Impending Offensives in Central Sudan; Ethnic Cleansing in el Fasher; Deadly Crackdown in Tanzania: Africa File, November 6, 2025

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Contributors: Femi Omotayo

Key Takeaways:

• Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces and Sudanese Armed Forces are setting conditions to launch new offensives across central Sudan. These preparations signal that neither side is interested in peace, which will undermine US-led peace efforts to secure a ceasefire and prevent the partition of Sudan.
• El Fasher. The Rapid Support Forces are continuing to commit mass crimes against humanity in el Fasher, western Sudan, including acts of ethnic cleansing that could amount to acts of genocide.
• Tanzania. The Tanzanian government enforced a highly deadly crackdown on nationwide protests after Tanzanian President Samia Hassan was elected president in sham elections in late October. The backlash threatens China’s influence and investments—Tanzania’s most important political and military partner outside Africa—and could make more Tanzanians vulnerable to Salafi-jihadi recruitment.
• Mali. The United States and several other countries have urged their citizens to leave Mali amid Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen’s (JNIM’s) ongoing blockade. JNIM has expanded its blockade as the Malian junta adapts its strategy, while IS Sahel Province may be exploiting JNIM’s focus on maintaining the blockade in southern Mali to encroach on traditionally JNIM-dominated parts of northern Mali.
• Nigeria. JNIM claimed responsibility for its first-ever attack in Nigeria as it continues to expand south toward the Gulf of Guinea.

Figure 1. Africa File, November 6, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Sudan

Authors: Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are massing forces to overrun the final remaining population center held by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in west-central Sudan. The RSF has massed forces outside Babanusa, which is located 250 miles west of El Obeid, the SAF-controlled North Kordofan state capital and main SAF westward point of advance.^[1] The RSF is reportedly drawing forces from Abu Zabad, al Fula, an Nahud, al Khawai, Lagawa, and Wad Banda.^[2] An RSF-aligned official and some local leaders have called on the SAF’s 22nd Infantry Division, which is the division responsible for protecting Babanusa, to surrender to avoid an RSF assault on the town.^[3]

The SAF has responded by conducting supply airdrops to besieged forces in Babanusa and drone strikes on RSF positions in the other localities.^[4] The RSF shot down a supply aircraft in Babanusa on November 3, however.^[5] The airdrops are the only way for the SAF to support the 22nd Infantry Division, as the RSF has besieged Babanusa since January 2024.

Figure 2. SAF Air Activity in West Kordofan

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo

The RSF is separately conducting a secondary effort to preoccupy and isolate SAF forces in central Sudan, where the SAF may be massing forces for an offensive. The RSF has attacked SAF positions around el Obeid, the SAF’s logistic hub in central Sudan. The RSF captured Bara and um Dam Haj Ahmed—both located approximately 40 miles north of El Obeid—on October 25 and 26, respectively.^[6] The RSF also captured Jabal al Hashaba—located 10 miles southwest of el Obeid—on October 28 before the SAF retook the area on the same day.^[7] The RSF has additionally attacked SAF positions in al Rahad, which is located approximately 50 miles southeast of el Obeid.^[8] The RSF conducted a drone attack on a village near el Obeid on November 3, reportedly killing around 40 people.[9]

RSF movements around Kordofan region indicate that Babanusa is currently taking priority over el Obeid. The RSF could use forces stationed in an Nahud and al Khawai to support an offensive on el Obeid, which is located approximately 70 miles to the east of al Khawai, but the group has instead sent these forces toward Babanusa.^[10] An Nahud is a major logistic node on Kordofan region’s main east–west highway and is located 90 miles west of the frontlines around el Obeid at um Sumeima. The SAF captured the city in early 2025, which was last time the SAF launched a successful offensive from el Obeid, but the RSF retook it in May.^[11]

The SAF may be preparing to launch a new westward offensive from el Obeid. The SAF has responded to recent developments by announcing a general mobilization in eastern Sudan, with a local source stating that the SAF is sending senior commanders and troop reinforcements to el Obeid.^[12] The SAF has reportedly secured additional military support from Egypt following the RSF’s capture of el Fasher, with Turkey also expected to supply more drones.^[13] The SAF has additionally conducted airstrikes on RSF positions north, southwest, and west of el Obeid.^[14] The SAF has repeatedly declared its intention to capture RSF-controlled territory in western Sudan.^[15]

Figure 3. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Kordofan Region

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo; Vista Maps; Thomas Van Linge.

