Iran Update, August 11, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati discussed the threats that Iran perceives to its regional influence in an interview on August 9 that underscored Iran’s commitment to its strategic goals despite recent setbacks.[i] Velayati’s statements demonstrate significant continuity between Iran’s pre- and post-war approach to the region and its use of the Axis of Resistance. Velayati reiterated Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance but notably highlighted the Houthis as a “gem” within the Iranian proxy and partner network.[ii] Velayati said that Iran will oppose US-supported efforts to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The Lebanese government, which the United States has pressured to disarm Hezbollah, agreed on August 7 to disarm Hezbollah.[iii] The United States has similarly pressured the Iraqi government to pass legislation that would disarm or reform the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which has been opposed by Iran’s Iraqi allies.[iv] Velayati held a phone call with the Iraqi State of Law coalition head and Iranian ally in Iraq, Nouri al Maliki, on August 8 in which Maliki emphasized that Iraq will not allow the United States to disarm the PMF, which suggests the pair discussed recent US efforts to undermine the PMF.[v] Velayati also suggested that resistance groups will form in Syria to resist Israel.[vi] Khamenei and other Iranian officials have previously framed the post-Assad Syrian landscape as an opportunity for Iran to shape events in Syria through grassroots mobilization, which is consistent with Iranian hopes prior to the Israel-Iran War.[vii]

It remains unclear how Iran will attempt to oppose any of these US-supported efforts, but Velayati’s interview highlights the increased importance of the Houthi Movement within Iran’s Axis of Resistance. The Houthis remain the most unified and capable member of the Axis of Resistance after two years of war, having suffered relatively little damage compared to Hezbollah or Hamas.

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani appears to be trying to secure Iranian interests in Iraq and Lebanon during planned visits to each country this week, amid Iranian concern about its regional influence. Larijani’s visits appear to be an effort to actualize the policy priorities outlined by Velayati. Larijani met separately with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and National Security Advisor Qassim al Araji on August 11.[viii] Iranian anti-regime media reported on August 11 that Larijani will encourage unidentified Shia parties to pass the Popular Mobilization Authority Law during his visit.[ix] CTP-ISW assessed on August 6 that this law, on which the Iraqi Parliament is yet to vote, would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing the PMF’s structures and responsibilities.[x] Larijani will reportedly also discuss coalition formation ahead of the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections with unspecified Iraqi officials.[xi] Iran has previously encouraged Iranian-backed Iraqi parties to unite ahead of the elections to improve the likelihood that the parties will maintain control of the Iraqi parliament.[xii] Larijani and Araji also signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to ”develop“ the 2023 Iran-Iraq security agreement that required Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Kurdish opposition groups from the Iran-Iraq border.[xiii] This is probably an extension of Iran’s focus on internal security because Iran views Iraqi Kurdistan as a rear area from which anti-regime Kurdish groups can operate in Iran, which threatens Iranian regime stability.[xiv] Iran has previously pressured the Iraqi federal government to remove Kurdish opposition groups from the Iran-Iraq border and may be concerned about the threat of Israel using these Kurdish groups to infiltrate Iran and transport materiel.[xv] Larijani will visit Beirut later this week to discuss “regional affairs” with unspecified Lebanese officials.[xvi]  Multiple Iranian officials have expressed their discontent with the Lebanese government’s initial steps to disarm Hezbollah over the last several weeks.[xvii]

Larijani’s diplomatic efforts in Iraq and Lebanon strongly suggest that Larijani will take a more active approach toward implementing Iranian foreign policy in the region as SNSC secretary compared to his predecessor. Larijani’s visits after his appointment as SNSC secretary on August 5  suggest that his approach will be more hands-on compared to his predecessor, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, who served as a coordinator of Iran’s security apparatus rather than an executor.[xviii] Pragmatic hardliner Larijani’s active role further suggests that moderate and pragmatic elements of the Iranian regime may begin to increase their engagement in Iranian foreign policy, particularly with its regional partners and proxies. Larijani has considerable experience engaging in Iranian foreign policy from his previous roles. [xix]

