Africa File, May 15, 2025: JNIM Seizes Burkinabe Provincial Capital in Latest Blow to Traoré; IS West Africa Regains the Advantage in Lake Chad; IS Sahel Operationalizes Support Networks in Nigeria; Tripoli Clashes

Data Cutoff: May 15, 2025, at 10 a.m. EST

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The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

• Burkina Faso. Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen’s latest attack highlights its ability to overrun population centers in the Sahel and the failures of the coup-prone Burkinabe junta. Burkinabe junta leader Ibrahim Traoré has failed to improve security in the country while deliberately increasing violence against civilians through a counterinsurgency strategy that has systematically encouraged state-sanctioned massacres of civilians.
• Lake Chad. IS West Africa Province (ISWAP) has overrun Nigerian security positions in northeastern Nigeria a dozen times since the beginning of March in its most successful offensive in years. The offensive shows that ISWAP has adapted to the Nigerian government’s counterinsurgency strategy and comes as regional counterinsurgency coordination is decreasing. A strengthened ISWAP will bolster the IS global network, especially in West Africa, including external attack plotting.
• Niger. IS Sahel Province (ISSP) has likely operationalized its support networks along the western edge of the Niger-Nigeria border. The group has had cells in this area since at least 2018, but the cells have carried out more attacks in 2025 than ever before, and ISSP claimed an attack in the area for the first time. These developments come after Nigerien and Nigerian forces increased counterinsurgency operations against the ISSP cells, which fits a trend of Salafi-jihadi insurgents operationalizing their support networks in response to heightened counterinsurgency pressure.
• Libya. Forces aligned with Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, leader of Libya’s western-based, UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU), launched operations against rival militias to consolidate control over Tripoli and key GNU institutions. The power grab risks infighting in central Tripoli and may create opportunities for the eastern-based Libyan National Army, led by Russian-aligned warlord Khalifa Haftar.

Assessments:

Burkina Faso

Author: Liam Karr.

Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate, Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), seized a provincial capital in Burkina Faso for several hours, highlighting its ability to mass forces and overrun besieged population centers in the Sahel. Hundreds of JNIM fighters attacked Djibo town—a provincial capital in northern Burkina Faso’s Sahel region—on May 11.[1] The fighters overran the town’s military base and targeted civilians with suspected links to pro-government militias. JNIM forced Burkinabe air support to retreat from the area with 14.5mm antiaircraft guns, which the group has captured in previous attacks on military bases.[2] Locals said that the attack inflicted over 100 casualties, and JNIM claimed on May 15 that the attack killed 200 Burkinabe soldiers.[3] The Burkinabe has not released an official statement.[4] JNIM separately attacked up to eight other locations on May 11, including an attack 30 miles west of Djibo on Sollé that the group claims killed 60 Burkinabe soldiers.[5] The attacks would be some of the deadliest in Burkina Faso since JNIM massacred hundreds in Barsalogho, northern Burkina Faso, in August 2024.[6]

Figure 1. JNIM Activity in Northern Burkina Faso

Source: Liam Karr.

The Djibo attack highlights possible cooperation gaps between the Burkinabe and Malian juntas, as the attack may have involved multiple JNIM subgroups.[7] Djibo lies near the area of operations overlap between Ansaroul Islam and Katiba Macina. The former operates in the tri-border region of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, while Katiba Macina operates in western Burkina Faso and central, southern, and western Mali.[8] Multiple sources claimed that the Malian government encouraged a series of ceasefires between local leaders and Katiba Macina in central Mali earlier in 2025, which led the group to lift blockades of Malian towns and freed resources to direct across the border into Burkina Faso.[9] These developments have likely contributed to a decrease in JNIM attacks and Malian counterterrorism activity on the Malian side of the border in the Mopti region, while attacks and Burkinabe counterterrorism activity have increased.[10] Katiba Macina separately began using drones to drop explosives on army positions in Burkina Faso more regularly in March 2025, after carrying out a handful of these attacks in Burkina Faso and Mali in 2024.[11]

Figure 2. JNIM Increases “Drone Drop” Attacks

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

JNIM is besieging several other major population centers in the Sahel and likely could overrun these areas should it choose to. JNIM’s rhetoric in recent months indicates that it may intensify attacks on besieged cities as part of this pressure campaign, although the group is still unlikely to directly seize and govern major population centers. JNIM’s spokesperson and high-ranking Katiba Macina leader, Mahmoud Barry, threatened in November 2024 that JNIM would “get you in the big cities.”[12] The brother of the Ansaroul Islam leader encouraged civilians in Djibo to move away from military sites and leave the city in general for their own safety after the recent attack on May 13.[13] JNIM’s siege tactics aim to dissuade civilian cooperation with state personnel and force communities into agreements that impose indirect or shadow governance without expending resources to directly seize and administer towns.[14]

Figure 3. Salafi-Jihadi Sieges Across the Sahel

Note: ISSP stands for IS Sahel Province.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data; Amnesty International.

