Iran Update, August 19, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The Shia Coordination Framework is reportedly divided over US efforts to dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. A source close to the Shia Coordination Framework told Iraqi media on August 19 that Shia Coordination Framework members are divided into two “camps,” with the first in support of challenging US objections to the PMF and the latter concerned about the threat of US sanctions and strikes targeting Iraq.[i] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the PMF and reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders.[ii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[iii] This report of Shia Coordination Framework divisions comes amid a broader debate within Iraq about limiting the transfer of arms to the Iraqi state and efforts by Iranian-backed Iraqi political actors to pass the Popular Mobilization Authority Law.[iv] CTP-ISW assessed on August 6 that this law, which the Iraqi Parliament has yet to vote on, would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key PMF structures, like the al Muhandis General Company, as part of the Iraqi government.[v] This company is controlled by Iranian-backed factions and acquired land along the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border that Iraqi groups used to launch drones targeting Saudi Arabia.[vi] The law nominally subordinates the PMF to the defense minister via the head of the future Popular Mobilization Authority, but the PMF has officially answered to the prime minister since 2016 without answering to the prime minister in reality.[vii] The US State Department spokesperson confirmed on August 12 that the United States opposes the law.[viii]

The Shia Coordination Framework source did not specify which Shia Coordination Framework parties support challenging US pressure to dissolve the PMF, but many Shia Coordination Framework parties with affiliated armed groups likely support passing the Popular Mobilization Authority Law.[ix] Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri and Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun bloc have expressed willingness to wear the PMF uniform during the next Parliament session to induce a vote on the PMF law.[x] CTP-ISW assessed on July 16 that some Iraqi parliamentarians, including Shia Coordination Framework-aligned Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi, have previously threatened to remove Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, likely in an effort to force Mashhadani to put the law on the Parliamentary agenda.[xi] Mashhadani has so far not placed the law on the agenda for a vote.   Over 120 parliamentarians submitted a petition on August 5 to amend the agenda for the August 5 parliament session to include a vote on the law.[xii] Mandalawi, the deputy speaker, chaired the session, which ended early due to a lack of quorum.[xiii] Mashhadani accused Mandalawi of violating the Parliamentary bylaws by chairing the session and called the session invalid.[xiv] Parliament reportedly did not discuss the law during the session.[xv]

There is domestic opposition to the law among Kurdish and Sunni parties. Parliament read the law for a second time on July 16, but Kurdish and Sunni parliamentarians left parliament to protest the law because it was raised without prior ”political consensus” or discussion in committee.[xvi] A Shia Coordination Framework parliamentarian told Iraqi media on August 18 that over 100 parliamentarians have signed a petition to vote on the law in the next Parliament session, but added that no Sunni or Kurdish parliamentarians have signed the petition.[xvii]

Iraqi media similarly did not specify which Shia Coordination Framework parties are concerned about the threat of US sanctions or military action in response to US pressure to dissolve the PMF.[xviii] Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stated in a recent interview that he objected to the “timing” of the Iraqi Parliament’s efforts to pass the law.[xix] Hussein emphasized the importance of convincing Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to disarm rather than forcing them to do so, however. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, some of which refuse to disarm before the return of the ”mahdi,” are very unlikely to be ”convinced” to disarm.[xx] A State of Law Coalition parliamentarian and member of the Shia Coordination Framework separately told Iraqi media on August 7 that unspecified actors submitted a proposal to Mashhadani to postpone the approval of the law until after the elections to allow time for discussion with the United States about the law’s ”controversial provisions.”[xxi] Division among the Shia Coordination Framework is notable ahead of the elections due to the way that factional infighting between Iranian-backed groups advantaged other Iraqi parties over Iranian-backed parties in the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[xxii]

Hardline media and officials are negatively responding to recent reformist calls for change within the Iranian regime, which highlights how the post-war environment has deepened existing fissures between reformists and hardliners over how to govern Iran and engage the West. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s official website said in an August 18 article that recent remarks by reformists were similar to a “quiet multimedia influence campaign” conducted by the United States and Israel, and alleged that the reformists seek to promote division within Iran over issues such as nuclear policy and uranium enrichment specifically.[xxiii] The article indicates that the Supreme Leader continues to reject any zero uranium enrichment demands.[xxiv] This statement from the Supreme Leader’s office comes after reformists have called for political reform and foreign policy shifts. The Reformist Front published a statement on August 18 outlining eleven demands, including lifting restrictions on reformist leaders, allowing free elections, reforming women’s rights laws, lifting censorship, and suspending uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief.[xxv] Former President Hassan Rouhani advocated on August 13 for reducing tensions with the West and expanding relations with European and neighboring countries.[xxvi] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency claimed on August 19 that reformists are conceding to Western pressure, and Tasnim warned that “trusting the enemy“ could threaten regime stability.[xxvii] Another IRGC-affiliated outlet dismissed the Reformist Front’s statement as a “blueprint” for selling Iran’s independence and accused reformists of spreading American and Israeli propaganda.[xxviii] Assembly of Experts Secretary Abbas Kaabi similarly said that the statement repeated “the enemy’s narrative” and focused too narrowly on internal problems rather than external threats.[xxix]

