JNIM Imposes Shari’a via Blockade; Burundi Hedges in the Eastern DRC: Africa File, October 23, 2025

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Contributors: Femi Omotayo, Anping Zhu, Alexandria Johnson, and Chris Dayton

Key Takeaways:

• Mali. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) has expanded the objectives of its ongoing blockade to overtly establish itself as a legitimate governing power in central and southern Mali. The Malian junta’s inability to ease the blockade is causing unrest and eroding support for the government in politically sensitive parts of the country.
• Burundi. The Burundian president recently received a Rwandan-backed M23 rebel delegation to discuss a possible nonaggression pact, signaling that the two sides are seeking to deconflict as M23 sets conditions to launch an offensive along the Congolese border. Burundi deconflicted with Rwanda in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in early 2025 and is likely trying to do so again to avoid a wider regional war.
• Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are attacking on two fronts in western Sudan to eliminate the final Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) strongholds and move toward a partition of Sudan. The US is increasing diplomatic efforts to end the war, but the United Arab Emirates–supported RSF offensive and continued reluctance from the SAF will likely obstruct progress.
• Mozambique. IS Mozambique Province (ISMP) targeted several major district capitals in northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province as part of its most significant attack campaign since late 2022. ISMP likely aims to undermine the Mozambican government’s authority, and its campaign may be tied loosely to efforts to resume Western- and US-backed natural gas projects in Cabo Delgado.
• Cameroon. Official preliminary results in Cameroon’s recent presidential elections have seven-time incumbent Paul Biya beating opposition candidate Issa Tchiroma Bakary. Political unrest will likely worsen if the election results are upheld, as has occurred in past contested elections.

Figure 1. Africa File, October 23, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Mali

Author: Miles Charles with Femi Omotayo and Liam Karr

Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) has expanded the objectives of its blockade to include several shari’a-based governance measures across central and southern Mali. A JNIM spokesperson announced on October 17 that its blockade on the southern half of Mali would continue until the junta fell or agreed to apply shari’a law nationwide.[1] The declaration accompanied a decree on public transportation requiring women to veil themselves and sit separately from men and prohibiting transportation companies from collaborating with security forces.[2] The group has since whipped unveiled women or forced them to disembark at checkpoints.[3]

JNIM is seeking to negotiate with the junta as an equal, moving it toward de jure legitimization. The junta has backed limited negotiations between JNIM and local leaders since early 2025.[4] RFI reported on October 10 that JNIM was demanding a single, formalized negotiation channel with the Malian junta, however.[5]

JNIM has likely opportunistically diverged from its original objectives due to its success in sustaining the blockade. JNIM started its blockade to coerce the junta into lifting its ban on fuel sales in rural villages across Mali.[6] The fuel smuggling corridors that run through these villages were critical to JNIM’s military operations and efforts to control local economic activity in Mali. The corridors stretch from Mauritania to Nigeria and involve an informal network of independent smugglers.[7] JNIM exploits these networks across the Sahel by taxing smugglers, securing unregulated supply chains, and building legitimacy among the communities in which it operates.

JNIM has continued carrying out large-scale ambushes on fuel convoys, despite land and air escorts, contributing to widespread fuel shortages, inflation, and power outages. JNIM has burned nearly 250 tankers since the start of its blockade on September 7, with its latest attack on October 17 destroying nearly 50 tankers.[8] The attacks have almost entirely stopped fuel from entering the country, with several hundred tankers believed to be stuck along the Ivorian border.[9] The fuel crisis has also affected the country’s diesel supply, with supplies dwindling.[10] A convoy of 300 tankers arrived in Bamako on October 7; however, citizens still wait hours in line, often overnight, as fuel prices remain three times the state limit and blackouts continue to spread.[11] The situation is worse in other parts of the country, with major towns such as Mopti left without power for two weeks.[12]

Figure 2. JNIM Besieges Southern Mali

Source: Liam Karr, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

The Malian junta’s inability to ease the blockade is heightening public tensions. The prime minister convened an Interministerial Committee for Crisis and Disaster Management to approve a plan to stabilize the petroleum market on October 14.[13] He then met with a delegation from the Malian Grouping of Petroleum Professionals the following week.[14] The junta also appointed a new army chief of staff and deputy chief of staff.[15]