The May 11 attacks will increase the risk of a coup against the embattled Burkinabe junta, which has turned to Russia, its neighbors, and Iran for regime support. Burkinabe junta leader Ibrahim Traoré returned from Moscow, Russia, on May 11, where he attended Russia’s Victory Day celebrations and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin.[15] The junta claimed to thwart a coup attempt in April, and major attacks similar to those on May 11 have helped incite coup attempts previously.[16] The French outlet Le Monde reported that the junta arrested members of elite Burkinabe units in connection with the coup plot, including members of Traoré’s protection force and elite Rapid Intervention Battalion brigades.[17] High-casualty and heavily publicized JNIM attacks in November 2021, September 2022, and June 2024 directly contributed to coup attempts in the subsequent weeks and months.[18] The optics of JNIM militants posing for pictures inside administrative buildings and the Djibo’s center roundabout will compound the fallout from the high casualties sustained in the attacks.[19]

The junta relies on Russia and its neighbors for regime support and has sought additional partners in Chad and Iran since the April coup. Russia and Mali sent reinforcements to the Burkinabe capital in the aftermath of the coup attempt in June 2024.[20] Le Monde reported that Traoré asked Chad to send 200 soldiers to reinforce his protection force after the latest coup attempt.[21] Russia also runs pro-Traoré information operations, which have bolstered Traoré’s image significantly in pan-Africanist circles worldwide despite the deteriorating security situation and increase in civilian deaths in Burkina Faso since he took power.[22] The Iranian law enforcement commander visited Burkina Faso as part of a multi-stop visit to Africa on May 6 to “share security expertise,” which was likely related to internal suppression tactics.[23]

The Burkinabe junta has failed to improve security in the country while deliberately increasing violence against civilians through a counterinsurgency strategy that has systematically encouraged state-sanctioned massacres of civilians. Traoré’s regime has killed record numbers of civilians each year since taking power.[24] 2025 is on pace to nearly equal 2024’s total of 980 civilians killed in operations involving state forces.[25] Many of these deaths are due to large-scale massacres of civilians with suspected links to insurgents, which is a war crime, and are often in retaliation for nearby insurgent attacks on security forces or civilian auxiliary militias.[26] Human Rights Watch published a new report on May 12 documenting an army-directed massacre of over 100 Fulani civilians in western Burkina Faso.[27] These tactics have been ineffective because the carnage feeds retaliatory cycles of violence against civilians, which fuel JNIM recruitment and allow JNIM to pose as avengers and protectors for targeted communities.[28]

Figure 4. Burkinabe State Forces Attacks on Civilians, 2022–25

Note: Attacks include all events with Burkinabe security forces as the primary or auxiliary actor. The current Burkinabe junta took power in October 2022.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Part of Traoré’s strategy has included mobilizing and arming poorly trained civilian auxiliaries with links to ethnically based violence. Traoré launched a campaign upon taking power in October 2022 to recruit 50,000 civilian auxiliaries to address the Burkinabe military’s inherent manpower shortages and stem the rapidly worsening insurgency.[29] Burkinabe authorities claimed over 90,000 Burkinabe enlisted, which marks an enormous expansion on preexisting efforts that began in 2020 to mobilize civilians under a formal auxiliary group called Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland, or Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie (VDP).[30] VDP members receive only two to three weeks of training before deploying and had already demonstrated a consistent pattern of ethnically motivated violence before Traoré took power.[31] The government built the initial VDP units on preexisting self-defense militias that had mobilized since the beginning of the Salafi-jihadi insurgency in Burkina Faso in 2015.[32] This recruitment strategy meant that units are mostly from sedentary communities and largely excluded Fulani, who are one of the most stigmatized and targeted ethnic groups in the region.[33]

