{{currentView.title}}
2 days ago
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 18, 2025
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on May 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces conducted the largest single drone strike of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18 – in disregard of US President Donald Trump's calls for Russia to stop long-range strikes against Ukraine, particularly against Kyiv Oblast.[i] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 273 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[ii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 88 drones over eastern, northern, and central Ukraine; that 128 decoy drones were "lost in location;" and that one drone was still in Ukrainian airspace as of 0800 local time. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike largely targeted Kyiv Oblast and that drones struck Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk oblasts.[iii] Russian forces launched 267 drones (and three ballistic missiles) in their overnight strike series against Ukraine on the night of February 22 and 23.[iv] Russian forces have significantly intensified their nightly strikes against Ukraine over the last five months and have conducted several of the largest strikes of the entire war since January 2025. A Russian milblogger claimed that the May 17-18 record-breaking strike was effective due to Russia's use of the "Geran-3" drone (the Russian analogue to the Iranian Shahed-238), which is reportedly equipped with a turbo jet and 300-kilogram warhead.[v] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are innovating their long-range drone strike tactics in order to offset the effectiveness of Ukrainian mobile defense units and overwhelm the Ukrainian air defense umbrella.[vi]
The Kremlin continues efforts to project Russia's military strength ahead of US President Donald Trump’s scheduled phone call with Putin on May 19. Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published on May 18 excerpts of an allegedly "new" interview with Putin, in which Putin claimed that Russia has enough manpower and materiel to bring the war in Ukraine to its "logical" conclusion with the "necessary" results for Russia.[vii] Putin reiterated long-standing Kremlin narratives about the necessity that peace negotiations address the war’s "root causes" and "protect" of Russian-speakers of Ukraine, whom Putin claimed consider Russia their "motherland." Ukrainian outlet The Kyiv Independent and Russian state media reported on May 18 that the excerpts that Zarubin published on May 18 are unaired footage from the documentary "Russia.Kremlin.Putin.25 Years" that the Kremlin published on May 4 in which Putin repeatedly promoted claims about Russia’s ability to bring the war to its "logical conclusion."[viii] The Kremlin's decision to delay publishing these clips until May 18 suggests that the Kremlin is trying to project a strong, militarily superior Russia to the West and to domestic Russian audiences ahead of Putin’s May 19 phone call with Trump. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky recently stated that Russia is prepared to fight for "however long it takes," and Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev recently made thinly veiled nuclear threats in reference to what Medvedev categorized as "negotiating ultimatums."[ix]
Putin is attempting to distract from Russia's military and economic challenges with this rhetoric. Finnish President Alexander Stubb stated during an interview with UK outlet the Guardian published on May 18 that the Kremlin is falsely posturing its economy and military as strong.[x] Stubb noted that Russia has depleted its financial reserves and that the Russian interest rate is over 20 percent. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are sustaining significant battlefield losses at rates that are likely unsustainable in the medium- to long-term and that Putin has mismanaged Russia's economy, which is suffering from unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia's sovereign wealth fund.[xi] The continued depletion of Russian materiel, personnel, and economic resources at the current rate will likely present Putin with difficult decision points in 2026 or 2027.[xii]
Reported support within the Russian military and society for continuing the war until Russia achieves its original war aims and territorial demands reflects the success of the Kremlin's years-long narrative efforts to justify a protracted war effort. The New York Times (NYT) reported on May 17 that interviews with 11 Russian soldiers who are currently fighting or have fought in Ukraine demonstrate that some Russian troops are against an unconditional ceasefire and believe that Russia should keep fighting until Russian forces have seized the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[xiii] Russian soldiers reportedly called for Russia to continue the war until it reaches its territorial goals and not offer any concessions to Ukraine or the West so that Russia does not have to fight Ukraine again in five or 10 years and so that Russian casualties thus far in the war will not have been in vain.