The fuel crisis has degraded relations between the junta, citizens, and the fuel sector. The Minister of Industry accused private operators of having total responsibility for the fuel crisis on October 14.[16] A member of the Malian National Transitional Council again accused tankers of colluding with JNIM the following week.[17] The SYNACOR truckers’ union announced it would suspend operations in response.[18] Operations resumed on October 20, following a public apology.[19] Representatives of the Segou youth published a video demanding Malian authorities resupply the city on October 19.[20] The US embassy in Mali released a security alert on October 23 warning about the “potential” for unpredictable disruptions in Mali’s security situation and urging American citizens to avoid demonstrations and be cautious around large gatherings or protests.[21]

Burundi

Author: Yale Ford with Anping Zhu

Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye recently received a Rwandan-backed M23 rebel delegation to discuss a possible nonaggression pact in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported that Ndayishimiye received the delegation in a “discreet visit” to Bujumbura, Burundi’s economic capital, about 16 miles east from Uvira town in South Kivu, in early October.^[22] The outlet said that M23 is trying to take advantage of disagreements among top Burundian government and army officials over continued military support to the DRC to pull Burundi away from its alliance with the Congolese government and into a nonaggression pact.^[23] The outlet did not give any specific stipulations of a potential pact.

The Bujumbura meeting signals that the two sides are seeking to deconflict as M23 sets conditions to attack Uvira on the Burundi-DRC border. Burundi has been the Congolese army’s (FARDC’s) most important ally against M23, particularly in South Kivu. The Burundian army (FDNB) has filled vital security gaps and been the main force able to check M23 and M23-aligned rebel militia advances in South Kivu through ground operations and drone strikes. Bujumbura has been the staging ground for FDNB-FARDC military operations against M23 in South Kivu for months.^[24] The FDNB has faced defections and heavy losses against M23, however, which has worsened troop morale and concerns about the long-term viability of its partnership with the DRC in 2025.^[25]

M23 is setting conditions to attack Uvira and likely wants to avoid heavy casualties in a fight with Burundian forces. Senior M23 officials in South Kivu told locals on the frontline in early October that M23 aims to capture Uvira soon.^[26] Africa Intelligence reported that M23 wants Burundi to deny refuge to pro-Congolese government militia fighters and Hutu extremists who would likely try to flee to Burundi in an offensive on Uvira.^[27] The FDNB had about four battalions deployed in and around Uvira in the surrounding mountains and ten battalions—up to 6,500 troops—in the Ruzizi Plain on the RN5 in April, according to the UN.^[28] Pro-M23 sources claimed that Burundi deployed hundreds of additional troops to South Kivu in late August and has 25,000 total troops in the eastern DRC.^[29] M23’s most direct route would involve a frontal assault over open terrain on the heavily fortified plain to advance on Uvira and would almost certainly sustain high casualties. CTP assessed in late September that M23 is likely seeking alternative routes to Uvira though tougher terrain that bypass the Ruzizi Plain and would enable the group to use the less-defended high ground above Uvira to flank and then encircle the town and cut off its supply lines.^[30]

Figure 3. M23 Sets Conditions for Uvira Offensive

Source: Yale Ford.

M23’s control of the key areas along the Burundi-DRC border would be a major security and economic risk to the Burundian government without a détente. M23 would be able to seal off the roughly 50-mile land border if it advanced successfully on the Ruzizi Plain or flanked Uvira and then pinched Burundian forces on the RN5. The closure of the border and the potential eviction of its forces from South Kivu would significantly hinder Burundi’s ability to fend off cross-border attacks on its western provinces from RED-Tabara, an armed group who aims to topple the Burundian government using their bases in the highlands in South Kivu. M23’s control of the border would also have dire economic implications for Burundi, as it relies heavily on the Bujumbura–Uvira corridor to transport the 90 percent of its total exports to the DRC.^[31] The spillover from large-scale fighting would additionally risk a refugee influx that would further strain the struggling Burundi economy, which has slid even further in 2025 due to chronic fuel shortages and the war in the eastern DRC.^[32]

Burundi deconflicted with Rwanda in the eastern DRC during the last major M23 offensive in early 2025 and is likely trying to do so again to avoid a wider regional war. Burundi and Rwanda are rivals in the eastern DRC, and both view their competition as potentially existential. M23 halted their southward advance along the Burundian border in South Kivu after CTP assessed that Burundi and Rwanda likely reached a deal to deconflict in the eastern DRC in February.^[33] These efforts decreased the risk of a wider regional war between the two countries in the immediate term, as Burundi scaled back its force deployment in the eastern DRC.^[34]

Figure 4. M23 Advances Southward in South Kivu Province (March 2025)

Source: Liam Karr; Yale Ford; Nick Markiewicz.

