Iran Update, August 26, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The Lebanese government will reportedly attempt to persuade rather than coerce Hezbollah to disarm. Hezbollah is unlikely to disarm on its own accord and has historically evaded previous disarmament efforts. US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack said that the Lebanese government will focus on persuasion to encourage Hezbollah disarmament after his meeting with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun on August 26.[i] Barrack announced that Lebanon will present a plan on August 31 that aims to encourage Hezbollah to surrender its weapons to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).[ii] Hezbollah’s threats to encourage violence if efforts to disarm it persist suggest that the group is attempting to test the government’s willingness to disarm it. A plan based on persuasion is therefore unlikely to disarm Hezbollah successfully, because the group will face few negative consequences if it declines to disarm. Barrack is attempting to build an ”economic zone” in southern Lebanon to court Hezbollah’s supporters, which is an incentive for the rank-and-file of Hezbollah fighters, but would probably not court ideologically motivated Hezbollah fighters and leadership.[iii] Hezbollah has used financial incentives, including jobs, salaries, pensions, and benefits, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia civilians and to recruit young fighters.[iv]

Hezbollah will likely respond to an explicitly “persuasive” approach by continuing to threaten military action if the government continues to pressure the group politically to disarm. Purely persuasive actions enable Hezbollah to threaten escalation as it needs, while rejecting government overtures because the government’s resort to persuasive actions indicates to Hezbollah that it has deterred the government. Hezbollah’s ability to threaten military action while the government condemns itself to a publicly political approach cedes the initiative to Hezbollah and indicates to Hezbollah that the government lacks sufficient will to disarm Hezbollah.

Hezbollah continues to view its weapons as the group’s core and has previously referred to its weapons as its ”soul,” which further demonstrates its commitment to arms.[v] Hezbollah has consistently initiated wars against Israel while using the excuse that Lebanon needs Hezbollah to “defend” against Israel to refuse disarmament. Hezbollah refused to disarm after Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, arguing that its weapons remained a critical element of national defense against any future Israeli operations.[vi] Hezbollah later attacked Israel in July 2006, kidnapping three Israeli soldiers and triggering a major Israeli ground operation. Hezbollah subsequently similarly used national defense as justification to retain its arms after the 2006 war despite the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, which called for the disarmament of all armed factions in Lebanon under UNSC Resolution 1701.[vii] Hezbollah also entered the war against Israel on October 8, 2023, by conducting offensive indirect and direct fire against northern Israeli towns. Hezbollah officials, including Secretary General Naim Qassem, have also stated that Hezbollah would ”confront” whoever attempts to disarm the group.[viii] Hezbollah has consistently rejected calls for disarmament, stating that Hezbollah will not surrender its weapons until Israel halts operations and withdraws from southern Lebanon.[ix] Hezbollah has called for negotiations on a national defense strategy once Israel withdraws, which Qassem previously suggested would entail Hezbollah retaining its weapons and acting alongside Lebanese security forces.[x]

Hezbollah’s fiery rhetoric against the government likely aims to deter the government from coercing Hezbollah into disarming while avoiding military escalation. Hezbollah has previously launched mass protests in response to much less significant Lebanese government efforts to counter the group. Hezbollah and its ally, the Amal Movement, incited a protest in Beirut in October 2021 in response to the Lebanese government’s investigation into the potential role of Hezbollah officials in the Beirut port explosion.[xi] This investigation was much less significant to Hezbollah’s long-term survival than government efforts in 2025 to disarm Hezbollah that are supported by the prime minister. The 2021 protests rapidly descended into sectarian clashes between pro-Hezbollah protestors and anti-Hezbollah Lebanese Forces members, which killed at least six individuals.[xii] Hezbollah has largely refrained from officially inciting protests in response to the Lebanese government’s recent decision to disarm the group, however. Hezbollah and the Amal Movement only called on supporters to protest once on August 25, but later postponed the protests to allow for dialogue.[xiii] Hezbollah’s dialogue suggests that the group fears escalation because its weaker position and the inherent unpredictability of protests or military escalation could rapidly spiral out of Hezbollah’s control.

Iran is very unlikely to meet the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) conditions to extend the snapback mechanism deadline before the E3’s end-of-August deadline. The E3 set a deadline for Iran to reach a “substantial deal” by the end of August before the E3 triggers the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to re-impose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran.[xiv] The snapback mechanism is set to expire on October 18, marking the end of the ten-year period outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, but the E3 would need to initiate the snapback process at the end of August in order to meet the October 18 deadline.[xv] An Iranian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi met with E3 officials in Geneva, Switzerland, on August 26 to discuss potential snapback sanctions and a snapback mechanism deadline extension.[xvi] An unspecified source told an Axios reporter on August 26 that the Iranians “have [not] put tangible, detailed deliverables on the table.”[xvii] Another source added that Iran offered “very little to work with” to secure an extension.[xviii] The E3 previously proposed on July 25 to extend the snapback mechanism’s deadline in exchange for full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a resumption of nuclear talks with the United States, and accounting for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[xix] Iran has repeatedly rejected this proposal.[xx] Iran has reiterated its right to enrich uranium domestically, continued to deny the IAEA access to Iranian nuclear facilities struck in the 12-day Israel-Iran War, and set maximalist preconditions for resuming nuclear talks with the United States.[xxi]

