13 hours ago

El Fasher Falls; Islamic State Kidnaps American: Africa File, October 30, 2025

Michael DeAngelo, Miles Charles, Yale Ford and Liam Karr

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Contributors: Christopher Dayton and Femi Omotayo

Key Takeaways:

  • Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) inflicted significant setbacks on the Sudanese Armed Forces, including capturing el Fasher, which the RSF had besieged for 18 months. The RSF is likely committing mass crimes against humanity in el Fasher and will likely enforce a de facto partition of Sudan despite US-led humanitarian and peace efforts.
  • Niger. Armed actors likely collaborating with IS Sahel Province orchestrated the first-ever kidnapping of an American citizen in Niamey.
  • Cameroon. Widespread protests have swept across parts of Cameroon after President Paul Biya was confirmed to have won elections for an eighth term. The government is violently cracking down on political unrest, but the opposition may be better positioned to sustain popular unrest, due in part to regime fatigue among youth and security forces.
  • Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Congolese army (FARDC) has escalated an air interdiction campaign against Rwandan-backed M23 rebels since mid-October, likely to contain M23 and deny the group additional leverage as they negotiate a peace deal. The FARDC likely seeks to deny M23 lines of advance to the DRC interior and disrupt M23’s supply lines in North and South Kivu.

Figure 1. Africa File, October 30, 2025

Source: Liam Karr.

Sudan

Author: Michael DeAngelo

The Rapid Support (RSF) Forces captured remaining Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) positions in el Fasher, giving the group control of all population centers in western Sudan and solidifying a de facto partition. The RSF conducted a multipronged assault on October 26, capturing the SAF Sixth Infantry Division Command headquarters in central el Fasher.[i] The RSF then captured el Fasher Airport on October 27, which was the final remaining key SAF position in the city.[ii] SAF head and leader of the SAF-aligned government Abdel Fattah al Burhan and SAF-aligned governor of Darfur Minni Minnawi confirmed that el Fasher had fallen despite reports of isolated resistance by SAF-aligned forces.[iii] Top SAF officials fled el Fasher before the RSF takeover.[iv] Sky News reported that the SAF secured a deal with the RSF allowing the retreat of some SAF forces, but the RSF has also reportedly ambushed SAF convoys.[v]

Figure 2. Control of Terrain in Western Sudan

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo; Vista Maps; Thomas Van Linge.

RSF control of western Sudan’s population centers enforces a de facto partition of Sudan, which strengthens the group’s leverage in peace talks. The only area in western Sudan still under SAF-aligned control is a rural pocket near the Chadian border. The RSF has established a parallel government, the Government of Peace and Unity, to administer RSF territory and increase its international legitimacy.[vi] RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) heads the government, which also includes a prime minister and cabinet.[vii] RSF parallel governance conflicts with SAF claims of being Sudan’s sole sovereign authority.[viii]

Figure 3. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo; Vista Maps; Thomas Van Linge.

RSF control of el Fasher will likely allow the RSF to redeploy resources from el Fasher to other frontlines. The RSF has mobilized forces near the final SAF-aligned pocket in Darfur since late September, potentially including forces redeployed from el Fasher.[ix] The RSF captured Abu Gomra—located 200 miles northwest of el Fasher—on October 16, but SAF-aligned militias known as the Joint Forces retook the town on October 17.[x] The RSF is reportedly reorganizing its forces to try to capture the town.[xi] The RSF is also countering an SAF offensive in central Sudan, preventing the SAF from advancing west toward RSF-controlled territory in western Sudan.[xii]

The RSF is likely committing mass crimes against humanity in el Fasher, including ethnic violence that may constitute genocide, which the group previously did when capturing other areas in western Sudan. International law defines crimes against humanity as specifically egregious crimes committed during a major attack against civilians that violate human dignity, including murder, extermination, forcible deportation, torture, sexual violence, ethnic persecution, disappearance, and apartheid.[xiii] The Joint Forces claimed that the RSF killed more than 2,000 civilians in El Fasher from October 26 to 27, and the Sudan War Monitor estimated on October 29 that the RSF had killed at least 3,000 civilians.[xiv] RSF fighters have published videos of themselves executing unarmed civilians fleeing el Fasher, and Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab published analysis showing civilian bodies near the RSF-constructed berm surrounding el Fasher.[xv]

The RSF has also targeted aid and health infrastructure, which is a war crime.[xvi] The RSF reportedly massacred 460 civilians at the Saudi Maternal Hospital.[xvii] Local sources reported that the RSF killed aid volunteers at the community kitchens that fed civilians during the RSF’s siege.[xviii] The RSF may have also raided the Sudanese Red Crescent office.[xix]

