Iran Update, August 20, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Former Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al Maliki may be using the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) to sideline political opponents ahead of the November 2025 elections. Iraqi media reported on August 20 that the AJC has so far barred 33 candidates affiliated with Shia Coordination Framework parties for alleged Baath party ties.[i] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The AJC reportedly barred eight members of Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun Movement, seven Badr Organization candidates, five members of Kataib Hezbollah’s Hoquq Movement, six members of the Imam Ali Brigade’s Services Alliance,  the head of Kataib Sayyid al Suhahda in Kirkuk, one member of Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development bloc, and three candidates from Labor Minister Ahmed al Asadi’s Jund al Samaa bloc.[ii] Asadi is aligned with Sudani.[iii] Shia political parties, but particularly Maliki, previously used the AJC ahead of elections in 2010 to bar candidates opposed to him, and could be weaponizing the commission again.[iv] It is highly unlikely that seven Badr Organization members, for example, have real Baathist ties due to Badr’s history. Badr Organization is the rebranded Badr Corps. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) founded the Badr Corps as an Iraqi Shia formation to fight Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army during the Iran-Iraq War.[v] The AJC only excluded three candidates aligned with Maliki for suspected Baath party ties, according to leaked documents published by Iraqi media on August 13.[vi] Candidates from political parties and coalitions that are competing with Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, meanwhile, constitute a disproportionate number of those barred due to alleged Ba'ath party links. This report comes after Maliki’s Dawa Party released a statement on August 13 affirming its support for the Commission’s measures.[vii] Maliki also emphasized on August 8 the need for the AJC to take action against Baathists.[viii] Former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi, once a member of Maliki’s former Dawa Party, criticized on August 20 the weaponization of the AJC for political purposes.[ix] Shia political parties, particularly Maliki, have long manipulated the Accountability and Justice Commission to target political opponents.[x]

The Accountability and Justice Commission’s investigation and exclusion of candidates tied to Shia Coordination Framework parties reflects ongoing tensions among Shia parties within the Framework. Iraqi media reported on August 19 that Shia Coordination Framework members are divided over US pressure to dissolve the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xi] Political sources close to the Shia Coordination Framework told Iraqi media on August 6 that some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are “almost at odds” with some elements of the Shia Coordination Framework.[xii] Division among the Shia Coordination Framework is notable ahead of the elections because factional infighting between Iranian-backed groups before the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections ultimately advantaged other Iraqi parties over Iranian-backed parties in the elections.[xiii]

Key Takeaways

• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Former Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al Maliki may be using the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) to sideline political opponents ahead of the November 2025 elections. Iraqi media reported that the AJC has so far barred 33 candidates affiliated with the Shia Coordination Framework parties for alleged Baath party ties.
• Damage at Fordow: The New York Times reported on August 20 that conclusive damage assessments of US strikes on Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant require more time, which is consistent with previous reporting. Several technical experts told the New York Times that a precise damage assessment requires advanced computer simulations, exact details of the bombs, and extensive knowledge of the geology of Fordow.
• US Counter-ISIS Operations: The United States conducted an operation reportedly targeting senior Iraqi ISIS leader Salah Noman in Atmeh, Idlib Province, on August 20. The US ground operation in Atmeh occurs amid ongoing counter-ISIS efforts in northern Syria near the Turkish border, including a recent ground operation in al Bab in July 2025.

Iran

The New York Times reported on August 20 that conclusive damage assessments of US strikes on Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant require more time, which is consistent with previous reporting.[xiv] The United States dropped twelve 30,000lb GBU-57 bunker buster bombs on Fordow in June 2025, targeting ventilation shafts at the site that led to a centrifuge cascade hall located at least 250 feet underground.[xv] An unspecified US Department of Defense official said that the United States aimed to destroy the centrifuges with shock waves and other effects of the blasts because the bombs would probably not make direct contact with the centrifuge chamber itself.[xvi] International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi previously stated that the Fordow centrifuges are “no longer working” and emphasized that even small vibrations can destroy them.[xvii] The US bombs would have generated a blast wave far more significant than small vibrations. Several technical experts told the New York Times that a precise damage assessment requires advanced computer simulations, exact details of the bombs, and extensive knowledge of the geology of Fordow.[xviii] Iranian officials have emphasized that Iran cannot access the nuclear sites struck by US and Israeli airstrikes yet, which also prevents conclusive battle damage assessments.[xix]

Several factors may have impacted the effectiveness of the US strikes on Fordow. A US defense official familiar with US decision-making said that the main targeted ventilation shafts had bends near the shaft entrances, which means the path to the underground facility through the shaft was not straight.[xx] Several geologists also stated that the geology of Fordow almost certainly had an impact on the extent of damage. One expert said that Iran likely built Fordow using volcanic tuff, which may have helped cushion the site from the bombs due to its porosity.