Figure 4. SAF-RSF Activity in North Kordofan

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo

The RSF is continuing efforts to capture the final remaining SAF-aligned pocket in western Sudan, which would complete the RSF’s de facto partition of Sudan. The RSF briefly captured Abu Gomra—located 200 miles northwest of el Fasher—on October 16 before SAF-aligned forces retook the town.^[16] The RSF has regrouped in nearby localities and is reportedly positioned to target Abu Gomra and Tina, which is located on Chadian border.^[17] The RSF conducted drone strikes on Karnoi—a logistic hub located 65 miles north of Abu Gomra—on November 3.^[18] The SAF has responded by conducting supply airdrops to Abu Gomra and Tina and airstrikes on RSF positions.^[19] CTP previously assessed that RSF control of el Fasher would enable the group to redeploy resources to other frontlines.^[20]

Figure 5. Control of Terrain in Western Sudan

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo; Vista Maps; Thomas Van Linge.

Continued RSF and SAF mobilizations are at odds with US demands for an immediate ceasefire and a unified Sudan. RSF advances in central or western Sudan would further entrench the group’s de facto partition. The RSF and the United Arab Emirates—the RSF’s primary sponsor—have already doubled down on the RSF’s demand for political legitimacy since the group’s capture of el Fasher in late October.^[21] The RSF reportedly plans to move the headquarters of its parallel government to recently captured el Fasher.^[22] The US has publicly committed to upholding Sudan’s territorial integrity, with Senior Adviser for African Affairs Massad Boulos stating that partition is unacceptable.^[23]

The SAF’s mobilization and solicitation of foreign support indicates that it is planning offensives rather than recognition of the RSF’s political legitimacy. The SAF has previously refused to acknowledge any peace process that disregards its role as Sudan’s sole sovereign authority.^[24] The RSF and SAF initially rejected a recent US-proposed three-month humanitarian ceasefire amid the solidification of the RSF’s de facto partition of Sudan.^[25]

El Fasher

Authors: Michael DeAngelo and Alexandria Johnson

The RSF are separately committing mass crimes against humanity and acts of ethnic cleansing of non-Arab populations in el Fasher. The RSF has continued mass killings of civilians in el Fasher.^[26] Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) published satellite imagery analysis showing growing clusters of probable bodies in multiple neighborhoods and near the RSF-constructed berm surrounding the city on October 31.^[27] HRL also noted the new presence of mass graves on November 4, including near the berm.^[28] The Sudan War Monitor reported on November 3 that RSF sources have claimed at least 7,000 deaths—mostly civilians—since capturing el Fasher. ^[29] The International Criminal Court announced on November 3 that it is collecting evidence of alleged RSF atrocities in el Fasher for “use in future prosecutions.”^[30] International law defines crimes against humanity as specifically egregious crimes committed during a major attack against civilians that violate human dignity, including murder, extermination, forcible deportation, torture, sexual violence, ethnic persecution, disappearance, and apartheid.^[31]

The RSF has explicitly targeted non-Arab civilians in acts of ethnic cleansing. The RSF has conducted house-to-house executions in non-Arab neighborhoods.^[32] The RSF’s actions match with videos of RSF fighters using ethnically charged language against non-Arabs across the country, including a video in which a RSF commander calls for violence against non-Arab women.^[33] The European Union condemned the RSF’s ethnic targeting on October 28.^[34] A UN Commission of Experts previously defined ethnic cleansing in the context of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as “rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area” and “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”^[35]

