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The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Syrian security forces told Emirati media on August 16 that the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is preparing a three-pronged offensive to seize Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces. This report and others are likely part of an effort by Turkey and some elements of the Syrian transitional government to coerce the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to surrender to the transitional government.[i] The Syrian security sources told Emirati media that the MoD has assembled 50,000 troops near the city of Palmyra, Homs Province, to capture Deir ez Zor and Raqqa provinces with support from local Arab tribes if the SDF refuses to hand over these provinces to the transitional government by October 2025.[ii] A separate Syrian source said that the MoD is preparing staging grounds for the offensive in Rusafa, Raqqa Province, and Sukhnah, Homs Province, which are 70 kilometers northeast and 166 kilometers northeast from Palmyra, respectively.[iii]

It is unlikely that the Syrian transitional government is preparing for a major offensive at this time. Local Syrians would almost certainly observe and publicize the movements of 50,000 personnel. The much smaller mobilizations towards the Syrian coast in March 2025 and southwestern Syria in July 2025 garnered significant media attention both within Syria and in the West. Satellite imagery shows no prepared staging areas in any of the locations mentioned by the sources. Some of the locations make little military sense as staging areas, moreover. Sukhnah is a less optimal staging area for a major offensive against the SDF compared to other areas closer to the Euphrates River. Deir ez Zor City and its surroundings have a significant amount of military infrastructure left over from the Assad regime, including Deir ez Zor Airport, that would be far more suitable than the remote desert town of Sukhnah.[iv] Sukhnah is also 135km by road from Deir ez Zor City, and any force staged in Sukhnah would need to travel 135km to reach its point of departure. Palmyra is even further to the west. Forces travelling from the staging grounds to the point of departure would also have to travel to areas frequently attacked by small ISIS cells. These cells could not stop a large Syrian force, but they could disrupt the movement and make an already challenging operation even more complex.

Rusafa presents a more viable staging ground for the MoD than Sukhnah. MoD forces in Rusafa would be positioned at the rear of SDF forces based in Deir Hafer and could try to cut off the ground line of communication between Deir Hafer and SDF-controlled Raqqa Province. Rusafa is located 26 kilometers south of two hydroelectric dams controlled by the SDF. The MoD would have to capture these towns in order to stage an assault to capture Raqqa City. An unspecified source told Emirati media that newly-integrated Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) units would advance on SDF positions near Tishreen Dam, which is located northeast of Deir Hafer.[v] This force would be canalized by the Tishreen Dam crossing, the eastern side of which is surely guarded by SDF units. Tishreen Dam is the only intact Euphrates River crossing between Lake Assad and the Turkish border.

This report comes amid similar reports in Turkish media that Turkey and the Syrian transitional government are preparing for an offensive against the SDF. Turkish media recently claimed on August 14 that a joint offensive by Turkey and the Syrian government against the SDF is imminent.[vi] These reports likely seek to pressure the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state and surrender its territory by threatening a military operation against it. 

An adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced on August 17 that US forces will withdraw from Ain al Asad Airbase and Baghdad International Airport in September 2025.[vii] A spokesperson for the US Embassy in Baghdad separately told Iraqi media on August 18 that the US-led international coalition’s mission in Iraq will transition to a “more traditional bilateral security partnership.”[viii] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[ix] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly threatened to attack US forces if the United States postpones its military withdrawal from Iraq.[x] 

Senior Lebanese officials called on the United States to pressure Israel and Syria to agree to the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah during US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s visit to Beirut on August 18.[xi] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun told Barrack that Israel and Syria must commit to the contents of the US proposal, which the Lebanese government approved on August 7.[xii] Aoun told Saudi media on August 17 that the US proposal will not become effective until all relevant parties approve it.[xiii] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam separately told Barrack that the United States must fulfill its responsibilities by pressuring Israel to cease hostilities, withdraw from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon, and release Lebanese prisoners held in Israel.[xiv] Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri similarly called on Israel to commit to the proposal during his meeting with Barrack.[xv] Barrack told Lebanese reporters following his meeting with Aoun that the United States has discussed the potential for a long-term ceasefire with Israel but has not shared the Hezbollah disarmament proposal with Israel.[xvi] Barrack suggested that Israel would take unspecified steps in the coming weeks.[xvii]

Barrack also reportedly told Aoun that Syria has not responded to the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[xviii] The US proposal includes provisions to increase joint Lebanese-Syrian border operations and demarcate unspecified areas of the Lebanon-Syria border.[xix] Lebanese and Syrian officials signed an agreement in March 2025 to demarcate the border and increase border security coordination.[xx] Lebanese officials have recently expressed willingness to discuss issues with Syrian officials that have complicated relations between the two countries, including the issue of imprisoned and displaced Syrians in Lebanon.[xxi] The Syrian government has consistently called on the Lebanese government to release Syrian prisoners and allow them to serve their sentence in Syria, but Lebanese judicial officials have denied these requests.[xxii]

Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed.[xxiii] Israel previously rejected Berri’s July 2025 demand that Israel halt all airstrikes in Lebanon prior to the Lebanese government’s disarmament of Hezbollah.[xxiv] An unspecified Israeli official told Saudi media on August 18 that Israel will “play its part” in the US proposal when Lebanon takes unspecified “concrete steps.”[xxv] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recently shifted to a “forward defense” posture on August 1 to maintain Israel’s “strategic superiority” in southern Lebanon and prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting capabilities that could pose a threat to northern Israeli towns.[xxvi] Recent IDF operations, including ground raids, airstrikes, and drone strikes, demonstrate this posture shift.[xxvii] The IDF had a similar objective in its campaign against Hezbollah in late 2024 due to Israel’s concern about a potential Hezbollah ground incursion into northern Israel.[xxviii] The Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement in November 2024 included an addendum that ensures the Israeli right to self-defense against any future threat that Hezbollah may pose.[xxix] The IDF has acted on this addendum and has continued to operate against Hezbollah since November 2024, including via airstrikes and raids targeting Hezbollah infrastructure.[xxx]

Hezbollah would likely use any delay in the implementation of the US disarmament plan to reconstitute its forces, increase its weapons stockpiles, and bolster its domestic support base, which would increase Hezbollah’s relative strength vis-a-vis the Lebanese government and thus make it more challenging for the government to disarm Hezbollah. Iranian officials and Axis-affiliated media recently reported that Hezbollah began appointing new commanders to reconstitute its command structure.[xxxi] Hezbollah reportedly began prioritizing domestic drone production in June 2025 to reduce its reliance on Iranian weapons.[xxxii] The IDF destroyed approximately 70 percent of the drones of Hezbollah’s primary aerial unit, Unit 127, during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[xxxiii] Hezbollah is also restructuring its financial system to confront challenges to its ability to pay salaries and provide services to Lebanese civilians.[xxxiv] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation for individuals who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[xxxv] These actions highlight how Hezbollah is actively trying to reconstitute as a military organization and maintain its domestic support base. Any delay in the implementation of the US proposal would give Hezbollah more time to try to achieve these objectives.

Key Takeaways

• Turkish Pressure Campaign: Syrian security sources told Emirati media on August 16 that the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is preparing a three-pronged offensive to seize Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces. This report and others appear to be an effort by Turkey and some elements of the Syrian transitional government to coerce the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to surrender.
• US Withdrawal from Iraq: An adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced on August 17 that US forces will withdraw from Ain al Asad Airbase and Baghdad International Airport in September 2025. A spokesperson for the US Embassy in Baghdad separately told Iraqi media on August 18 that the US-led international coalition’s mission in Iraq will transition to a “more traditional bilateral security partnership.”
• Hezbollah Disarmament: Senior Lebanese officials called on the United States to pressure Israel and Syria to agree to the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah during US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s visit to Beirut on August 18. Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed.

Iran
The Iranian Reformist Front issued a statement on August 17 that called for political reforms and foreign policy shifts, which highlights how reformists in the Iranian regime may feel emboldened in the post-war environment to call for change.[xxxvi] The statement warned that Iran’s fragile economy and potential E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) snapback sanctions could cause Iran to enter a deeper economic crisis.[xxxvii] The Reformist Front outlined eleven demands, including lifting restrictions on reformist leaders, freeing political prisoners, excluding the armed forces from non-military fields, allowing free elections, reforming women’s rights laws, lifting censorship, and suspending uranium enrichment under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight in exchange for sanctions relief.[xxxviii] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency condemned the statement on August 18, criticizing the Reformist Front’s call to suspend uranium enrichment and accusing reformists of pursuing policies that weaken Iran in favor of Iran’s adversaries.[xxxix] The Reformist Front statement comes after former President Hassan Rouhani urged the regime on August 13 to implement reforms, ease tensions with the West, and limit the Iranian armed forces’ involvement in politics and the economy.[xl] Rouhani framed the post-war period as an opportunity to restore public trust and recalibrate Iran’s trajectory.[xli] The emergence of reformist and moderate elements in the Iranian regime likely reflects a political opening created by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s absence from the public view and the loss of hardliner leadership during the Israel-Iran War.[xlii]

