924294; https://t.me/BARS011/24722

[88] https://t.me/dva_majors/71493

[89] https://t.me/dva_majors/71495; https://t.me/wargonzo/26633

[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24435; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24404; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24401

[91] https://t.me/kpszsu/34584

[92] https://t.me/kpszsu/34584; https://t.me/synegubov/14342; https://t.me/synegubov/14343 https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/1020515-u-cerkasah-19-travna-lunali-vibuhi-so-vidomo-pro-dronovu-ataku-rf/

View Citations