The NYT noted that an unpublished mid-April 2025 poll by independent Russian opposition polling organization Chronicles found that roughly half of respondents said that they would not support a peace deal that falls short of Russian President Vladimir Putin's initial war aims of Ukrainian "denazification," demilitarization, and neutrality. Russian opposition outlet Verstka conducted a poll of 100 Russian military personnel in April 2025 in which only 18 percent said they would support a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine prior to achieving Putin's stated war goals and only about a fifth of respondents indicated that they thought the war would end in the coming months.[xiv] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has not been preparing the Russian information space for a peace agreement in the near future and that Russian forces and society do not anticipate an imminent end to the war.[xv] The Kremlin has been engaged in a concerted effort to justify Putin's war aims as existential to the Russian state and to garner societal support for the protraction of the war until Russia achieves these goals. Kremlin officials are increasingly publicly stating that Russia is prepared to continue fighting until Ukraine accepts Russia's demands, likely because the Kremlin assesses that it has adequately prepared Russian society and the Russian military for such a scenario.[xvi]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues efforts to negotiate a diplomatic end to the war in Ukraine. Zelensky spoke with US Vice President JD Vance and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Rome on May 18 and highlighted the importance of an unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine and Ukraine's willingness to engage in meaningful diplomacy.[xvii] Zelensky underscored that the Russian delegation presented unrealistic and unacceptable terms during the May 16 Ukrainian–Russian talks in Istanbul. Rubio had a call on May 17 with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, during which Rubio reiterated the Trump administration's call for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine.[xviii] Ukraine continues to demonstrate its willingness to establish meaningful peace dialogues and commit to an unconditional ceasefire.[xix] Russia, however, continues to demonstrate that it is not interested in a ceasefire or in good faith negotiations to end the war.[xx]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces conducted the largest single drone strike of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18 — in disregard of US President Donald Trump's calls for Russia to stop long-range strikes against Ukraine, particularly against Kyiv Oblast.
- The Kremlin continues efforts to project Russia's military strength ahead of US President Donald Trump’s scheduled phone call with Putin on May 19.
- Reported support within the Russian military and society for continuing the war until Russia achieves its original war aims and territorial demands reflects the success of the Kremlin's years-long narrative efforts to justify a protracted war effort.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues efforts to negotiate a diplomatic end to the war in Ukraine.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Alleged Ceasefire Violation
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Alleged Ceasefire Violations
There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 17 and 18.[xxi]
The Ukrainian General Staff stated on May 18 that Ukrainian forces are still working to provide a buffer zone along the international border with Russia to prevent new Russian offensives in the Sumy and Kharkiv directions, but that Ukrainian forces have completed their key objectives in Kursk Oblast.[xxii] The General Staff also stated that Russian forces suffered 63,172 casualties since August 6, 2024, including roughly 4,000 North Korean troops. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 18 that Ukrainian forces operating near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) have isolated Russian units in this part of the front by interdicting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) with drones and artillery.[xxiii]
A Russian milblogger claimed on May 18 that Russian forces recently repelled Ukrainian attacks near Popovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[xxiv]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in Sumy Oblast on May 18.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 18 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 17 that Russian forces advanced towards Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxv]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 17 and 18.[xxvi] Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces repelled an at least company-sized Russian mechanized assault between Zhuravlevka, Ustinka, and Zolntsevka in Belgorod Oblast (all just across the international border north of Kharkiv City).[xxvii] Russian forces recently conducted an unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force mission near Zhuravlevka toward the international border, and Russian forces may intend to expand their salients in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[xxviii]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Zapad-Akhmat” Battalion are reportedly operating in Vovchansk.[xxix]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 18 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced towards Velykyi Burluk (northwest of Kupyansk).[xxx]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near the international border towards Stroivka on May 17 and 18.[xxxi]
The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on May 18 that Russian forces are attempting to use boats, inflatable tubes, and motorcycles on pulley systems to cross the Oskil River near Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk) to support a future Russian effort to envelop Kupyansk.[xxxii] The battalion commander reported that Russian forces are intensifying strikes on Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and drone usage in the Borova and Lyman directions, but that Ukrainian forces have not yet observed Russian forces using artificial intelligence (AI) drones in these directions.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[xxxiii]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Hrekivka and northeast of Novomykhailivka (both southeast of Borova).[xxxiv]
Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka; northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and towards Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Olhivka, Tverdokhlibove, and Novoyehorivka on May 17 and 18.[xxxv]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 18 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[xxxvi]
