Iran Update, August 28, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February  2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) initiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process on August 28.[i] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments.[ii] The JCPOA gives the UNSC 10 days to initiate a resolution to continue providing sanction relief to Iran after an E3 member notifies the UNSC of Iran’s ”significant non-performance.”[iii] All prior UN sanctions would return 30 days after the initial referral to the UNSC if the resolution does not pass or a permanent member vetoes it.[iv] The snapback mechanism is currently set to expire on October 18, 2025. The triggering of snapback sanctions comes after Iran failed to meet the E3’s conditions for extending the mechanism’s deadline by the end of August.[v] The E3 previously set an August 31 deadline for Iran to show real progress toward a nuclear deal by renewing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and restarting negotiations with the United States.[vi] Iranian negotiators met with the E3 in Geneva on August 26 but failed to "put tangible, detailed deliverables on the table,” which prompted the E3 to move forward with the snapback process before the snapback mechanism‘s expiration.[vii] The snapback mechanism would reimpose six UNSC resolutions on Iran, which would impose restrictions on Iran’s conventional arms trade, missile program, uranium enrichment activities, and development of nuclear-capable missiles.[viii]

Iran has demolished buildings at the Mojdeh site (Lavisan-2) at Shahid Rajaei University in Lavisan, Tehran Province, which Israel damaged during the 12-day Israel-Iran War. The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on August 27 that Iran is likely trying to conceal undeclared nuclear weapons research and development activities at this site.[ix] Israel damaged at least four buildings at the Mojdeh site between June 14 and 20 during the war.[x] Satellite imagery from August 20 shows that Iran has demolished two of the damaged buildings, including a building affiliated with the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research‘s (SPND) Shahid Karimi Group that is involved in explosives research.[xi] The Mojdeh site previously housed the SPND headquarters, which played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[xii] Shahid Rajaei University is affiliated with Iran’s nuclear program, and some US officials believe that the university has been involved in nuclear warhead design research.[xiii]

The IAEA reported on August 27 that there is no evidence Iran has moved its stockpile of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) stored underground at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) since the US strikes on June 21, using satellite imagery.[xiv] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated on August 27 that “there is nothing to contradict the notion that the material is where it [previously] was.“[xv] Grossi confirmed on June 23 that US and Israeli airstrikes damaged tunnel entrances used for storing enriched material at the ENTC. The Institute for Science and International Security similarly reported, citing satellite imagery, that Iran ”backfilled” these entrances ahead of US strikes likely to try to contain an explosion or prevent the dispersion of hazardous material.[xvi] Iran cannot currently access the ENTC and, therefore, likely cannot conduct a conclusive damage assessment or extract materials. Senior Israeli intelligence officials said that any Iranian attempts to recover the material would "almost certainly" be detected.[xvii] The US strikes also destroyed components of Iran’s nuclear program that would be necessary for further enrichment and weaponization to create a deliverable nuclear weapon.[xviii]

Hezbollah is reportedly attempting to compel Lebanese politicians to support the group’s efforts to delay or reverse the government’s plan to disarm it.  Hezbollah officials have recently held several meetings with political leaders and the group’s allies to acquire support for Hezbollah retaining its weapons.[xix] Hezbollah reportedly sent letters to several independent parliamentarians promising financial and political support in return for neutrality on the government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah.[xx] Hezbollah allegedly told these parliamentarians to not ”bet on the Arab and American positions” as Hezbollah would disrupt the ”situation” with Iranian support.[xxi] Lebanese media reported that the parliamentarians responded negatively to Hezbollah’s efforts.[xxii] Hezbollah has historically used its military capabilities and political influence within other state institutions to sway the Lebanese government’s decision-making.[xxiii]

