May 02, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 2, 2025

May 2, 2025, 9:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on May 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months, but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024. ISW assesses that Russian forces gained a total of 1,627 square kilometers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in January, February, March, and April 2025, and daily Russian casualty reports from the Ukrainian General Staff indicate that Russian forces suffered 160,600 casualties during the last four months for an average of 99 casualties for every square kilometer taken over the last four months. ISW assesses that Russian forces seized an estimated 496 square kilometers in January 2025; an estimated 313 square kilometers in February 2025; an estimated 601 square kilometers in March 2025; and an estimated 217 square kilometers in April 2025. Ukrainian General Staff reports indicate that Russian forces lost an estimated 48,060 casualties in January 2025, 35,300 casualties in February 2025, 40,670 casualties in March 2025, and 36,570 casualties in April 2025.[1] Russian advances significantly increased in March 2025 due to the elimination of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, coinciding with the temporary cessation of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine, although Russian advances on average decreased between January, February, and April 2025. Russian gains have also slowed as Russian forces come up against more well-defended Ukrainian positions in and around larger towns such as Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk over the last four months.

Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024. Russian forces gained an estimated 2,949 square kilometers at the cost of 174,935 casualties between September and December 2024 — an average of 59 casualties per square kilometer taken.[2] Russian casualty rates consistently increased throughout September, October, November, and December 2024 and peaked at an estimated 49,135 total monthly casualties in December 2024.[3] Monthly Russian rates of advance plateaued at 839 square kilometers in November 2024, however, and began to slow in December 2024 to an assessed 593 square kilometers and have continued to slow in 2025 (with the exception of the elimination of the Kursk salient). Russian gains have been 45 percent slower between January and April 2025 than in the period between September and December 2024, although Russian casualty rates have only decreased by 10 percent in that interval. The Russian military command thus appears to be tolerating similar personnel loss rates despite a significant decrease in the rate of territorial gains.

Russia has thus far sustained these casualties and the current tempo of offensive operations by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units, although the reliance on such troops is also hindering Russia's ability to conduct complex operations and make rapid advances in Ukraine. ISW has not observed a notable decrease in the tempo of Russian offensive operations along the frontline in recent months, despite the slowing rates of advance, suggesting that Russia is generating enough forces to sustain these casualties without having to deprioritize any frontline area. ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine, and this limited training is likely constraining recruits' combat capabilities and the Russian military's overall capacity to successfully conduct complex operations.[4] The Russian military command is currently prioritizing funneling poorly trained recruits into highly attritional infantry assaults to offset personnel losses in Ukraine while sustaining the current tempo of operations, possibly at the expense of Russia's long-term warfighting capabilities.[5] The Russian military does not have a reserve pool of well-trained troops who are not currently engaged in combat in Ukraine and can rapidly deploy along the frontline, and the Russian military command's decision to funnel poorly trained troops to the frontline in Ukraine is undermining Russia's ability to create a pool of such forces.[6]

Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to maintaining the tempo of offensive operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin's ongoing efforts to leverage further battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to force Ukraine's collapse. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and Ukraine and make additional battlefield gains.[7] Russian forces intensified offensive operations throughout the frontline in February and March 2025, including a limited offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast, as part of an ongoing Russian effort to slowly degrade frontline Ukrainian positions and make opportunistic tactical advances. Putin may intend to leverage any gains over the last four months and in the near future to extract further Ukrainian and Western concessions during future peace negotiations. It remains unclear if Russia will maintain sufficient force generation rates to sustain offensive operations in Ukraine indefinitely, however, due to the rising economic cost of social benefits and one-time payments for Russian servicemembers.[8] ISW previously noted that Russia's ongoing and forecasted economic struggles are closely tied to Russian losses on the battlefield and that it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure on Russia with economic tools alone.[9] The United States can better leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position and more durable resolution to the war in Ukraine by forcing Putin to rethink his negotiation and battlefield strategies and empowering Ukrainian forces to continue inflicting significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.