These acts of ethnic cleansing may constitute acts of genocide, which are defined as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.^[36] The RSF’s actions in el Fasher demonstrate systematic intent. The Sudan War Monitor reported that the RSF has systematically prioritized clearing non-Arab neighborhoods and that the group explicitly barred non-Arab RSF-aligned fighters from taking part in the operations.^[37] The RSF has consistently exhibited genocidal intent in the past two decades, starting with the RSF’s predecessor, the Janjaweed. The Janjaweed perpetuated the Darfur genocide in the early 2000s, killing up to 400,000 people.^[38] The RSF committed a monthslong genocide against the non-Arab Massalit in el Geneina from April to November 2023, killing up to 15,000.^[39]

The United Arab Emirates’ (UAE’s) support for the RSF has enabled the group’s actions. The UAE has supplied weapons, particularly drones, and other equipment to the RSF from bases in Chad and Libya since 2023.^[40] The RSF has relied on Chinese-manufactured, UAE-supplied drones to target SAF positions and infrastructure, disrupting SAF logistics and governance.^[41] The UAE increased its support in early 2025, as the SAF advanced into RSF-controlled territory in west-central Sudan.^[42] This support allowed the RSF to repel the SAF and intensify its siege of el Fasher.^[43] The UAE helped the RSF establish a base near al Kufra, Libya, where the group stationed fighters and Colombian mercenaries who participated in assaults on el Fasher.^[44] The UAE has used its leverage over the RSF to influence the group’s actions in the past. The Guardian reported that the UAE halted a planned RSF assault on el Fasher in June 2024 due to pressure from the UN Security Council.^[45]

Tanzania

Author: Yale Ford

Tanzanian President Samia Hassan was declared the winner in Tanzania’s late October presidential election. Tanzania’s electoral commission gave Hassan a landslide win with more than 97 percent of total votes in the October 29 election on November 1.^[46] Hassan was swiftly sworn in at a military parade ground in Dodoma, Tanzania’s administrative capital, in a private ceremony attended by regional leaders and dignitaries on November 3.^[47] Hassan’s five-year term will be her first elected mandate after she took power in early 2021, when her predecessor, John Magufuli, died in office. Hassan leads Tanzania’s ruling party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which has been in power in various forms since independence in 1961.

Large-scale protests and low voter turnout marred the election after the CCM sidelined the two main opposition candidates and repressed its political opponents in the run-up to the election. Hassan ran virtually unopposed after jailing and disqualifying her two major challengers. The Tanzanian government arrested and prosecuted the main opposition candidate on fabricated treason charges and barred his party from qualifying in elections until 2030 in early 2025.^[48] The government also disqualified the candidate of the second largest opposition party on procedural grounds.^[49] The rest of Hassan’s other challengers represented smaller parties that historically have not had widespread public support.

The Tanzanian government suppressed the opposition and tried to weaken its ability to challenge the government. The government has increasingly targeted its opponents with extrajudicial measures, restricted media and speech, and further eroded the electoral commission’s independence in 2025.^[50] The UN said in June that it was concerned about a “pattern of repression” involving gross human rights violations against opposition parties and their members.^[51] The Tanzanian government reportedly escalated attacks on critics in the final days before October 29—killing, arresting, abducting, and torturing senior opposition officials, in what Amnesty International called a “wave of terror.”^[52] The European Parliament said that the elections were “neither free nor fair” in a statement on October 30.^[53] The African Union (AU) slammed the election as undemocratic on November 5.[54]

Protests erupted in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’s commercial capital, and across the country on October 29, raging intensely for three days.^[55] The protesters vandalized polling stations and fuel stations, tore down posters of Hassan and the CCM, blocked main roadways, and caused extensive damage to private and public property, among other actions.^[56] The public discontent reportedly stemmed from the election fixing and the government’s flagrant repressive tactics in the months and weeks prior to the election.^[57]

Figure 6. Protests Erupt Across Tanzania After Sham Election

Source: Yale Ford; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Voter turnout was reportedly low amid the unrest, despite claims of high participation from the Tanzanian government. Electoral authorities claimed that 87 percent of registered voters participated in the election.^[58] Many voters, especially young people, were reportedly hesitant to vote, however, and election observers noted that polling stations were mainly empty on October 29.^[59] Observers from the AU and the Southern African Development Community said that voter turnout was “very low” and there were more police officers at polling stations than voters.^[60] A student told the Associated Press that he refused to vote because the election was a “one-horse race.”^[61] State television broke with tradition and did not air live footage of voters casting their ballots.