Iran has taken steps to protect its nuclear scientists following the 12-day Israel-Iran War. Israel killed at least 14 nuclear scientists during the war.[xx] The Telegraph reported on August 11 that Iran has sent its remaining nuclear scientists to safe houses in northern Iran, citing a senior Iranian official.[xxi] The official said Iran has replaced all the nuclear scientists teaching at universities with individuals who have no connection to Iran's nuclear program. Iran reportedly assigned each key nuclear scientist at least one deputy in order to try to ensure knowledge continuity.[xxii] Israeli sources are concerned that some of these deputies have replaced the scientists whom Israel killed during the war. Some of the replacement scientists reportedly have expertise in explosives and warhead design. An Israeli intelligence and defense analyst stated that Iran still has scientists who have previously worked on nuclear weapons delivery systems, including efforts to adapt Shahab-3 missiles to hold nuclear warheads.[xxiii] The senior Iranian official also said Iran has assigned multiple agencies to protect nuclear scientists as opposed to the single Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) unit that handled the scientists’ protection previously.[xxiv]

Iran likely assigned multiple agencies to protect its nuclear scientists to address counterintelligence concerns following the war.[xxv] The existence of multiple agencies providing security for the scientists enables each agency to ensure the compliance of the other agencies, but it will contribute to siloed organizations that hinder information sharing. Iranian authorities executed an Iranian nuclear scientist on August 6 for reportedly providing Israel with information about another nuclear scientist whom Israel killed during the war.[xxvi]

Key Takeaways

• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati discussed the threats that Iran perceives to its regional influence in an interview on August 9 that underscored Iran’s commitment to its strategic goals despite recent setbacks.
• Iran: Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani appears to be trying to secure Iranian interests in Iraq and Lebanon during planned visits to each country this week, amid Iranian concern about its regional influence. Larijani’s diplomatic efforts in Iraq and Lebanon strongly indicate that Larijani will take a more active approach toward implementing Iranian foreign policy in the region as SNSC secretary compared to his predecessor.
• Iran: Iran has taken steps to protect its nuclear scientists following the 12-day Israel-Iran War.
• Yemen: The Houthis and Iran are using an extensive smuggling network involving personnel in Iran, Somalia, and Yemen to bypass the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism in Djibouti, according to smugglers detained by a pro-Yemeni government faction.

Iran

Nuclear negotiations continue to increase tensions between hardliners and moderates in Iran. Norway reportedly may host a sixth round of nuclear talks between Iran and the United States.[xxvii] This comes after Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Andreas Kravik and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi held a meeting on August 5  to discuss the nuclear negotiations.[xxviii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on August 10 that Iran risks further conflict with the United States unless diplomacy is pursued, which is likely a response to the hardliner anti-negotiation camp within Iran.[xxix] Ultrahardliner Saeed Jalili implicitly criticized Iranian officials who support renewed talks with the United States.[xxx] Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takh Ravanchi expressed willingness on August 9 to engage in nuclear negotiations but reiterated Iran‘s refusal to accept zero uranium enrichment. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran’s continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment after the conflict suggests that Iran is unlikely to make concessions during the reported upcoming talks.[xxxi]

Unspecified fighters tried to enter a police station in Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on August 10, and clashed with Iranian security forces.[xxxii] Three fighters and one Iranian police chief were killed.[xxxiii] News outlets reported that the militants were part of Jaish al Adl, the Baloch Salafi-Jihadi group that has frequently attacked Iranian security forces in the region.[xxxiv] The initial police report did not make an assessment.[xxxv] Iran has placed a growing emphasis on border security in southeastern Iran following an uptick in anti-regime militant attacks in the region since December 2023.[xxxvi]

Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani issued several directives on August 9 targeting Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) command and control issues. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of militias that, on paper, report to the Prime Minister but in reality often report to a parallel command that sometimes takes orders from Iran.[xxxvii] A government committee formed by Sudani to investigate clashes between several Kataib Hezbollah members and Iraqi Federal Police officers on July 27 offered recommendations to Sudani.[xxxviii] Iraq’s Joint Operations Command arrested 14 members of the Kataib Hezbollah-controlled 45th and 46th PMF brigades in response to their suspected of involvement in the July 27 attack on an Agriculture Department building in Baghdad and the engagement that followed. Kataib Hezbollah fighters killed a civilian and a federal police officer in the engagement. Kataib Hezbollah commands the 45th and 46th PMF Brigades.