Iranian security forces raided a house near Enghelab Square in central Tehran on August 17 where unspecified individuals were reportedly constructing drones for Mossad.[xliii] Iranian security forces seized several drones during the raid
[xliv] This incident highlights Iranian officials’ heightened concern about Israeli infiltration following the Israel-Iran War.[xlv] Israel clandestinely built a one-way attack drone base in Iran that it used to strike Iranian ballistic missile launchers at the beginning of the war.[xlvi] This operation hindered Iran’s ability to immediately respond to Israel.[xlvii]

Iranian security forces continue to conduct counterterrorism operations against Salafi-jihadi militant group Jaish al Adl in Sistan and Baluchistan Province, southeastern Iran.[xlviii] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Quds Operational Base dismantled two Jaish al Adl cells in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on August 17.[xlix] The Quds Operational Base stated that it killed six fighters, detained an unspecified number of others, and seized 25 kilograms of explosives and other military equipment during an operation in Chabahar.[l] The IRGC Ground Forces separately dismantled a safe house and killed several armed militants in northern Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[li] These operations came after Jaish al Adl fighters shot at a vehicle in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on August 15, killing an Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officer and wounding another.[lii] Senior Iranian security officials have recently met with Pakistani officials to discuss how to address Jaish al Adl attacks.[liii]

Iraq

The Iraqi Accountability and Justice Commission is investigating Shia Coordination Framework electoral candidates for alleged ties to the Baath Party, according to leaked documents published in Iraqi media on August 18.[liv] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The Accountability and Justice Commission is reportedly investigating between 250 and 400 candidates. The candidates represent “most” Shia Coordination Framework parties.[lv] Iraqi media noted that the individuals under investigation include a senior official of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada in Kirkuk Province, Bassem Ghazi al Amerli. This report comes after State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki emphasized on August 8 the need for the Accountability and Justice Commission to take action against Baathists.[lvi] Shia political parties have long manipulated the Accountability and Justice Commission to target political opponents.[lvii] The commission has barred several candidates in recent months from competing in the November 2025 parliamentary elections due to alleged Baathist ties.[lviii]

An unidentified Iraqi official told Fox News on August 14 that US Treasury Department officials pressured Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein in March 2025 to prevent Iraq’s largest bank from engaging in financial transactions with the Houthis.[lix] The US officials called for the Sanaa branch of Rafidain Bank to relocate to internationally-recognized Yemeni government-controlled territory. The Iraqi Embassy in Washington, DC, denied the Fox News report and claimed that Rafidain Bank has not operated in Sanaa since 2017.[lx] The Fox News report comes as Rafidain Bank signed a “professional partnership agreement” with US-based financial consulting firm K2 Integrity on August 15 to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.[lxi] The Iraqi federal government has previously used Rafidain Bank to process and distribute salaries to members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[lxii] Iraqi media reported in July 2025 that US pressure on Rafidain Bank caused a multi-week delay in the distribution of PMF salaries in June 2025.[lxiii]  Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have historically exploited loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to commit fraud and obtain funds to support Iranian and militia operations, including attacks on US forces and allies.[lxiv]

Sunni Azm Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai discussed cooperation between “political forces” with Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) head Masoud Barzani on August 16.[lxv] Samarrai and Barzani’s meeting is notable given that these parties allied following the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[lxvi] This meeting follows Samarrai’s request on August 13 for the Iraqi electoral commission to disqualify former Parliament Speaker and Progress Party head Mohammad al Halbousi from competing in the upcoming elections.[lxvii] Samarrai also discussed the elections and “support for the executive parties” with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on August 15.[lxviii]

Syria

The General Security Service (GSS) arrested an MoD member that the Syrian National Inquiry Commission accused of involvement in the March 2025 coastal massacres.[lxix] This arrest marks the Syrian transitional government’s first publicized arrest of an MoD member for their involvement in the atrocities on the Syrian coast.[lxx] The Syrian National Inquiry Commission referred 298 individuals to the Syrian judiciary on July 22 for their attacks on Alawite civilians in March.[lxxi] The Syrian judiciary must prosecute, try, and punish the individuals involved in atrocities against Alawites in order to be able to rebuild minority trust in the government.

Arabian Peninsula

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Navy struck the Houthi-controlled Hezyaz Power Station, south of Sanaa City, on August 16 in response to Houthi drone and missile attacks targeting Israeli civilian and military sites.[lxxii] The IDF Navy struck a generator at one of the power station’s three production units, damaging the unit, according to an Israeli open-source analyst.[lxxiii] The IDF previously targeted the Hezyaz Power Station in December 2024 and May 2025.[lxxiv]

The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting Ben Gurion Airport in Israel on August 17 in response to the Israeli attack on the Hezyaz Power Station.[lxxv] The IDF intercepted the missile outside Israeli territory.[lxxvi] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic “blockade” on Israel in October 2023.[lxxvii]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.