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Key Takeaways:

• Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Rwandan-backed M23 rebels launched an offensive in the eastern DRC that violates a Qatari-brokered ceasefire and undermines the US-backed peace framework. The offensive likely aims to gain more leverage after DRC-M23 peace talks stalled.
• Mali. The Malian junta claimed to thwart a coup, which is likely the result of ongoing power struggles within the junta. The coup could affect Mali’s security partnerships and will likely create further gaps for al Qaeda– and IS-affiliated insurgents to exploit.
• Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) launched another major assault to seize el Fasher, the besieged North Darfur state capital, likely to gain leverage before the potential resumption of US-led peace talks in September. The RSF is worsening the already dire humanitarian crisis in the town and continuing to commit war crimes, including likely crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and possible genocide, and will almost certainly commit these atrocities on an even larger scale if it captures el Fasher.
• Libya. Russia could be engineering another migrant crisis on the European Union’s eastern border using flights from eastern Libya to Belarus. Russia could use its positions in Libya and the Sahel to foment increased migration to the EU in multiple ways, even if it is not doing so currently.
• Niger. IS Sahel Province (ISSP) has escalated its attack campaign to quash civilian resistance and establish support zones in northwestern Niger. The Nigerien junta is expanding militias under the government in response to the surge in ISSP attacks, which will likely increase the communal mobilization and violence that ISSP has historically capitalized on to recruit.
• Somalia. African Union and Somali forces retook a key town in southern Somalia as part of a monthslong campaign to retake key villages that create a defensive buffer around Mogadishu.

Figure 1. Africa File, August 14, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Assessments:

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford

M23 launched an offensive against the Congolese army (FARDC) and allied pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters in South Kivu, violating the mid-July Qatari-brokered ceasefire. M23 retook control of several villages near Walungu town on August 7 and has clashed with FARDC-Wazalendo fighters for control of an area in Walungu district about 15 miles south of the town since August 9.^[1] Both sides have reportedly used heavy weaponry and reinforced their positions near the contested area since August 10.^[2] M23 reportedly aims to capture Nzibira, which is a Congolese army logistics hub 20 miles from Walungu town and gateway to the Shabunda district.^[3]

Figure 2. M23 Advances Southward in South Kivu Province

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

The offensive violates the Qatari-brokered July ceasefire. The DRC and M23 signed a preliminary peace agreement and ceasefire in mid-July as part of Qatari-mediated peace talks.^[4] The ceasefire provision prohibited new attacks or attempts to conquer new territory and committed both sides to “ensure that the ceasefire applies to all forces engaged in the conflict” in the eastern DRC.^[5]

M23 is likely using heavy weaponry and sophisticated military equipment in South Kivu that it seized from Goma in early 2025. Congolese media and government officials have claimed that M23 launched one-way attack drones against pro-Congolese government forces before conducting ground incursions using “armored tanks” as part of the Walungu offensive.^[6] Unconfirmed reports noted that M23 deployed light armored vehicles to the front line in South Kivu in July.^[7] M23 seized an arsenal of light and heavy weaponry and military vehicles and aircraft when it captured Goma in late January, including Soviet-era T-54/55 tanks, US-made BATT UMG armored personnel carriers, and possibly up to 20 Belarusian unmanned aerial vehicles—likely one-way attack drones, according to the open-source intelligence outlet Janes.^[8] M23 had previously used small quadcopter suicide drones in attacks against the FARDC that were relatively ineffective.^[9] M23 also seized truck-mounted rocket launchers and a Russian-made Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jet in Goma that pro-M23 sources claimed on social media M23 repaired and returned to service in early July.^[10]

M23 likely aims to gain more leverage after direct peace talks with the DRC government stalled. The preliminary Qatari-brokered peace agreement set a deadline to initiate by August 8 another round of negotiations to reach a final deal.^[11] The DRC and M23 remained at odds over the ceasefire’s long-term implementation and prisoner releases, however, which is a key confidence-building measure intended to create favorable dialogue conditions.^[12] The two sides did not dispatch representatives for the second stage and have reiterated their maximalist positions on prisoner releases since August 7.^[13] It remains unclear when and if negotiations will resume.