VDP militias are increasingly participating in state-sanctioned violence against civilians. VDP militias are on pace to be involved in nearly double the instances of violence against civilians in 2025 that they were involved in in 2024. This trend is even more apparent in terms of fatalities: VDP is on pace to be involved in the same number of civilian deaths in 2025 as they were in 2023 and 2024 combined.[34]

Figure 5. VDP Attacks on Civilians, 2022–25

Note: Attacks include all events with VDP as the primary or auxiliary actor. The current Burkinabe junta took power in October 2022.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Traoré has systematically violated the political rights of Burkinabe citizens. Traoré broke promises to restore civilian rule, extended his hold on power for five years in July 2024, and gave himself the opportunity to run for president at the end of the term in 2029.[35] The Burkinabe junta has aggressively and systemically cracked down on opposition and political dissent since it took power in 2022 by adding prominent critics to terror lists and forcibly conscripting journalists and critics into military service.[36] The junta has also banned media outlets that publish unfavorable news.[37] Freedom House graded Burkina Faso a three out of 40 in the political rights category due to these repressive measures.[38]

Lake Chad

Author: Liam Karr.

IS West Africa Province (ISWAP) has overrun Nigerian security positions in northeastern Nigeria a dozen times since the beginning of March in its most successful offensive in years. ISWAP likely timed the start of the campaign to coincide with Ramadan during March, when it overran Nigerian security positions five times. The group has sustained the campaign, however, and overrun Nigerian forces four more times in April and three times so far in May.[39] The campaign has spread across ISWAP’s area of operations in northeastern Nigeria, but the group has concentrated attacks near its havens in the Alagarno forest in March, the Sambisa Forest and the Mandara Mountains in April, and closer to the Lake Chad Basin in May.

Figure 6. ISWAP Spring Offensive Overruns Nigerian Super Camps

Source: Liam Karr.

ISWAP’s offensive may culminate in the coming weeks with the onset of the rainy season and possible seasonal counterterrorism offensives. The rainy season in the Lake Chad Basin roughly stretches from June to October.[40] The rains flood insurgent support zones in the Lake Chad Basin and forests in northeastern Nigeria, forcing insurgents to relocate and ultimately decreasing attacks. The Nigerian army and regional forces typically increase operations in the spring before the rainy season begins as part of a “mow the grass” counterinsurgency approach.[41] These operations target and temporarily degrade the same insurgent support zones to contain an insurgency but do not sustain pressure or defeat the insurgents, enabling militants to return and rebuild.[42] The Nigerian chief of army staff relocated to northeastern Nigeria in early May.[43]

The offensive shows that ISWAP has adapted to the Nigerian government’s “super camp” and containment strategy. The Nigerian army consolidated its forces in “super camps” based in key population centers beginning in 2019. This strategy intends to concentrate soldiers in heavily fortified positions from which they can respond to reported insurgent activity but ceded large swaths of rural areas to insurgents.[44] Nigerian officials notably made this shift after a series of insurgent attacks that overran smaller posts in 2018. ISWAP has had newfound success attacking these super camps in 2025 by launching nighttime raids.[45] Militants have targeted bridges and roads between the camps—and launched diversionary attacks on nearby positions—to prevent reinforcements from reaching targeted bases.[46] ISWAP has also targeted resettled villages near these super camps, further undermining the population-centric component of the super camp strategy.[47]

ISWAP is strengthening as regional counterterrorism cooperation in the Lake Chad Basin is decreasing. ISWAP militants have seized weapons, ammunition, and other equipment before burning the bases. These raids have improved the armories of insurgent groups drastically in Lake Chad and across West Africa for years.[48] ISWAP in late 2024 began using drones to drop explosives—a tactic becoming more common across West Africa.[49] ISWAP explicitly declared that it had defeated the super camp strategy after a major attack in January 2025, prior to the latest offensive, and threatened to shift its focus to capturing major population centers in the near future.[50] ISWAP’s growing weapons stockpile would help enable such attacks.

