Iran Update, August 12, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Likely Hezbollah sources threatened to incite protests in Lebanon against US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s upcoming visit to Beirut if senior Lebanese officials do not meet with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani’s visit to Beirut on August 13.[i] Lebanese officials have reportedly attempted to pressure Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and other Lebanese officials not to meet with Larijani. Lebanese media reported on August 12 that Prime Minister Nawaf Salam suggested that Lebanese officials should boycott Larijani’s visit.[ii] Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji is reportedly continuing his “domestic and foreign contacts” in an attempt to cancel Larijani’s visit or force Iran to ”offer an apology“ to the Lebanese government for its recent statements in support of Hezbollah.[iii] Lebanese media also reported that anti-Hezbollah Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea is exerting ”major pressure” on Salam to convince Aoun not to receive Larijani.[iv] Aoun has reportedly declined these requests, stating that such a move would ”violate all diplomatic norms.”[v] Several anti-Hezbollah parliamentarians similarly expressed discontent and criticized Larijani’s upcoming visit.[vi] Lebanese Forces Party parliamentarian Ziad Hawat claimed on August 11 that Iran has blatantly interfered in Lebanese politics through arming Hezbollah and inciting “resistance” in Lebanon, stating that “Iran should stay in Iran.”[vii]

Unspecified informed sources told Hezbollah-aligned media on August 12 that any attempt to prevent Larijani from visiting Beirut would be an “explosive step” that could be met with a “broad popular response” against the visits of “other envoys.”[viii] Larijani is expected to visit Beirut on August 13 to reportedly meet with Aoun, Salam, and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, only five days before US Envoy Thomas Barrack is expected to visit Beirut on August 18.[ix] The ”informed sources”--likely Hezbollah officials or close Hezbollah allies, given that they are speaking to a Hezbollah-aligned outlet--are implying that Hezbollah will mobilize protesters against Barrack. Hezbollah previously mobilized protesters on August 8 after the Lebanese government approved a plan to disarm Hezbollah.[x] Hezbollah-aligned media reported that Larijani will also meet with unspecified Hezbollah leaders.[xi] Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani posted on X on August 12 and said that Larijani’s visit seeks to express ”Iran’s perspective and vision.”[xii]

Salam and Rajji’s willingness to entertain an effort to spurn Larijani during his visit demonstrates the degree to which this Lebanese government is willing to challenge inordinate Iranian influence in Lebanon. Previous Lebanese governments would have been unlikely to even entertain such a public challenge to Iran and its ally Hezbollah.

The Lebanese government has recently expressed discontent over Iranian officials’ statements in support of Hezbollah since the Lebanese government took early steps to disarm Hezbollah. The Lebanese government tasked the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with creating a plan to establish a state monopoly on arms on August 5 and agreed to the objectives of the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah on August 7.[xiii] Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi noted on August 6 that the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah is unrealistic and ”doomed.”[xiv] International Affairs Advisor to the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Akbar Velayati, said on August 9 that Iran is “certainly” opposed to disarming Hezbollah.[xv] The Lebanese Foreign Ministry called Velayati’s statement a ”flagrant and unacceptable interference” by Iran.[xvi]

Iranian officials have strongly criticized the US proposal to oversee a transit corridor in the southern Caucasus due to Iranian fears that its adversaries and competitors seek to use the corridor to undermine Iranian security and economic interests. Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a declaration of intent on August 8 on a US-brokered peace deal that grants the United States exclusive development rights to a 27-mile corridor through southern Armenia that connects Azerbaijan to its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region.[xvii] The agreed-upon corridor is fundamentally the actualization of the Zangezur Corridor—a Turkish and Azerbaijani-proposed transit route that would connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan. Iran has historically opposed the Zangezur Corridor and viewed it as an effort to economically sideline Iran and limit Iranian regional influence.[xviii] A senior adviser to the Supreme Leader emphasized Iran's strong opposition to the proposed transit corridor on August 9 and referred to it as a "political conspiracy" against Iran.[xix] An Iranian analyst close to the regime similarly characterized the proposed transit corridor as an Iranian “containment belt” meant to isolate Iran and threaten Iran’s security.[xx]  The corridor runs along Iran's only shared border with Armenia and would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia, which could exclude Iran from a new international transit route and hinder Iranian efforts to become a major transit hub. The corridor would enable Azerbaijan to circumvent Iran to access the Nakhchivan Autonomy Republic, which will likely deprive Iran of political leverage and any associated revenue along the transit corridor. Azerbaijan currently accesses its exclave and Turkey through Iran.