[xxii]

Key Takeaways

• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese government will reportedly attempt to persuade rather than coerce Hezbollah to disarm. Hezbollah is unlikely to disarm on its own accord and has historically evaded previous disarmament efforts. Hezbollah’s fiery rhetoric against the government likely aims to deter the government from coercing Hezbollah into disarming while avoiding military escalation.
• Iran: Iran is very unlikely to meet the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) conditions to extend the snapback mechanism deadline before the E3’s end-of-August deadline. The E3 set a deadline for Iran to reach a “substantial deal” by the end of August before the E3 triggers the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran.

Iran

Iran continues to consult Russia over mutual concerns over the southern Caucasus after the US began efforts to broker a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan that would grant the United States exclusive development rights to a strategic corridor in the southern Caucasus.[xxiii] Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali met with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin on August 26 to discuss security concerns in the southern Caucasus and Russo-Iranian military cooperation.[xxiv] They likely discussed the recent US proposal to oversee a transit corridor in the southern Caucasus. This meeting comes after Iranian officials criticized a US-brokered peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan that grants the United States exclusive development rights to a 27-mile corridor through southern Armenia that connects Azerbaijan to its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi previously discussed Russo-Iranian concerns about the deal with Russian Foreign Minister Special Representative to the Caucasus Region Igor Khayev in Tehran on August 13.[xxv] Iranian officials have also recently held meetings with Armenian officials, likely to try to dissuade Armenia from agreeing to the proposed trade corridor.[xxvi]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei denied reports in Western media that reported that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani proposed lowering Iran's uranium enrichment from 60 percent to 20 percent to advance negotiations with the United States.[xxvii]

Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi met with Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir on August 26 to discuss enhancing border security along Iran’s southeastern border.[xxviii] Mousavi stated that there has been an increase in terrorist activity on the Iran-Pakistan border and expressed Iran’s willingness to cooperate with Pakistan to address the issue.[xxix] The Iranian Intelligence Ministry announced on August 23 that Iranian security forces destroyed a terrorist cell that had entered Iran from the Pakistan-Iran border and was armed with rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns, grenades, explosive vests, and large quantities of ammunition.[xxx] Iranian security forces have recently conducted several counterterrorism operations against the Baloch Salafi-jihadi group Jaish al Adl in southeastern Iran.[xxxi]

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) issued a directive on August 12 to begin to standardize MoD members’ uniforms and appearance, which is a small step towards instilling military discipline and professionalism.[xxxii] The MoD directive prohibits all MoD personnel from “wearing or affixing any unapproved slogans on military uniforms in any form, under penalty of accountability.”  The directive bans the use of unauthorized banners, flags, phrases, or other symbols by MoD personnel.[xxxiv] The MoD stated that it intends to standardize its uniforms and emblems for each military division within the next three months.[xxxv] Some Syrian MoD members have been recorded wearing patches affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Uyghur Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), and other Salafi-Jihadi insigni .[xxxvi] Security cameras captured members of the MoD’s 82nd Division wearing ISIS patches in Suwayda National Hospital when Syrian security forces executed a medical volunteer there on July 16.[xxxvii] The MoD’s decision to standardize unit appearance is a small step toward the implementation of proper unit discipline and professionalism.

Arabian Peninsula

Israeli airstrikes on Sanaa City on August 24 destroyed a building at a Houthi command center in the Presidential Palace complex and damaged several structures at a Yemeni Petroleum Company (YPC) site in Asir District, according to commercially available satellite imagery published on August 26.[xxxviii] Local sources claimed that one of the IDF airstrikes on August 24 targeted YPC fuel depots in Asir District.[xxxix] The IDF stated that they struck Asir and Heyzaz power stations, as well as an unspecified fuel storage site.[xl]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Lebanese media reported on August 26 that Hezbollah will soon announce the allocation of one billion USD to begin reconstruction.[xli] Lebanese media claimed that Hezbollah already has the funds on hand despite the group’s widely-reported financial struggles.[xlii] Reconstruction funds will reportedly focus on Beirut’s southern suburbs and other affected areas, excluding towns along the Israel-Lebanon border and towns that remain under threat of ongoing Israeli airstrikes.[xliii] Lebanese media added that the process will proceed at a ”rapid pace” and would be completed within a maximum of eight months.[xliv] Hezbollah, which quickly rebuilt Lebanon and provided a social safety net for Lebanese civilians after the 2006 war, has struggled to reconstruct damaged infrastructure following the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[xlv] Hezbollah has similarly struggled to maintain its financial commitments to fighters, which has contributed to growing frustration among Hezbollah supporters.[xlvi] Frustrated Hezbollah supporters have demanded answers from Hezbollah about when they will receive reconstruction funds to rebuild businesses and homes destroyed in the war.[xlvii] Disruptions to Hezbollah’s ability to provide its support base with promised benefits may not have an immediate effect on the population’s support for Hezbollah, but could diminish support for Hezbollah over time.