Iran Update, August 27, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The  Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) will reportedly initiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process as soon as August 28, according to three European diplomats and one Western diplomat.[i] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments.[ii] The snapback mechanism is currently set to expire on October 18, 2025. The E3 imposed a deadline of August 31 on Iran to make meaningful progress toward a nuclear deal, such as by renewing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and resuming negotiations with the United States.[iii] The E3 offered to postpone the expiration of the snapback mechanism to allow Iran more time to negotiate with the United States.[iv] Iran reportedly failed to make “sufficiently tangible commitments” during the most recent Iran-E3 meeting in Geneva on August 26.[v] Another source stated that Iran offered “very little to work with” to secure an extension.[vi]

It is unclear if the E3 will initiate the dispute resolution process outlined in the JCPOA or directly refer Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC. The dispute resolution process can take up to 35 days and involves a series of steps that aim to resolve non-compliance issues.[vii] The E3 can choose to engage in the dispute resolution process and then refer the issue to the UNSC if it believes that Iran continues to show "significant non-performance." The E3 can conversely bypass the dispute resolution process and directly refer the non-compliance issue to the UNSC. The E3 would be required to include a description of "the good-faith efforts the [E3] made to exhaust the dispute resolution process" when they refer Iran’s non-compliance to the UNSC.[viii]  The JCPOA gives the UNSC 30 days to pass a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but UNSC permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto such a resolution. The E3 is reportedly hopeful that Iran will make unspecified commitments regarding its nuclear program within 30 days that will allow the E3 to avoid reimposing UNSC sanctions on Iran.[ix] The snapback mechanism would reimpose six UNSC resolutions on Iran, including bans on the transfer of conventional arms to and from Iran, international support for Iran's missile program, enrichment-related activities, and the testing and development of nuclear-capable missiles.[x]

Hardline Iranian parliamentarians criticized the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to Iran and argued that their return undermines a recent law that parliament passed to restrict cooperation with the agency.[xi] These criticisms arose after IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi announced on August 26 that IAEA inspectors would soon resume inspections in Iran.[xii] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi stated on August 27 that IAEA inspectors will supervise the fuel replacement at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) to ensure that electricity is produced in a timely manner.[xiii] The Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 to suspend all cooperation with the IAEA.[xiv]  

The Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission warned on August 26 that the AEOI and Foreign Affairs Ministry must fully comply with the law suspending cooperation with the IAEA.[xv] Hardline parliamentarians separately accused the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) on August 27 of concealing decisions from parliament and the public.[xvi] Hardliners warned that continued government cooperation with the IAEA would justify legal action against senior SNSC officials for undermining parliament’s authority.[xvii] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on August 20 that Iran cannot completely end all cooperation with the IAEA since the upcoming fuel replacement at the BNPP requires inspectors to be present. Araghchi emphasized that the return of IAEA inspectors to Iran would take place within the framework of the law that parliament passed on July 25.[xviii] The IAEA inspectors currently in Iran are reportedly only permitted to oversee the fuel replacement at the BNPP and cannot access or inspect damaged nuclear sites such as Natanz and Fordow.[xix] These sites remain largely inaccessible to any party.

Iran may have allowed IAEA inspectors to return to Iran to show limited cooperation and ease international pressure from the E3. The E3 offered on July 25 to extend the snapback mechanism’s deadline if Iran fully cooperated with the IAEA, resumed nuclear talks with the United States, and accounted for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[xx] Grossi stated on August 26 that the 12-day war damaged some Iranian nuclear facilities and that he and Iranian officials have discussed steps to restart the agency’s work in Iran.[xxi] The location of Iran’s 408 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium is unknown, and it is unclear if Iran can access this material.[xxii]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani withdrew the Popular Mobilization Authority bill from parliament on August 27, reportedly due to US threats to sanction Iraq if he did not withdraw the bill.[xxiii] The Popular Mobilization Authority bill would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xxiv] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service comprised of many militias, some of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[xxv]  The Council of Ministers, which Sudani leads, approved the Popular Mobilization Authority bill and submitted it to parliament in February 2025.[xxvi] The Iraqi parliament completed its first and second readings of the draft bill but had not yet voted on it.[xxvii] The Council of Ministers can reintroduce the bill to parliament at a later date, despite Sudani’s withdrawal of the bill at this time.[xxviii]