The RSF’s crimes may be constituent acts of ethnic cleansing. A UN Commission of Experts previously defined ethnic cleansing in the context of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as “rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area” and “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”[xx] Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab published satellite imagery analysis showing potential mass killings from RSF house-to-house clearing operations in the Daraja Oula neighborhood, one of the many primarily non-Arab settlements in el Fasher.[xxi] The European Union accused the RSF of ethnic targeting on October 28.[xxii] CTP previously assessed that the RSF would likely commit mass crimes against humanity, including ethnic violence that may constitute genocide, if it captured el Fasher.[xxiii] Acts of ethnic cleansing may amount to constituent acts of genocide, which are defined as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.”[xxiv]

The RSF is committing these atrocities despite promises to protect civilians.[xxv] Hemedti acknowledged “abuses” and said the RSF is investigating them on October 29, but the RSF and its predecessor, the Janjaweed, have a two-decade history of war crimes and genocide.[xxvi] Communications have been offline in El Fasher since the RSF captured the city.[xxvii]

The RSF is following the same pattern that it did during the genocide of the Massalit in el Geneina from April to November 2023. The RSF captured el Geneina—the West Darfur state capital—in June 2023 after a month-long siege, executing civilians during house-to-house clearing operations.[xxviii] The RSF ended its campaign in November 2023 by clearing the SAF from headquarters in nearby Ardamata, killing at least 1,000 mainly Massalit civilians sheltering there.[xxix] Communications were offline during much of this period.[xxx] Upper estimates by the United Nations stated that the campaign against the Massalit killed 15,000 people.[xxxi] The United States declared in January 2025 that the RSF had committed genocide against the Massalit.[xxxii] The RSF has already targeted non-Arab civilians around el Fasher, killing up to 1,500 during an assault on Zamzam refugee camp—located 10 miles south of el Fasher—in April 2025.[xxxiii]

Figure 4. RSF Atrocities in Sudan

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo.

The RSF also recaptured a key town on the northern axis between Khartoum and central Sudan, complicating SAF efforts to consolidate control over key supply lines in central Sudan and advance west to break the RSF partition. The RSF recaptured Bara and um Dam Haj Ahmed—both located about 40 miles north of el Obeid, the North Kordofan state capital—on October 26.[xxxiv] The RSF reportedly committed further war crimes during house-to-house clearing operations in Bara.[xxxv] The RSF executed at least 23 civilians, including five aid workers with the Sudanese Red Crescent.[xxxvi] Reports indicate that at least 120 civilians are missing.[xxxvii] The Sudan Doctors’ Network also reported that the RSF executed 38 civilians accused of having ties with the SAF in um Dam Haj Ahmed.[xxxviii] The RSF had previously targeted civilians around Bara during battles with the SAF in July 2025, killing over 300.[xxxix] The SAF had captured Bara from the RSF in mid-September 2025.[xl]

The RSF’s recapture of Bara and um Dam Haj Ahmed hinders SAF efforts to reinforce and use el Obeid to launch offensives targeting RSF-besieged towns and RSF-controlled western Sudan. RSF control of sections of the road from Khartoum to el Obeid denies the SAF from using the road as a supply line. The SAF recently captured um Sumeima—located 40 miles west of el Obeid on the border of West Kordofan—on September 28.[xli] The RSF has repelled past SAF offensives from el Obeid into the South and West Kordofan states, however.[xlii] The RSF has also used its presence to the west and south to pressure el Obeid, attacking the city outskirts from the west as recently as September 13.[xliii]

Figure 5. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Kordofan Region

Source: Liam Karr and Michael DeAngelo; Vista Maps; Thomas Van Linge.

The US is leading efforts to secure a ceasefire and humanitarian aid into el Fasher, but the Quad’s internal divisions and warring Sudanese parties’ irreconcilable positions on RSF legitimacy will likely hamper talks. The US hosted the other Quad countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—and SAF and RSF delegations in Washington on October 24.[xliv] Sudan’s foreign minister reportedly met with his UAE counterpart for the first time since the war started.[xlv] The Quad countries “agreed to establish a Joint Operational Committee to strengthen coordination,” which would be the Quad’s first action since releasing a joint statement calling for the secure provision of humanitarian aid and a ceasefire on September 12.[xlvi] The UAE’s refusal to withdraw support from or condemn the RSF has caused disagreements with other Quad countries, especially Egypt, hindering progress.[xlvii]