The Tanzanian government cracked down brutally on protesters, leading to hundreds of deaths. The Tanzanian army deployed to major cities across Tanzania to quell the unrest as police and security services fired live ammunition and tear gas upon protesters. Tanzanian authorities declared a six-day, 24-hour lockdown and a nationwide communications blackout, cutting access to basic services and internet and online platforms across the country as prices for fuel and goods soared. A diplomatic source told Agence France-Presse (AFP) that Tanzanian police used the internet blackout to “hunt down” opposition officials and any protesters who possessed incriminating videos of the crackdown.^[62] Police went door-to-door in some towns.^[63] Unidentified and heavily armed plainclothes militants, presumably members of state security services, roamed the streets in Dar es Salaam, reportedly shooting civilians.^[64] The government sent a text message to cellphone users that said circulating distressful images would risk “treason charges” as internet service resumed in some areas on November 3.^[65]

As many as 2,000 people may have died in the nationwide unrest. A senior opposition official claimed that Tanzanian police and security services killed up to 2,000 people in the riots.^[66] A diplomatic source told the BBC on November 3 that there was “credible evidence” that at least 500 people died in the protests.^[67] Amnesty International said at least 100 people died.^[68] The foreign ministers of Canada, Norway, and the United Kingdom said there were “credible reports of a large number of fatalities and significant injuries” in a joint statement on October 31.^[69] Hospitals, health clinics, and morgues across Tanzania reportedly had an influx of patients but refused to release information on deaths and casualties due to fear of the authorities.^[70] The Tanzanian opposition claimed on November 4 that security services were “secretly dumping” the corpses of “hundreds” whom they had killed.^[71]

Hassan has aggressively solidified her grip on power within the CCM and likely has no plans to compromise with party elites or opposition groups. Hassan has faced internal dissent from CCM elites who want to replace her as party head. She had been battling for months to prove to senior party cadres, many of whom were Magufuli acolytes, that she was the most viable candidate to lead the party and country.^[72] The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported in late August that Hassan had purged dozens of several senior CCM members who were challenging her leadership.^[73] Hassan has relied on her inner circle and her son whom Hassan’s critics say acts as an informal intelligence chief and was the “key organizer” of the election crackdown.^[74] A former Hassan adviser told AFP on October 27 that Hassan likely views a no-holds-barred approach against critics as “necessary to cement her rule.”^[75]

The crackdown represents Tanzania’s most severe crisis in years but aligns with the CCM’s history of repression. Magufuli sidelined his major rival in the CCM ahead of the 2020 election.[76] Hassan was seen as more moderate than Magufuli, as she promised reforms and appeared to open the political space. The sham election and the government’s heavy-handed response signals that she has become even “more autocratic” than Magufuli, according to one expert on Tanzanian politics, however.^[77] Hassan has taken no chances in going after the political opposition and officials in her own party, whereas previous leaders had yielded to the party to an extent and sought to weaken but not imprison the political opposition on treason charges.

The public discontent likely will not force Hassan’s hand to compromise with party elites or opposition groups. Opposition officials had urged the Tanzanian army to step in and take power amid the unrest, but it remains unlikely that the military elite will intervene to capitalize on popular discontent, unlike what occurred in Madagascar in September.^[78] Magufuli won a landslide victory in the last election in 2020, which was tainted by electoral fraud and state-directed violence and intimidation against the opposition.^[79] The CCM never made concessions to the opposition in 2020 despite the election’s illegitimacy.

