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Contributors: Miles Charles and Edlawit Tesfaye

Key Takeaways:

• Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured several areas in far northwestern Sudan near the Sudan-Egypt-Libya tri-border area, likely to strengthen its supply lines. The Sudanese Armed Forces accused the Libyan National Army (LNA) and the United Arab Emirates, which backs both the RSF and the LNA, of supporting RSF operations and threatened to retaliate, further heightening the risk of regional spillover.
• Gulf of Guinea. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) has likely operationalized rear support zones in northwestern Nigeria, which it has used to open a second front in Benin and could use to support attacks in Nigeria. Increased coordination among Benin, Niger, and international partners would help degrade the enclave.
• Sahel. Foreign companies in the Sahel are under growing pressure from both JNIM and the Sahelian juntas. JNIM has launched a campaign against foreign work sites to likely extort foreign companies and undermine the legitimacy of the Malian government. Meanwhile, the juntas are continuing their campaign to forcibly gain greater ownership over the countries’ natural resources, which has created difficulties for Western companies and opportunities for Russia.
• Mali. Recent Tuareg rebel attacks in northern Mali and government-backed negotiations with JNIM in central Mali further highlight the failures and ineffectiveness of Russian forces.
• Somalia. Somali and African Union forces launched a counteroffensive to retake key towns south of Mogadishu from al Shabaab, aiming to secure routes into Mogadishu and disrupt the group’s ability to stage attacks on the capital.

Assessments:

Sudan

Author: Kathryn Tyson

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured a key border area between Egypt, Libya, and Sudan on June 10 that the RSF will likely use to strengthen its supply lines.[1] The RSF claimed that it captured the tri-border region on June 11, and the SAF retreated from the area toward the south on the same day.[2] The RSF also captured the small village Karb al Toum, approximately 32 miles east of the Libya-Sudan border, on June 16.[3]

The RSF likely aims to strengthen an already existing logistic route into western Sudan via Libya. The RSF has used the tri-border region to smuggle fuel, ammunition, and vehicles to its forces in Sudan.[4] The Libyan National Army (LNA) has sent convoys and at least one plane to stock the RSF with military supplies since the civil war began in April 2023. [5] The UN reported in January 2024 that an LNA-aligned militia in the area has built on preexisting smuggling ties and supplied the RSF with fuel, vehicles, and ammunition.[6] The previous use of these routes and harsh desert terrain may limit the tangible impact of greater RSF control over the border area, however.

The RSF may attempt to push south toward a Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) position in al Atrun, North Darfur, which serves as a pressure point the SAF can use against the RSF’s smuggling routes.[7] The RSF could attempt to connect a supply line from the Libyan border to its main strongholds in western Sudan, but the RSF would struggle to defend the over 400-mile, predominantly Saharan supply line.

The RSF may be trying to establish greater control over this Libya logistics route due to increased constraints with other Emirati-backed supply hubs in Chad and Sudan. The Chadian regime agreed to allow the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—the RSF’s primary sponsor—to use Amadjrasss airport in eastern Chad to support the RSF in exchange for financial aid.[8] Chadian president Mahamat Déby has faced growing internal pressure for this decision, however, as many of Chad’s military and political elite are from the border area and view the RSF as a threat due to long-running cross-border violence.[9] Egyptian media reported in June 2025 that Chadian generals have pressured the Chadian president to stop using eastern Chad to supply the RSF.[10] The SAF has separately increased air and drone strikes on Nyala airport in western Sudan since May 2025, damaging the airport.[11] The SAF launched the attacks in response to RSF drone strikes on the SAF’s main base in Port Sudan in May 2025.[12]

The RSF’s offensive aligns with an increase in Emirati cargo flights to southeastern Libya. Publicly available flight tracking data showed the first cargo flights between the UAE and Kufra—approximately 195 miles from the Sudanese border in southeastern Libya—in May 2025, and flights to Kufra have continued through June.[13] The UAE cargo flight activity increased as the RSF was reportedly consolidating forces in southwestern Libya.[14]