Hezbollah also appears to be exploiting Lebanese government concerns regarding the potential for internal conflict in Lebanon and Israeli compliance with the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah as a part of the group’s efforts to avoid disarmament. A “well-informed” Lebanese source told Saudi media on August 28 that the Lebanese Council of Ministers’ upcoming session to review the Lebanese Armed Force (LAF)’s plan to disarm Hezbollah is still on ”for now.”[xxiv] The source noted that the session, which is scheduled for September 2, could be postponed if ”internal matters” become complicated.[xxv] Saudi media reported on August 24 that Hezbollah has resorted to inflaming sectarian tensions by portraying the Lebanese government’s decision as an attempt to disarm the Lebanese Shia community.[xxvi] Lebanese officials have previously raised concerns that the government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah could spark communal tensions in Lebanon.[xxvii] Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri told Saudi media on August 27 that the United States gave Lebanon “the opposite” of what it promised.[xxviii] Lebanese politicians have reportedly perceived this statement as representing Berri’s doubts about the US proposal.[xxix] The US proposal includes an Israeli withdrawal from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon within 90 days and Hezbollah’s complete disarmament by the end of 2025.[xxx] Lebanese ministerial sources previously told Saudi media on August 26 that Lebanese authorities were concerned after Israeli officials said in recent days that Israel would not withdraw until Hezbollah is fully disarmed.[xxxi] The sources said that these Israeli statements are a ”negative sign” and have thwarted US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s mission to disarm Hezbollah.[xxxii]

Key Takeaways

• Snapback Sanctions: The E3 initiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process on August 28. The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments.
• Iranian Damage Assessments: Iran has demolished buildings at the Mojdeh site (Lavisan-2) at Shahid Rajaei University in Lavisan, Tehran Province, that Israel damaged during the 12-day Israel-Iran War. The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on August 27 that Iran is likely trying to conceal undeclared nuclear weapons research and development activities at this site.
• Iranian Highly Enriched Uranium: The IAEA reported on August 27 that there is no evidence Iran has moved its stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) stored underground at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) since the US strikes on June 21, citing satellite imagery. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated on August 27 that “there is nothing to contradict the notion that the material is where it [previously] was.“
• Hezbollah Political Coercion: Hezbollah is reportedly attempting to compel Lebanese politicians to support the group’s efforts to delay or reverse the government’s plan to disarm it. Hezbollah also appears to be exploiting Lebanese government concerns regarding the potential for internal conflict in Lebanon and Israeli compliance with the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah as a part of the group’s efforts to avoid disarmament.

Iran

Iranian security forces seized a likely Jaish al Adl weapons cache during a clearing operation in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on August 28.[xxxiii] The weapons cache included improvised explosive device (IED) components and hand grenades.  Iranian security forces found the weapons cache after an engagement in which Iranian forces killed eight Jaish al Adl fighters in Iranshahr on August 27.[xxxiv] Iranian security forces also killed five other Jaish al Adl fighters in Khash and Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on the same day.[xxxv] Jaish al Adl is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran. Jaish al Adl has increased attacks targeting Iranian security forces in Sistan and Baluchistan Province in recent weeks.[xxxvi]

The Iranian rial depreciated to 1,016,500 rials per one US dollar on August 28.[xxxvii] This value is close to the April 2025 record low of 1,059,000 rials per US dollar.[xxxviii]  This drop comes after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the JCPOA snapback process on August 28, which would reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran.[xxxix]

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a recovery operation to recover sensitive surveillance equipment discovered by Syrian Ministry of Defense personnel near Jabal Manea, Rif Dimashq Province.[xl]  An Israeli drone strike killed six MoD personnel on August 26 as they attempted to remove sensitive surveillance equipment and listening devices they found at the military base on Jabal Manea.[xli] An Israeli analyst said on August 28 to the Wall Street Journal that Israel conducted the strikes to prevent MoD forces from capturing Israeli surveillance and listening devices, which suggests that these systems were sensitive, and their capture would present a security concern.[xlii] The IDF then conducted at least 13 more airstrikes on Jabal Manea on August 27, causing no casualties.[xliii] These strikes presumably sought to destroy any remaining equipment at Jabal Manea.[xliv] Four IDF helicopters then inserted a ground team on Jabal Manea on August 27.[xlv]  The IDF ground team did not engage nearby MoD personnel during the ground-based portion of the recovery operation, which suggests the IDF sought to recover or destroy any remaining equipment.[xlvi] This was the first Israeli ground operation this far into Syrian territory since the fall of Assad in December 2024.[xlvii]