CTP previously forecast that M23 could relaunch its military campaign and conduct an offensive to gain leverage if talks stalled.^[14] M23 and Rwanda conducted several offensives in early 2025 to bolster their leverage in peace talks. Angolan-mediated peace talks with Rwanda collapsed after the DRC rejected Rwanda’s demand for the DRC to hold direct negotiations with M23 for the talks to continue in late 2024.^[15] Rwanda then provided “decisive” support—6,000 troops and advanced military technology—to back an M23 offensive in the first quarter of 2025 that ended in M23’s capture of Goma and Bukavu, the South Kivu provincial capital.^[16] M23 conducted a more limited offensive a few weeks later and captured the Walikale district capital in North Kivu to augment its leverage and force direct peace talks with the DRC in March.^[17]

Figure 3. M23 Advances in Eastern DRC

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

Both sides have reinforced their positions in North and South Kivu and traded accusations that each has violated the Qatari-brokered ceasefire and provoked military confrontation. The FARDC accused M23 of violating the Qatari-brokered ceasefire from July and threatened to retaliate. FARDC spokesperson Sylvain Ekenge said in an August 12 communiqué that M23 has perpetrated “almost daily attacks” on FARDC positions in North and South Kivu that violate the US-brokered and Qatari-brokered accords.^[18] Ekenge warned that the FARDC “reserves the right to respond appropriately” to M23’s aggression in the statement.^[19]

Figure 4. Tensions Rise in Eastern DRC

Source: Yale Ford.

M23 accused the FARDC of violating the ceasefire and building up troops in several areas in the Kivu provinces. M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka said that the FARDC has “continued its offensive military maneuvers aimed at full-scale war” and launched “systematic attacks on densely populated areas” in violation of the July ceasefire on August 11.^[20] Kanyuka claimed that the FARDC landed over 1,100 FARDC troops in Uvira town on August 10 and has repositioned a significant number of soldiers and military equipment into six strategic locations on the front lines in North and South Kivu.^[21] Kanyuka claimed separately on August 12 that the FARDC recently landed five Russian-made Antonov planes loaded with troops and military equipment in Walikale district.^[22] CTP assessed previously that M23 has used the pretext of FARDC buildups and civilian targeting to justify its advances and “eradicate the threat” despite ceasefires.^[23]

Both sides have steadily amassed forces on the front lines since early July. M23 moved troops to M23 military bases in Bukavu in South Kivu in early July.^[24] M23 began redeploying troops and heavy weaponry “en masse” as reinforcements from Bukavu and several villages in Kabare district along the RN2 in South Kivu to the frontlines in Walungu district and Uvira districts around August 10.[25] The FARDC has reportedly deployed thousands of troops and newly trained recruits to Uvira and Fizi districts in South Kivu, including about 30 miles south of Bukavu to Kamanyola, where the front lines with M23 have been frozen since March.^[26] CTP assessed on several occasions in early 2025 that M23, Rwanda, and pro-Congolese government forces will use any ceasefire and lull in fighting to reset militarily and set conditions for future offensives.^[27]

A complete breakdown of the ceasefire would undermine the US-brokered peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda. The US-brokered peace agreement mandates that the DRC and Rwanda “take all possible measures” to prevent nonstate armed groups from engaging in fighting and “not allow any military or hostile activities against each other on or from their respective territories or provide support for such activities abroad.”^[28] Both the FARDC and Rwandan forces have decreased direct involvement since March.^[29]

Military escalation in South Kivu could lead to renewed Rwandan military action in the eastern DRC. Rwandan President Paul Kagame implied after the two sides signed the US peace deal that Rwanda would continue to take unilateral military action in the eastern DRC if the DRC “plays tricks.”^[30] Kagame said that the US-brokered agreement and the Qatari-mediated talks between the DRC and M23 are “two sides of the same coin.”^[31] Kagame’s rhetoric sets conditions to justify renewed Rwandan engagement, especially given the front lines at Kamanyola are along the Rwandan border. M23’s early 2025 offensive in North and South Kivu involved direct Rwandan command and control over M23 and substantial Rwandan military support to the group, according to the UN.^[32]