Western intelligence reportedly suggests that Putin may begin prioritizing short-term goals such as consolidating Russia's gains in Ukraine and Russia's immediate economic viability over seizing more territory, but Putin's demonstrated commitment to maintaining the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite continuing high casualty rates is a counter-indicator to this reported assessment. CNN reported on May 1 that new intelligence reviewed by US and Western officials suggests that Putin may be pivoting his immediate focus to shorter-term objectives of cementing Russian control over occupied Ukrainian territory and boosting Russia's economy.[10] CNN reported that Putin may be concerned by the Trump administration's threats to apply more sanctions on the struggling Russian economy. An unnamed official told CNN that Putin's willingness to settle for more limited objectives in Ukraine depends on whether Putin can portray Russia's gains in Ukraine as an acceptable victory domestically. The source insinuated that Putin likely remains committed to revisiting his longer-term goals of subjugating all of Ukraine and undermining NATO after taking a "significant pause," however.

ISW has observed a variety of indicators suggesting that Putin is not reconsidering his short-term objectives in Ukraine, however. Russian forces have increased the intensity of offensive operations throughout the theater, particularly redoubling efforts to advance deeper in the Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions and launching a limited offensive operation in Sumy Oblast.[11] Russian forces are rapidly integrating tactical innovations to optimize timely gains in response to Ukrainian drone operators, including integrating motorcycles into offensive operations in Ukraine.[12] The Kremlin is also leveraging legal, financial, and socioeconomic measures to increase Russia's force generation capabilities and boost Russia's drone production capabilities to support the war in Ukraine.[13]

A future slowing of Russian offensive operations and/or transition to defensive operations in all or part of the theater would be indicators that Putin is shifting his short-term goals from seizing more territory to consolidating previously held territory. Putin could choose to pivot toward shorter-term objectives on account of mounting economic and manpower constraints that are increasingly hindering Russia's ability to perpetuate its war in Ukraine.[14] Russian forces could slow the tempo of offensive operations and work to implement policies and tactics to mitigate casualties if Putin issues an order to prioritize consolidating Russia's hold over occupied Ukraine instead of making further gains. Russian forces would likely shift to defensive operations with the aim of fortifying and consolidating current positions on the frontline, largely in an effort to safeguard battlefield gains and preserve increasingly limited manpower and materiel reserves, in response to such an order. Russian forces could begin constructing fortifications near frontline positions in response to such an order. ISW would observe such indicators and will continue to monitor Russian and Ukrainian reporting for these indicators.

ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his long-term military objectives of seizing all of Ukraine and undermining NATO. Senior US officials reportedly remain skeptical that Putin has eased his intransigence regarding a peace agreement and told CNN that Russia may resume the war and try to seize more Ukrainian territory even after agreeing to a US peace proposal.[15] CNN reported that unspecified officials maintain the belief that Russia will retain its aims of seizing the maximal amount of Ukrainian territory even if Putin signs a peace agreement. Ongoing Russian efforts to seize Lyman and Pokrovsk and advance north of Toretsk toward the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka indicate that Putin maintains his long-standing goals of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast.[16] The Russian government's efforts to expand Russia's force generation capabilities in the short- and long-term and Russia's ongoing military restructuring efforts suggest that Russia is not only responding to a drawn-out conflict in Ukraine but also preparing for a future conflict on Russia's western borders.[17] The Russian government also continues to prioritize long-term investment in Russia's domestic industrial base (DIB), despite the significant economic cost of this wartime economy to Russia’s population.[18] These factors indicate that Putin is not abandoning his territorial ambitions in Ukraine but is in fact preparing for a long war of attrition against Ukraine and likely the collective West.

Russian officials are also continuing to condition Russian society to support a long-term war effort in Ukraine and against NATO. Russian officials, including Putin, have consistently leveraged false claims about the war in Ukraine to make maximalist territorial demands, including that Ukraine give up "Novorossiya" — an invented region of Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia that Ukraine must concede for Russia to end the war.[19] Putin invoked the term "Novorossiya" as recently as April 21, indicating that the Kremlin has not abandoned this territorial objective.[20] Russian state media previously cautioned Russian domestic audiences in March 2025 against expecting "big agreements" from recent peace negotiations between Putin and US President Donald Trump.[21] A Verstka poll of 100 Russian military personnel published on April 29 indicates that only 18% of career Russian military personnel and officers, most of whom have been fighting in Ukraine for over two years, would support a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine prior to achieving Putin's stated goals (likely referring to the demilitarization and "denazification" of Ukraine).[22] Only about a fifth of surveyed Russian military personnel and civilians indicated that they believe the war will end in the coming months. Verstka’s polling indicates that the Kremlin is not preparing the Russian information space for a peace agreement in the near future and that Russian forces and society do not anticipate an imminent end to the war. This pattern of Kremlin informational activity and the resonance it has achieved in Russian society will make it much harder for Putin to present any long-term ceasefire, let alone peace agreement, that falls far short of his stated aims as any kind of victory to his domestic audience.