Iran secured loans against tankers transporting Iranian and Iranian allies’ oil exports to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to circumvent Western sanctions between 2019 and 2023, according to the Financial Times on August 20.[xxi] A US-sanctioned Iranian broker set up one billion dollars' worth of mortgages in Switzerland against at least 34 oil tankers, according to Panama Maritime Authority documents.[xxii] The United States has sanctioned 20 of these 34 tankers.[xxiii] The Iranian broker used these mortgages as collateral, which allowed the broker to take ownership of the tanker if the buyer did not complete the payment once the oil arrived at its destination.[xxiv] Buyers traditionally require official bank documents to prove their credit to traders.[xxv] These mortgages allow buyers to circumvent bank involvement in the process. Many banks have increasingly refused to work on transactions related to Iran's illicit oil trade since the United States began to impose strict sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports in 2019.[xxvi] Iran’s illicit oil export network has moved at least 130 million oil barrels worth $9.6 billion using mortgages to circumvent detection between 2019 and 2023. This network transferred sanctioned Iranian oil as well as sanctioned Russian and Venezuelan oil. The network exported the vast majority of this oil to the PRC, according to a research group focused on illicit networks.[xxvii]

Iran’s use of mortgages on tankers to evade US sanctions is only one of the many strategies that Iran employs to obfuscate illicit Iranian and Russian oil trade to the PRC. Many companies affiliated with Iranian oil tankers use fake addresses and conduct ship-to-ship transfers.[xxviii]  The multi-national network controlled by Senior Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani’s son, Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, frequently changes vessel operators and managers to obscure ownership, falsifies cargo information, and turns off automatic identification systems (AIS) during loading. The United States sanctioned Shamkhani on July 30.  

Iran is deepening its economic and military cooperation with Belarus. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on August 20 in Minsk, Belarus, to discuss opportunities to expand bilateral relations.[xxix] Pezeshkian stated that Iran and Belarus share common interests and want to combat US and European efforts to ”push unilateralism” in the region.[xxx] Pezeshkian emphasized that both countries can cooperate to mitigate the effects of international sanctions.[xxxi] Iranian and Belarusian officials signed 12 memorandums of understanding (MoU) focused on increasing bilateral trade, military-tech cooperation, and mutual investment during Pezeshkian’s visit.[xxxii] Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi stated on August 20 that Iran plans to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with Belarus.[xxxiii] Iran and Belarus have increased defense and security cooperation over the past few years.[xxxiv] Iran showcased military equipment at a Belarusian military exhibit in May 2025.[xxxv] Iran has reportedly worked to establish a drone factory in Belarus since May 2023 to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[xxxvi] 

Iraq

See the topline section.

Syria

The United States conducted an operation reportedly targeting an Iraqi Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leader in Atmeh, Idlib Province, on August 20.[xxxvii] A Syrian security source and Syrian residents told Reuters that local Syrian forces cordoned off the neighborhood, but that only US forces participated in the raid.[xxxviii] A US official confirmed to Reuters that the operation targeted a “suspected high-value target.”[xxxix] US Central Command (CENTCOM) has not acknowledged the operation or its outcomes as of this writing. Syrian state-owned outlet Al Ekhbariya reported that senior Iraqi ISIS leader Salah Noman was killed during the operation, citing an unspecified security source.[xl] The source said that Noman was responsible for activating ISIS cells in Syria.[xli] The General Security Service (GSS) had pursued Noman from Dana, in the Idlib countryside, to Atmeh.[xlii] Noman is also known as Abd al Nayif al Jabouri and previously operated with the Islamic State (IS) in Salah al Din Province, Iraq.[xliii]

The US ground operation in Atmeh occurs amid ongoing counter-ISIS efforts in northern Syria near the Turkish border. Syrian Interior Ministry forces arrested nine members of an ISIS cell in Harem, near the Turkish border, on August 7.[xliv] Syrian government forces also participated in a recent US counter-ISIS ground operation that targeted and killed senior ISIS leader Dhiya Zawba Muslih al Hardani in al Bab, Aleppo Province, on July 25.[xlv]

Anti-government Druze militia Liwa al Jabal announced on August 19 that it has joined a “unified army” that is aligned with Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri, which indicates that some anti-government forces in Suwayda Province seek to form a more unified armed force to support Hijri’s new autonomous project.[xlvi] Liwa al Jabal is a prominent Suwayda-based Druze militia that has an estimated 5,000 fighters.[xlvii] The faction’s August 19 statement claimed that the group’s recent defense of Suwayda Province from ”dark militias supported by government forces” has led the group to conclude that it must ”unify efforts and close ranks” to defend Suwayda Province and Syria.[xlviii] Liwa al Jabal said that its new participation in this ”unified army” is ”under the blessing” of Hijri, who is the most prominent anti-Damascus Druze leader in Suwayda Province.[xlix] Hijri's political movement declared an autonomous Suwaydawi government on August 6.[l] Judges on the “Supreme Legal Committee” within the new ”autonomous government” appointed an executive body, security officials, and ministerial heads to govern Suwayda instead of the Damascus-based transitional government.[li] Liwa al Jabal’s announcement of its participation in a new Hijri-aligned force that has Hijri’s blessing suggests that Hijri or his political allies may be uniting Suwayda’s anti-government militias under a single command or structure to support the new autonomous government.