Ndayishimiye is likely trying to deconflict with Rwanda again to hedge his bets as M23 eyes Uvira. Africa Intelligence reported that Ndayishimiye asked M23 to distance itself from Rwanda in the meeting in Bujumbura and has asked France to mediate peace talks with Rwanda in recent weeks.^[35] The outlet reported that officials in the Burundian government are worried about Burundi’s stability and are willing to play all sides as part of a “survival strategy.”^[36]

Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo with Alexandria Johnson and Liam Karr

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured a Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)-aligned forces headquarters and advanced to the outskirts of the SAF headquarters, which are two of three key locations in el Fasher—the capital of North Darfur region. The RSF advanced from the north to take control of the SAF-aligned militia Joint Forces headquarters at the former United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) base on October 18, giving the RSF control over northwest el Fasher.^[37] The RSF had already controlled part of the base since late September.^[38] The RSF also attacked the SAF Sixth Infantry Command headquarters in central el Fasher. The RSF made a brief incursion into the base for the first time before the SAF reportedly repelled them on October 19.^[39] The RSF launched another attack on the base and the nearby Darfur governor’s compound on October 23.^[40] The RSF claimed to have captured the governor’s compound, but the SAF claimed to have repelled the attack.^[41]

The Sixth Infantry headquarters and el Fasher Airport are the main remaining SAF bases in el Fasher after the fall of the Joint Forces–UNAMID base. The Sixth Infantry Command coordinates SAF operations with SAF-aligned forces in Darfur state, including near the Chadian border.^[42] The RSF has positions less than a mile south of the headquarters in the neighborhood immediately east of the airport.^[43] The former UNAMID base is located less than 3 miles northwest of the headquarters and less than 2 miles north of the airport.

Figure 5. RSF Offensive on El Fasher

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo

The SAF degraded RSF air supremacy in el Fasher to enable limited resupply airdrops, but SAF forces have still been unable to halt the RSF’s advances. The SAF conducted several airstrikes around el Fasher from August 24 to September 28, reportedly destroying several RSF air defense systems for the first time in the area.^[44] Those strikes enabled the SAF to conduct two resupply airdrops to el Fasher on September 29 and October 7, which were the first in five months.^[45] The SAF delivered ammunition, food, and medicine to its forces.^[46] The airdrops are the only way for any military or humanitarian supplies to reach el Fasher, as the RSF is conducting a siege and constructed a berm encircling the city.^[47]

The RSF are simultaneously assaulting a SAF-aligned pocket along key ground lines of communication that connect North Darfur to the RSF’s rear support zone in Chad. The RSF captured Abu Gomra—located 200 miles northwest of el Fasher—on October 16, advancing from Kabkabiya, which is 60 miles to the south.^[48] The Joint Forces retook the town on October 17.^[49] The RSF has reportedly organized forces in Kabkabiya, al Zarq, and Saraf Omra to recapture Abu Gomra, potentially including personnel and equipment redeployed from el Fasher.^[50] A local source also reported that the RSF has closed the Kabkabiya to Abu Gomra section of a road leading to the Chadian border.^[51] The SAF conducted airstrikes in Kabkabiya, al Zarq, and Saraf Omra on October 19 and 20.^[52] The RSF and SAF had mobilized forces in North and West Darfur since late September.^[53]

Figure 6. RSF-SAF Attacks in Rural Darfur

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo.