China is a strategic partner of the Tanzanian regime and has exported its model of authoritarian rule and regime security, as well as military equipment and repressive techniques that likely aided the crackdown. Tanzania is one of China’s oldest political and military allies in Africa, designated as a comprehensive strategic cooperative partner—the highest partnership grouping outside of a handful of special accolades. Comprehensive strategic cooperative partnerships involve a greater emphasis on the full pursuit of cooperation and development.^[80] The CCM’s party structure and governance philosophy is modeled closely on the Chinese Communist Party.^[81] China founded a school for politicians in Tanzania training leaders across the continent in regime security in 2022.^[82] China is also Tanzania’s top military partner as a leading supplier of arms and military training and has heavily influenced the Tanzanian army’s order of battle, military doctrine, and culture.^[83] More than 90 percent of Tanzania’s arms imports came from China between 2000 and 2018.^[84]

The unrest in the country threatens China’s heavy economic investment in Tanzania, which is an anchor state for Chinese investment in the region. Tanzania closed the port of Dar es Salaam and its border with Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia, which severely disrupted trade and economic activity across the country during the protests.^[85] China is Tanzania’s largest trading partner, and Tanzania is a key node in China’s Belt and Road Initiative in East Africa.^[86] Chinese firms are building two major infrastructure projects in Dodoma—Msalato International Airport and a highway project around the city.^[87] China is helping to build sections of Tanzania’s multibillion-dollar Standard Gauge Railway, which will connect Dar es Salaam to western Tanzania and several Great Lakes countries.^[88] China has pledged more than $1 billion to revamp the Tanzania-Zambia railway, linking the port of Dar es Salaam—a major logistics hub for investment on the African continent—to the central African copper belt and is a direct competitor to the US-backed Lobito Corridor.^[89] China is heavily invested in industrial and small-scale mining operations in Tanzania, including nickel and gold.^[90] China is also a stakeholder in the East African Crude Oil Pipeline, which will transport crude oil from Uganda’s oil fields on Lake Albert to the Tanzanian port of Tanga.^[91]

Government repression could make Tanzania more vulnerable to Salafi-jihadi expansion. Tanzanian nationals play important roles in Salafi-jihadi networks across East Africa, including in al-Shabaab, IS Central Africa Province, and IS Mozambique Province (ISMP). Tanzania has been a refuge and recruiting ground and a transit point for Salafi-jihadi operatives across the region.^[92] These structures that are already in place in Tanzania could be mobilized to fuel an insurgency inside Tanzania if anti-government sentiment grows as the government signals intolerance to any dissent. Muslim identity intersects with separatist groups and local grievances, and restricted avenues for political freedom could create opportunities for these groups to establish connections with local populations. Tanzanian security services undertook a severe crackdown in 2016-17, which played a part in ISMP’s formation.^[93]

Mali

Authors: Miles Charles and Liam Karr with Femi Omotayo

The United States and several other countries have urged their citizens to leave Mali amid Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen’s (JNIM) ongoing blockade, signaling a credible and imminent threat to foreign nationals in the capital. The US embassy issued a security alert on October 28 stating that all US citizens in Mali should “depart immediately” due to persistent infrastructure challenges and the ongoing insecurity around Bamako.[94] Germany, Japan, and eleven other governments have followed suit, issuing similar security alerts in the following days.[95]

Figure 7. JNIM Besieges Southern Mali

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

JNIM has expanded its blockade as the Malian junta slowly adapts its security and procurement protocols. JNIM announced on November 2 that it would prevent the sale of fuel west of a designated cordon in central Mali’s Mopti region.[96] A JNIM spokesperson explicitly noted that fuel traders could continue selling east of the cordon and that the measure was aimed at preventing fuel from reaching the Malian army and aligned Dozo militias.[97]

Figure 8. JNIM Prohibits the Sale of Fuel West of the Designated Towns

Source: Miles Charles.

The junta has adapted its convoy protection protocols and fuel procurement strategies to alleviate pressure on Bamako. The junta has successfully transported at least 900 tankers to the capital via the Ivorian trade corridor and reshuffled the Malian military command all in the past week.[98] Local media also reported on October 24 that Russia agreed to deliver up to 200,000 tons of petroleum and agricultural products to Bamako.[99]

The lack of fuel continues to hinder everyday activities and business operations. The Malian junta closed schools and universities nationwide for two weeks starting on October 27.[100] The Malian Education Minister said the closures were due to fuel shortages hindering the mobility of school staff.[101] A Malian business owner reported that up to 80 percent of his workforce was absent, causing an 85 percent drop in production.[102] The city of Mopti in central Mali has been without electricity for over a month.[103] Citizens across central Mali have reportedly led sporadic protests.[104]

