Iran Update, August 15, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi published a statement on August 15 in which he called for strengthening Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, likely in response to recent US efforts to weaken the Axis of Resistance.[i] Hamidawi underlined the necessity of “supporting” Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with advanced weapons, enhanced technical capabilities, and improved “defensive and destructive capacities.”[ii] Hamidawi’s statement comes as the United States pursues various lines of effort to weaken Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[iii] The Lebanese government agreed on August 7 to a US proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[iv] The United States has also pressured the Iraqi government to dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed militias.[v]  State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki emphasized the importance of the PMF’s existence in the face of US and Israeli efforts to disarm Hezbollah in a phone call with Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati on August 8.[vi] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba separately warned the United States on August 14 against “taking steps against Iraq,” referring to US pressure to dissolve the PMF.[vii] 

Hamidawi was presumably asking both Iran and the Iraqi federal government to provide Kataib Hezbollah with advanced weapons and technical capabilities. Iran has historically provided Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, with weapons and training.[viii] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani reportedly told PMF leaders to pressure the Iraqi government for funding to modernize their weapons systems during his July 28 visit to Baghdad.[ix]

Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati emphasized Iranian support for the Houthis during a meeting with the Houthi representative to Iran on August 14. Velayati denied that the Axis of Resistance has weakened and underlined the Houthis' pivotal role in the Axis of Resistance’s war against Israel in a meeting with Houthi Representative to Iran Ibrahim al Dailami.[x] The Houthis are the only Axis of Resistance member that still regularly conducts attacks targeting Israel. The Houthis also continue to threaten international shipping.[xi] Velayati separately criticized US pressure to disarm Lebanese Hezbollah and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq.[xii] This meeting comes after Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani reaffirmed Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance during his visits to Iraq and Lebanon between August 11 and 14.[xiii]

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem threatened to incite anti-government protests in Lebanon if the Lebanese government attempts to disarm Hezbollah during a speech on August 15.[xiv] Qassem claimed that the Lebanese government is carrying out an “American-Israeli order” to disarm Hezbollah “even if it leads to civil war and internal strife.”[xv] The Lebanese government agreed on August 7 to the objectives of US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[xvi]  Hezbollah mobilized some protestors on August 8 after the Lebanese government approved the US proposal.[xvii] These protests did not gain traction or expand beyond Hezbollah support zones, however.[xviii] Qassem stated that Hezbollah is prepared for confrontation and will incite protests if “confrontation is imposed on Hezbollah.“[xix]

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Hezbollah-affiliated officials have recently taken steps to try to prevent clashes between the LAF and Hezbollah during the disarmament process.[xx] The disarmament proposal tasks the LAF with disarming Hezbollah.[xxi] LAF Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri have discussed ways to prevent any confrontation between the LAF and Hezbollah during the disarmament process.[xxii] Berri is Hezbollah’s highest-ranking ally in the Lebanese government and is currently mediating between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah to resolve outstanding issues.[xxiii]

Qassem also reiterated that Hezbollah will not surrender its weapons until Israel halts its operations and withdraws from southern Lebanon.[xxiv]  Qassem called on the Lebanese government to hold a meeting to plan to “confront” Israel and added that Hezbollah will confront "the Israeli-American project no matter the cost.”.[xxv]  Hezbollah has long used continued Israeli operations and the 1989 Taif Agreement, which called for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias except Hezbollah, to justify retaining its weapons.[xxvi] Hezbollah will likely continue to use Israeli operations in Lebanon and the Taif Agreement to reject the government’s decision to disarm the group.[xxvii] Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm will likely complicate the Lebanese government and the LAF’s ability to implement the disarmament plan.

Several Lebanese officials rejected Qassem’s statements on August 15. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam criticized Qassem’s speech for containing “a veiled threat of civil war.”[xxviii] Salam rejected Qassem’s claims that the Lebanese government is implementing an “American-Israeli project,” stating that the government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah was “purely Lebanese.”[xxix] Anti-Hezbollah Lebanese Justice Minister Adel Nassar similarly stated that the Lebanese government had been working on a plan to disarm Hezbollah prior to US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s presentation of the US proposal to the Lebanese government in June 2025.[xxx] Nassar added that the issue of the state’s monopoly on arms is “not open to debate.”[xxxi]

Key Takeaways

• PMF Dissolution: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi published a statement on August 15 in which he called for strengthening Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, likely in response to recent US efforts to weaken the Axis of Resistance. Hamidawi underlined the necessity of “supporting” Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with advanced weapons, enhanced technical capabilities, and improved “defensive and destructive capacities.”
• Iran-Houthi Relations: Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati emphasized Iranian support for the Houthis during a meeting with the Houthi representative to Iran on August 14. Velayati denied that the Axis of Resistance has weakened and underlined the Houthis' pivotal role in the Axis of Resistance’s war against Israel in a meeting with Houthi Representative to Iran Ibrahim al Dailami.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem threatened to incite anti-government protests in Lebanon if the Lebanese government attempts to disarm Hezbollah during a speech on August 15. Qassem reiterated that Hezbollah will not surrender its weapons until Israel halts its operations and withdraws from southern Lebanon.

