Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 15, 2025

May 15, 2025, 6:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on May 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to engage in bilateral negotiations in Istanbul and continues refusing to offer concessions to end the war in Ukraine. Putin spoke to media organizations on the night of May 10 to 11, following the May 10 joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire for at least 30 days beginning on May 12.[1] Putin did not agree to the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal and instead proposed that Russia and Ukraine "resume" on May 15 the direct negotiations that he claimed Ukraine "interrupted" in 2022 in Istanbul. Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15.[2] Zelensky stated that he would personally wait for Putin in Turkey and arrived in Turkey on May 15.[3] Putin assigned several Russian officials, who are notably not in Putin's innermost circle, to attend the talks in Istanbul, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed on May 15 that Putin will not travel to Istanbul.[4] Putin's rejection of Zelensky's invitation demonstrates Putin's continued resistance to making any concessions and engaging in legitimate, good-faith negotiations at the highest level.

The Russian delegation in Istanbul does not include officials in Putin's innermost circle and is largely the same delegation that Russia sent to the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in 2022 in Istanbul. Putin announced on the night of May 14 that Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky is leading the Russian delegation in Istanbul.[5] The delegation also includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Chief of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov, and Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin. Medinsky similarly headed the delegation in 2022, and Fomin and Galuzin's predecessor participated in the 2022 talks.[6] Kostyukov is the only 2025 participant who did not attend the 2022 talks.

The 2025 Russian delegation also includes four experts from the Presidential Administration, GRU, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that correspond with the four leading delegation members: Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration for State Policy in the Humanitarian Sphere Elena Podobreevskaya, Director of the Second Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alexei Polishchuk, First Deputy Chief of Information of the GRU Alexander Zorin, and the Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation in the Russian MoD Viktor Shevtsov.[7]

Medinsky explicitly described the May 2025 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul as a continuation of the early 2022 Istanbul negotiations during which Russia issued demands that were tantamount to Ukraine's complete capitulation. Medinsky told journalists on May 15 in Istanbul that Russia considers the May 2025 negotiations a "continuation" of previous negotiations in Istanbul in April 2022, which he claimed Ukraine interrupted.[8] Medinsky is reiterating Putin's May 11 framing that the new bilateral negotiations in Istanbul would be based on the April 2022 Istanbul protocols draft agreement, which included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression.[9] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that they both obtained several versions of the Istanbul protocols draft agreement.[10] The draft protocols demanded that Ukraine forego its NATO membership aspirations and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances. The draft protocols also would have banned Ukraine from hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality [of Ukraine]," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded that Ukraine limit its military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.

Russia demanded these terms in the first and second months of its full-scale invasion when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and making significant gains throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Medinsky is purposefully attempting to frame the May 2025 talks as a continuation of the April 2022 Istanbul negotiations to portray Russia's demands for Ukraine's surrender as legitimate, despite the fact that Ukraine is now in a much stronger battlefield position on the battlefield than in April 2022 and the Russian military is much weaker than in the early months of the full-scale invasion.

Medinsky also reiterated Putin's longstanding demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions on NATO. Medinsky claimed that Russia's goal for the May 2025 Istanbul negotiations is to "establish long-term peace by eliminating the root causes" of the war.[11] Russian officials routinely demand that any peace agreement address the war's "root causes," which Russian officials define as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[12] Russian officials have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers in Ukraine to justify the Kremlin's demands for regime change in Ukraine, the establishment of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv, and Russia's occupation and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. Medinsky's attempt to frame May 2025 Istanbul negotiations as peace talks contradicts stated Ukrainian, US, and European efforts to first establish a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations.[13] Medinsky's framing echoes consistent Russian rejections of this sequence of events, which Ukraine and the United States have consistently supported.[14]