Kurdish media reported that Sudani withdrew the bill after he reportedly told Shia Coordination Framework members during a recent meeting that the United States would impose “severe” sanctions on Iraq and that “Iraq will be destroyed” if the Popular Mobilization Authority bill was not withdrawn from parliament.[xxix] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The US State Department spokesperson confirmed on August 12 that the United States opposes the Popular Mobilization Authority law.[xxx] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the PMF and reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders.[xxxi]

NOTE: A version of the following text also appears in CTP-ISW’s August 27 Adversary Entente Task Force Update:

Iran and Belarus have continued to deepen ties, especially regarding military and military industrial matters.[xxxii]  Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk, Belarus, on August 20 to discuss expanding bilateral cooperation and sanctions mitigation efforts.[xxxiii] Iranian and Belarusian officials signed 12 memorandums of understanding intended to strengthen bilateral trade, military technical cooperation, and mutual investment during Pezeshkian’s visit.[xxxiv] Belarusian state media reported that Pezeshkian and Lukashenko agreed to work toward codifying a strategic partnership treaty.[xxxv]

Lukashenko said during the meeting that Belarus is ready to expand “military technical collaboration” with Iran, though Lukashenko did not specify what this cooperation could entail.[xxxvi] Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) warned on August 22 that Iran seeks Belarusian help to restore Iranian air defense systems and electronic warfare (EW) equipment that Israel damaged during the June 2025 war.[xxxvii] The SZRU did not specify how Belarus could help Iran restore damaged assets, and Belarus likely lacks the domestic capabilities to do so. Russia effectively controls Belarus' air defense assets within an integrated air defense system, and Russia's delays in providing S-400 systems to Iran have been a source of friction between Russia and Iran.[xxxviii] Iran may seek to increase defense industrial cooperation with Belarus given that Israeli strikes also targeted Iranian domestic production capabilities for air defense components.[xxxix] Belarus reportedly produces missile components for Russian air defense systems, including S-300 and S-400 systems, and Iran may hope to secure similar components from Belarus.[xl] Such an arrangement would mirror the way that Russia currently uses Belarus’ industrial base to source munitions and other dual-use components to augment Russian military output and sustain its war effort in Ukraine.[xli] Iran and Belarus may additionally further collaborate on drone production--Lukashenko announced in March 2025 that Russia would open a drone production facility in Belarus.[xlii] Iranian engineers previously traveled to Belarus in May 2023 to reportedly examine modifying local factories to produce Iranian drones, like Shahed-type models, for Russia.[xliii]

Iran’s deepening cooperation with Belarus ultimately benefits Russia and helps sustain the Russian war effort against Ukraine given Minsk’s role as Moscow’s key sanctions evasion partner. The SZRU noted that looser restrictions on Belarus’ military sector may make Belarus a more compelling partner for Iran compared to Russia.[xliv] Iranian officials have more publicly voiced discontent with Russian military support for Iran since Russia’s non-response to the Israel-Iran war.[xlv] Iran’s expansion of ties with Belarus will not sideline Russia as Iran’s primary military partner, however, and will simply allow Iran to diversify the manner in which it interacts with Moscow. ISW has long assessed that Russia has de-facto annexed Belarus, and Iran may seek to benefit from this de-facto annexation without having to circumvent the same suite of sanctions that are currently levied against Russia.[xlvi]