RSF control of the SAF-aligned pocket would enhance the RSF’s ability to supply the main frontlines in el Fasher and central Sudan, where the SAF is attempting to push west toward Darfur.^[54] SAF-aligned forces’ control territory on the Chadian border forces the RSF to transport supplies from Chad’s Amdjarass International Airport through West Darfur rather than directly to North Darfur.^[55] The RSF depends on supply lines from Chad and Libya to receive equipment and weapons, including drones, from the United Arab Emirates (UAE).^[56]

Figure 7. RSF Supply Lines Into Darfur From Neighboring Countries

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

The RSF will take advantage of any victory in North Darfur to enforce a partition of Sudan, which would increase the group’s leverage in peace talks and undermine Sudan’s territorial integrity. El Fasher and the SAF-aligned pocket near the Chadian border are the final SAF-held areas in western Sudan. The RSF would be able to redeploy resources currently tied down in these areas to help freeze the frontlines or launch a counteroffensive in central Sudan. The group has already established a parallel government, the Government of Peace and Unity, to entrench a de facto partition and strengthen its international legitimacy.^[57] RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) leads the parallel government, which has a prime minister and cabinet officials.^[58] The RSF’s aim to govern the entirety of Darfur is directly opposed to the SAF’s objective to unify and control the entire country, further convoluting peace talks.^[59]

The United States has recently reengaged Sudanese factions and their regional partners to end the war in Sudan for the first time since contentious talks at the United Nations General Assembly in mid-September. The Quad countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States—failed to enforce a joint statement released on September 12, which called for respect of Sudan’s “territorial integrity,” the provision of humanitarian aid, and an eventual ceasefire.^[60] Egypt and the UAE—who support the SAF and RSF, respectively—reportedly disagreed over explicitly condemning the RSF’s siege of el Fasher.^[61] A Sudanese official claimed that the UAE rejected a proposed call for the RSF to withdraw from el Fasher and end the siege.^[62]

US Senior Adviser for African Affairs Massad Boulos resumed outreach by meeting with the Egyptian and SAF leaders. Boulos met Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi in Cairo on October 15, emphasizing Egypt’s “constructive role in Sudan.”^[63] Boulos then met SAF head and leader of the SAF-backed government General Abdel Fattah al Burhan, which was their first meeting since August.^[64] Burhan separately met with el Sisi in Cairo on the same day, discussing the war and Egypt-Sudan relations.^[65]

Boulous then met with Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby, who has been a key enabler of Emirati military support to the RSF. Boulos held a series of separate and joint meetings with Déby and Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Waleed el Khereigi on October 16.^[66] Déby has allowed the UAE to supply the RSF from Chadian territory, but some Chadian military officials have urged Déby to reverse the policy.^[67] The Quad is reportedly scheduled to meet again in the US in late October.^[68]

Boulous did not directly meet with RSF officials but remains “in communication” with the group.^[69] Boulos reportedly secured Hemedti’s word to allow humanitarian aid to el Fasher in mid-September, but Hemedti reneged on his pledge.^[70] The US initially established contact with the RSF after the August meeting between Boulos and Burhan.^[71] Asharq al Aawsat journalist Rana Abtar reported that the US Deputy Secretary of State and Khereigi will meet with with SAF and RSF officials separately at Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 23.^[72]

Reluctance from the SAF and RSF to engage in dialogue and continued UAE support for the RSF will likely obstruct progress toward a peace agreement, however. Burhan stated in mid-October that any peace talks must first prioritize ending the RSF’s “rebellion” and that the RSF cannot have a role in post-war Sudan.^[73] Burhan previously affirmed the SAF’s role as the only legitimate governing authority in Sudan and its intention to militarily defeat the RSF after the Quad’s statement on September 12.^[74] The RSF is refusing to ease its Darfur offensive before capturing remaining el Fasher and the SAF-aligned pocket on the Chadian border.

The UAE has continued to enable the RSF by supplying the RSF with equipment and weapons and providing the group with diplomatic cover.^[75] Burhan reportedly requested that the US pressure the UAE to stop its support to the RSF during his meeting with Boulos on October 15.^[76] The UAE also reportedly disrupted the release of a joint Quad statement and a planned meeting in July with a late demand to bar the SAF from participating in a post-war transition.^[77] Egypt reportedly objected to the UAE’s demand.^[78]

Mozambique

Author: Yale Ford

IS Mozambique Province (ISMP) targeted several major district capitals in attacks in northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province as part of its most significant attack campaign since late 2022. ISMP attacked and killed civilians in two separate raids on Mocímboa da Praia town on September 7 and September 22.^[79] The attacks in Mocímboa da Praia marked ISMP’s first attacks in the town since August 2024 and its most significant incursion since 2020–21, when it controlled the town.^[80] ISMP insurgents attacked civilians in Macomia town on September 28 in the group’s first major attack there since May 2024.^[81] The group conducted raids on Nangade town on September 23 and October 9, marking its first attack on Nangade since July 2022.^[82] ISMP attacked civilians on the outskirts of Palma town on October 9, following an uptick in ISMP activity in the surrounding district since September, for the first time since January 2025.^[83]

Figure 8. ISMP Targets District Capitals in Cabo Delgado

Source: Yale Ford.