Iran
The Iranian, Chinese, and Russian permanent representatives to the UN met in Vienna on August 14, likely to continue coordinating diplomatic efforts in response to the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) warning that it may trigger the snapback mechanism by the end of August.[xxxii]  Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Mikhail Ulyanov stated that the three officials coordinated “their positions and actions on the Iranian nuclear dossier.”[xxxiii] This meeting comes after the E3 warned on August 13 that it would trigger the snapback mechanism unless Iran shows a commitment to negotiations before August 31.[xxxiv] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments.[xxxv] The snapback mechanism expires on October 18, 2025.[xxxvi] CTP-ISW previously assessed that it is unlikely that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia could prevent the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[xxxvii]

Iran is trying to strengthen border security in northwestern Iran amid concerns over the threat that Kurdish opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan pose to Iranian security and tensions with Azerbaijan over the proposed Zangezur Corridor.[xxxviii] Iranian Law Enforcement Command Border Guard Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Ali Goudarzi met with the provincial border guard commanders of East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, and Ardabil provinces in Jolfa, East Azerbaijan Province, on August 15 to strengthen operational cohesion, intelligence sharing, and readiness to counter border threats.[xxxix] Goudarzi called for greater coordination among the three provinces.[xl] This meeting comes after Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani signed a memorandum of understanding with Iraqi officials on August 11 to “develop” the 2023 Iran-Iraq security agreement that requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Kurdish opposition groups from the Iran-Iraq border.[xli]  Iran has long accused Kurdish opposition groups of helping Israel facilitate attacks on Iran and has previously pressured the Iraqi federal government to remove Kurdish opposition groups from the Iran-Iraq border.[xlii] It is also noteworthy that the meeting took place in Jolfa, which is located across the border from the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.[xliii] Iranian officials have recently strongly opposed a US-brokered peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan that would grant the United States exclusive development rights to the Zangezur Corridor.[xliv] The Zangezur Corridor is a Turkish- and Azerbaijani-proposed corridor that would connect Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and cut off Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia.[xlv]

Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref stated that Iran seeks to increase trade with Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member states at an EAEU meeting in Kyrgyzstan on August 14 and 15.[xlvi] Pursuing increased trade with EAEU member states aligns with Iran’s “neighborhood policy,” which focuses on increasing Iran’s bilateral relations with regional countries to alleviate the pressure of international sanctions on the Iranian economy.[xlvii] The EAEU granted Iran observer status in 2024 and signed a free trade agreement with Iran in May 2025.[xlviii] Aref announced at the EAEU meeting that Iran seeks to become a full EAEU member.[xlix] Aref and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin discussed the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) on the sidelines of the EAEU meeting.[l] The INSTC is a proposed regional trade route that would connect Russia and India via Iran.[li]  

Iraq

Sunni Azm Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai requested on August 13 that the Iraqi electoral commission disqualify former Parliament Speaker and Progress Party head Mohammad al Halbousi from competing in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[lii] Samarrai argued that the November 2023 Federal Supreme Court ruling that removed Halbousi as parliament speaker makes him unfit to compete in the elections.[liii] The Baghdad Court of Appeals dismissed the charges against Halbousi in late April 2025.[liv] Halbousi’s party announced in May that it will compete independently in the elections.[lv] Samarrai is a long-time political rival of Halbousi and a competitor for political influence among Sunni Iraqis.[lvi] Samarrai and some of Halbousi’s other historic rivals are members of the United Sunni Leadership Coalition, which was established in early January 2025 and has advocated for long-held Sunni political demands.[lvii] Samarrai discussed the elections and “support for the executive parties” with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani two days after Samarrai submitted this request.[lviii]

Syria

Assadist remnants have reportedly increased attacks targeting Syrian transitional government forces on the Syrian coast in recent days, which underscores the continued threat that Assadist remnants pose to Syrian security. The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on August 15 that Assadist attacks targeting MoD forces in Latakia and Tartous provinces have increased over the past three days.[lix] Assadist remnants attacked an MoD vehicle on the al Burjan Bridge in Latakia Province on August 14.[lx] The MoD deployed significant reinforcements, including armored units, to the Syrian coast on August 15 in response to the increase in attacks.[lxi]  Transitional government forces previously arrested Assadist remnants who likely attempted to conduct a false flag attack on a church in Tartous Province on August 6.[lxii]

Reuters reported on August 15 that foreign Islamists have petitioned the Syrian transitional government to acquire Syrian citizenship.[lxiii] The foreign Islamists claimed that they deserve Syrian citizenship after helping Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) oust the Assad regime.[lxiv] Bilal Abdul Kareem, an Islamist journalist, submitted the petition to the Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI). Kareem has lived in Syria since 2012 and is a prominent voice among foreign Islamists in Syria.[lxv] HTS imprisoned Kareem in 2020 for six months after he reported on HTS’s torture of detainees in prisons under its control.[lxvi] The petition would benefit thousands of foreigners from more than a dozen nations, most of whom lack documentation and face lengthy prison sentences or death if they return to their countries of origin.[lxvii]  The United States has accepted the Syrian transitional government’s integration of foreign fighters into the new Syrian army to prevent foreign fighters from joining Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria. The petition for citizenship does not concern foreign fighters' integration into the Syrian army but is instead intended to allow former Islamist foreign fighters and their families, aid workers, and journalists to live and work in Syria. A decision to grant Islamist foreigners Syrian citizenship would likely alienate Syrian minorities.[lxviii] Syrian minorities largely view foreign Islamists as extremists and oppose their naturalization in Syria.[lxix] A Reuters investigation revealed in June 2025 that foreign fighters participated in atrocities during the coastal massacres against Alawites in March 2025.[lxx]

Arabian Peninsula

See topline section.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.