Mali

Author: Liam Karr

An alleged coup plot in Mali is likely related to internal power struggles within the junta. Malian authorities have reportedly arrested at least 40 soldiers and three generals since August 7.^[33] General Abass Dembele—former governor of the Mopti region—and Air Force Brigadier General Nema Sagara were among the generals arrested.^[34] Nigeria-based open-source network Zagazola reported that security forces also detained the Chief of Staff of the National Guard, Brigadier General Famouke Camara.^[35] The Malian junta has yet to release a statement, but senior political and senior officials allege that the soldiers planned to stage a coup.^[36] Malian police arrested former prime minister Choguel Maïga on August 13, although no reports have linked him to the coup attempt.^[37] The junta appointed Maïga as prime minister in 2021 but removed him on 2024.[38]

The coup could be the result of internal rivalries within the junta. Several leading figures within the junta settled on current leader Assimi Goïta as the consensus presidential pick when the junta took power in 2021. However, the relationship between Goïta and Defense Minister Sadio Camara has deteriorated since 2024.[39] Several other leading figures in the junta—Malick Diaw, Ismaël Wagué, and Alou Boï Diarra—support Camara.[40] Goïta removed several of Camara’s allies from their administrative posts in January 2024 and has reportedly stopped consulting Camara on major decisions in the months since.[41]

The schism is reportedly related to a power struggle over future elections. Goïta wants to hold elections to give himself greater legitimacy and consolidate power, but Camara and his allies will not support Goïta and could use the elections to depose him.[42] Goïta sacked Maïga after Maïga criticized the slow transition to democracy and election postponements and then extended his tenure for five years in April 2025.[43]

Some reports claim that Goïta targeted officers aligned with Camara and his bloc as part of the crackdown. French state outlet Radio France Internationale reported that many arrested officers were from the national guard.[44] The national guard is a key support base for Camara, who began his career in the national guard.[45] Arrested National Guard Chief of Staff Famouke Camara has no relation Sadio Camara, but the two are close allies.[46] A former Argentinian diplomat reported that Wagué and intelligence head Modibo Kone—one of Goïta’s key senior allies in the junta—had an argument on August 11 over the crackdowns.[47]

The internal rivalry has already affected Mali’s security relationships, including its relationship with Russia, and the coup could further coup could impact these partnerships. Camara and Diarra were key to facilitating the Kremlin-funded Wagner Group’s deployment to Mali in 2022.[48] These ties led Goïta to lessen his reliance on Wagner as his rivalry with Camara’s camp grew.[49] French media reported that Goïta hired Turkish trainers to train special forces loyal to him to counter Camara’s Wagner ties.[50]

Goïta marginalizing Camara’s bloc further is unlikely to diminish Russian influence, however, given the growing relationship Goïta has established with the Kremlin. Goïta has supported the transition of Russian forces in Mali from Wagner Group to Africa Corps under the Russian Ministry of Defense since the effort began in June 2023.[51] Camara and Diarra were much more hesitant, however, because they feared losing the personal influence and protection that they enjoyed from their relationships with Wagner.[52] The transition to Russian state control and a more state-based partnership through Goïta favors the junta leader. Goïta has since visited Moscow and met with Putin in July 2023 as part of the Russia-Africa Summit and June 2025 as part of a bilateral working trip.[53]

The deteriorating security situation in Mali could have fomented a genuine coup plot. Several arrested officers fought together in the battle of Konna, where Malian and French forces ultimately repelled Islamist insurgents attempting to infiltrate central Mali in 2013.[54] These officers were part of various service branches, including the army, national guard, and air force. These backgrounds indicate that at least some alleged plotters were part of a human network that stretched across various branches of the military.

Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) strengthened across the country in recent months. The group carried out a wave of large-scale attacks across Burkina Faso and central and northern Mali in May and June. This campaign produced one of the deadliest periods in the Sahel in years, which CTP assessed at the time could degrade the morale of the armies and increase the risk of coup plots.[55] JNIM then proceeded to launch a series of attacks in western Mali in July, which had been largely unaffected by the insurgency until 2022. CTP previously assessed that the attacks further undermined the junta’s legitimacy by highlighting its growing strength in economically and politically sensitive areas.[56] A Malian sociologist told Agence France-Presse that the purge was due to discontent within the army, including some discontent over preferential treatment given to Russian soldiers.[57]

The unstable situation will likely create further gaps for JNIM and IS Sahel Province to exploit. Arrests are still ongoing, which will distract the junta and security forces from security operations. A former Argentinian diplomat also claimed that two Malian battalions loyal to one of the arrested generals from central Mali redeployed toward Bamako in a show of force and possible warning to the junta.[58]

Sudan

Authors: Liam Karr and Ellery White

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and allied groups repelled a major Rapid Support Forces (RSF) assault on multiple fronts around el Fasher, the besieged capital of North Darfur. The RSF began its latest attack on August 11 by shelling Abu Shouk refugee camp, before ground forces advanced from the east, north, and south.^[59] The army claimed it killed 245 fighters, including a high-ranking commander, and seized 34 combat vehicles as it repelled the attack.^[60] The fighting killed more than 40 civilians and wounded at least 19, according to local health organizations.^[61] The RSF launched additional artillery strikes in residential areas on August 12 that killed at least nine people and wounded 13.^[62] The coordinated assault marked the fiercest ground battle in weeks, breaking a monthlong period of relative calm—aside from artillery shelling—since the RSF’s last ground offensive on July 11.^[63]

Figure 5. RSF Assault in el Fasher

Source: Liam Karr.

The RSF likely aims to capture el Fasher before the potential resumption of US-led peace talks in September to gain more leverage. The United States planned to hold peace talks involving the regional actors involved in the Sudan civil war—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—in late July. US officials postponed the talks until at least September, however, after the UAE reportedly demanded a “last-minute amendment” to ban the SAF from a postwar transitional process in the planned joint statement, which Egypt—an SAF ally—rejected.^[64] The RSF has escalated their efforts in early August since talks were postponed. CTP has previously assessed that the RSF has intensified operations to capture several besieged SAF holdouts in Kordofan and neighboring Darfur in 2025 as part of a broader strategic effort to consolidate military and political control of the western half of the country and enforce a de facto partition.[65]

Figure 6. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War

Source: Liam Karr; Vista Maps; Thomas van Linge; Kathryn Tyson.

The RSF has used reinforcements from the Libyan border and central Sudan—partially with Emirati assistance—to support its latest offensive on el Fasher, which could signal that the group faces capacity challenges. RSF fighters and Colombian mercenaries who were initially based in the Libyan desert near al Kufra joined the offensive. The UAE has supported the creation of an RSF base in the area, which is controlled by the Emirati-backed Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army, to serve as a logistics hub.^[66] These reinforcements arrived at Zamzam refugee camp—nine miles south of the city—on August 3, joining a buildup of 543 combat vehicles that assembled weeks leading up to the offensive.^[67] The RSF-aligned Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) al Hilu faction sent at least fifty newly equipped vehicles from its South Kordofan base to Zamzam.^[68]

The arrival of new forces signals possible capacity challenges, which could force the offensive to culminate in the coming months. The SPLM-N al Hilu faction and Colombian mercenaries had not been involved in any engagements near el Fasher until the latest uptick in fighting in early August, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.^[69] Eyewitnesses also claim that the RSF has resorted to using child soldiers in its latest attacks.^[70]

Figure 7. Control of Terrain in Western Sudan

Source: Liam Karr; Vista Maps; Thomas van Linge; Kathryn Tyson.