This proposed agreement would be an additional victory for Iranian adversaries at a time when Iran’s relative ability to project power in its near abroad has diminished.[xxi] Iranian officials have expressed concern about Turkey's expanding influence as a rival in the Middle East and around Iran’s borders, especially after Turkey replaced Iran as the primary backer of the new Syrian government following Assad's fall in December 2024. Turkey currently uses routes through Iran to trade with Central Asia, but a new route directly from Turkey to Azerbaijan through Armenia means that Turkey may be able to use the corridor to reach the Caspian Sea while circumventing Iran completely. Iran has similarly found itself at odds with Azerbaijan, which has taken steps to strengthen ties with Israel in recent months. Iran has historically accused Israel of using Azerbaijani territory to conduct operations in Iran, including during the Israel-Iran War.[xxii] Israeli government officials have recently called for including Azerbaijan in the Abraham Accords.[xxiii]

Iran has taken some steps in an effort to deter the corridor from being established. Iranian President Masoud Pezeskhian warned Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan during a phone call on August 11 to be wary of foreign attempts to use the agreement as a way to achieve “hegemonic goals,” likely referring to the United States.[xxiv] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately held a phone call with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan on August 12 to discuss the US-brokered peace deal and the proposed transit corridor.[xxv] Pezeshkian is scheduled to visit Armenia on August 18.[xxvi] The Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Commission held a meeting with defense, military, and foreign policy officials on August 11 to discuss Iranian diplomatic and military efforts to block the passage of the transit corridor.[xxvii] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated media stated on August 12 that Iran will be forced to adopt a "multi-layered and measured response" to the corridor.[xxviii] Iran has previously threatened to take military action to prevent the development of the Zangezur Corridor.[xxix] Iran has also previously conducted numerous provocative military exercises along the border designed to discourage the development of the corridor.[xxx] 

Turkey pressured Syria to withdraw from the US- and French-brokered integration negotiations in Paris and encouraged Syria to strengthen ties with Russia to counterbalance US and partner influence in Syria, which undermines US policy objectives in Syria.[xxxi] Unspecified Turkish sources told Syria in Transition that Turkey pressured the Syrian transitional government to withdraw from scheduled Paris negotiations with the United States, France,  and the SDF, due to fears that the transitional government would be forced to concede to Kurdish autonomy demands due to its poor handling of security in Suwayda.[xxxii] This demonstrates that Turkey’s primary concern about the Syrian government’s behavior in Suwayda is whether the Syrian government’s behavior will strengthen the SDF, not the behavior itself or the crimes committed by government forces. The SDF’s decision to invite prominent Druze leader Hikmat al Hijri to a political conference in Hasakah City on August 8 likely made it easier for Turkey to successfully pressure Syria to abandon the talks in Paris and demand that the SDF negotiate in Damascus, however.[xxxiii] Hijri's political movement declared an autonomous Suwaydawi government, and fighters close to Hijri have broken multiple ceasefires by attacking government forces and other Druze factions.[xxxiv] Turkey is simultaneously attempting to help Russia retain influence in Syria by encouraging the Syrian transitional government to strengthen diplomatic ties with Russia. Turkish sources said that the Turkish government had advised President Ahmed Shara to strengthen relations with Russia so that Russia, Turkey, and Syria can counterbalance US, European, Israeli, and Saudi interests in the country.[xxxv]

These Turkish efforts undermine key US policy objectives, including maintaining Syrian stability and preventing Russia from re-establishing itself in Syria. The US effort to integrate the SDF into Syria would prevent future rounds of conflict between the Kurdish-dominated SDF and Turkish-backed factions, which could seriously imperil Syrian stability and provide openings for ISIS to resurge. Increased Russian military influence in Syria would be similarly deleterious to Syrian stability. Russian state media reported on August 11 that the Syrian transitional government sought renewed Russian military police patrols in southern Syria to curb Israeli activity, citing a Russian source at an August 1 meeting between Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Shaibani and the Syrian diaspora in Moscow.[xxxvi] The Russian military conducted a patrol in SDF-controlled Qamishli, Hasakah Province, on August 4 shortly after Syrian diplomats returned from Moscow to negotiate Russian basing in Syria.[xxxvii] Russian military operations in Syria, particularly in southern Syria, did not contribute to lasting stability during the civil war and, in some cases, supported Iranian operations in Syria.[xxxviii]

The SDF and the transitional government have nonetheless continued to make progress in negotiations over the integration agreement despite Turkish interference.  Al Jazeera reported on August 11 that an SDF delegation arrived in Damascus to renew integration talks with the transitional government, but no updates have followed.[xxxix] The SDF and the Syrian transitional government likely desire to avoid any major fighting between the government and SDF, given that major military operations would risk significant destabilization of Syria that could imperil the political positions of both sides.