The RSF is unlikely to engage in substantive peace talks if the SAF refuses to recognize its political legitimacy, especially now that the RSF controls western Sudan. RSF and SAF delegations met with Quad intermediaries separately in Washington.[xlviii] The warring parties failed to reach an agreement on humanitarian aid and future negotiations.[xlix] The RSF reportedly demanded that negotiations include a political track alongside a military one, which the SAF refused.[l] Burhan previously stated that peace talks must affirm the SAF’s role as the only legitimate governing authority in Sudan, end the RSF’s “rebellion,” and bar the RSF from having a role in post-war Sudan.[li] An adviser to the Emirati president stated that the RSF’s capture of el Fasher “calls for rationality and realism” and that the “political path is the only option to end the civil war.”[lii]

Niger

Author: Miles Charles with Femi Omotayo

Armed actors likely collaborating with IS Sahel Province (ISSP) orchestrated the first-ever kidnapping of an American citizen in Niamey. Unidentified armed men abducted an American missionary 100 yards from the Presidential Palace in Niamey on October 21.[liii] The kidnapping occurred in the highly secure Chateau 1 district, which houses several NGOs.[liv] The missionary had worked in Niger since 2010.[lv] No demands have been made, but the US embassy issued a security alert mandating escorts for embassy personnel, restricting travel, and imposed a curfew.[lvi] This marks the first kidnapping of a foreign national in the capital since 2011.[lvii]

Figure. 6 Armed Assailants Kidnap an American Citizen

Source. Miles Charles.

ISSP is likely behind the kidnapping. The missionary’s phone was tracked 56 miles north of Niamey in the Tillaberi region, a known ISSP stronghold.[lviii] The group has worked with local criminals to orchestrate the kidnapping of foreign nationals since early 2025.[lix] ISSP outsources kidnappings to bandits and other armed groups, who then sell the hostages to ISSP.[lx] The group has since coordinated four kidnappings with local bandits in 2025.[lxi] The group kidnapped an Austrian woman, a Spanish citizen, and four Moroccan drivers across the Sahel in January 2025.[lxii] The group also kidnapped two Chinese workers in western Niger in February 2025.[lxiii]

Cameroon

Author: Miles Charles with Christopher Dayton

Official Cameroonian election results confirmed that President Paul Biya was reelected for his eighth term, defeating the lead opposition candidate Issa Tchiroma Bakary. The Constitutional Council validated the results, saying that Biya won 54 percent of the vote to opposition candidate Issa Tchiroma Bakary’s 35 percent.[lxiv]

Independent observers have given contested claims on the credibility of the election. The African Union Election Observation Mission said that the election was in accordance with regional, continental, and international standards and identified only a few localized irregularities.[lxv] The National Episcopal Conference of Cameroon reported serious irregularities, however.[lxvi] Nine ambassadors or representatives, including from the United States and European Union, refused to attend the Constitutional Council’s announcement of the results, implying they did not believe the elections were credible.[lxvii] None of these countries have publicly criticized the elections, however.

The results have sparked widespread and sometimes violent protests across Cameroon. Tchiroma denounced the results and called for popular unrest on October 29.[lxviii] His rhetoric has been more aggressive than past defeated candidates, such as Maurice Kamto in 2018. Tchiroma warned before the results were finalized that there would be unrest if Biya was confirmed the winner and declared after the results that the “people are ready to fight for as long as necessary to recover their victory.”[lxix] Kamto’s rhetoric remained mild, stating he would “firmly defend” the mandate given to him.[lxx]

Violent protests first erupted in Garoua, Nord region, which is Tchiroma’s political stronghold, after the results were announced.[lxxi] Tchiroma claimed snipers killed two civilians outside his house following the release of the results.[lxxii] Protests then spread throughout Nord region before reaching the Littoral, Ouest, Est, and Extrême-Nord regions.[lxxiii] Protesters set fires in Cameroon’s economic capital Douala and national capital Yaoundé, clashed with security forces in Ouest region, and looted an electoral commission in Est region.[lxxiv] The protests have resulted in hundreds of arrests.[lxxv]

Figure 7. Cameroonian Election Protests

Source: Miles Charles.