The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) reopened the Damascus-Suwayda Road on August 27, which will serve as a second humanitarian corridor within Suwayda Province.[xlviii] The MoI closed the road on July 13 after intercommunal violence began in Suwayda Province.[xlix] Aid providers previously opened a corridor near Busra al Harir on August 19 in response to repeated attacks by Sunni tribal fighters against civilians, which forced another humanitarian corridor to close.[l]

Arabian Peninsula

The IDF conducted an unspecified number of airstrikes targeting a Houthi "military" site in Sanaa City on August 28.[li] Local sources circulated footage of explosions from the airstrikes in Haddah District, which is 2.9 km west of the Presidential Palace complex in southern Sanaa City.[lii] Israeli media reported on August 28 that the IDF targeted and killed Houthi Chief of Staff Mohammad Abd al Karim al Ghamari and Defense Minister Mohammad Nasir al Atifi.[liii] A Houthi Defense Ministry source denied that the IDF airstrikes killed Houthi commanders, however.[liv] Houthi President Mahdi al Mashat also called the August 28 airstrikes on Sanaa City unsuccessful and threatened Houthi retaliation.[lv]

The IDF airstrikes followed a Houthi drone attack that the IDF intercepted outside of Israeli territory on August 28.[lvi] The Houthis have not claimed the drone attack at the time of this writing. The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic “blockade” on Israel in October 2023.[lvii] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned on August 28 that Israel will continue to respond to Houthi attacks on Israel.[lviii]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed.[lix] Israel reportedly rejected US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s previous proposal to disarm Hezbollah on August 22 but agreed to gradually halt its operations in Lebanon if the LAF makes progress towards disarming Hezbollah.[lx] An unspecified Israeli political official told Saudi media on August 26 that Israel will continue its operations to disarm Hezbollah regardless of the Lebanese government’s ”internal debate” regarding Hezbollah disarmament.[lxi] The political official added that Israel would launch a broader operation across Lebanon if necessary.[lxii] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recently shifted to a “forward defense” posture on August 1 to maintain Israel’s “strategic superiority” in southern Lebanon and prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting capabilities that could pose a threat to northern Israeli towns.[lxiii] The IDF had a similar objective in its campaign against Hezbollah in late 2024 due to Israel’s concern about a potential Hezbollah ground incursion into northern Israel.[lxiv] The Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement in November 2024 included an addendum that ensures Israel's right to self-defense against any future threat that Hezbollah may pose.[lxv] The IDF has acted on this addendum and has continued to operate against Hezbollah since November 2024, including via airstrikes and raids targeting Hezbollah infrastructure.[lxvi]

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously approved the revised version of the French-drafted resolution to extend the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)’s mandate in an August 28 vote.[lxvii] UNIFIL patrols Lebanon’s southern border with Israel and operates under an annually renewed mandate that would have expired on August 31, 2025.[lxviii] The approved resolution extends UNIFIL’s mandate until December 31, 2026, when UNIFIL will begin to withdraw from Lebanon (see graphic below).[lxix] UNIFIL will completely withdraw from Lebanon by December 31, 2027.[lxx] The approved resolution reportedly states that UNIFIL is authorized to undertake several tasks during its withdrawal, including providing security for UN personnel and assets, conducting rescue operations, and protecting civilians.[lxxi] The United States and Israel had opposed the previous version of the French resolution that extended UNIFIL’s mandate until August 2026 and called on the UNSC to "signal its intention” to gradually withdraw UNIFIL forces from Lebanon.[lxxii]