CTP-ISW has not observed any other Druze militias discuss membership in a new force under Hijri’s autonomous government, but Liwa al Jabal is not the only Druze militia that has expressed its support for Hijri’s political aspirations. A group of Druze militias have long opposed Shara’s government, and several other militias, including Liwa al Jabal, have turned against the government in recent months after government forces committed abuses against Druze during the violence in Suwayda in July 2025. Liwa al Jabal, for example, participated in the December 2024 offensive on Damascus as a member of the Southern Operations Room and emerged as an initial supporter of President Ahmed al Shara and the new Syrian government soon after the fall of the regime.[lii] A spokesperson more recently wrote an op ed on August 9 in support of an alliance to stand up to the “terrorist [Shara] government” and restore “consideration” for minorities and moderate Sunnis, highlighting the significant breakdown in trust between some Druze militias and the transitional government.[liii] The breakdown in trust is at least partially motivated by political divisions (not just intercommunal divisions). Another Southern Operations Room faction, the Eighth Brigade, was subverted and suppressed by Shara’s government. It is possible that Liwa al Jabal and others seek to avoid a similar fate. The formalization of the alliance between anti-government Druze militias under the term “unified army” would represent a significant hurdle to the Syrian government's efforts to work with Druze parties with the aim of gradually incorporating Suwayda into state institutions.

Humanitarian aid providers opened a new humanitarian corridor that leads into northern Suwayda Province due to repeated attacks by Sunni tribal fighters and unknown gunmen along the previous southern corridor. Sunni tribal fighters have attacked civilians four times on the outskirts of Suwayda Province since August 15.[liv] Unknown gunmen previously attacked a Syrian Red Crescent convoy headed toward the corridor on August 8.[lv] These attacks have prevented humanitarian workers from distributing aid via the Busra al Sham corridor.[lvi] Humanitarian organizations have since adapted by opening a new humanitarian corridor that enters northern Suwayda Province near Busra al Harir on August 19.[lvii] It is not clear if the government or humanitarian agencies will reopen the Busra al Sham corridor.[lviii] The General Security Services (GSS) lack the strength to guard the full 90-kilometer border of Suwayda Province and cannot reinforce their positions in the event of an attack, according to a Syrian journalist.[lix]

The attacks along the humanitarian corridor may suggest that tribal fighters are attempting to disrupt Suwaydawis’ evacuations from Suwayda Province, the provision of humanitarian aid to Suwayda, or both. Tribal fighters reportedly feel neglected by the Syrian transitional government because the government continues to send aid to Suwayda Province, but has done little to address Sunni Bedouin displacement in Daraa Province.[lx] It remains unclear why the Sunni tribal fighters have attacked civilian vehicles, however. The civilians subjected to these attacks are not solely Druze, which suggests that the attacks are not entirely motivated by intercommunal tensions.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Senior Lebanese officials have continued diplomatic efforts to generate support for the French-drafted resolution to extend the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)’s mandate.[lxi] UNIFIL, which patrols Lebanon’s southern border with Israel, operates under an annually renewed mandate that is set to expire on August 31, 2025.[lxii] The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is expected to vote on a French-proposed resolution on August 25 to extend UNIFIL’s mandate until August 31, 2026 (see graphic below).[lxiii] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam each met with US Senator Markwayne Mullin and a delegation of other unspecified US officials in Lebanon on August 20 and discussed UNIFIL‘s role supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).[lxiv]  The United States has reportedly opposed an automatic renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate and raised concerns over the French resolution’s lack of an explicit withdrawal date for UNIFIL.[lxv] Salam emphasized that UNIFIL provides critical support to LAF efforts to assert state authority over southern Lebanon.[lxvi]UNIFIL’s presence and familiarity with southern Lebanon may be needed to conduct a successful transfer of authority in southern Lebanon.[lxvii] Berri stated that Lebanon was surprised by US opposition to UNIFIL’s mandate extension and questioned how the United States ”can target its own efforts.”[lxviii] Berri is suggesting that US opposition to the resolution goes against US sponsorship and leadership in the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire monitoring committee, which contains UNIFIL forces in its structure and tasks.[lxix]

Several other UNSC members, including Russia and the PRC, have opposed extending UNIFIL’s mandate. Unspecified diplomatic sources told Lebanese media on August 20 that the PRC and Russia informed Lebanon that they reject the proposed UNIFIL resolution.[lxx] The PRC and Russia said that they will not oppose any proposals to end UNIFIL’s mission in Lebanon, according to the source.[lxxi] The PRC and Russia have consistently expressed their discontent with UNIFIL by abstaining from previous UNIFIL mandate renewals.[lxxii] The PRC and Russia’s opposition to UNIFIL is also unsurprising given Russia and the PRC’s ongoing political support for other members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, such as the Houthi Movement.[lxxiii] The PRC and Russia both abstained from the July 15 vote on UN Security Council Resolution 2787, which condemned the Houthi strikes against international shipping as acts of terrorism, for example.[lxxiv]