The Lebanese government and the World Bank will reportedly sign a 250 million USD loan agreement early next week that seeks to support Lebanon’s reconstruction.[xxx] This loan agreement is likely part of the Lebanese government’s efforts to use reconstruction fronts to decrease support for Hezbollah. Lebanese Finance Minister Yassin Jaber announced on August 13 that the Lebanese cabinet authorized him to sign the agreement, which the World Bank previously approved in June 2025.[xxxi] The loan agreement is dedicated to rebuilding infrastructure and clearing the remaining rubble in Lebanon from Israeli operations since September 2024.[xxxii] Lebanon has reportedly received an initial installment of 75 million euros from France and 20 million USD from Iraq, which the Lebanese Finance Ministry has started to allocate to reconstruction efforts in Beirut’s southern suburbs and southern Lebanon, which were heavily damaged during the Israeli campaign in Lebanon.[xxxiii] The 250 million USD loan will serve as the initial funding for a 1 billion USD financing program that aims to launch reconstruction and recovery efforts in Lebanon.[xxxiv] International organizations and entities will reportedly provide the remaining 750 million dollars in grants.[xxxv] The Lebanese Parliament will vote on the loan in early September 2025.[xxxvi]

The Lebanese government has taken early steps to begin reconstruction in Lebanon following the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in November 2024. The Lebanese government has secured several foreign donations, appointed individuals to focus on reconstruction efforts, started clearing debris, and taken steps to reform government policies to address corruption and economic issues that may deter foreign investors.[xxxvii] Hezbollah previously led such reconstruction efforts and provided a social safety net for the Lebanese population after the 2006 war, but Hezbollah has recently struggled to reconstruct damaged infrastructure following the conflict in late 2024.[xxxviii] Hezbollah has similarly struggled to maintain its financial commitments to fighters, which has contributed to growing frustration among Hezbollah supporters.[xxxix] Frustrated Hezbollah supporters have demanded answers from Hezbollah about when they will receive reconstruction funds to rebuild businesses and homes destroyed in the war.[xl] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation to those who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[xli] The Lebanese government’s recent reconstruction efforts amid growing frustration among Hezbollah’s Shia support base could weaken Hezbollah’s ability to maintain its domestic support base. These efforts will need to be sustained to be successful, however.

Key Takeaways

• Iraqi Domestic Politics: The Shia Coordination Framework is reportedly divided over US efforts to dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Division among the Shia Coordination Framework is notable ahead of the elections due to the way that factional infighting between Iranian-backed groups advantaged other Iraqi parties over Iranian-backed parties in the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections.
• Iranian Internal Fissures: Hardline media and officials are negatively responding to recent reformist calls for change within the Iranian regime, which highlights how the post-war environment has deepened existing fissures between reformists and hardliners over how to govern Iran and engage the West.
• Lebanon’s Reconstruction: The Lebanese government and the World Bank will reportedly sign a 250 million USD loan agreement early next week that seeks to support Lebanon’s reconstruction. This loan agreement is likely part of the Lebanese government’s efforts to use reconstruction fronts to weaken Hezbollah’s ability to maintain its domestic support base.

Iran

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Armenian officials in Yerevan, Armenia, on August 19 to discuss concerns about the US proposal to oversee a transit corridor in the southern Caucasus.[xlii] Pezeshkian emphasized Iran’s concerns about ”the presence of third-party forces” near the Iran-Armenia border during his meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.[xliii] Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a declaration of intent on August 8 for a US-brokered peace deal that grants the United States exclusive development rights to a 27-mile corridor through southern Armenia that connects Azerbaijan to its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region. Senior Iranian officials have strongly criticized the proposal due to Iranian fears that its adversaries and competitors could use the transit corridor to undermine Iranian security and economic interests. The Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee visited Iran’s northwestern border on August 19 to ”ensure decisions reflect national security interests.”[xliv]