The RSF offensive is worsening the already dire humanitarian crisis in el Fasher. The RSF’s siege has displaced 780,000 people, including 500,000 civilians uprooted during the RSF’s assault on Zamzam in April.^[71] Health officials first detected famine in Zamzam in August 2024 and Abu Shouk in December 2024.^[72] El Fasher is now officially facing starvation, as more than 60 people—primarily women and children—died from malnutrition in el Fasher in in early August.[73] Others are relying on animal fodder and food waste to survive.^[74] The UN reports that the RSF has blocked all exit routes from el Fasher, trapping at least 900,000 civilians in the town and surrounding refugee camps and blocking humanitarian assistance from entering the area.^[75] There have also been deadly cholera outbreak across western Sudan, with rainy season further worsening conditions and putting more than 640,000 children under the age of five at risk.^[76]

The RSF continues to commit war crimes, including likely crimes against humanity, as part of its offensive. International law defines crimes against humanity as specifically egregious crimes against civilians that violate human dignity, which include: murder, extermination, forcible deportation, torture, sexual violence, ethnic persecution, disappearance, and apartheid.^[77] RSF forces killed at least 15 civilians fleeing el Fasher on August 2 after prominent RSF-aligned leaders declared an active conflict zone and urged residents to evacuate.^[78] The use of child soldiers would violate the 1949 Geneva Conventions and subsequent international legal protocols.^[79] The RSF has systematically imposed famine conditions, attacked health infrastructure and personnel, and targeted the Abu Shouk with likely the goal of using the camp as a staging ground as it has with Zamzam.^[80]

The RSF will almost certainly carry out these crimes on an even larger scale, including the ethnic cleansing and possible genocide of tens of thousands of Sudanese civilians, if it captures el Fasher. The RSF capture of the Zamzam refugee camp in April, which the group now uses as a staging ground for its assault on el Fasher, included several crimes against humanity and serves as a preview of what the RSF capture of the town would look like. The Guardian published a report in August detailing the nearly 72-hour massacre of the hundreds of thousands of refugees who had lived in the camp.^[81] The many crimes detailed in the report include graphic depictions of widespread summary executions of civilians, including women and children, rape, and the intentional targeting of civilian infrastructure and medical facilities and personnel.^[82] Local committees investigating the attack say the death toll is at least 1,500 people and continues to rise, making it the second largest atrocity in the war.^[83]

The United Nations and other international observers have warned repeatedly that the RSF could perpetrate a genocide if it captures el Fasher.^[84] A UN Commission of Experts previously defined ethnic cleansing in the context of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as “rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area” and “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”^[85] Acts of ethnic cleansing may amount to constituent acts of genocide, which are defined as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.”^[86]

The RSF has repeatedly committed acts of ethnic cleansing and possible genocide as it captures areas in western Sudan. The group has demonstrated a pattern of genocidal violence throughout its history stretching back to the Janjaweed—the Darfur-based rebel groups behind the 2000s Darfur genocide that became the RSF.^[87] RSF militants have systematically targeted Zaghawa and other non-Arab ethnic groups around el Fasher, including the attack on Zamzam.^[88] The largest atrocity in the war occurred when the RSF captured el Geneina, the capital of West Darfur state. The group committed similar crimes as it did in Zamzam but on a much larger scale, killing up to 15,000 people.^[89] The violence included a “systematic” mass ethnic cleansing campaign, which the United States declared a genocide in January 2025, against the Massalit—another non-Arab ethnic group.^[90]

Libya

Author: Liam Karr

Increased flights from eastern Libya to Belarus could indicate a Russia-backed attempt to engineer a migrant crisis on the EU’s eastern border. European officials told The Telegraph that an increase in flights from Benghazi to Minsk in June and July suggested possible collusion to “facilitate a wave of illegal migration” into the European Union.[91] The Telegraph reported that there were four flights between the cities in June and four in July, compared to just two in May. The EU border patrol agency and numerous European officials warned in 2024 that Putin is attempting to foment greater refugee flows from Africa to destabilize Europe, influence elections, and undermine support for Ukraine.[92] The EU has not recorded a surge in illegal migration on its eastern border in 2025, however.