Protests in Douala have been particularly violent. Security forces have responded to protesters with water cannons, tear gas, and live ammunition.[lxxvi] Security forces killed four protesters the night before the results were announced.[lxxvii] The governor of the region acknowledged the deaths and stated that 105 arrests had been made during the same protests.[lxxviii] Violence has since escalated, with protesters in Douala burning the mayor’s house, looting an oil depot, and ransacking a police station.[lxxix] Tchiroma’s lawyer stated that security forces had detained at least 250 protesters in Douala since the results announcement.[lxxx]

The Cameroonian government will likely violently crackdown on growing political unrest led by the opposition coalition, as it has in previous elections. The Biya regime has deployed security forces to quell protests. The government deployed tanks to several districts in Douala.[lxxxi] The regime also repositioned troops from border posts in the jihadist-afflicted Far-North region to the capital and major cities in the North.[lxxxii] The Batallion d’Intervention Rapide (BIR), which led the regime’s crackdown on unrest during the 2008 and 2018 election protests, is among the troops deployed.[lxxxiii] The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has called for investigations after reports of state violence in connection with the election.[lxxxiv]

The regime has quickly moved to suppress the opposition coalition. The Biya regime has matched Tchiroma’s aggressive rhetoric, accusing the protesters of planning an insurrection.[lxxxv] The government imposed bans on public gatherings and traffic restrictions following the announcement of the election results.[lxxxvi] The government also arrested Djeukam Tchameni and Anicet Ekane, senior leaders in the Union of Change, in Douala on October 24.[lxxxvii] Jeune Afrique reported that the BIR likely carried out the arrest.[lxxxviii] Reports of widespread internet disruptions further suggest a coordinated effort to hinder the opposition.[lxxxix]

The state intensely suppressed Kamto’s coalition, Mouvement pour la Renaissance du Cameroun (MRC), during election-related protests from 2018 to 2020.[xc] Kamto assembled a coalition of thirty parties in 2018 that led sporadic protests lasting until 2020. The MRC organized small protests immediately after the election, which the government responded to with widespread troop deployments and intimidation tactics.[xci] Opposition organizers were forced to hold protests in churches and universities to avoid the crackdown.[xcii] The MRC escalated its response in 2019 with a call for public marches, which the government suppressed by arresting Kamto and 200 of his supporters in Yaoundé and across the Ouest.[xciii] Protests resurged before regional elections in 2020, resulting in 550 arrests.[xciv] The junta ultimately barred Kamto and his coalition from participating in the 2025 elections.[xcv]

The opposition may be better positioned to sustain popular unrest than it has been in the past, due in part to regime fatigue among youth and security forces. Unconfirmed reports on social media suggest that security forces across Cameroon have sporadically joined demonstrations or expressed their solidarity for the protesters.[xcvi] Mbonji Jean Baptiste, Mbouda’s senior divisional officer, led security forces as they walked with protesters.[xcvii] Brigadier General Ngolo Ngomba Tobie said “we are with you” as he addressed protesters in Douala on October 28.[xcviii] Security forces similarly joined hands with protesters in Madagascar and eventually led a coup in October 2025.[xcix]

The protests are also largely youth-led, joining a broader trend of transformative Gen Z protests across Africa, which may further bolster the opposition’s momentum.[c] Gen Z protests have proliferated across Africa since 2024, leading to large-scale demonstrations in Madagascar, Morocco, and Kenya. The protests have been met with varying degrees of state violence and suppression.[ci] Kenya’s president reshuffled his cabinet in response to the protests in 2024.[cii] The protests led to a coup in Madagascar, which partially secured protesters aims to remove the government but has left its broader goals in limbo.[ciii] Protests in Kenya and Morocco have simmered but are ongoing despite more than 30 deaths and thousands of arrests.[civ]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author: Yale Ford

The Congolese army (FARDC) has escalated an air interdiction campaign against Rwandan-backed M23 rebels in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since mid-October. The FARDC has escalated airstrikes on M23’s advanced positions, particularly in North Kivu, since October 15. The FARDC targeted M23 positions on the RP1030, including in Mpeti village—M23’s forward operating base on the RP1030—in at least two strikes on October 15 and October 18.[cv] The October 15 strike forced M23 to retreat from Mpeti.[cvi] The FARDC conducted another strike against M23 north of the RP1030 and in Kalembe village on the RP1030 on October 21.[cvii] The FARDC has also targeted M23 positions in north-central Masisi district in the Bashali chiefdom since mid-October.[cviii]

The FARDC has likely ramped up attacks after M23 managed to hold several advanced positions in Masisi and Walikale districts despite concerted air and ground attacks from pro-Congolese government forces that began in late September and early October. M23 also reportedly reinforced the frontlines with hundreds of troops in early October after it commissioned what the group claimed was over 9,000 additional fighters.[cix]

Figure 8. FARDC Escalates Airstrikes on M23

Source: Yale Ford; Liam Karr; Anping Zhu.

