Iran Update, August 22, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani gave an interview on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website on August 22 in which he discussed Iran’s post-war defense and considerations for future conflicts.[i] Larijani warned that adversaries may seek new opportunities to attack Iran and that Iran must correct its defensive flaws and rebuild deterrence.[ii] Israel’s strikes during the 12 Day War severely damaged Iranian nuclear and military facilities and killed nuclear scientists and senior commanders.[iii] The Israeli campaign and US strikes demonstrated Iran’s defensive gaps and inability to deter its adversaries. Larijani stated that the Defense Council works as a subsidiary body tasked exclusively with military readiness and fixing deficiencies in the armed forces.[iv] The SNSC established the Defense Council on August 3 to address systemic operational failures during the Israel-Iran War and to take “rapid, balanced, and coordinated” steps against future threats.”[v] Larijani stated that Iran is focusing on improving air defense and radar systems and strengthening its missile force. Larijani added that Iran relies mainly on domestic production but also buys some military equipment from abroad.[vi] Iran previously sought to strengthen defense cooperation with China following the war, including by showing interest in acquiring PRC systems such as the J-10 fighter jet and AWACS to compensate for wartime losses and upgrade air defense capabilities.[vii] Larijani also highlighted that Iran must recognize the war has not ended but has only paused.[viii]

Larijani reaffirmed Iran’s commitment to support the Axis of Resistance and framed resistance groups as natural responses to “foreign aggression.”[ix] Larijani stressed that Iran considers the Axis of Resistance a genuine and strategic asset.[x] Iran previously used the Axis as a key deterrent against the United States and Israel, but the Axis of Resistance has been badly degraded over the past two years of fighting with Israel.  Larijani compared Iran’s support for regional allies to US support for Israel and warned that abandoning them would be “political insanity.”[xi] Larijani rejected the idea that Hezbollah or other groups burden Iran and insisted that they both assist Iran and rely on Iranian support.[xii] Larijani characterized the relationship with Hezbollah and other partner groups as ”brothers” rather than ”subordinates.” This is consistent with CTP-ISW’s longstanding assessment that the Axis of Resistance is an unconventional alliance that Iran leads. Some groups in the Axis are proxies, while Iran exerts more limited influence over other groups.[xiii] Larijani’s inaugural visits to Lebanon and Iraq attempted to demonstrate that Iran has not abandoned its partners in the Axis, but Larijani offered very little visible, tangible support during those visits.[xiv]

Larijani criticized international pressure on Iran from Western countries and accused the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of "partisanship” against Iran during the 12 Day War. Larijani accused IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi of giving a “blank check” to the United States and Israel during the 12 Day War.[xv] Larijani claimed that Grossi “completely gave up and surrendered” and called the agency’s silence after Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities “truly disgraceful.”[xvi] Larijani questioned the value of continued cooperation with the IAEA but stopped short of calling for withdrawal from the NPT, saying instead that the treaty has had “no value” for Iran. Iranian officials repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the NPT if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggers the snapback sanction mechanism at the end of August.[xvii] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments.[xviii] The snapback mechanism expires on October 18, 2025, but the E3 would need to initiate the snapback process at the end of August in order to meet the October 18 deadline.[xix] Iran and the E3 previously discussed extending the snapback deadline during a July 25 Istanbul meeting.[xx] An extension would require a new UNSC resolution with at least nine votes in favor of the resolution and no vetoes from permanent UNSC members. Larijani rejected European proposals to extend the UN Security Council snapback deadline, however. He said that the JCPOA fixed a ten-year limit to the snapback sanctions that cannot be altered. He added that any extensions are a form of “cheating.”[xxi] Larijani added that Iran will never abandon diplomacy but stressed that negotiations must be “real” and not a pretext for pressure. He also warned that Iran will not accept “submission.”[xxii] Iranian officials previously demanded preconditions, including assurances of no further strikes, to continue nuclear talks with the West.[xxiii]

Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi echoed Larijani’s position during a phone call with the foreign ministers of the E3 and European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas on August 22.[xxiv] Araghchi insisted that only the UN Security Council can decide on an extension.[xxv] Araghchi stated that Iran will consult Russia and China on the implications of snapback sanctions.[xxvi] Both sides agreed that Iran and the E3 will continue discussions at the deputy foreign minister level on August 26.[xxvii] CTP-ISW assessed that Iran is very unlikely to accept any arrangement that restricts enrichment, even if the E3 extends the deadline.[xxviii]

Larijani called on the regime to prioritize solving people’s basic problems to preserve resilience in future conflicts. Larijani said citizens must have a minimum standard of living even in wartime so they can endure and remain steadfast, stressing that the state must meet essential needs in both war and peacetime. Larijani warned that energy shortages in electricity and gas, and factory closures, are unacceptable because they erode national wealth and weaken resilience. The regime may fear that if citizens grow dissatisfied, they will be less likely to support the regime in the next conflict. A recent energy shortage has forced Iran to shut schools, universities, and government offices across most provinces as authorities cut electricity and water amid extreme heat and war damage to infrastructure.[xxix] Larijani's remarks follow a large protest in Shiraz, Fars Province, on August 21, where residents gathered outside the provincial governor’s office to denounce repeated water and power outages and chanted “Not Gaza, not Lebanon - my life is for Iran.”[xxx] These chants are a criticism of the regime’s decision to funnel resources to its regional partners while neglecting basic services for Iranians.[xxxi] Energy shortages have triggered repeated unrest in recent months, including the May strike by iron market traders in Tehran and a large July demonstration in Gilan Province over water and electricity outages.[xxxii]

The United States reportedly asked Israel on August 21 to significantly reduce “non-urgent” military operations and withdraw from one of its five permanent positions in Lebanon, according to two unspecified sources speaking to Axios.[xxxiii] The sources said that US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack and Israeli officials recently discussed steps that the Israeli government could take while the Lebanese government disarms Hezbollah.[xxxiv] Barrack proposed a temporary pause of Israel‘s “non-urgent“ airstrikes for a ”few weeks” and a phased plan for Israel to withdraw from its five permanent positions.[xxxv] The sources noted that this temporary pause could be extended if the Lebanese government takes further action to prevent Hezbollah reconstitution in southern Lebanon.[xxxvi] The sources stated that the United States also envisions implementing an “economic zone” in southern Lebanon.[xxxvii] This economic zone would address Israeli concerns of Hezbollah reconstitution on its northern border by reportedly making it difficult for Hezbollah to reconstitute in southern Lebanon.[xxxviii] The sources did not provide any further information on the details of this economic zone. Qatar and Saudi Arabia have reportedly agreed to invest in the reconstruction of southern Lebanon once Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon is complete.[xxxix]

Israel and the United States have reportedly made progress on the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah, according to the same Axios sources.[xl] The sources did not provide any further details on Israel and the United States’ talks on the US proposal. The source noted that Israel did not reject the US proposal and ”is willing to give it a chance.”[xli] One of the sources noted that Israel has not yet made a final decision on the US proposal, however.[xlii] Senior Lebanese officials previously called on the United States to pressure Israel to agree to the US disarmament proposal during Barrack’s visit to Beirut on August 18.[xliii] Lebanese officials have also stated that the Lebanese government would not implement the US proposal until Israel agrees to the US proposal.[xliv]

Hezbollah officials have continued to warn the Lebanese government about potential confrontation if the Lebanese government attempts to disarm Hezbollah, which is likely an effort to leverage the government’s concerns about internal conflict in Lebanon to delay or reverse the government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah Executive Council Head Ali Damoush said on August 22 that Hezbollah has acted calmly so far but that this approach will “not last long.”[xlv] Lebanese media recently reported on August 20 that Hezbollah vowed not to resort to protests and to keep things calm at least until the end of August.[xlvi] Damoush added that Hezbollah may resort to escalation if the Lebanese government insists on implementing its decision to disarm Hezbollah.[xlvii] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem also made an earlier threat on August 15 to ”confront” the government and incite protests against it.[xlviii] Prime Minister Nawaf Salam criticized Qassem’s speech on August 15 for containing “a veiled threat of civil war,“ which he stated no one in Lebanon wants.[xlix]