Russia has previously used Belarus to stage illegal migration waves into the EU. The Russian and Belarusian governments have surged refugees to the borders of Finland, Lithuania, and Poland since 2021.[93] Their tactics included luring refugees from the Middle East and Africa on flights to Europe based on false promises before dropping them at the border.[94]

CTP continues to assess that Russia could use its positions in Libya and the Sahel to increase migration to the EU in multiple ways, even if it is not doing so currently. Russia can use its growing influence and footprint in both areas to lure migrants to NATO’s borders directly. The Russia-aligned leaders in these countries have distanced themselves from the West, including on migration policy. For example, Russia’s partners in the Nigerien junta annulled an EU-backed migration law that aimed to stem these flows in December 2023, benefiting both allies but increasing migrant flows to North Africa and Europe.[95] Haftar’s eastern Libyan government rejected a meeting with an EU delegation that was visiting the country in July.[96]

Figure 8. Growing Russian Presence on Trans-Saharan Migration and Trafficking Routes

Note: Listed Wagner Group Facilities are now under Africa Corps control after Wagner’s formal transition to Africa Corps in Mali in June 2025.

Source: Liam Karr, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Norwegian Center for Global Analyses, Clingendael Institute.

Russia’s counterproductive security assistance in the Sahel also fuels migration indirectly. Russian mercenaries in the Sahel have contributed to a massive spike in human rights abuses since 2021, helping fuel record-high levels of trans-Saharan migration to Europe.[97] The Kremlin foments prolonged instability in theaters where it is active, such as Syria, Ukraine, and now the Sahel, which creates long-term refugee crises.[98] Russian personnel in Africa have contact with traffickers but lack the capacity to heavily impact and weaponize these sprawling and decentralized networks beyond continuing to feed the instability that lies at the root of migration.[99]

Niger

Authors: Miles Charles and Liam Karr

The Nigerien junta is expanding state-sponsored militias, which will likely increase the communal mobilization and violence that IS Sahel Province (ISSP) has historically capitalized on to recruit. Junta-supported pro-junta civil society organizations have created plans for state-supported civilian militias called the Garkouwar Kassa—Shields of the Fatherland.[100] Civilian volunteers will train in Niamey and deploy to conflict zones alongside Nigerien security forces.[101]

Militia mobilization helps boost manpower but has historically been counterproductive in Niger. ISSP exploited state-led communal mobilization programs to gain footholds in various parts of the Tillaberi region in the late 2010s, however.[102] This trend forced the Nigerien government at the time to cut back on support for militias and sponsor communal reconciliation programs.[103] These programs led to a decrease in ISSP activity throughout northern Tillaberi as the group was no longer able to recruit as effectively among ethnic minorities.

The Garkouwar Kassa resemble state-backed civilian militias in Burkina Faso, which have increased counterproductive communal mobilization and violence against civilians. Burkina Faso began formalizing pre-existing civilian militias under the Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie (VDP) in 2020.[104] The current junta then launched a campaign upon taking power in 2022 to increase the VDP by at least 50,000 recruits to stem the worsening insurgency and address the military’s manpower shortages.[105] This expansion and the junta’s use of the VDP alongside state forces have led to new records for civilian fatalities inflicted every year since 2023.[106] The VDP has disproportionately and indiscriminately targeted Fulani due to their ties to insurgent groups and the militias ethnic organization, which naturally excludes Fulani and pushes the VDP to become a driver of ethnic conflict.[107] The violence against Fulani enforces a self-fulfilling prophecy, in which the Fulani partner with the insurgents to protect themselves from indiscriminate state-sponsored violence that targets them regardless of their affiliations.[108]