Sudani’s special investigative committee confirmed on August 9 that Kataib Hezbollah members in the 45th and 46th PMF brigades conducted the attack and added that there are unspecified command and control issues within the Kataib Hezbollah formations.[xxxix] Such command and control issues are unsurprising because Kataib Hezbollah does not answer to the formal chain of command and instead takes its orders from the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[xl] Sudani dismissed the commanders of the 45th and 46th PMF Brigades on August 9 and formed a council to investigate the commander of the PMF’s Jazeera Operations Command for neglecting his command and control duties.[xli] The PMF Jazeera Operations Command is primarily composed of Kataib Hezbollah members.[xlii] Sudani's decision to dismiss the commanders of the 45th and 46th PMF Brigades comes as the United States pressures the Iraqi government to dissolve the PMF.[xliii]

Previous Iraqi governments have conducted similar spasmodic and limited crackdowns against PMF activities, but have failed to follow through with convictions or jail time. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi twice arrested Iranian-backed Iraqi militia members for illegal activity, but militia pressure secured their release in both cases.[xliv] Sudani’s orders could begin to limit Iranian influence within the Iraqi government, but it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will follow through with its announced actions.

Syria

Statements by the Syrian transitional government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) after a political conference in Hasakah, Syria, demonstrate a lack of trust on both sides that will undermine Syrian integration efforts. The Syrian Foreign Ministry’s director of US Affairs, Qutaiba Idlibi, said that the transitional government condemned the August 8 “Unity of Position” conference.[xlv] Idlibi announced on August 9 that the transitional government withdrew from the scheduled Paris negotiations in response to the Hasakah conference and asked international mediators to move future talks to Damascus.[xlvi] Idlibi said that the conference’s decision to host ”separatist figures involved in hostile acts” is a clear ”violation” of the March 10 agreement. The March 10 agreement is a framework for integrating SDF-controlled territory into the rest of Syria.[xlvii] Idlibi stated that the Syrian transitional government viewed the Hasakah conference as an attempt to ”internationalize a Syrian issue, invite foreign interference, and reimpose sanctions,” and that the government holds the SDF fully accountable for the conference.[xlviii]  The SDF released a statement on August 9 following the transitional government's withdrawal from the scheduled Paris negotiations.[xlix] The statement accused Turkish-backed factions operating under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) of repeated ceasefire violations across multiple provinces, urged an immediate halt to attacks, called for international monitoring, and reaffirmed readiness for dialogue while holding Damascus fully responsible for ceasefire violations.[l] One notable ceasefire violation occurred on August 2 after SDF forces allegedly attempted to advance toward MOD positions near al Kayariya village in Aleppo Province.[li] The SDF, Syrian transitional government, France, and the United States were previously scheduled to meet in Paris on an unspecified date to negotiate the integration of the SDF into the Syrian Defense Ministry.

The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) decision to invite Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri to the Hasakah conference on August 8 likely provoked the transitional government to withdraw from integration negotiations with the SDF in Paris.[lii] Hijri formed a committee that announced an autonomous government for Suwayda Province on August 6.[liii] The transitional government likely views cooperation between the SDF and Hijri as a threat to its ability to establish control over all of Syria. Both the SDF and the Syrian transitional government are responsible for failures to uphold the March 10 agreement, however. The transitional government has failed to ensure minority representation, which is a key stipulation within the March 10 agreement.[liv] Very few government officials and no military commanders or government officials in senior security positions are from minority communities.

The extreme distrust between Damascus and the SDF could trigger a resumption in fighting if a minor ceasefire violation spirals out of control due to distrust and poor communication between the two sides. A relatively minor robbery, exacerbated by distrust between local communities, spurred widespread intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province, for example.[lv]

A Suwaydawi news outlet released a video on August 10 that shows Syrian security forces executing a hospital worker at the Suwayda National Hospital on July 16.[lvi] Suwayda 24 released footage that shows Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) members executed a medical volunteer after he resisted their assault.[lvii] The MoI condemned the execution and said that it would investigate the footage on August 10.[lviii] The MoI appointed Security Affairs Deputy Minister Major General Abdul Qader al Tahhan on the same day to investigate the execution and arrest perpetrators.[lix] This investigation is separate from the broader inquiry committee created by the transitional government on July 31 to investigate government violations in Suwayda Province.[lx] Whether or how the Syrian transitional government holds its forces accountable for atrocities they commit will influence the government’s legitimacy and perception among minority groups. If the investigation fails to deliver credible accountability, it will likely reinforce perceptions among minority groups that the transitional government tolerated or enabled such abuses.