Figure 1. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War

Source: Kathryn Tyson

Figure 2. RSF Supply Lines into Darfur from Neighboring Countries

Source: Kathryn Tyson

The LNA may have supported the RSF attack, which would mark the first direct LNA involvement in the Sudan conflict.[15] The SAF accused the LNA of participating in the RSF attack on SAF positions in the tri-border region.[16] The LNA dismissed the SAF’s claims and accused the SAF of attacking LNA patrols.[17] CTP cannot independently verify these claims, but LNA-linked militias are active in the area, conduct border security operations along the Libya-Sudan border, and have supported the RSF previously through various smuggling activities.[18] The SAF-aligned Joint Forces clashed with the LNA-aligned Subul al Salam Brigade and claimed to capture an “LNA convoy” in the tri-border region on June 6.[19] The UN reported in January 2024 that the RSF has coordinated with Subul al Salam and that the militia provided key logistic support for the RSF.[20]

The tensions between the SAF and several regional Emirati partners, including the LNA, risk further regionalizing the conflict. The SAF said that the LNA committed “blatant aggression against Sudan, its land, and its people” and that the SAF would defend itself “no matter the extent of the . . . aggression.”[21] The UAE is active in Libya and has backed the LNA during the Libyan civil war, particularly from 2019 to 2020.[22] The SAF similarly threatened in March 2025 to attack bases near the Sudanese border in eastern Chad that the RSF has used to receive weapons shipments from the UAE.[23] The SAF cut diplomatic ties with the UAE in May 2025 following an RSF drone attack campaign targeting Port Sudan, which the SAF accused the UAE of backing.[24]

Gulf of Guinea

Author: Liam Karr

Contributor: Miles Charles

Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) has likely operationalized rear support cells in northwestern Nigeria to open a second front in Benin. JNIM attacked a Beninese outpost in Basso, 3 miles from the Nigerian border in the Borgou department, on June 12.[25] JNIM claimed to take control of and loot the outpost.[26] The attack is JNIM’s second claimed attack in Borgou in 2025 and the furthest south in Benin that CTP has located a claimed JNIM attack.[27] Basso is 134 miles south of the Benin–Burkina Faso–Niger tri-border, where JNIM’s primary areas of operation in and around the Park W complex emanate from. The attack’s proximity to the border and distance from JNIM’s primary area of operations near the Park W complex indicate that the attackers likely came from Nigeria.

Figure 3. Salafi-Jihadi Militants Infiltrate Northwestern Nigeria

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data; Clingendael Institute.

JNIM militants based in the Kainji reserve in Nigeria likely carried out the attack. JNIM has likely established a presence in the Kainji area since 2021. Multiple researchers have noted that Francophone militants have crossed into the Kainji area and other parts of north-central and northwestern Nigeria from Benin in recent years.[28] The Dutch research institute Clingendael reported in June 2024 that the militants in Kainji contributed to an increase in bandit-related incidents along the Benin-Nigeria border.[29] These characteristics suggest links to JNIM, given that it is the dominant group in Benin and is based in Francophone countries.

CTP and others have noted previously that JNIM is likely one of many Salafi-jihadi groups who use the Kaniji reserve as a sanctuary, however.[30] Other actors include regional IS affiliates, Boko Haram offshoot Darul Salam, and al Qaeda’s small Nigerian associate Ansaru. The various militants in the area likely have fluid ties to multiple factions.[31]

JNIM could use these support zones to support attacks in Nigeria. JNIM’s presence in the Kainji area is an attack risk for Nigeria, especially given the likely fluid relationships among JNIM-linked militants and other, more Nigerian-focused groups in the Kainji area. IS West Africa Province (ISWAP) in 2022 was behind an attack on the Wawa prison cantonment, which is within 20 miles of Kainji Lake. Researchers believe that militants with links to Ansaru, Darul Salam, and non-jihadist bandit factions played various roles in the attack, highlighting how these various factions can combine resources to carry out attacks in Nigeria.[32] Darul Salam has entrenched itself more visibly since 2024 in the Kainji reserve, where locals claim it enforces taxes, forced labor, roadblocks, and aspects of shari’a law.[33] Darul Salam is an attack threat to Nigeria and has been linked to multiple high-profile attacks closer to central Nigeria in recent years.[34] JNIM noted Basso’s proximity to Nigeria in its attack claim, which indicates the propaganda value the group believes it can gain from its own activity near and in Nigeria.