Recent ceasefire violations amid heightened tensions between the SDF and transitional government forces could threaten progress to negotiate the March 10 agreement, however. Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces reportedly made “suspicious movements" near Deir Hafer, Aleppo Province, and nearby villages, on August 11.[xl] These movements occurred in relatively open farmland dotted by small villages crisscrossed by dirt roadways and small agricultural canals. The only notable defensive line outside of the small villages is a 30-meter-wide east-west canal that runs south of Tal Maaz, 8 km northwest of Deir Hafer. The MoD engaged SDF forces near Tal Maaz on August 12 after the SDF advanced toward MoD positions there..[xli] The precise MoD-SDF frontlines in Aleppo Province are unclear, but the reports of ”suspicious movements” and the engagement near Tal Maaz suggest that both sides may be executing reconnaissance operations, which seek to ”obtain information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary [and] secure data concerning...characteristics of a particular area.”[xlii]

Key Takeaways

• Lebanese Hezbollah: Likely Hezbollah sources threatened to incite protests in Lebanon against US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s upcoming visit to Beirut if senior Lebanese officials do not meet with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani’s visit to Beirut on August 13. Salam and Rajji’s willingness to entertain an effort to spurn Larijani during his visit demonstrates the degree to which this Lebanese government is willing to challenge inordinate Iranian influence in Lebanon.
• Iran in the Caucasus: Iranian officials have strongly criticized the US proposal to oversee a transit corridor in the South Caucasus due to Iranian fears that its adversaries and competitors seek to use the corridor to undermine Iranian security and economic interests. This proposed agreement would be an additional strategic victory for Iranian adversaries at a time when Iran’s relative ability to project power in its near abroad has diminished.
• Turkey in Syria: Turkey pressured Syria to withdraw from the US- and French-brokered integration negotiations in Paris and encouraged Syria to strengthen ties with Russia to counterbalance US and partner influence in Syria, which undermines US policy objectives in Syria. Negotiations have continued despite this interference, but recent ceasefire violations threaten to derail this.

Iran

Senior Iranian defense officials discussed strengthening Iranian-South African bilateral relations and, through BRICS, with South African National Defense Force Commander General Rudzani Maphwanya in Tehran on August 12.[xliii] Maphwanya met with Defense and Armed Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh, who oversees the Iranian defense-industrial complex and manages Iranian arms sales and purchases. [xliv]Maphwanya separately met Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi and Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami.[xlv] Iran and South Africa signed a memorandum of understanding to increase economic cooperation in August 2023.[xlvi] The specific terms of economic cooperation between Iran and South Africa remain unclear.

Iranian “Enjoining the Good and Forbidding the Evil” Headquarters Spokesperson Ali Khan Mohammadi claimed on August 12 that Iran plans to unveil a new missile, the Rastakhiz (Resurrection).[xlvii] The headquarters is an Iranian state body that promotes Islamic duties as defined by Islamic law through policy-making, promotional campaigns, oversight, support activities, and coordination between state and religious institutions.[xlviii] Khan Mohammadi claimed the Rastakhiz could mount a tactical nuclear warhead and generate an electromagnetic pulse (EMP).[xlix] Other Iranian missiles could be equipped with nuclear warheads, but Iran does not possess the technological know-how to miniaturize a nuclear weapon for use on a ballistic missile. Any nuclear explosion would cause an EMP wave. He claimed that the Rastakhiz measures 14 meters in length and weighs 27 tons.[l] It is not clear how Khan Mohammadi would have access to this information, given his position outside of Iranian security institutions.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Deputy Director General Massimo Aparo visited Iranian officials on August 12 to discuss Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA.[li] This visit marks the first IAEA visit to Iran since the Israel-Iran War and since all IAEA inspectors left Iran due to safety concerns.[lii] Iran approved on June 26 a bill that suspended cooperation with the IAEA. Iranian officials repeatedly stated ahead of Aparo’s visit that the IAEA delegation would not inspect Iranian nuclear facilities during the visit.[liii] The IAEA’s visit comes ahead of the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) end-of-August deadline for Iran to make progress towards a nuclear deal before the E3 triggers the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism.[liv] The E3 reportedly aims to engage Iran and secure verifiable steps, such as restoring Iranian cooperation with the IAEA and the removal of Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile, before the snapback deadline takes effect.[lv]