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis launched three drones targeting Ben Gurion Airport and "vital sites" in Ashkelon and Beer Sheva in southern Israel on August 7.[lxi] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force intercepted two Houthi drones outside of Israeli territory.[lxii] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic ”blockade” on Israel in October 2023.[lxiii]

The Houthis and Iran are using an extensive smuggling network involving personnel in Iran, Somalia, and Yemen to bypass the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) in Djibouti, according to smugglers detained by a pro-Yemeni government faction. UNVIM is a UN-established inspection mechanism based at Dijbouti Port designed to facilitate the import of commercial goods to Yemen while preventing the smuggling of weapons and military equipment to the Houthis.[lxiv] The Yemeni National Resistance Front (NRF) published interviews on August 9 from Yemeni crew members of a vessel that the NRF intercepted on July 16.[lxv] The ship was carrying over 750 tons of military equipment bound for the Houthis, including Iranian-made cruise and anti-ship missiles, drone engines, air defense components, and communication equipment.[lxvi]

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Houthis operate an extensive network of smuggling routes encompassing maritime and overland pathways, according to the crew’s testimonies.[lxvii] The maritime operations include direct shipments from Bandar Abbas Port in southern Iran to the Houthi-controlled al Salif and Hudaydah ports in western Yemen. The network also includes operations via the Somali coast, where IRGC operatives are stationed. The network also bypassed UNVIM using locally-recruited Djiboutians and by disguising ostensibly commercial shipping traveling through Djibouti Port.[lxviii] The network sends smugglers on overland routes, including flights between Houthi-controlled Sanaa Airport and Jordan, and then flights from Jordan to Lebanon or over land crossings to Syria and Iraq before reaching Tehran and then ultimately to Bandar Abbas for maritime smuggling operations.[lxix] The smugglers also utilize routes through the Omani-Iranian border.[lxx] Omani border customs have previously intercepted weapons shipments bound for the Houthis.[lxxi] Several shipments contained ”sensitive chemicals” disguised as medicine, which Iran reportedly uses for ballistic missile fuel production.[lxxii]

The crewmembers also disclosed the names and roles of six Houthi officials responsible for the Houthi-Iranian smuggling network:[lxxiii]

• Houthi Deputy Defense Minister Brigadier General Abu Jaafar al Talbi: responsible for military logistics and procurement, coordinates with the IRGC directly to oversee weapon transfers, and arranges for smugglers to travel to Tehran and stay at Houthi camps.[lxxiv]
• Houthi - IRGC Liaison Officer Mostafa al Sharifi: coordinates with Yemeni sailors arriving in Iran and manages container shipping logistics.[lxxv]
• Houthi General Authority for Fishing in the Red Sea head Hussein al Attas: recruits sailors to facilitate weapons shipments and oversees smuggling operations from Somalia and Djibouti.[lxxvi]
• Houthi General Authority for Fishing in the Red Sea deputy head Eyad Atini: supports Attas in recruitment and coordination activities and manages fishing operations at al Salif and Hudaydah ports.[lxxvii]
• Houthi Recruitment and Smuggling Coordinator Yahya Jiniya: manages recruitment operations for smuggling networks and coordinates smuggling activities.[lxxviii]
• Houthi Financial Operations Manager Ibrahim al Moayad: oversees financial operations for the smuggling network and manages salary payments for operatives.[lxxix]

Yemeni security forces in al Houta, Lahj Governorate, intercepted a shipment of cranes, possibly for offloading and loading containers on vessels bound for Houthi-controlled Hudaydah Port on August 10, according to a Yemen analyst.[lxxx] US and Israeli airstrikes targeting Hudaydah Port between March and July 2025 destroyed most of the loading infrastructure, including cranes, making it harder for the Houthis to import and export goods.[lxxxi] The Houthis rely on Hudaydah Port for oil exports to generate revenue and to import commercial goods.[lxxxii]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Anti-Hezbollah parliamentarians expressed discontent over Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani’s upcoming visit to Beirut by claiming that Iran is interfering in Lebanese affairs.[lxxxiii] Larijani is expected to visit Beirut this week for a three-day visit to discuss “regional issues” with unspecified Lebanese officials.[lxxxiv] Several anti-Hezbollah parliamentarians have criticized Larijani’s upcoming visit to Beirut. Lebanese Forces Party parliamentarian Ziad Hawat claimed on August 11 that Iran has blatantly interfered in Lebanese politics through arming Hezbollah and inciting “resistance” in Lebanon, stating that “Iran should stay in Iran.”[lxxxv] Kataeb Party parliamentarian Elias Hankach similarly stated that Iran is encouraging Hezbollah to “refuse to hand over its weapons, start more wars,” and “destroy Lebanon.”[lxxxvi]