Statements by US officials suggest that the Trump administration is considering stepping back from intensified mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine. US Vice President JD Vance told Fox News on May 1 that the war in Ukraine will not end "any time soon" and that it is "up to the Russians and Ukrainians now that each side knows what the other’s terms are for peace."[23] US Secretary of State and Acting National Security Advisor Marco Rubio told Fox News on May 1 that US President Donald Trump will need to prioritize other issues if Ukrainian and Russian negotiating positions remain too far apart for reconciliation but that the United States will continue "helping" wherever possible.[24] US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce echoed Rubio’s statements during a press briefing on May 1 and noted that the matter of resolving the conflict in Ukraine is "now“ between Russia and Ukraine, as the United States is changing its "style" and "methodology" and will no longer "fly around the world at the drop of a hat" to mediate negotiations."[25] Bruce reiterated that the United States is "still committed" to a lasting peace in Ukraine

The US Department of State submitted a proposed license for defense exports to Ukraine to the US Congress on April 29.[26] The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is considering the proposal.

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months, but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024.
  • Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024.
  • Russia has thus far sustained these casualties and the current tempo of offensive operations by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units, although the reliance on such troops is also hindering Russia's ability to conduct complex operations and make rapid advances in Ukraine.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to maintaining the tempo of offensive operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin's ongoing efforts to leverage further battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to force Ukraine's collapse.
  • Western intelligence reportedly suggests that Putin may begin prioritizing short-term goals such as consolidating Russia's gains in Ukraine and Russia's immediate economic viability over seizing more territory, but Putin's demonstrated commitment to maintaining the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite continuing high casualty rates is a counter-indicator to this reported assessment.
  • A future slowing of Russian offensive operations and/or transition to defensive operations in all or part of the theater would be indicators that Putin is shifting his short-term goals from seizing more territory to consolidating previously held territory.
  • ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his long-term military objectives of seizing all of Ukraine and undermining NATO.
  • Statements by US officials suggest that the Trump administration is considering stepping back from intensified mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine.
  • The US Department of State submitted a proposed license for defense exports to Ukraine to the US Congress on April 29.
  • Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

  • Alleged Ceasefire Violation
  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Limited fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 2, but Russian forces did not advance.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in Gornal and the Gornal Monastery contrary to the Russian MoD's April 26 claim that Russian forces seized the settlement.[27]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[28]

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that unattributed drones struck the Russian Zvezda military space intelligence facility in Stavropol Krai on May 2.[29] Kovalenko noted that facility is one of the Russian General Staff Main Directorate's [GRU] main electronic intelligence system stations and specializes in detecting foreign intelligence communication systems and commercial electronic signatures in orbit. Kovalenko stated that Russia used the facility as a technical base to monitor Ukraine and conduct cyber intelligence operations. Stavropol Krai Governor Vladimir Vladimirov claimed that Ukrainian drone fragments fell in Moskovskoe village in Izobilnensky Raion but caused no damage or casualties.[30]

Fighting continued in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 2, but Russian forces did not advance.