Iranian officials emphasized the importance of expanding bilateral relations with Armenia during the visit, likely as part of a broader Iranian effort to try to hedge against future US influence in the region.[xlv] Iranian ministers signed ten memorandums of understanding (MOU) focused on bilateral trade and transportation relations.[xlvi] Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi stated on August 19 that Iran and Armenia agreed to finalize a comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement soon.[xlvii] Iranian Minister of Transport and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh discussed the reopening of the Jolfa–Yerevan–Georgia rail link with the Armenian territorial administration minister and mentioned the role the link could play in boosting regional transit.[xlviii]

Iraq

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Ansar Allah al Awfiya spokesperson Adel Garawi told Iraqi media on August 18 that Israel may attack Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, which suggests that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to fear imminent Israeli attacks in Iraq.[xlix] Garawi did not provide further details. Israel last struck PMF bases in Iraq in 2019, but there have been unexplained explosions in Iraq since then.[l] An Israeli airstrike killed a senior member of the Iranian-backed Iraq militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada (KSS) on the Iran-Iraq border on June 21.[li]

Syria

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack in Paris on August 19.[lii] The meeting focused on security arrangements for the Israel-Syria border, which includes an Israeli proposal to establish a humanitarian aid corridor spanning over 40 miles from the Israeli border to Suwayda City, according to Israeli media.[liii] Barrack, Dermer, and Shaibani previously met during US-brokered peace talks in Paris on July 24 after Israel conducted airstrikes in Syria in response to intercommunal violence in Suwayda.[liv] Israeli officials said that the Israeli government seeks to deliver humanitarian supplies to the Suwaydawi Druze population.[lv]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis continued to conduct repairs at Hudaydah Port after Israeli airstrikes damaged the port between May and July.[lvi] Commercially available satellite imagery captured between August 2 and 16 showed that the Houthis filled in craters at berth six and between berth four and five at Hudaydah Port. Satellite imagery from August 15 showed that the Houthis had moved containers near the filled-in crater between berth four and five. A Yemen analyst reported that only berths four and six were fully operational, while berth eight was partially operational.[lvii] Local sources reported that the Houthis were filling in the craters so that they could resume shipping operations at the port.[lviii] Commercially available maritime data confirmed that several cargo ships and oil tankers arrived at Houthi-controlled ports in June and July.[lix]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Neither Israel nor Lebanon has changed its position on the timeline for disarming Hezbollah, which could further delay the implementation of the US disarmament plan. Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri told Qatari media on August 18 that the Lebanese government would not be bound to its responsibilities outlined in the US proposal if Israel does not commit to the proposal.[lx] Mitri noted that the Lebanese government would not implement the US plan to disarm Hezbollah until Israel commits to ending its military operations in Lebanon.[lxi] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun similarly told Saudi media on August 17 that the US proposal will not become effective until all relevant parties approve it.[lxii] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed.[lxiii] Israel previously rejected Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri’s July 2025 demand that Israel halt all airstrikes in Lebanon before the Lebanese government disarms Hezbollah.[lxiv] US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack told Lebanese reporters after he met with Aoun on August 18 that the United States has discussed the potential for a long-term ceasefire with Israel but has not shared the Hezbollah disarmament proposal with Israel.[lxv] Barrack suggested that Israel would take unspecified ”steps“ in the coming weeks.[lxvi] Barrack did not make clear whether the steps would be the steps outlined in the proposal.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) discussed on August 18 a French resolution to extend the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)’s mandate until August 31, 2026.[lxvii] The UNSC is expected to vote on the proposed resolution on August 25.[lxviii] UNIFIL, which patrols Lebanon’s southern border, operates under an annually renewed mandate that is set to expire on August 31, 2025.[lxix] The French resolution reportedly states that the UNSC would indicate its intention to gradually withdraw UNIFIL forces from Lebanon with the aim of making the Lebanese government the sole security provider in southern Lebanon.[lxx] This intention is contingent upon the Lebanese government’s full control of all Lebanese territory and that all parties agree on an unspecified comprehensive political arrangement.[lxxi] Unspecified US officials noted that the draft resolution includes a one-year extension of UNIFIL’s mandate, followed by a withdrawal period of six months.[lxxii] A previous extension resolution from August 2024 notably did not include any details about UNIFIL’s withdrawal.[lxxiii]