JNIM will likely lash out against Nigerian forces if the group comes under counterinsurgency pressure, as Salafi-jihadi groups have repeatedly conducted more attacks when facing increased counterinsurgency activity. CTP has assessed previously that IS Sahel Province has operationalized a nearby subgroup based on the western edge of the Niger-Nigeria border in 2025 in response to increased counterterrorism pressure on both sides of the border.[35] JNIM initially operationalized what had been support cells in neighboring Benin and Togo in 2022, when it came under stronger counterinsurgency pressure.[36]

Benin and Nigeria may have more success cooperating on border security than either country has had with their Sahelian neighbors. Cross-border military cooperation between the littoral and Sahel states has decreased since the coups in Burkina Faso and Niger in 2022 and 2023, respectively.[37] Nigerien officials falsely accused both Benin and Nigeria of deliberately harboring and supporting insurgents to undermine Niger.[38] Burkina Faso and Niger have additionally withdrawn from several regional bodies in recent years, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Sahel G5 Force, and Multinational Joint Task Force.[39] UN officials have warned repeatedly that decreased coordination has created gaps for insurgents to exploit.[40]

Benin and Nigeria, comparatively, remain in many coordination platforms, although these platforms have not been used effectively in recent years. ECOWAS has intensified efforts to create a joint counterterrorism force, but ECOWAS’s counterterrorism efforts have fallen short of stated goals due to political divisions and member states prioritizing national initiatives over regional funding.[41] Benin was a founding member of the Accra Initiative, which aims to combat the spread of the Salafi-jihadi insurgency in West Africa, and Nigeria joined as an observer in April 2022. The Accra Initiative explicitly focuses on intelligence sharing and joint security operations, although the body has faced many of the same limiting factors as ECOWAS.[42] These platforms—as well as coordinated non-kinetic efforts that protect local livelihoods premised on the reserve complex—are critical to stabilizing the border.[43]

Sahel

Author: Liam Karr

Contributor: Miles Charles

JNIM has likely launched an attack campaign against foreign companies in Mali. JNIM has attacked foreign worksites two times in June and threatened that all companies operating in Mali must secure permission from JNIM to continue operations on June 7, 2025.[44] JNIM kidnapped an Iranian national who worked for a Turkish mining company on June 6.[45] JNIM then attacked a Chinese-owned mining site in the Koulikoro region on June 12.[46] JNIM had only attacked foreign companies in 2025 two other times, when it attacked Chinese-owned mines in May 2025.[47]

The attack campaign could allow JNIM to effectively set up racketeering networks that will extort foreign companies and undermine the legitimacy of the Malian government. JNIM has kidnapped foreigners historically to sell hostages to their home governments for ransom. JNIM may also attempt to force businesses to pay a bribe, or “taxes,” for protection from JNIM attacks. JNIM uses these mafia-like tactics to extort zakat from civilians across the Sahel. The campaign poses a political challenge to state authority and is an economic threat to the Malian government that could undermine lucrative foreign investments.

Figure 4. JNIM Attacks Foreign Mining Companies in Mali

Source: Liam Karr.

Foreign companies face additional ownership challenges from the Sahelian juntas. The Burkinabe and Malian juntas have taken control of several gold mines in June as they continue their sovereigntist campaign to extract more revenue from their countries’ mineral resources. The Burkinabe government announced on June 11 that the Burkinabe state-owned mining company had taken control of five gold mining assets—two mines and three exploration licenses—held by multinational mining companies Endeavour and Lilium.[48] Endavour had tried to sell its assets to Lillium, but the two companies had been entangled in a legal dispute over the sale and agreed in August 2024 to transfer the assets to the Burkinabe government.[49]

A Malian court on June 16 placed the Loulo-Gounkoto gold complex under state provisional administration for at least six months following a yearlong dispute between Canadian company Barrick Mining and the Malian junta.[50] A former Malian minister will oversee management of the complex and participate in continued negotiations with Barrick on behalf of the Malian courts.[51] The Malian junta and Barrick have been in a dispute since they failed to agree on a restructured contract after Mali reformed its mining code in 2023 to secure a bigger share of mining revenue.[52] Mali attempted to pressure Barrick to comply with the new tax code by arresting senior-level Malian employees in September 2024 and issuing an arrest warrant for Barrick’s CEO in December 2024.[53] Barrick suspended operations at Loulo-Gounkoto, which accounts for nearly a third of Mali’s gold output and was projected to generate $1 billion over the next year, in January after Malian authorities detained employees, blocked gold shipments, and seized over $200 million worth of Barrick Gold stockpiles for noncompliance with Mali’s new tax code.[54]