A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continued near Popovka and Demidovka (both northwest of Belgorod City) and that Russian forces are conducting drone operations in the area.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 2, but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Bilovody (northeast of Sumy City), while another milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized the majority of the settlement.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Loknya (southeast of Bilovody) toward Yablunivka (south of Bilovody).[33]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Volodymyrivka and Vodolahy and northeast of Sumy City near Zhuravka and Loknya on May 2.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Loknya.[35]

The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces are creating a "security strip" along the border of Sumy Oblast, and a Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are shifting offensive operations towards Sumy Oblast.[36]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in Bilovody.[37] Elements of the Chechen "Akhmat-Russia" Regiment are reportedly operating near Seredina-Budy (on the international border northwest of Sumy City).[38] Drone operators of the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets in Sumy Oblast.[39]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 1 and 2.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Kupyansk near Novoosynove, Kolisnykivka, and Hlushkivka on May 1 and 2.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and advanced to the northern part of the settlement on May 2.[42]

The Ukrainian Border Service and Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on May 2 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian motorized assault of at least 10 motorcycles and two all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) in an unspecified area of the Kupyansk direction.[43] A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are consolidating and reinforcing manpower and materiel resources to replenish losses from April 2025 before resuming assaults in this direction.[44] The servicemember also stated that Ukrainian forces observed Russian forces atypically modifying a tank by removing its turret and welding a "shed"-like structure on top of the tank to protect Russian infantry.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya, Serhiivka, and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on May 1 and 2.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Zelena Dolyna, into Ridkodub, and within central Lypove (all north of Lyman).[46]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Nove, Zelena Dolyna, and Lypove; northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Kolodyazi, Novyi Mir, Myrne, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman toward Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on May 1 and 2.[47]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on May 1 that Russian forces near the Serebryanske forest area unsuccessfully attempted to use anti thermal-imaging rain ponchos to evade Ukrainian drone operators.[48]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD), including its 283rd, 488th, and 1428th motorized rifle regiments, reportedly participated in the recent seizure of Nove.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 2 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 2 that Russian forces advanced south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[50]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and toward Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 1 and 2.[51]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove; and south of Chasiv Yar towards Bila Hora and near Stupochky on May 1 and 2.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky.[54]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), the 2nd Airborne (VDV) Battalion of the 98th VDV Division, and the "Burevestnik" detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[55] Elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Stupochky.[56]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid an intensified effort to advance along and up to the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway and eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 1 indicates that Russian forces advanced into Novoolenivka (southwest of Toretsk).[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) with motorcycle support participated in the advance into Novoolenivka and seized half of the settlement.[58]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 10th Tank Regiment and 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division) are advancing near Oleksandropil (just southeast of Novoolenivka) and that additional elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division also recently advanced into Malynivka (southwest of Novoolenivka).[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are also advancing toward Romanivka (southwest of Toretsk).[60] Russian forces recently intensified attacks along the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk, and the Russian military command appears to be tasking the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA) with eliminating the pocket.[61] Russian forces' advance into Novoolenivka will help Russian forces advance further along the T-0504 highway, and Russian forces may intend to force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the pocket under threat of envelopment if Russian forces can make further advances from Novoolenivka and Sukha Balka (southwest of Toretsk).

Russian forces continued assaults near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toresk near Druzhba; north of Toretsk toward Dyliivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka, Romanivka, Stara Mykolaivka, Vodyane Druhe, Oleksandropil, Malynivka, and Nova Poltavka on May 1 and 2.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Vozdvyzhenka (southwest of Toretsk).[63]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA]) are reportedly operating near Druzhba.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced into the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk, two kilometers west of Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk), into the eastern outskirts of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), and southeast of Novooleksandrivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[65] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a reconnaissance-in-force mission into southern Pokrovsk but did not suggest that Russian forces maintain enduring positions in the southern outskirts of the settlement.[66] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk) and Zvirove (west of Pokrovsk).[67]

Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske; east of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Promin, and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Dachenske, Chunyshyne, and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Zvirove on May 1 and 2.[68]

Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on May 1 that the Pokrovsk direction remains the most active section of the frontline.[69] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian infantry operating in this direction fear they will face retribution from frontline Russian commanders if they refuse to fight or attempt to retreat.[70]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate) and the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions near Pokrovsk and attacking Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).[72]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, Troitske, and Preobrazhenka; and southeast near Bohdanivka on May 1 and 2.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 2 that elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) recently retreated from Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) after frontline Russian commanders deployed poorly trained troops to combat operations in the area.[74]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in Novooleksandrivka.[75] Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly clearing Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).[76] Elements of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly attacking eastern Kolyarivka (east of Pokrovsk).[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove toward Oleksiivka and near Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, Rozlyv, and Bahatyr on May 1 and 2.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 2 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr.[79]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 200th Artillery Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bahatyr.[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Odradne, west of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil, and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 2 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vesele (north of Velyka Novosilka).[82]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[83]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Chervone on May 2.[84]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
 
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 27 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv).[85]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Lobkove; and west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky and Kamyanske on May 1 and 2.[86]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 1 and 2 but did not advance.[87]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on May 2 that Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations in the southern section of the Dnipro River Delta near Kizomys on the west (right) of the Dnipro River (southwest of Kherson City).[88] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are attempting to create a bridgehead and cross the Dnipro River from the south.