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Novyi Mir, Zelena Dolyna, Katerynivka, and Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Lozova and Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Torske on May 17 and 18.[xxxvii]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[xxxviii]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on May 17 and 18.[xxxix]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ozaryanivka and Kurdyumivka; and south of Chasiv Yar toward Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora on May 17 and 18.[xl]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade and 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[xli]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).[xlii]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 17 that Russian forces advanced into Dyliivka (north of Toretsk) and are fighting for the settlement.[xliii] Another Russian milblogger claimed on May 18 that Russian forces advanced towards Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[xliv]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; southwest of Toretsk near Shevchenko Pershe, Romanivka, Nova Poltavka, Oleksandropil, Stara Mykolaivka, and Vozdvyzhenka and toward Zorya; west of Toretsk near Petrivka and Yablunivka; and northwest of Toretsk toward Popiv Yar on May 17 and 18.[xlv] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 18 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka road.[xlvi]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Timer" Battalion of the 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly participated in the recent seizure of Nova Poltavka; elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Berestok (northwest of Toretsk) and Toretsk; and elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 101st Separate Rifle Regiment (reportedly under the operational control of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[xlvii]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Yelyzavetivka and toward Shevchenko Pershe; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Hrodivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, Novoukrainka, and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne on May 17 and 18.[xlviii]
A Russian milblogger amplified claims that Russian drones are interdicting Ukrainian supply routes along the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway.[xlix] Another Russian milblogger posted footage of a Russian air strike against a building in southwestern Pokrovsk.[l]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[li]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and east of Novopavlivka near Troitske and Kotlyarivka on May 17 and 18.[lii]
Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) with recently seizing Bohdanivka (southeast of Novopavlivka).[liii]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 18 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward the H-15 Komar-Bahatyr road and on the southeastern outskirts of Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[liv]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Oleksiivka, Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, and Bahatyr on May 17 and 18.[lv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[lvi]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 18 that Russian forces seized Bahatyr, and ISW observed geolocated evidence to indicate that Russian forces seized the settlement as of May 17.[lvii] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces maintained positions within Bahatyr earlier this week.[lviii] A Ukrainian brigade posted footage on May 18 of Ukrainian forces operating in Bahatyr after Russian forces planted a flag in the settlement.[lix]
Order of Battle: Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with recently seizing Bahatyr.[lx]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 18 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Novopil and on the eastern and southern outskirts of Zelene Pole (both southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[lxi]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Komar, west of Velyka Novosilka toward Zelene Pole, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil on May 17 and 18.[lxii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilne Pole.[lxiii]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on May 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Orikhiv toward Lukyanivske and west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Mali Shcherbaky on May 17 and 18.[lxiv]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Smuglyanka" detachment are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxv]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on May 17 and 18 but did not advance.[lxvi]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text for updates on Russian long-range drone strikes against Ukraine.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[i] https://x.com/TrumpDailyPosts/status/1915381953668280560
[ii] https://t.me/kpszsu/34546
[iii] https://t.me/kpszsu/34546; https://suspilne dot media/1020441-naslidki-ataki-rf-na-kiivsini-zaginula-zinka-poraneno-troh-ludej-sered-nih-ditina/ ; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/5452 ; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/5453; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/42862; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1123945699773318&id=100064736946785&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=PsGDBbGgq3PFwalg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/18/koly-czil-zhytlovi-budynky-ta-medczentry-kyyivshhyna-ogovtuyetsya-vid-nichnoyi-ataky-ye-zhertvy/
[iv] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2025
[v] https://t.me/yurasumy/23043
[vi] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025
[vii] https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3993; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3994; https://t.me/tass_agency/315565; https://t.me/tass_agency/315569
[viii] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050425; https://ria dot ru/20250518/putin--2017663127.html; https://smotrim dot ru/video/2973828; https://rtvi dot com/news/putin-nazval-nuzhnyj-dlya-rossii-rezultat-svo/; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1026229 ; https://rg dot ru/2025/05/18/putin-nazval-nuzhnyj-rossii-rezultat-svo.html; https://kyivindependent dot com/putin-vows-to-complete-war-in-ukraine-rejects-concessions-ahead-of-trump-call/
[ix] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725
[x] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/18/donald-trump-is-losing-patience-with-russia-says-finnish-leader?CMP=oth_b-aplnews_d-1
[xi] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[xii] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[xiii] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/17/world/europe/russian-troops-peace-putin.html
[xiv] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2025