Burkinabe and Malian authorities have framed their efforts as part of their pro-sovereignty agenda. Malian officials said the 2023 tax code allowed “gold to shine for Malians” and aimed to return mineral riches to Malians.[55] The Burkinabe decree announcing state control of the Endavour and Lilium assets framed the acquisition as “in line with the state’s policy of sovereign ownership of mining resources to optimize exploitation for the benefit of the population.”[56]

The juntas’ campaign comes at the expense of established mining companies in the Sahel, which are predominantly Western, and creates opportunities for Russian mining companies to enter the Sahel. Mining industry experts have warned that these measures increased financial difficulties for affected Western mining companies and could lead companies to withdraw from Mali.[57] Several smaller mining companies have restructured their contracts, however, and most companies have remained in the Sahel to try and protect the hundreds of millions of dollars that they have invested in their mines.[58] Mali and Niger have also reprimanded China for its unfair employment and mining practices, showing the campaign is not exclusively anti-Western.[59]

Russia has positioned itself to capitalize on newly available mining assets. Russia had lobbied Mali to evict Western gold mining companies, including Barrick and other companies that the junta has targeted, and reallocate Western-owned contracts to Russian companies since the arrival of the Wagner Group in 2021.[60] The French magazine Jeune Afrique cited anonymous Malian sources who claimed that Mali’s new tax code and escalatory actions against Barrick are explicitly part of a joint campaign with Russia to gain control of lucrative Western-owned mines.[61] Russian companies secured access to formerly French-owned uranium assets in Niger and a new gold deposit in Burkina Faso in the last year.[62] Mali and Russia also began construction of a new gold refinery, which will allow Mali to refine more gold domestically to keep more profits in the country.[63]

Mali

Author: Liam Karr

Contributor: Miles Charles

Tuareg rebels have inflicted two high-publicity blows to the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps in the first week since the Wagner Group completed its withdrawal from Mali. Tuareg separatist rebels in the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA) ambushed a Malian-Russian convoy near Aguelhok, in northern Mali’s Kidal region, on June 13.^[64] The FLA killed several Russian Ministry of Defense–backed Africa Corps troops, dozens of Malian soldiers, and destroyed 21 vehicles.^[65] The FLA then shot down the Africa Corps’ only Su-24 jet in Mali, which tried to launch a retaliatory airstrike, on June 14.^[66] The two setbacks came nearly a week after the Wagner Group announced its withdrawal from Mali on June 6. The Africa Corps has subsumed Wagner’s operations in Mali and elsewhere since 2023 as part of the Kremlin’s effort to centralize control of volunteer companies like the Wagner Group.[67]

High-profile Africa Corps losses risk damaging the Kremlin’s prestige, global perception, and domestic support. The Kremlin used Wagner’s status as a private military company to gloss over military setbacks suffered in Africa and pass them off as Wagner failures—not Russian failures—despite directly funding and supporting Wagner’s operations.[68] CTP has assessed previously that the Russian Ministry of Defense’s takeover of operations in Mali means that the Kremlin will be more overtly responsible for Russian casualties and failures.[69] This reality means that tactical defeats and high casualties risk undermining domestic support and Russia’s global perception as a capable and effective partner force.

The Malian government, meanwhile, has supported an increasing number of local negotiations with JNIM in central Mali in 2025 despite Russia’s efforts to clear JNIM from the region since 2022. The Malian government is reportedly supporting negotiations in Diafarabé, in central Mali’s Mopti region. French investigative magazine Jeune Afrique reported on June 12 that the government supported local outreach after JNIM kidnapped several local leaders on June 9.[70]