The United States and its European partners should view Belarus’ cooperation with Iran as an extension of Russo-Iranian engagement, with similar impacts and potential consequences. Russian efforts to de-facto annex Belarus ensure that Russia reaps any benefits brought to Belarus from cooperation with Iran.[xlvii] Expanding military technical or defense industrial cooperation between Iran and Belarus will likely directly support Russia’s war effort against Ukraine given how the Kremlin has subsumed elements of Belarus' defense industrial base.[xlviii] Iranian economic cooperation that reinforces the Belarusian economy bolsters Russia’s ability to leverage Belarus as a key sanctions evasion partner.[xlix] Iranian-Belarusian economic cooperation furthermore takes place within and reinforces Russian-led initiatives, including the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and efforts to develop the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).[l] Russia similarly uses Belarus’ relations with other Russian partners, such as the PRC, as a way to circumvent international sanctions and use engagement with these partners to support its war effort.[li] The United States and European partners should endeavor to levy the same suite of sanctions on Belarus as they do against Russia in order for sanctions on Russia to bear weight.  

Key Takeaways

• Snapback Sanctions: The E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) will reportedly initiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process as soon as August 28, according to three European diplomats and one Western diplomat. The snapback mechanism would reimpose six UNSC resolutions on Iran, including bans on the transfer of conventional arms to and from Iran, international support for Iran's missile program, enrichment-related activities, and the testing and development of nuclear-capable missiles.
• Nuclear Inspections in Iran: Hardline Iranian parliamentarians criticized the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to Iran and argued that their return undermines a recent law that parliament passed to restrict cooperation with the agency. Iran may have allowed IAEA inspectors to return to Iran to show limited cooperation and ease international pressure from the E3.
• Iranian Influence in Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani withdrew the Popular Mobilization Authority bill from parliament on August 27, reportedly due to US threats to sanction Iraq if he did not withdraw the bill. The Popular Mobilization Authority bill would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).

Iran

Iran is continuing to take steps to secure its northwestern and southeastern borders amid concerns about Israeli infiltration and militant activity in border areas. Deputy Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Qassem Rezaei announced on August 27 the deployment of aerial surveillance, smart cameras, and geographic information systems to border areas in northwestern Iran.[lii] Rezaei stated that this equipment is meant to increase border security and identify potential vulnerabilities along the Iraqi-Kurdistan-Iran border.[liii] Iranian officials have emphasized the need to strengthen Iran’s northwestern border following Israeli covert operations during the Israel-Iran War.[liv] The Iranian regime has historically accused Israel of using Iraqi Kurdistan and Kurdish opposition groups to conduct operations against Iran.

The regime also faces internal security challenges in southeastern Iran. An Iranian security officer was killed in clashes with “terrorists” in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on August 26.[lv] Iranian security forces killed 13 Jaish al Adl fighters and arrested several others in a counterterrorism operation in Iranshahr, Khash, and Saravan towns in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on August 27.[lvi] Jaish al Adl, which is a Baloch Salafi-jihadi militant group, has conducted a series of attacks targeting Iranian security forces in Sistan and Baluchistan Province in recent weeks.[lvii] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi discussed enhancing border security along the Iran-Pakistan border in a phone call with Pakistani Army Commander Asim Munir on August 26.[lviii]

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a drone strike that killed six Ministry of Defense (MoD) personnel near al Kiswah, Rif Dimashq Province, on August 26.[lix] The IDF strike occurred shortly after a landmine detonated and killed four MoD personnel during a tank training exercise at a nearby military base on Jabal Manea.[lx] Syrian media reported that the IDF struck the location where the landmine detonated, which prevented the treatment and recovery of casualties from the landmine incident.[lxi] The Syrian Foreign Ministry condemned the Israeli drone strike, calling it a “violation of international law” and Syria’s sovereignty.[lxii] Syrian media reported that Israel later conducted at least six airstrikes targeting the military base on Jabal Manea on August 27.[lxiii] The IDF has not commented on the recent airstrikes at the time of this writing. Israel has previously targeted the military base on Jabal Manea before and after the fall of the Assad regime, with the most recent strike occurring in February 2025.[lxiv] The IDF has conducted numerous airstrikes targeting MoD personnel and equipment in recent months, including during intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province in July.[lxv] A separate Israeli airstrike killed a Syrian civilian in Trinjeh, Quneitra Province, on August 26.[lxvi] Trinjeh is located near the border between Syria and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.[lxvii]