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of overnight naval and aerial drone strikes targeting Russian military infrastructure objects in occupied Crimea on May 1 to 2. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched 30 naval drones and at least 100 aerial drones, and that Russian forces destroyed 10 Ukrainian naval drones and 100 aerial drones near occupied Sevastopol.[89] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian drones struck Russian airfields in occupied Kacha, Belbek, Hvardiiske, and Saky, and that a fire broke out in Uhlove, seven kilometers from the Russian military airfield in Kacha.[90] Russian forces typically station air defenses at the Belbek, Hvardiiske, and Saky airfields and leverage the airfields to launch Shahed drones against Ukraine.[91]

Russian and Ukrainian sources reported on May 2 that Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian S-300 air defense system, a Kasta-2E2 mobile radar system, an Imbir long-range radar system, an Obzor-3 radar system, and a ST-68 radar station in occupied Crimea.[92]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 150 strike and decoy drones from Bryansk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 64 Shahed and other drones over eastern, northern, and central Ukraine and that 62 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that drone strikes damaged civilian and commercial infrastructure in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[94]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06W44ezsFpBSRJsouTmp812SQ22eLf3V1pzyMwF6YEE7koRcQq32JGzJ2HnzyWuvyl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20444 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031frKwcfzQKsFhG7kFj3hoVWG8FPvGbFatwKBLj8pEpH8CHiLWWGeHZCzPwjXpbzml ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22561 [Total losses generated from the Ukrainian General Staff's daily 0800 SITREP between January 1 and April 30, 2025.]

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2024

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025

[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025

[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[10] https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/01/politics/intelligence-putin-war-goals-shifted-ukraine

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042725

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-15-2025

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[15] https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/01/politics/intelligence-putin-war-goals-shifted-ukraine

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-30-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-23-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-ukraine-war; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023; https://t.me/mod_russia/23498; https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-na-tematicheskom-selektornom-soveshchanii-07-03.

[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage;

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125

[21] https://tass dot ru/interviews/23001625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025

[22] https://verstka dot media/chto-dumayut-rossiiskie-voennye-o-vozmozhnom-peremirii ; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/6761

[23] https://kyivindependent dot com/vance-says-ukraine-war-wont-end-any-time-soon-urges-sides-to-agree-on-peace-terms/; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/vance-does-not-see-russias-war-ukraine-ending-any-time-soon-fox-news-interview-2025-05-01/; https://archive.ph/zXyUf; https://www.foxnews.com/video/6372190741112; https://www.cnbc.com/2025/05/02/russia-war-in-ukraine-not-going-to-end-any-time-soon-jd-vance-says.html; https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/02/europe/vance-ukraine-war-not-ending-soon-intl

[24] https://www.foxnews.com/video/6372195430112

[25] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-may-1-2025/

[26] https://www.congress.gov/senate-communication/119th-congress/executive-communication/859?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22Ukraine%22%7D&s=4&r=1 ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/01/trump-administration-readies-first-sale-of-military-equipment-to-ukraine

[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27947 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35133 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35194 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2025

[28] https://t.me/epoddubny/23323

[29] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9183

[30] https://t.me/VVV5807/4024

[31] https://rutube dot ru/video/cdffbed33da010ec8b3b7441618ce473/; https://t.me/rybar/70069

[32] https://t.me/yurasumy/22698 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26282

[33] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63929 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70321

[34] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63929 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22698 ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5688

[35] https://t.me/dva_majors/70321

[36] https://t.me/rybar/70072 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52033