ISMP maintained its activity simultaneously in the southern districts of Cabo Delgado and the neighboring Nampula province. ISMP began escalating its rate of attacks in southern Cabo Delgado in late July and August, displacing at least 50,000 people—the largest number of displaced people in the southern districts due to ISMP attacks since early 2024.^[84] The group then launched new waves of attacks in four southern districts of Cabo Delgado and at least two districts in northern Nampula province in late August through October after a brief lull in early August.^[85] The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that ISMP attacks in southern Cabo Delgado displaced a further 11,000 people in late September and early October.^[86]

ISMP’s recent activity amounts to its most active three-month attack campaign since 2022. ISMP conducted 51 attacks from July through September—half of them in September alone—representing its most active month since October 2022 and its most significant attack campaign since September to November 2022.^[87] ISMP’s total 93 attacks so-far in 2025 has surpassed its total attacks at this time in 2024 and are on pace to become the group’s most active year since 2022.^[88]

Figure 9. ISMP Most Active Since 2022

Source: Yale Ford; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data.

ISMP likely aims to undermine the Mozambican government’s authority and drive a wedge between local communities and security forces in Cabo Delgado. ISMP insurgents infiltrated a mosque in Mocímboa da Praia on October 7 and denounced the government as illegitimate and called for the establishment of an Islamic state in Mozambique.^[89] ISMP warned locals that the group would attack them if they cooperated with the Mozambican government or the army and its Rwandan military partners.^[90] The insurgents did not attack civilians during the message but appeared to encourage filming, which is an inflection in ISMP’s messaging strategy and gives the first glimpse into the group’s objectives in several years, according to Armed Conflict Location and Event expert Peter Bofin.^[91]

ISMP likely aims to drive a wedge between local communities and Mozambican authorities and their Rwandan military partners. Local communities in Cabo Delgado have increasingly distrusted government officials and security forces to protect them from ISMP attacks amid the group’s mid-2025 attack campaign.^[92] Many locals and business leaders spoke out against the army and governing authorities in Mocímboa da Praia after the September attacks, and the IOM reported that at least 26,000 people fled from two neighborhoods affected by the ISMP attacks between September 22 and October 6.^[93] Mocímboa da Praia is the most militarized district in Cabo Delgado, but security forces—particularly Rwandan troops—reportedly did not respond quickly to the mosque incident or the two attacks in the district capital in September.^[94] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data assessed in early September that limited responses to ISMP attacks in urban areas could diminish local communities’ trust in Rwandan forces and weaken Rwanda’s image as an effective and necessary force.^[95] Mozambican and Rwandan authorities insinuated in public comments that ISMP insurgents had received tacit support from local populations amid its recent attacks across the province in September.^[96]

ISMP’s campaign may be tied loosely to efforts to resume Western- and US-backed natural gas projects in Cabo Delgado. ISMP’s mid-2025 campaign has corresponded with the recent push to resume two of Cabo Delgado’s four major liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects, which American and Western investors suspended due to the insurgency.^[97] US-based ExxonMobil and the French hydrocarbon company TotalEnergies are both financing LNG projects on the Afungi peninsula in in Palma district in the Rovuma deepwater basin. ExxonMobil had delayed the final investment decision on its site in Afungi in late 2024 from 2025 to 2026 due to the security situation in Cabo Delgado.^[98] The ISMP insurgency previously forced Total to declare force majeure on its $20 billion project in April 2021 and shelve plans to restart the project in early 2024.^[99] The Total CEO said in September that the project is slated to restart construction soon, and the company is reportedly expected to lift its declaration of force majeure in the coming weeks.^[100]

Figure 10. Natural Gas Projects in Northern Mozambique

Source: Bloomberg.