Reported Kremlin instructions to Russian media explaining how to cover the Istanbul negotiations indicate that the Kremlin is preparing the Russian population for a longer war in Ukraine and is not interested in engaging in good-faith negotiations that require compromises from both sides. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on May 15 that it acquired a manual that Russian media received from the Presidential Administration's political bloc with instructions about how to cover the negotiations in Istanbul.[15] The manual reportedly instructed Russian media to explain Medinsky's participation in the Russian delegation as "logical" since he led the Russian delegation in Istanbul in 2022 and is continuing this work. A political strategist who works with the Kremlin told Meduza that Russian officials overseeing domestic policy assess that the Istanbul talks will end in "deadlock" and that the Kremlin assesses that the West will likely impose new sanctions in response to such "deadlock." The manual reportedly advises Russian media to preemptively talk about a "new package of sanctions" while claiming that new sanctions will not harm Russia's development as Russia "successfully copes with the challenges of any sanctions." Russian media should reportedly vaguely say that "negotiations are taking place on worse terms for Ukraine" than three years ago, but the manual does not explain how current battlefield realities where Russia controls much less of Ukraine are "worse terms." The Presidential Administration's claim that the May 2025 negotiations are taking place on "worse terms" for Ukraine compared to 2022 is an attempt to posture Russian military strength and battlefield successes while ignoring Ukraine's significant battlefield successes and ability to slow Russian advances in the last three years of the war. This claim also ignores significant Russian losses among elite forces and increasing reliance on poorly trained recruits. The Presidential Administration's reported framing of the negotiations demonstrates that Russia expects Ukraine to refuse the terms the Russian delegation will present in Istanbul as Ukraine would not accept terms tantamount to its surrender. Russia similarly issued ultimatums to Ukraine, the West, and NATO in 2021 before it launched its full-scale invasion in 2022 certainly knowing that NATO and Ukraine would not undergo the transformations to their core charters, constitutions, and principles required to meet the Russian demands.[16] The West rejected Russia's pre-war ultimatums, allowing Russia to establish superficial justifications for its subsequent full-scale invasion. Russia's continued insistence on its 2022 Istanbul demands in May 2025 demonstrates that Russia continues to only be interested in a full Ukrainian surrender, is unwilling to offer compromises in any good-faith negotiations, and is prepared to continue the war to achieve its goal of Ukrainian surrender.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to engage in bilateral negotiations in Istanbul and continues refusing to offer concessions to end the war in Ukraine.
• The Russian delegation in Istanbul does not include officials in Putin's innermost circle and is largely the same delegation that Russia sent to the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in 2022 in Istanbul.
• Medinsky explicitly described the May 2025 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul as a continuation of the early 2022 Istanbul negotiations during which Russia issued demands that were tantamount to Ukraine's complete capitulation.
• Medinsky also reiterated Putin's longstanding demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions on NATO.
• Reported Kremlin instructions to Russian media explaining how to cover the Istanbul negotiations indicate that the Kremlin is preparing the Russian population for a longer war in Ukraine and is not interested in engaging in good-faith negotiations that require compromises from both sides.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Alleged Ceasefire Violation
• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 14 and 15.[17]

Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continues in Tetkino and near Novyi Put (both southwest of Glushkovo).[18]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen 204th “Akhmat” Spetsnaz Regiment’s “Aida” Group reportedly continue operating near Tetkino.[19]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in northwestern Belgorod Oblast but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 14 and 15 that Russian forces advanced near Popovka and Grafovka (both northwest of Belgorod City).[20]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Veselivka (north of Sumy City).[21]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue to attack near Bilovody and Vodolahy (both northeast of Sumy City).[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bilovody.[23]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during 2022 partial reserve call up) are reportedly operating near Veselivka, and elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Bilovody.[24]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on May 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Kudiivka, Hlyboke, and towards Vysoka Yaruha and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Tykhe, and Vovchanski Khutory on May 14 and 15.[25]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on May 15 that Russian forces are accumulating forces in the Kharkiv direction and already started summer offensive operations in the area.[26] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian unit operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on May 15 that the Russian forces are conducting assaults near Vovchanski Khutory and Tykhe (both northeast of Kharkiv City) every day but recently ceased attempts to cross the Vovcha River.[27]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen 204th “Akhmat” Spetsnaz Regiment’s “Bati” Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction.[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka and toward Pishchane on May 14 and 15.[29]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka and Zahryzove and toward Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Kruhlyakivka and Nova Kruhlyakivka; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, Olhivka, and Novyi Myr on May 14 and 15.[30]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Torske (east of Lyman).[31]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed on May 15 that elements of the Russian 19th Tank Regiment and 31st, 36th, and 37th motorized rifle regiments (all of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) seized Torske and are conducting clearing operations in the settlement.[32]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Lozova, and Yampolivka; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on May 14 and 15.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hyrhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 14 and 15.[34]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka.[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 15 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Chasiv Yar.[36] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Hryhorivka (north of Chasiv Yar).[37]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka and toward Markove; south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Kurdyumivka on May 14 and 15.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Chasiv Yar.[39]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk.[40]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recently advanced north and northwest of Druzhba (east of Toretsk), southwest of Zorya, east of Oleksandropil, within southern Nova Poltavka, to the western outskirts of Yablunivka, north and northwest of Novoolenivka along the T-05-04 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway (all southwest of Toretsk), and toward Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), recently advanced toward Rusyn Yar, to the southern outskirts of Yablunivka, and to Zorya and Hnativka (southwest of Toretsk).[42]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Krymske and Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; southwest of Toretsk near Stara Mykolaivka, Nova Poltavka, Novoolenivka, Romanivka, Yelyzavetivka, Kalynove, Yablunivka, Hnativka, and Zorya; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Petrivka and toward Popiv Yar on May 14 and 15.[43] Official Ukrainian sources reported on May 14 and 15 that Ukrainian forces operating in Toretsk repelled several Russian motorized assaults using an unspecified number of motorcycles near Zorya and Dyliivka and in Toretsk itself.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Toretsk.[45]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated on May 15 that Russian forces have suffered 70,000 casualties since July 2024 in the Toretsk direction.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 14 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Myrne; northeast, northwest, and southwest of Malynivka (both east of Pokrovsk); and north of Hrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[47]

Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Myrolyubivka, Myrne, and Promin and toward Mykolaivka and Novoekonomichne; southwest of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on May 14 and 15.[48]

The commander of a Ukrainian artillery reconnaissance battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on May 15 that Russian forces are using large numbers of first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber-optic cables in the area in order to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[49] The commander stated that Russian forces are using recently recruited and poorly-trained personnel in assaults.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[50] Elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and artillery elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR], SMD) are reportedly operating in Malynivka.[51] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Myrolyubivka.[52]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 15 shows that Russian forces conducted a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced south of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[53]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed on May 15 that Russian forces seized Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[54] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 14 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and in Troitske and Horikove (both east of Novopavlivka).[55]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, Novoserhiivka, Novooleksandrivka, and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske; and west of Novopavlivka near Novoolenivka on May 14 and 15.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Troitske and Horikhove.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on May 14 that Russian forces advanced in central Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove) and south of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[58]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Bahatyr on May 14 and 15.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr.[60]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Odradne.[61]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 15 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Vilne Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka).[62]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Shevchenko (west of Velyka Novosilka).[63] Another Russian milblogger claimed on May 14 that Russian forces advanced in an area up to three kilometers wide and one kilometer deep from Zelene Pole to Novopil (west to southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[64]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Komar, Vesele, and Burlatske; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on May 14 and 15.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vesele and Vilne Pole.[66]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 15 but did not advance.
 
Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Mali Shcherbaky on May 14 and 15.[67]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and artillery elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[68]

Russian forces continued attacks in the Kherson direction on May 15 but did not make confirmed advances.
 
Unconfirmed claims: Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on May 15 that Russian forces recently seized islands in the Dnipro River Delta northeast of Kherson City near Nova Kakhovka, Dnipryany, and Korsunka.[69]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas in the Kherson direction on May 14 and 15.[70] Saldo claimed that Russian forces conducted raids on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River near Burhunka, Mykolaivka (both northeast of Kherson City), and Kizomys (southwest of Kherson City) at an unspecified time.[71]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 110 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[72] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 62 drones over northern, eastern, western, and central Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces lost sight of 29 decoy drones. Official Ukrainian sources reported that Russian drones struck Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Kyiv, and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts.[73]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on May 14 that Belarusian instructors-in-training from unspecified Belarusian units participated in fire, tactical, medical, and other training at the Russian 333rd Combat Training Center in Mulino, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.[74] The Belarusian MoD readout specifies that the training program takes into account ”experience of modern armed conflicts” - likely referring to Russian combat operations in Ukraine.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.