JNIM may have created a vacuum by redeploying forces from northern Mali to reinforce its blockade, which ISSP has exploited to contest areas of northern Mali historically dominated by JNIM. The Malian army killed Ridwan al Ansari, a Tuareg JNIM field commander, during an ambush on a fuel convoy 58 miles west of Bamako on October 28.[105] Ansari’s presence suggests that Ansar al Din, JNIM’s Tuareg-dominated northern Mali subgroup, has redeployed fighters south to support the ongoing blockade on Bamako.[106] The presence of Tuareg fighters in southern Mali is unusual, as Mali’s Tuareg population is concentrated in northern Mali, and JNIM’s franchise model typically keeps fighters near their home regions.

JNIM has decreased its attacks on security forces in northern Mali since the start of its blockade on September 3. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) has recorded seven JNIM attacks in northern Mali in the two months since the blockade began at the beginning of September, compared to 26 attacks in the preceding two-month period.[107] Prior to that, JNIM had averaged roughly eight attacks per month in northern Mali in 2025.[108]

ISSP may be exploiting the vacuum to begin contesting JNIM controlled territory around Kidal. ISSP killed six civilians and kidnapped seventeen others near the Kidal-Gao regional border on October 26.[109] The attack marks ISSP’s first recorded attack in the Kidal region, nearly hundreds of miles north of its main area of operations along the Mali-Niger border.[110] JNIM and Tuareg separatists, with long-standing ties to JNIM, have dominated Kidal and its surrounding area since their emergence in 2012.

Figure 9. ISSP Encroaches on JNIM Territory in Northern Mali

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

Nigeria

Authors: Miles Charles and Chris Dayton

Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) claimed responsibility for its first-ever attack in Nigeria on October 28. The group attacked a patrol of Nigerian troops in Kwara state, killing one soldier.[111] The Nigerian president expressed concern to his military leadership in the following days about groups in north-central Nigeria, presumably referring to the presence of JNIM and other Salafi-jihadi groups in the area.[112]

JNIM militants based in the Kainji reserve likely carried out the attack. JNIM-linked militants began settling in the Kainji reserve in early 2021, when locals reported that Francophone militants crossed into the reserve from Benin.[113] The Dutch research institute Clingendael reported in June 2024 that militants in the Kainji area had contributed to an increase in bandit-related incidents along the Benin-Nigeria border, which CTP assessed suggested links to JNIM.[114] CTP assessed in June 2025 that JNIM’s presence in the Kainji Reserve posed an attack risk for Nigeria, especially given the likely fluid relationship among JNIM-linked militants and other more Nigerian-focused groups in the Kainji area.[115]

The same JNIM cell has also likely carried out attacks in neighboring Benin. JNIM attacked a Beninese outpost in Basso, 3 miles from the Nigerian border, on June 12.[116] The attack’s proximity to the border and distance further south from JNIM’s primary area of operations near the Park W complex indicate that the attackers likely came from Nigeria. JNIM militants released a video along the border with Benin on July 12, stating their intent to increase attacks in the littoral states and establish a new battalion in Nigeria.[117]

Figure 10. JNIM Attacks Linked to the Subgroup in Nigeria’s Kainji Reserve

Source: Miles Charles; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

JNIM militants in the area will likely escalate attacks if Nigerian forces increase counterinsurgency pressure, as Salafi-jihadi groups have done in the past. CTP assessed in early 2025 that ISSP had operationalized a nearby subgroup on the western edge of the Niger-Nigeria border in response to increased counterterrorism pressure.[118] JNIM similarly operationalized support cells in Benin and Togo in 2022 when it came under increased counterinsurgency pressure.[119]

JNIM’s expansion in Nigeria signals the group’s continued intention to expand south toward the Gulf of Guinea. JNIM’s activity in Nigeria has followed the pattern of expansion that both JNIM and ISSP have used in littoral West Africa, with the militants first building operational and logistic capacity before claiming attacks.[120] Former Commander of US Africa Command General Michael Langley warned in March that coast access would open new trade and smuggling routes for armed groups and put the US homeland at increased risk.[121]

Africa File Data Cutoff: November 6, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.