Challenges to the regional counterterrorism force—the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)—are undermining regional security cooperation. The MNJTF consisted of the four countries bordering Lake Chad—Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria—and Benin. Niger withdrew from the MNJTF in March 2025, however.[51] Chad threatened to withdraw from the MNJTF in October 2024 after blaming the organization for failing to prevent a major insurgent attack in Chad.[52] The African Union and European Peace Fund help fund the MNJTF because the force has been one of the more successful African-led initiatives to contain Salafi-jihadi insurgent groups in Africa.[53] The MNJTF has been unable to defeat the Salafi-jihadi insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin due to weak structural commands, short-lived operations, and an underfunded civilian oversight committee that cannot exert authority.[54] The force has conducted regular “mowing the grass” offensives, however, which help contain the insurgency, decrease the total number of insurgent attacks, and return refugees and local business to some parts of the Lake Chad Basin.[55]

A strengthened ISWAP will bolster the IS global network, especially in West Africa, including external attack plotting. IS disseminates guidance and resources and coordinates external activity through its General Directorate of Provinces. The General Directorate of Provinces has regional offices that help coordinate this activity on the regional level.[56] ISWAP hosts the West Africa office, Maktab al Furqan, which oversees IS Sahel Province (ISSP) and ISWAP.[57] A strengthened ISWAP will give the office more space and resources to support ISSP and global IS activity.

IS has shown a clear intent to use its trans-Saharan networks to support attack cells in North Africa and Europe and support the movement of foreign fighters. Morocco’s General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance claimed in February 2025 that ISSP is making a concerted effort to “recruit, arm, and direct sympathizers to carry out attacks in Morocco.”[58] Moroccan police foiled two separate IS attack cells with direct ties to ISSP in January and February 2025.[59] At least one of these cells used a weapons cache in a remote area of the Morocco-Algeria border in the Sahara for supplies.[60] The United Nations reported in July 2023 that IS recruiters and facilitators in the Sahel had established transit corridors between southern Europe and the Sahel and established a thwarted attack cell that operated from Morocco and Spain.[61] Moroccan security forces also disrupted three IS cells that facilitated foreign fighters’ travel to ISSP in Mali between October 2023 and February 2024.[62] The presence of foreign fighters has led to an increase in Salafi-jihadi groups’ external attack plots historically, since foreign fighters are usually more hardened ideologues than local recruits and often aim to eventually return to their homeland to organize attacks.[63]

Figure 7. General Directorate of Provinces Organizational Chart

Source: Tore Hamming.

Figure 8. Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation Across West Africa

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Niger

Author: Liam Karr.

IS Sahel Province (ISSP) claimed its first attack along the western edge of the Niger-Nigeria border. ISSP fighters attacked several Nigerien positions in southwestern Niger’s Dosso region on May 4.[64] The attacks killed at least 10 soldiers and up to 37 soldiers, according to some accounts.[65] ISSP claimed the attack on May 8, marking its first claim in this area.[66] ISSP-linked militants known locally as “Lakurawa” have been active in this area of Niger and across the border in northwestern Nigeria since 2018, but ISSP had not officially claimed the subgroup’s activity.[67]

Figure 9. ISSP “Lakurawa” Supgroup Operationalizes Support Cells

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Lakurawa has historically operated primarily as an IS support network, but the group’s attack patterns in 2025 and the new ISSP claim signal that ISSP has operationalized this network. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data reported in 2024 that ISSP militants used the area stretching from the regional border area between Dosso, Tahoua, and Tillaberi in Niger down to Sokoto and Kebbi in Nigeria—Lakurawa’s area of operations—as a support zone and supply corridor.[68] The UN reported in 2024 that support cells in this area served as a bridge between ISSP and IS West Africa Province in the Lake Chad Basin.[69] This support function is reflected in the lack of kinetic IS activity in Lakurawa areas of operation in recent years. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data recorded more instances of IS movement than attacks in Dosso every year between 2022 and 2024.[70] The group has inverted this pattern in 2025, however, and is on pace to conduct more attacks in Niger in 2025 than it did from 2022 and 2024 combined.[71]

Figure 10. ISSP “Lakurawa” Subgroup Increases Activity in Niger

Notes: Fatalities include civilian, militant, and soldier fatalities from ISSP-initiated engagements (attacks). All ISSP activity from Niger’s Dosso region and Birni N’Konni department, Tahou region.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Figure 11. ISSP “Lakurawa” Subgroup Increases Activity in Nigeria

Notes: Fatalities include civilian, militant, and soldier fatalities from ISSP-initiated engagements (attacks). ISSP activity in northwestern Nigeria has gone underreported and almost certainly been misidentified as bandit or other criminal activity in recent years.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