[xv] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2025
[xvi] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2025; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3993; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3994; https://t.me/tass_agency/315565; https://t.me/tass_agency/315569
[xvii] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14250; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/volodimir-zelenskij-proviv-zustrich-iz-dzhej-di-vensom-i-mar-97905
[xviii] https://x.com/SecRubio/status/1923766710752117048; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/secretary-rubios-phone-call-with-russia-foreign-minister-lavrov/;
[xix] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725
[xx] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040425
[xxi] https://t.me/wargonzo/26607 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24399 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24377 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24364
[xxii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24397
[xxiii] https://t.me/dva_majors/71399
[xxiv] https://t.me/alehingennadiy/5473
[xxv] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28789
[xxvi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24377; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24364; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10203; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28789
[xxvii] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/92nd-and-58th-brigades-repel-mechanized-assault-in-belgorod-region/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025
[xxviii] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2025
[xxix] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5735
[xxx] https://t.me/alehingennadiy/5473
[xxxi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24377; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24364; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10203
[xxxii] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3NogfDOf9PQ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/18/motoczykly-na-motuzkah-cherez-oskil-yak-ukrayinski-drony-polyuyut-na-vynahidlyvyh-okupantiv-shho-rvutsya-do-kupyanska/
[xxxiii] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91856
[xxxiv] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9171; https://t.me/dumky_frontovyka/1990; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9172
[xxxv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24399; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24377; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24364; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10203
[xxxvi] https://t.me/tass_agency/315539
[xxxvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24399; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24377; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24364; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10203; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28820; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28820
[xxxviii] https://t.me/dva_majors/71406
[xxxix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24399; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24377; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24364 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10203
[xl] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24399; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24377; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24364; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10203; https://t.me/wargonzo/26607; https://t.me/dva_majors/71399
[xli] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28802
[xlii] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9176; https://www.instagram.com/p/DJuXPkBNk0M/
[xliii] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91855
[xliv] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64371
[xlv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24399; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24377; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24364; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10203; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64371
[xlvi] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64371
[xlvii] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/221859; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165153; https://t.me/wargonzo/26618; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13821 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13822
[xlviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24399 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24377 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24364 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10203
[xlix] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91879
[l] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/165108
[li] https://t.me/sashakots/53740
[lii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24399 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24377 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24364 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10203
[liii] https://t.me/motopatriot78/36097
[liv] https://t.me/voin_dv/15023
[lv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24399; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24377; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24364; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/10203; https://t.me/rybar/70483; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64368; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23421
[lvi] https://t.me/voin_dv/15023
[lvii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2025; https://t.me/mod_russia/52833
[lviii] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1020503-armia-rf-aktivizuvala-nastup-na-doneccini-garaci-tocki-pokrovsk-casiv-ar-bagatir/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/18/yih-vdalosya-zvidty-ostatochno-vykynuty-syly-oborony-zachystyly-selo-bagatyr-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku/
[lix] https://t.me/mechanized33/860
[lx] https://t.me/rybar/70483; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28812; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91878
[lxi] https://t.me/voin_dv/15023
[lxii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24399; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24377; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24364
[lxiii] https://t.me/voin_dv/15023
[lxiv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24399; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24377; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24364
[lxv] https://t.me/dva_majors/71430
[lxvi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24399; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24377 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24364