Other elements of the Lebanese government have not replied with as much confidence as Salam, which suggests that Hezbollah’s efforts to prevent its disarmament by threatening the government may be experiencing some success. A pro-Hezbollah media outlet reported on August 22 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) had rhetorically responded to this pressure, however, by telling senior Lebanese officials and Hezbollah that it will not take any action that could undermine internal stability.[l] LAF Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal previously told Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri that the LAF will not “clash with a key component of the country.“[li] The LAF’s recent statements underscore the Lebanese government’s ongoing concerns about internal conflict arising between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah.[lii] Lebanese officials have raised concerns that the government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah could spark communal tensions in Lebanon.[liii] A delay or reversal of the Lebanese government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah would provide Hezbollah with the time needed to reconstitute its forces and re-establish itself domestically.[liv] Hezbollah is very unlikely to disarm on its own accord because it believes that its arms are central to its ability to challenge and ultimately destroy the Israeli state.[lv]

Key Takeaways

• Iran: Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani gave an interview on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website on August 22 in which he discussed Iran’s post-war defense and considerations for future conflicts.
• Iran: Larijani criticized international pressure on Iran from Western countries and accused the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of "partisanship” against Iran during the 12 Day War.
• Lebanon: The United States reportedly asked Israel on August 21 to significantly reduce “non-urgent” military operations and withdraw from one of its five permanent positions in Lebanon, according to two unspecified sources speaking to Axios.
• Lebanon: Hezbollah officials have continued to warn the Lebanese government about potential confrontation if the Lebanese government attempts to disarm Hezbollah, which is likely an effort to leverage the government’s concerns about internal conflict in Lebanon to delay or reverse the government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah.

Iran

Jaish al Adl conducted an attack targeting Iranian security forces in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on August 22.[lvi] Iranian police announced that unspecified fighters attacked two patrol units on the Khash-Iranshahr road, killing five police officers.[lvii] Jaish al Adl later claimed the attack.[lviii] Jaish al Adl is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.[lix] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Quds Operational Base recently destroyed two Jaish al Adl cells in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on August 17.[lx] The Quds Operational Base conducted the counterterrorism operation after Jaish al Adl fighters killed an Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officer in the province on August 15.[lxi]

Iraq

The Islamic Resistance Coordination Committee warned on August 22 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are “on the trigger in defense” of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[lxii] Recent US political and economic pressure on the Iraqi government to curb Iranian influence in Iraq has sparked a debate in the Iraqi political space on the future and possible dissolution of the PMF.[lxiii] The committee also reiterated its demand for US forces to withdraw from Iraq.[lxiv] The United States is expected to complete the first phase of a withdrawal from Iraq to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region by the end of September 2025.[lxv] Remaining US forces are expected to withdraw to the Kurdistan Region by the end of 2026.[lxvi] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani separately discussed the US withdrawal from Iraq with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali on August 21.[lxvii]

Kurdish security forces executed a warrant for the arrest of the head of the People’s Front, Lahur Jangi Talabani, and his two brothers on August 22 in Sulaymaniyah City, Iraqi Kurdistan Region.[lxviii] Kurdish security forces raided the Lalazar Hotel, which is where the People’s Front is headquartered.[lxix] Jangi resisted arrest, which led to fighting between Jangi’s private security force and Kurdish government forces. Kurdish news reported that at least four security personnel died in the fighting. Security forces arrested Jangi and several of his family members after the fighting ended.[lxx]