Lebanese and European officials have supported extending UNIFIL’s mandate, while Israel and the United States have expressed reservations about the resolution.[lxxiv] Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar reportedly recently sent a letter to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio opposing the renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate, arguing that UNIFIL has failed its core mission.[lxxv] US officials stated that the United States would require the resolution to explicitly identify a date for UNIFIL’s withdrawal.[lxxvi] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun met with UNIFIL Commander Major General Diodato Abagnara on August 19 to express his support for renewing UNIFIL’s mandate.[lxxvii] Aoun reportedly told Abagnara that Lebanon needs UNIFIL to help maintain security and support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)’s deployment to southern Lebanon.[lxxviii] UNIFIL’s presence and familiarity with southern Lebanon may be needed to conduct a successful relief-in-place/transfer of authority in southern Lebanon.[lxxix] UNIFIL has largely failed to undertake the tasks given to it under its mandate. UNIFIL is present in southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 and to “take all necessary action” to prevent the area from being used for hostile activities, which would include Hezbollah‘s extensive development of military infrastructure.[lxxx] UNIFIL has previously taken only rare and very limited steps to degrade Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon.[lxxxi]

[i] https://almadapaper dot net/411192/

[ii] https://almadapaper dot net/389291/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D

[iii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces

[iv] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate072825 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate081125 ; https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/040820258 ; https://almadapaper dot net/409926/

[v] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2025 ; https://www.rudaw dot net/Library/Files/Uploaded%20Files/07/NewFolder/175%20175%20175%20(1).pdf

[vi] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-muhandis-general-company

[vii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces ; https://observeriraq dot net/%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%B5-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9/

[viii] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-12-2025/

[ix] https://almadapaper dot net/411192/

[x] https://almadapaper dot net/411192/ ; https://alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=233043

[xi] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2025

[xii] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/536091/%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84

[xiii] https://ina dot iq/ar/political/240215-.html ; https://ina dot iq/ar/political/240224-.html

[xiv] https://ina dot iq/ar/political/240256-.html

[xv] https://www.mawazin dot net/Details.aspx?jimare=264687 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86

[xvi] https://en.964media dot com/38210/

[xvii] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/180820257

[xviii] https://almadapaper dot net/411192/

[xix] https://almadapaper dot net/411192/

[xx] https://shafaq dot com/en/Security/Iraq-s-Kataib-Hezbollah-rejects-disarmament-Weapons-for-Imam-Mahdi

[xxi] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/07082025

[xxii] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iraq-crisis-elite-consensus-based-politics-turns-deadly

[xxiii] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/others-report?id=60940

[xxiv] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/others-report?id=60940  ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-4-2025 ;

https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=60355

[xxv] https://hammihanonline dot ir/بخش-سیاست-18/46601-بیانیه-جبهه-اصلاحات-ایران-تنها-راه-نجات-کشور-تغییر-بازگشت-به-مردم-است

[xxvi] https://www.rouhanihassan dot com/Fa/News/116484

[xxvii] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/28/3379624

[xxviii] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6565050/

[xxix] https://kayhan dot ir/fa/news/316751

[xxx] https://x.com/nivcalderon/status/1955679499791552983 ; https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/news-bulletin-reports/873597/250-million-loan-marks-start-of-lebanons-major-reconstruction-effortst/en

[xxxi] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/25/lebanon-new-us-250-million-project-to-kickstart-the-recovery-and-reconstruction-in-conflict-affected-areas ; https://www.aljadeed dot tv/news/محليات/541761/معلومات-الجديد-مجلس-الوزراء-فوض-وزير-المال-توقيع-اتفاقية-قرض-مع-البنك

[xxxii] https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/news-bulletin-reports/873597/250-million-loan-marks-start-of-lebanons-major-reconstruction-effortst/en ; https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/25/lebanon-new-us-250-million-project-to-kickstart-the-recovery-and-reconstruction-in-conflict-affected-areas

[xxxiii] https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/news-bulletin-reports/873597/250-million-loan-marks-start-of-lebanons-major-reconstruction-effortst/en ; https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/economy/873437/lebanon-to-sign-250-million-reconstruction-loan-with-world-bank-in-com/en

[xxxiv] https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/news-bulletin-reports/873597/250-million-loan-marks-start-of-lebanons-major-reconstruction-effortst/en ; https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/25/lebanon-new-us-250-million-project-to-kickstart-the-recovery-and-reconstruction-in-conflict-affected-areas

[xxxv] https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/news-bulletin-reports/873597/250-million-loan-marks-start-of-lebanons-major-reconstruction-effortst/en

[xxxvi] https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/news-bulletin-reports/873597/250-million-loan-marks-start-of-lebanons-major-reconstruction-effortst/en

[xxxvii] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/25/lebanon-new-us-250-million-project-to-kickstart-the-recovery-and-reconstruction-in-conflict-affected-areas ; https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/313411-reconstruction-process-to-begin-in-late-2025 ; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1463993/reconstruction-work-to-begin-in-lebanon-before-the-end-of-the-year-announces-cdr-president.html ; https://www.dw dot com/en/lebanese-strive-to-rebuild-amid-uncertainty-over-ceasefire/a-71005031 ; https://www.newarab dot com/news/lebanon-passes-banking-restructuring-law-key-reform ; https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/news-bulletin-reports/873597/250-million-loan-marks-start-of-lebanons-major-reconstruction-effortst/en