The Syrian transitional government’s Supreme Committee for People’s Assembly Elections updated the number of People’s Assembly seats for each province on August 27.[lxviii] The updated number of seats follows an announcement from Supreme Committee Chairman Mohammad Taha al Ahmed on July 27 that the total number of seats in the People’s Assembly would increase from 150 to 210. Ahmed also stated that the committee would adjust the number of seats per province according to figures from the 2011 Syrian census.[lxix] Provincial subcommittees will elect 140 seats, while Syrian President Ahmed al Shara will appoint the remaining 70.[lxx]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting Ben Gurion Airport in Israel on August 26.[lxxi] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force intercepted the missile outside Israeli territory.[lxxii] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic “blockade” on Israel in October 2023.[lxxiii] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on August 24 that Israel will respond to Houthi attacks with “compound interest.”[lxxiv]

Israeli airstrikes targeted three production units at the Hezyaz Power Station, southeast of Sanaa City, on August 24. Commercially available satellite imagery from August 27 shows that the IDF struck a production unit that it previously struck on August 17.[lxxv] An Israeli open-source analyst assessed on August 27 that Israeli airstrikes on August 24 rendered all three of the Hezyaz Power Station's production units inoperable.[lxxvi]

The IDF struck a power station in Asir District, southwestern Sanaa City, on August 24, according to an Israeli open-source analyst.[lxxvii] The power station is located approximately 1.6 miles northwest of the Yemeni Petroleum Company’s fuel depot in Asir District.[lxxviii] IDF airstrikes on August 24 also damaged the fuel depot.[lxxix]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members are reportedly discussing a revised version of the French resolution to extend the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon’s (UNIFIL) mandate.[lxxx] UNIFIL patrols Lebanon’s southern border and operates under an annually renewed mandate that is set to expire on August 31, 2025.[lxxxi] The revised resolution reportedly extends UNIFIL’s mandate until December 31, 2026, after which the mandate will end and UNIFIL will withdraw from Lebanon by the end of 2027.[lxxxii] The previous version of the French resolution extended UNIFIL’s mandate until August 2026 and called on the UNSC to "signal its intention” to gradually withdraw UNIFIL forces from Lebanon.[lxxxiii] The UNSC was scheduled to vote on the original French resolution on August 25 but delayed the vote due to US and Israeli opposition.[lxxxiv] The UNSC has not officially rescheduled the vote, but unspecified diplomatic sources told Western media on August 25 that the UNSC will vote on the resolution by the end of the week.[lxxxv] An unspecified US diplomat told Western media on August 26 that the United States would support extending UNIFIL’s mandate but wants UNIFIL to immediately begin its phased withdrawal from Lebanon.[lxxxvi]  

The Lebanese government has continued diplomatic efforts to secure military and economic support for the government and armed forces. Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa met with Kuwaiti Crown Prince Sabah al Khalid al Sabah, Defense Minister Abdullah Ali Abdullah al Salem al Sabah, and Interior Minister Fahad Yousef Saud al Sabah in Kuwait on August 25 and 26.[lxxxvii] Menassa and the senior Kuwaiti officials discussed enhancing military support and cooperation between the two countries.[lxxxviii] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam separately met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly, and other Egyptian officials in Egypt on August 27.[lxxxix] Madbouly expressed willingness to provide Lebanon with reconstruction assistance and logistical support for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).[xc] The Lebanese and Egyptian officials agreed to continue discussions and potentially sign agreements in the coming months.[xci] Menassa told Kuwaiti media on August 27 that Lebanese President Joseph Aoun is conducting visits to European and Arab countries, particularly the Gulf states, to “garner support for the [LAF]” and the Lebanese state.[xcii] Regional support is crucial for Lebanon’s ability to recover from the Israeli campaign in Lebanon in late 2024, address its ongoing financial struggles, and implement its plan to disarm Hezbollah.[xciii] Lebanese officials have continuously called on foreign countries to support the LAF as it implements its plan to disarm Hezbollah.[xciv] The LAF has historically faced resource deficits, which have previously weakened its ability to successfully counter Hezbollah.[xcv]