[37] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63929

[38] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5688

[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90977

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl

[42] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35175

[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9229; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/pozbavyly-okupantiv-10-motoczykliv-nashi-bijczi-znyshhyly-mobilni-shturmovi-grupy-rf-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/; https://dpsu.gov dot ua/uk/news/47009-video-pomsta-znishuye-mobilni-shturmovi-grupi-voroga-na-kup-yanskomu-napryamku

[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/pryvaryly-saraj-na-tank-poblyzu-kupyanska-rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-vygaduvaty-bronovanyh-monstriv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dGVneFXTZ7U

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27898;

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27898

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27898; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/1015; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/deceptive-defense-russian-infantry-stormed-positions-wearing-anti-thermal-ponchos/

[48] https://t.me/OMIBr_60/1015; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/deceptive-defense-russian-infantry-stormed-positions-wearing-anti-thermal-ponchos/

[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27898

[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35188

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl

[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35188

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/26282

[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35187

[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27910 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163254 ; https://t.me/rybar/70062

[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35187

[57] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1918014207036960908; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9041; https://t.me/dva_majors/70304

[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/70304 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35140 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90948 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22699  ;

[59] https://t.me/dva_majors/70303  ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70321 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22704  ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63935

[60] https://t.me/yurasumy/22704 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63935

[61] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425

[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl

[63] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63925

[64] https://t.me/rybar/70069

[65] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163192; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90955; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163192; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35134; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35131; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35154; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35198

[66] https://t.me/yurasumy/22708

[67] https://t.me/yurasumy/22700; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35158

[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27895; https://t.me/wargonzo/26282; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63935

[69] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/mayemo-pershij-rezultat-vatikanskoyi-zustrichi-yakij-robit-y-97493

[70] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/odyn-ne-hotiv-jty-jomu-postrilyaly-po-nogah-pid-pokrovskom-rosiyany-zhenut-vpered-navit-svoyih-poranenyh/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dGVneFXTZ7U

[71] https://t.me/sashakots/53449; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90941 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90949; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90986

[72] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27897

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl;

[74] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35165

[75] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35134

[76] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27897

[77] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27897

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl ; https://t.me/rybar/70069; https://t.me/dva_majors/70321;

[79] https://t.me/voin_dv/14716

[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/14701; https://t.me/voin_dv/14710

[81] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63928; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789

[82] https://t.me/wargonzo/26282

[83] https://t.me/voin_dv/14700

[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789

[85] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27812; https://t.me/IIsb_128ogshb/10

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23789 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Kbtt9CquVipVnN1XztUr74jZH2oszYjnfjA4WPoELMYr3Ajk9YNt5xMqrs733Ngnl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70321

[87]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WFG61Me5FPbKespJafQpjHDYjP1Tb9SkDCuhu384hHcRy2LuXWmXY8CqZgF5SBGzl

[88] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/eng/news/2025/05/1/7510060/

[89] https://t.me/andriyshTime/36717 ; https://t.me/razvozhaev/11523; https://t.me/razvozhaev/11526 ; https://t.me/rybar/70080 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/23327 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/23084 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/23103 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52052 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/313074 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/313074 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52035 ;

[90] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/836 ; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/839 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/78898 ; https://www dot idelreal.org/a/anneksirovannyy-krym-podvergsya-massirovannoy-atake-dronov/33402916.html ; https://t.me/astrapress/80242 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/36729 ; https://t.me/astrapress/80242 ; https://t.me/astrapress/80245

[91] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2025

[92] https://t.me/russianocontext/6658 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/prymary-strike-drones-flew-into-crimea-and-destroyed-air-defense-systems/ ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/19506

[93] https://t.me/kpszsu/33675

[94] https://t.me/synegubov/14102 ; https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/05/02/unaslidok-udariv-rf-na-harkivshhyni-zagynula-lyudyna-shhe-odna-postrazhdala/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/22771 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/21298 ; https://x.com/SESU_UA/status/1918206863415316871 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/36722 ; https://t.me/severrealii/30348; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/vorog-zavdav-masovanogo-udaru-bpla-po-zaporizhzhyu-29-postrazhdalyh-poshkodzheni-bagatopoverhivky/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18978 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/79742 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18929 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18930 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18939 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18937 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18938 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18973 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18965 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18957 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18947 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18941 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18977 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18981 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/18997 ; https://t.me/severrealii/30351 ; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/6847 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27916

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