IS could be operationalizing these support zones in response to increased counterterrorism pressure from Nigeria and Niger. Nigeria launched a counterterrorism campaign targeting Lakurawa in December 2024, shortly after Nigerian media sounded the alarm about increased Lakurawa infiltration in November.[72] Nigerian forces have continued conducting operations in 2025, albeit at a slower pace.[73] Nigerien forces have also carried out more operations in Dosso in 2025 than they did in the entirety of 2024.[74] IS and other Salafi-jihadi groups will sometimes avoid carrying out attacks or publicizing their links as a preventive measure to evade unnecessary counterterrorism pressure. The counterterrorism pressure on Lakurawa means that the group no longer benefits from this low-profile strategy, which may have led IS to operationalize and publicly acknowledge this subgroup. Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen similarly operationalized support cells in neighboring Benin and Togo in 2022, when it came under stronger counterinsurgency pressure.[75]

Figure 12. Security Forces Increase Pressure on ISSP “Lakurawa” Subgroup

Notes: ISSP activity in northwestern Nigeria has gone underreported and almost certainly been misidentified as bandit or other criminal activity in recent years.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Libya

Authors: Kathryn Tyson and Liam Karr.

Forces aligned with Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah—the leader of Libya’s western-based, UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU)—attacked rival militias in Tripoli.^[76] The 444th Brigade—a military unit under the GNU’s Ministry of Defense (MOD)—and other militias aligned with Dbeibah captured parts of central Tripoli from the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) on May 12.^[77] The SSA has links to the GNU’s Presidential Council and GNU Ministry of Interior (MOI).^[78] The fighting began during a meeting between SSA leader Abdel Ghani al Kikli and several militias and killed at least six people, including al Kikli and several of his bodyguards.^[79] Witnesses told Reuters that MOD-aligned militia fighters patrolled central Tripoli and the former SSA headquarters on May 13.^[80]

Dbeibah-aligned forces then attacked the Special Deterrence Force (Rada)—another Tripoli-based militia—later on May 13.^[81] Rada is an Islamist-leaning militia that operates under the nominal authority of the MOI, though in practice it functions with significant autonomy and is the last major Tripoli-based faction not aligned with Dbeibah.^[82] The 444th Brigade initially attempted to seize areas from Rada after Dbeibah issued a decree for Rada-affiliated forces to withdraw from their positions.^[83] Rada mobilized forces and counterattacked 444th Brigade, leading to prolonged clashes that eventually drew in other Dbeibah-aligned militias.^[84]

Figure 13. Area of Influence, November 2023

Source: Emaddedin Badi (Adam Hakan).

The MOD declared a unilateral ceasefire on May 14, but both sides have continued to mobilize forces, which could lead to heavy fighting in central Tripoli in the most dangerous scenario. The MOD deployed lightly armed police units to enforce the ceasefire on May 14.^[85] Heavy fighting has calmed, but sporadic clashes have continued.^[86] Dbeibah has reportedly contacted the United Arab Emirates, which has mediated between the Tripoli-based factions in recent years.

Rada-aligned militias from Warshefana, Zawiya, and Zintan have mobilized hundreds of vehicles and militiamen to support Rada.^[87] Rada’s outreach to these groups included proposals to replace Dbeibah altogether, according to Atlantic Council Nonresident Senior Fellow Emadeddin Badi, which would almost certainly lead to intensified civil war in Tripoli.^[88]

Dbeibah-aligned militias in Misrata declared general mobilization on May 14.^[89] The Misrata mobilizations were officially in response to alleged Libyan National Army (LNA) advances in eastern Libya, however. Multiple analysts believe that the LNA threat has prevented Misrata-based groups from moving toward Tripoli to support Dbeibah.^[90]

Dbeibah likely aims to seize control of key institutions and eliminate other challengers in Tripoli to consolidate control over the GNU. A UN-led process formed the GNU in 2021 to unify the country and lead it toward elections.^[91] The GNU has faced several challenges to its effectiveness and legitimacy from rival eastern authorities and the multitude of rival factions in the west since its inception, however. The GNU is heavily fragmented and empowers Tripoli-based militias by incorporating them into state institutions and funneling public money into the militias’ operations.^[92] Militia leaders’ positions within the government blur the line between state authority and nonstate armed groups and militarize Libyan politics.^[93] For example, Dbeibah framed the attacks on the SSA as ending “the era of parallel security institutions.”^[94] On the other side, Rada mobilized support on the pretense that Dbeibah’s move was an effort to install officials from Misrata and Zintan into key positions.^[95] Militias aligned with competing actors within the GNU have clashed dozens of times since 2021, including previous efforts by Dbeibah to oust rival groups.^[96]