The junta’s move is likely at least partially in response to ISSP’s escalating attack campaign against civilians and civilian militias in the Niger River Valley. ISSP claimed to kill 31 militia fighters in various towns in the Anzourou commune in the Tillaberi department on July 31, which would be one of its deadliest attacks on Nigerien militias in 2025.[109] ISSP claimed that the attack was in retaliation for the militias committing crimes against Muslim citizens.[110] No independent sources have confirmed the attack, but Armed Conflict & Location Event Data recorded that ISSP had killed 26 civilians in the same area on July 19.[111] The attack was 20 miles from Tillaberi, the regional capital, and 70 miles from Niamey. The group claimed to kill an additional 14 militia fighters in the Tillaberi department on July 23 and 24.[112]

Figure 9. ISSP Targets Civilians in the Niger River Valley

Note: Data are from Ayorou, Bankilare, Tera, and Tillaberi departments. Attacks include all acts of political violence and looting against civilians and communal militias.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The attacks are part of a broader ISSP campaign to quash civilian resistance and establish support zones in the Niger River Valley. The group has historically targeted civilians in the Niger River Valley to play on ethnic tensions between the nomadic Fulani ethnic group it recruits and other rival ethnic groups.[113] ISSP has increased the severity of these attacks every year since 2022. The group has attacked civilians and civilian militias in the Niger River Valley more in 2025 than the entirety of 2024 and is on pace to inflict nearly as many fatalities in 2025 as it did from 2022 to 2024 combined.[114]

Figure 10. ISSP Escalates Civilian Attacks in the Niger River Valley

Note: Data are from Ayorou, Bankilare, Tera, and Tillaberi departments, Tillaberi region, Niger. Attacks include all acts of political violence and looting against civilians and communal militias.

Source: Miles Charles; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

ISSP is particularly targeting areas around the N1 and N23 highways, likely to degrade lines of communication and isolate the northern Tillaberi region from Niamey. Over 70 percent of civilian attacks were within 15 miles of the N1 or N23 in 2025.[115] The N1 and N23 are the two road arteries of the Niger River Valley, connecting Ayerou, Tera, and Tillaberi—the three department heads and largest towns in the area—to Niamey. ISSP will be able to further pressure the capital and target hardened security positions along the major roadways with greater support zones in the valley. Insurgent groups typically target civilians as they attempt to establish support zones in a new area and develop the capability to more consistently and effectively target security forces.[116]

Somalia

Authors: Edie Tesfaye and Liam Karr

African Union (AU) and Somali forces retook Barire—a key town in southern Somalia—as part of a monthslong campaign to retake key villages that create a defensive buffer around Mogadishu. AU and Somali National Army (SNA) forces have attempted to dislodge al Shabaab from Barire since at least June and launched their most recent offensive against the group in late July.^[117] Al Shabaab put up fierce resistance and repelled multiple assaults using extensive trench warfare and multiple suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).^[118] Somali and Ugandan forces claimed to kill at least 100 al Shabaab militants during its latest attack, including key commanders.^[119] Al Shabaab killed at least 17 AU soldiers.^[120]

The operation is part of a joint AU-Somali counteroffensive to “recapture the previously lost forward operating bases” in Lower Shabelle region.^[121] Al Shabaab captured several operationally key towns—Anole, Awdheegle, Barire, and Sabiid—in March 2025.[122] AU and SNA forces captured Sabiid and Anole on June 22, following heavy fighting with al Shabaab.^[123] Al Shabaab recaptured both towns on July 21 following complex attacks involving suicide VBIEDs, although AU and SNA forces have continued to contest the area.^[124] Unspecified security officials told Somali media that security forces plan to shift their attention toward Awdheegle.^[125]

Figure 11. Battle for the Mogadishu Outskirts

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

These towns are crucial for Somali forces to defend Mogadishu from al Shabaab VBIEDs.^[126] All the towns are in the Afgoi district—effectively the Mogadishu suburbs, within 30 miles of the Mogadishu administrative limits—along one of the two main roads that lead to Mogadishu via Afgoi town. These towns have key bridges over the Shabelle River that link the al Shabaab–controlled areas of southern Somalia to the main road and, therefore, Mogadishu.^[127] Control of the bridges creates a buffer zone and also contains al Shabaab north of the Shabelle River.^[128]

Africa File Data Cutoff: August 14, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.