Several Iranian officials have expressed support for Hezbollah since the Lebanese government took early steps to disarm Hezbollah. The Lebanese government tasked the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with creating a plan to establish a state monopoly on arms on August 5 and agreed to the objectives of the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah on August 7.[lxxxvii] Supreme Leader Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati said that Iran is “certainly” opposed to disarming Hezbollah on August 9.[lxxxviii] Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on August 6 that Iran would support ”from afar” any decisions that Hezbollah made in response to the Lebanese cabinet’s disarmament plan.[lxxxix] Araghchi noted that the Lebanese government’s plan is unrealistic and “doomed.”[xc] Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force Iraj Masjedi also noted on August 7 that Hezbollah would never be disarmed.[xci] 

Hezbollah officials and parliamentarians rejected calls for Hezbollah to disarm and called the Lebanese government’s decision illegitimate, which could complicate the Lebanese government’s ability to implement plans to disarm the group.[xcii] Hezbollah Political Council deputy head Mahmoud Qamati said on August 11 that the Lebanese government “would not be able to disarm [Hezbollah].”[xciii] Several Hezbollah parliamentarians similarly pledged that Hezbollah would not hand over any weapons and that the government’s plan would fail.[xciv] Hezbollah parliamentarian Hassan Ezzedine noted that the group “could not” disarm when Israel is continuing its operations in Lebanon.[xcv] Hezbollah has long used continued Israeli operations and the Taif Agreement to justify retaining its weapons.[xcvi] Hezbollah officials and parliamentarians’ statements suggest that Hezbollah will resist any LAF and Lebanese government plan to establish a state monopoly on arms. Hezbollah has long used its military capabilities and political influence within other state institutions to sway the Lebanese government’s decision-making, and could attempt to do so again.[xcvii]

The Lebanese government has reportedly been under financial pressure to form and implement a plan to disarm Hezbollah. Unspecified sources told Bloomberg on August 9 that the Gulf states previously informed Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam that reconstruction and investment funds to Lebanon are contingent upon the Lebanese government adopting a plan to fully disarm Hezbollah that includes a timetable.[xcviii] The unspecified sources did not specify when Gulf officials told Aoun and Salam about this requirement. The sources noted that Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, want Lebanon to restructure its banking sector and crackdown on corruption to control Lebanon’s vast cash-based informal economy.[xcix] Gulf funding is crucial for Lebanon’s ability to recover from the Israel-Lebanon War and to address its ongoing financial struggles.[c] The World Bank estimated in March 2025 that Lebanon would need approximately $11 billion to address its reconstruction and recovery needs following the war.[ci] Lebanon’s recovery needs and the Gulf states‘ stipulation that the government disarm Hezbollah likely contributed to the Lebanese government’s decision to approve the US proposal objectives on August 7.[cii] The United States’ proposal objectives included that Lebanon would secure reconstruction funding from unspecified countries within 90 days.[ciii] The proposal objectives also stated that the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, France, and other unspecified countries would organize an economic conference to support the Lebanese economy within 120 days.[civ]

Both the LAF and the Hezbollah-allied Amal Movement have issued statements warning civilians against protesting the Lebanese government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah.[cv] Hezbollah and Amal Movement supporters previously held protests in 16 locations across Lebanon on August 7 in response to the Lebanese government’s support for disarming Hezbollah.[cvi] The LAF warned citizens against ”endangering the country’s security through actions with unpredictable consequences” on August 9 in response to social media calls to protest the government’s decision.[cvii] Amal executive body head Mostafa Fouani also responded to the August 7 protests and issued a directive prohibiting Amal party members from participating in ”any provocative popular movement that contradicts the movement’s leadership directives.”[cviii] The Amal Movement has long supported Hezbollah’s retention of its arms but its leadership has also continuously called internal unity as “the best form of resistance“ and stressed that its members respect the privacy of all Lebanese civilians across all sects and regions.[cix] Fouani threatened ”organizational accountability” and expulsion for violators of the directive.[cx]