The SSA has major influence over the Central Bank of Libya (CBL). The CBL controls all of Libya’s oil funds, which account for over 90 percent of government revenue, pays government salaries, and supports the GNU and LNA’s individual patronage networks.^[97] The SSA had controlled security around the CBL since 2024, and al Kikli had placed loyalists in key banking positions, enabling him to control cash transfers from the CBL.^[98] The SSA fled its positions around the CBL following the recent fighting, and Dbeibah issued a decree on May 13 that replaced an SSA ally with the MOI to head CBL security.^[99] Dbeibah has tried to gain control of the CBL for years and replaced the CBL head in August 2024, leading to a financial crisis.^[100]

The SSA and Rada also have key roles in other Libyan institutions. The SSA has controlled large swaths of Tripoli and has run prisons and occupied government ministries since 2021.^[101] Dbeibah replaced an SSA-linked entity overseeing illegal immigration and migrant detention in Libya on May 13 with a new department under the MOI.^[102] Rada controls key security infrastructure, including Mitiga Airport and an adjacent prison, giving the group substantial influence within western Libya.^[103]

The LNA—the GNU’s eastern-based rival, led by Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar—may be mobilizing its forces to capitalize on the infighting in Tripoli. Multiple sources have reported that LNA militias are massing forces in Sirte for a potential westward offensive.^[104] Flight tracking data shows that the LNA has flown three cargo flights from Benghazi to Sirte since May 5, compared with one cargo flight from the same airport in the rest of 2025.^[105] The LNA frequently turns off flight transponders to conceal flights between Sirte and Benghazi.^[106] Dbeibah-aligned militias in Misrata, which is roughly 150 miles west of Sirte along the Libyan coast, mobilized in response to alleged LNA movement from Sirte on May 14.^[107] The LNA mobilizations could aim to distract Dbeibah-aligned Misrata groups, however, to support Haftar-linked militias that are supporting Rada and keep Tripoli fragmented.^[108]

The GNU and LNA are appealing to outside actors to increase their international legitimacy and gain external support. Dbeibah is appealing to his Emirati backers for additional support amid the latest crisis. Jalel Harchaoui—an associate fellow with the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies—said on May 13 that Dbeibah’s nephew was in the United Arab Emirates to lobby for support.^[109] The United Arab Emirates began a rapprochement with the Dbeibah government in 2022 and has played a more prominent role in brokering conciliative meetings between the GNU and LNA after historically supporting the LNA.^[110] Turkey is the GNU’s most prominent military and political ally and has provided direct military assistance to the western-based government since at least 2019.^[111] Turkey maintains a permanent presence at strategic locations, such as al Watiya Air Base and the Misrata naval base, due to its strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean.^[112]

LNA leader Khalifa Haftar was in Moscow from May 8 to 10 prior to the crisis. Haftar discussed increasing security and military cooperation in separate meetings with Russian President Vladamir Putin, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, and Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu.^[113] Russia has been a major LNA partner for years to strengthen its influence around the Mediterranean Sea.^[114] The Kremlin provided troops and weaponry via the Wagner Group from 2018 to 2020 and has sent more men and matériel to eastern Libya since the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria, which threatens Russia’s Mediterranean standing.^[115] The United Arab Emirates has historically been one of Haftar’s most significant backers, providing financial assistance, weaponry, and direct air support, particularly between 2019 and 2020 during the LNA assault on Tripoli.^[116] Emirati leaders view Haftar as a bulwark against political Islam, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood.^[117]

Read more on how Libya fits into the Kremlin’s Mediterranean strategy after the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in “Africa File Special Edition: Syria’s Potential Impact on Russia’s Africa and Mediterranean Ambitions.”

Haftar’s sons met with Western officials in April, as the LNA continues to play the West and Russia against each other.^[118] The United States hosted the head of the LNA Ground Forces—Saddam Haftar—in April 2025 to hold talks, saying that a “prosperous Libya with strong technocratic institutions including the National Oil Corporation and Central Bank of Libya will be better able to do business with US companies.”^[119] The UK defense attaché met with Khaled Haftar, who is the chief of staff of LNA security units, in April to discuss border security, stability, and UK engagement efforts.^[120]