[xxxviii] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-27-2024

[xxxix] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-22-2025

[xl] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/04/world/middleeast/hezbollah-weapons-lebanon.html

[xli] https://ict.org dot il/hezbollahs-financing-ecosystem-crime-families-as-a-case-study/

[xlii] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/28/3379612 ; https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/240469

[xliii] https://x.com/drpezeshkian/status/1957744683536552229

[xliv] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6565189

[xlv] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/771329

[xlvi] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/771329

[xlvii] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/28/3379645

[xlviii] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/28/3379172

[xlix] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/180820259

[l] https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/american-officials-confirm-israeli-strikes-in-iraq-report-599465

[li] https://t.me/Smedia1/1129  ; https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iran/210620253

[lii] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1957839678175850718

[liii] https://www.mako dot co dot il/news-world/2025_q3/Article-22396bbfad2c891026.htm?utm_source=AndroidNews12&utm_medium=Share , https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1957911747202789653

[liv] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1957839678175850718 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2025 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-israeli-officials-discuss-de-escalation-paris-meeting-us-envoy-says-2025-07-24/

[lv] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2025  ; https://www.axios.com/2025/08/12/israel-syria-corridor-suwayda-tom-barrack

[lvi] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919435502656053678; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1923386330408521805; https://x.com/tvalmasirah/status/1932309142754205807?s=46&t=nQTab-m77zhUUBSh8E68DQ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1941972900321362343; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1947208668241375573

[lvii] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1957532144131273176

[lviii] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/5170728-أنشطة-عسكرية-وحشود-حوثية-متسارعة-في-الحديدة

[lix] Starboard Maritime Intelligence. Available by subscription at https://www.starboardintelligence.com/

[lx] https://www.alaraby dot com/news/نائب-رئيس-الحكومة-اللبناني-لـالعربي-لم-نتلق-ضمانات-حتى-اليوم

[lxi] https://www.alaraby dot com/news/نائب-رئيس-الحكومة-اللبناني-لـالعربي-لم-نتلق-ضمانات-حتى-اليوم)

[lxii] https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/1957111439585333565

[lxiii] https://www.arabnews dot com/node/2603593/amp

[lxiv] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-pressures-lebanon-issue-cabinet-decision-disarm-hezbollah-before-talks-2025-07-29/

[lxv] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-envoy-says-israel-should-comply-with-lebanon-plan-disarm-militant-groups-2025-08-18/  ; https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-us-envoy-hezbollah-barrack-fe54aba5e9614b77b6b7b19438bae815  ; https://ca.news.yahoo.com/u-envoy-israel-must-comply-153049688.html

[lxvi] https://www.alhadath dot net/2025/08/18/اهتمام-اميركي-مزدوج-بلبنان-جدول-زمني-لسحب-السلاح-وتقليص-اليونيفيل-

[lxvii] https://apnews.com/article/un-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-israel-trump-f11b5b48425de7a7c5c91978319b9623

[lxviii] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/un-security-council-begins-debates-to-extend-unifil-mission-in-lebanon/

[lxix] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-security-council-starts-talks-fate-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-2025-08-18/

[lxx] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-security-council-starts-talks-fate-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-2025-08-18/

[lxxi] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-security-council-starts-talks-fate-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-2025-08-18/

[lxxii] https://apnews.com/article/un-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-israel-trump-f11b5b48425de7a7c5c91978319b9623

[lxxiii] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4060205?v=pdf ; https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15801.doc.htm

[lxxiv] https://apnews.com/article/un-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-israel-trump-f11b5b48425de7a7c5c91978319b9623

[lxxv] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/un-security-council-begins-debates-to-extend-unifil-mission-in-lebanon/ ; https://www.israelhayom dot com/2025/08/19/israel-takes-official-step-to-end-un-mission-in-southern-lebanon/

[lxxvi] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-security-council-starts-talks-fate-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-2025-08-18/ ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/un-security-council-begins-debates-to-extend-unifil-mission-in-lebanon/

[lxxvii] https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/1957696111860158672

[lxxviii] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314775-aoun-stresses-importance-of-unifil-s-presence-in-south

[lxxix] https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-07/lebanon-33.php ;

[lxxx] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-mandate

[lxxxi] https://x.com/EtatMajorFR/status/1953394699680501817