The negotiations follow an escalation in violence since March 2025 between JNIM and security forces in the area, which has impacted the locals disproportionately. JNIM’s agreement with several nearby villages collapsed in early March, which led to an increase in clashes between JNIM and local Dozo militias as JNIM tried to coerce these communities to demobilize again.[71] The group carried out as many attacks in the Djenne and Tenenkou cercles in March–May 2025 as it did in the entirety of 2024.[72] The Malian army and Dozo militiamen killed 26 Fulani civilians on May 12 in retaliation.[73] JNIM then attacked a Malian army camp in mid-May in revenge—killing 40 soldiers—and imposed a siege on Diafarabéand nearby Nouhon-Peuhl on May 26.[74]

Negotiations with JNIM in central Mali may be allowing JNIM to focus resources on Burkina Faso. JNIM has already cultivated the same number of local agreements in central Mali in 2025 as it did in the entirety of 2024.[75] These developments have likely contributed to a decrease in JNIM attacks and Malian counterterrorism activity on the Malian side of the border in the Mopti region, while attacks and counterterrorism activity have increased in Burkina Faso.[76] Multiple JNIM subgroups have participated in large-scale attacks in northern Burkina Faso in 2025, which would likely involve JNIM militants moving across the border.[77]

The spread of local negotiations in central Mali highlights the ineffectiveness of Russian forces in the area. Russian forces have been active in central Mali since 2022 and have conducted frequent and brutal counterinsurgency operations, including indiscriminate and collective violence against civilians.[78] Nearly half—44 percent—of activity in Mali involving Russian forces since 2022 has occurred in central Mali.[79] The Malian government’s acquiescence to negotiations across several parts of central Mali, however, shows that Russian operations have not slowed JNIM from increasing its control in the region.

Figure 5. JNIM Local Negotiations in Central Mali

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Somalia

Author: Kathryn Tyson

Contributor: Edlawit Tesfaye

Somali security forces launched a new counteroffensive against al Shabaab in southern Somalia to relieve pressure on the outskirts and roads surrounding Mogadishu. Ugandan troops from the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and Somalia National Army (SNA) soldiers launched the operation to “recapture the previously lost forward operating bases of Sabiid Anole, Awdheegle and Bariire” in Lower Shabelle region.[80] The offensive comes after al Shabaab captured these operationally key towns in March 2025.[81]

The targeted towns in Lower Shabelle are crucial for Somali forces to defend Mogadishu from al Shabaab vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).[82] All the towns are in the Afgoi district—effectively the Mogadishu suburbs, within 30 miles of the Mogadishu administrative limits—along one of the two main roads that lead to Mogadishu via Afgoi town. These towns have key bridges over the Shabelle River that link the al Shabaab–controlled areas of southern Somalia to the main road and, therefore, Mogadishu.[83]

Figure 6. Al Shabaab Area of Operations

Source: Kathryn Tyson

Figure 7. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations in Lower Shabelle

Source: Kathryn Tyson

Al Shabaab has strongly resisted the offensive thus far. Al Shabaab destroyed the Bariire bridge on June 16 after Somali government forces and AUSSOM troops attempted to retake three bridges seized by al Shabaab in March 2025.[84] Al Shabaab has also dug trenches to defend against Somali advances.[85] SNA and AUSSOM forces have engaged al Shabaab in at least eight armed clashes in Bariire, Sabiid, and Aw Degeele since May 2025.[86] Unspecified local witnesses reported that al Shabaab was regrouping in Sabiid on June 11.[87]

Al Shabaab will likely use its recent territorial gains to increase pressure on Mogadishu through asymmetric and symbolic attacks. The group has separately made major gains north of Mogadishu in central Somalia in 2025 that have relinked its support zones in central and southern Somalia and strengthened its presence along the roads between central Somalia and Mogadishu.[88] The group can move suicide bombers and VBIEDs into the capital using these roads and areas, conduct other high-profile attacks, and disrupt the city’s political and economic life. Al Shabaab has continued targeting sensitive areas like Villa Somalia and the airport’s embassy compound despite an overall decline in VBIED attacks after the Somali Federal Government’s (SFG) campaign in Somalia ended in 2023.[89] The group has historically used its presence in the outskirts—particularly in the Afgoi district—to conduct shadow governance, including taxation and judicial functions.[90] These activities enable al Shabaab to erode the SFG’s legitimacy and potentially replicate siege tactics used by other jihadist groups to destabilize governments through economic disruption.

Africa File Data Cutoff: June 18, 2025, at 3 p.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.