Iraq

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani continued to meet with Iraqi political actors on August 11 and 12 in an attempt to secure Iranian interests in Iraq.[lvi] Larijani met with Najaf Province Governor Youssef Kinawi in Najaf on August 12.[lvii] Larijani has met with various Iraqi state officials during his two-day inaugural trip to Iraq following his appointment as SNSC chairman.[lviii] Conservative Iranian newspaper Qods Online claimed on August 12 that Larijani’s visit to Iraq is an attempt to stabilize the Axis of Resistance.[lix] Unspecified political sources told Iraqi media on August 12 that Larijani’s visit to Iraq is linked to Iranian government concerns that the Iraqi government will succumb to US pressure to dissolve the PMF.[lx] The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to disarm the PMF, which is an effort that Iran and its Iraqi allies oppose.[lxi]  

Iraqi Oil Minister Hayyan Abdul Ghani discussed the restoration of the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline with Syrian Energy Minister Mohammed al Bashir in Baghdad on August 12.[lxii] Syrian Energy Ministry Oil Affairs Deputy Ghiath Diab also attended the meeting. The ministers agreed to form a joint technical committee to assess the pipeline’s current status.[lxiii] Syria and Iraq agreed to reopen the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline in 2007, but closed the pipeline in 2010 after it sustained damage during the war in Iraq.[lxiv] An Iraqi delegation discussed the potential reopening of the pipeline with Syrian officials in late April 2025.[lxv] CTP-ISW assessed on April 25 that the Syrian transitional government may seek to re-open the pipeline to compensate for a reduction in Iranian oil exports to Syria after the fall of the Assad regime.[lxvi]

Syria

US, Syrian, and Jordanian officials met in Amman, Jordan, on August 12 and released a joint statement about consolidating the ceasefire in Suwayda Province and fully integrating the province into the Syrian state.[lxvii] Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, and US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack agreed to establish a tripartite “working group” to strengthen the Suwayda ceasefire and to provide additional international humanitarian support to Suwaydawis.[lxviii] The joint statement said that Suwayda is an “integral part of Syria,” and also called for the Syrian transitional government to ensure Suwaydawi rights and political representation in the Syrian state.[lxix]  Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al Hijri established a temporary” autonomous Suwayda government on August 6.[lxx] The United States and Jordan commended the Syrian transitional government for initiating investigations into perpetrators of violence in Suwayda.[lxxi] The Syrian Ministry of Justice (MOJ) formed a committee to investigate the violence in Suwayda on July 31.[lxxii] The Syrian transitional government’s ability to rebuild trust with the Suwaydawi community is contingent upon the MOJ committee producing tangible results through convictions and punishment, however.  

The United States is attempting to broker a deal that would establish a humanitarian corridor between Suwayda City and Israel to deliver aid to the Druze community there, according to US and Israeli officials speaking to Axios.[lxxiii]  US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack is expected to meet with Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and  Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani in Paris in the coming week to negotiate an agreement on the corridor.[lxxiv] The United States previously brokered talks between the Syrian transitional government and Israel on July 24 in Paris after Israel conducted airstrikes on the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD)  and Bedouin tribal militias in response to intercommunal violence in Suwayda.[lxxv] Suwaydawis have repeatedly demanded that the transitional government lift a ”siege” on Suwayda that has caused food, fuel, and water shortages in the province.[lxxvi]

Arabian Peninsula

The IDF Air Force intercepted a Houthi drone outside of Israeli territory on August 12.[lxxvii] The Houthis did not claim an attack on Israel as of the time of writing. The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic ”blockade” on Israel in October 2023.[lxxviii]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri has reportedly continued to serve as an intermediary between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah to coordinate on implementing the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Unspecified sources close to Berri told Lebanese media on August 11 that Berri has continued to mediate between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah “in a calculated attempt to address concerns on both sides.”[lxxix] Berri has previously served as a key interlocutor between Hezbollah, the Lebanese government, and the international community, such as in the recent negotiations to disarm Hezbollah.[lxxx] Berri also served as a mediator between Hezbollah and the United States during the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire negotiations. [lxxxi]The sources did not specify the Lebanese government or Hezbollah’s concerns but did state that Berri is reportedly concerned with reining in possible protests that could descend “into chaos.”[lxxxii] Hezbollah orchestrated protests on August 8 and threatened on August 12 to trigger protests again (see topline).[lxxxiii] The sources noted that Berri is also simultaneously ”coordinating” with the LAF and Hezbollah.[lxxxiv] Berri’s efforts to mediate and resolve outstanding concerns between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah are crucial for the LAF to implement the government’s plans to disarm Hezbollah. The Lebanese government previously tasked the LAF on August 5 with creating a plan to establish a state monopoly on arms across Lebanon by the end of 2025, which will include LAF deployments.[lxxxv] Hezbollah’s continued rejection of calls to disarm, if unaddressed, would complicate the Lebanese government’s ability to implement these plans.[lxxxvi]