Increased construction activity around the natural gas projects in 2025 has likely given ISMP more incentive to increase attacks in Cabo Delgado and attract international attention. Both Total and Exxon redeployed employees to the LNG sites and have made substantial construction progress in 2025.^[101] The deteriorating security situation linked to ISMP in 2025 has posed challenges for the resumption of operations, however. ISMP’s increased activity near the N380 road—a vital supply and logistics corridor for both projects as the primary paved route in Cabo Delgado—forced Total to stop using the N380 and transport equipment to the project site exclusively using Afungi’s airstrip.^[102]

Securing the LNG sites is a prerequisite for both projects. Both companies have said that the projects are still on track despite ISMP’s record attacks but have sought security and measures guarantees from the Mozambican and Rwandan governments.^[103] The Mozambican president formalized Mozambique’s defense partnership with Rwanda with a status of forces agreement in August and said in early October that Rwandan forces will stay in Cabo Delagdo to guard Afungi until both projects are built, currently planned for 2029.^[104]

ISMP likely conducted its latest campaign at least partially for propaganda purposes. The group promoted its recent attacks across Cabo Delgado with a media campaign that showed attacks targeting Christians, burning dozens of houses and churches, and attacking Mozambican troops in several raids, particularly in late September and October.^[105] The group also publicized its evangelization efforts—called dawah—in Mocímboa da Praia and at least one other district. These themes follow well-established IS propaganda topics across its global affiliates. Previous ISMP offensives aligned with global IS campaigns to maximize the group’s propaganda utility for IS central media.^[106]

Cameroon

Author: Miles Charles with Chris Dayton

Official preliminary results in Cameroon’s recent presidential elections have seven-time incumbent Paul Biya beating opposition candidate Issa Tchiroma Bakary. The National Vote Counting Commission released its provisional count on October 20, claiming Biya won the election with 53 percent of the vote, ahead of Tchiroma’s 35 percent.^[107] Tchiroma has contested the results, claiming his party’s vote has him winning more than 60 percent of the vote.^[108] Tchiroma first claimed to have won the election on October 14.^[109] The opposition will refrain from pursuing post-election litigation, with Tchiroma’s campaign director calling it a flawed process.^[110] The Constitutional Council is scheduled to release formal results on October 26.^[111]

Independent observers generally endorsed the credibility of the election but noted minor issues. The African Union Election Observation Mission, which deployed 40 observers, covered the Cameroonian elections from October 7 to 16.^[112] Local media reported that the mission’s preliminary findings described the elections as free, transparent, and peaceful, identifying only a few localized irregularities that did not compromise the overall credibility of the election.^[113] Nouvelle Perspective Internationale, which deployed 35 observers across 1340 polling stations, reported similar findings.^[114] The National Episcopal Conference of Cameroon (NECC) claimed that there were irregularities that “seriously hinder progress towards democracy,” however.^[115] The NECC reported high abstention rates, relocated and unregistered polling stations, the electoral registration of deceased persons, and more according to reports from 202 observers across over 12,000 stations.^[116]

Political unrest will likely worsen if the Constitutional Council upholds the election results, as has occurred in past contested elections. Tchiroma warned on October 22 that there will be unrest if the Constitutional Council confirms Biya is the victor.^[117] Demonstrations are already ongoing throughout the country. Violent clashes erupted across the Extrême-Nord region, Tchiroma’s stronghold, on October 22. Police used teargas to disperse protestors in Maroua, while local media reported that police opened fire and killed one protestor in Garou.^[118] Protests also broke out in western Cameroon and Cameroon’s capital Yaoundé on October 15 and 21, respectively, resulting in 20 arrests and property destruction.^[119]

Biya offered to appoint Tchiroma as Prime Minister on October 22, which Tchiroma rejected, likely to co-opt the opposition and avoid further escalation.^[120] Biya faced drawn-out protests following the 2018 election. Opposition candidate Maurice Katmo claimed to have won, but the government put his vote count at only 14 percent.^[121] The opposition organized countrywide protests in retaliation, which police responded to by opening fire on protestors.^[122] Police eventually arrested Katmo along with 200 protestors, however, protests continued until late 2020.^[123]

Africa File Data Cutoff: October 23, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.