The Sulaymaniyah City Court announced on August 22 that the court charged Jangi under Article 56 of the Iraqi Penal Code for criminal conspiracy and the Anti-Terrorism Law.[lxxi] A senior advisor to KRG President Nechirvan Barzani claimed that the arrest was driven by an internal PUK power struggle.[lxxii] Jangi served as the co-chair of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and head of the PUK’s Zanyari intelligence service before being dismissed by Bafel Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Jangi’s cousin, in July 2021 because of a power struggle between the two.[lxxiii] Jangi subsequently founded the People’s Front, which won two seats in the 2024 Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) parliamentary elections.[lxxiv] He also reportedly established his own special forces and has acquired significant financial interests in the region.[lxxv] Jangi has also reportedly reached out to the PUK’s rival, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), and attempted to establish ties with the Iraqi federal government and Iran. PUK sources cited by Kurdish news claimed that Jangi attempted a coup and wanted to destabilize Sulaymaniyah and PUK control there.[lxxvi]

Kurdish media circulated footage reportedly showing one-way drone attacks on PUK targets that coincided with Jangi’s arrest on August 22.[lxxvii] One drone attack struck Bafel Talabani’s residence at the Dashaban compound, and a second drone struck the headquarters of the PUK’s Unit 70.[lxxviii]

Syria

Two ISIS fighters reportedly attempted to conduct a tactically sophisticated but poorly executed suicide attack on a General Security Service (GSS) checkpoint in al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province, on August 22.[lxxix] Local Syrian media reported that two ISIS suicide bombers on a motorcycle attacked a GSS checkpoint in al Mayadin’s al Taybeh neighborhood.[lxxx] The ISIS fighters planned to use the first suicide attacker to breach the checkpoint and kill or disorient the first line of GSS personnel while the second attacker entered the checkpoint and detonated his vest surrounded by the remaining GSS personnel. The GSS commander of Deir ez Zor Province reported that one fighter attempted to rush the checkpoint but was killed before he was able to detonate his vest.[lxxxi] Imagery posted by Syrian media showed that the fighter wore a plate carrier, which could have been packed with explosives.[lxxxii] The second fighter used his rifle to engage the checkpoint, but he was unable to detonate his vest before he was shot and critically wounded.[lxxxiii] The theory behind this attack demonstrated a degree of tactical sophistication compared to the small arms attacks commonly conducted by ISIS against SDF and GSS checkpoints, but the attack’s execution was poor and amateurish. An armed man approaching a checkpoint in fatigues on a motorcycle was unlikely to get close enough to the checkpoint to detonate his vest, especially in daylight.

The construction of a suicide vest and other more advanced weapons systems and the cultivation of suicide attackers requires extensive and relatively security logistical networks in support zones that are inaccessible to counter-ISIS forces. ISIS also recently conducted a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack in al Mayadin.[lxxxiv] Both VBIEDs and suicide vests require areas in which ISIS can build the vests or VBIEDs as well as safehouses for suicide attackers for suicide vest attacks.  The attack and attempted attacks using these systems near and in al Mayadin suggest that ISIS has developed a support zone near al Mayadin from which it can launch these attacks.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed on August 21 that US forces conducted a ground raid which killed an Iraqi Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leader and financier in Atmeh, Idlib province, on August 19.[lxxxv] CENTCOM did not confirm the ISIS leader’s identity but said that he planned attacks in Iraq and Syria.[lxxxvi] CTP-ISW reported on August 20 that Syrian media identified the ISIS leader as Salah Noman, also known as Abd al Nayif al Jabouri, who previously operated in Salah al Din Province, Iraq.[lxxxvii]

Arabian Peninsula

The Israel Defense Force (IDF) Air Force intercepted one Houthi drone attack and a separate Houthi missile attack outside of Israeli territory on August 22.[lxxxviii] The Houthis have not claimed either attack on Israel at the time of writing. The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic “blockade” on Israel in October 2023.[lxxxix]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.