The FARDC and aligned forces are likely trying to deny M23 lines of advance to the DRC interior. The FARDC is targeting M23 positions on several axes around Pinga in Masisi and Walikale. Pinga is a key town due to its vital infrastructure and location as a potential launching pad for future M23 offensives into the DRC interior. CTP previously assessed in September that M23 was setting conditions to attack the town.[cx]

Additional airstrikes on advanced M23 positions in western Masisi are likely aimed at blocking a potential offensive on Walikale town on the RP529. The FARDC conducted airstrikes on M23 positions on the frontlines in western Masisi on the RP529, roughly eight miles from Nyabiondo, on October 23 and 28.[cxi] Walikale is a key town because it has about 60,000 inhabitants and is the gateway between North Kivu province and the interior of the DRC along the RN3 road.[cxii] Walikale district also has extensive gold, tantalum, and tin ore deposits that the group would benefit from.[cxiii] M23 advanced along the RP529 in March and held Walikale for 16 days before withdrawing in early April as part of US-and Qatar-backed negotiations.[cxiv]

Figure 9. M23 Advances Westward Toward the DRC Interior (March 2025)

Source: Yale Ford; Liam Karr; Nick Markiewicz.

Pro-Congolese government Wazalendo fighters have simultaneously conducted ground attacks to maintain pressure on M23 forces on the Pinga and Walikale axes. M23 has repelled numerous attacks on its positions near the RP1030 since October 14.[cxv] M23 has also repelled several Wazalendo attacks south of Pinga in north-central Masisi and along the RP529 near Nyabiondo and Masisi towns in western Masisi.[cxvi]

The FARDC air interdiction campaign is also targeting M23 supply lines in North and South Kivu. The FARDC airstrikes have put pressure on M23’s supply lines in North Kivu. The FARDC bombed and disabled a key bridge on the RP1030 about three miles southeast of Mpeti in two separate strikes on September 28 and October 8.[cxvii] The RP1030 is the primary supply and transit corridor in northern Masisi. The FARDC conducted the October 8 strike after M23 had nearly repaired the bridge from a late September strike.[cxviii] The destruction of this bridge and FARDC strikes on Kalembe—a key transit point for the group on the RP1030—will almost certainly degrade or outright deny M23’s ability to move troops and weaponry to the frontlines.[cxix]

The FARDC air campaign has targeted a M23-controlled industrial facility in South Kivu, likely to disrupt M23’s logistics in South Kivu and cut off a source of its revenue. The FARDC has conducted at least five separate bombing runs on the Twangiza industrial gold mine in northern Mwenga district in South Kivu since the second week of October.[cxx] The FARDC strikes targeted and destroyed the facility’s power generation infrastructure on October 15.[cxxi] The mine doubles as a fuel storage depot for M23, according to the French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence.[cxxii] CTP has assessed that M23 is setting conditions to attack Uvira and that its control of the area around Twangiza strengthens its control of supply lines to the advantageous mid-level highlands around Uvira.[cxxiii]

Figure 10. M23 Advances Southward in South Kivu Province

Source: Yale Ford; Liam Karr; Anping Zhu.

The FARDC likely also targeted Twangiza to cut off a source of revenue for M23. M23 captured the Chinese-owned site during an offensive in early May and had reportedly restarted gold production in mid-July.[cxxiv] The company that owns and formerly operated the mine told Reuters on October 21 that M23 has illegally profited from about $70 million of gold since May.[cxxv] The company accused M23 of transporting gold through underground tunnels and deploying technicians to expand mining operations.[cxxvi] M23 denied the report.[cxxvii] CTP assessed in September that M23’s control of Bukavu, the South Kivu provincial capital, has allowed the group to exercise significant control over the mineral trade in South Kivu since early 2025.[cxxviii]

The FARDC is bombing legitimate military targets, but its campaign likely violates the Qatari-brokered ceasefire. Qatar brokered a ceasefire provision as part of a preliminary peace agreement between the Congolese government and M23 in July.[cxxix] The ceasefire provision prohibited new attacks, attempts to conquer new territory, and acts of sabotage, and committed both sides to “ensure that the ceasefire applies to all forces engaged in the conflict” in the eastern DRC.[cxxx] The two sides signed an agreement to establish a ceasefire-verification mechanism that aims to adjudicate violations and stabilize the military conflict on October 14.[cxxxi] This mechanism has not yet been formally established, however, and M23 has accused the FARDC of violating the ceasefire repeatedly and said that it will respond militarily to these attacks.[cxxxii] The FARDC spokesperson acknowledged the interdiction campaign in an interview with the German outlet Deutsche Welle on October 24 and said that M23 has provoked the FARDC into conducting attacks.[cxxxiii]

M23 is likely unable to defend against FARDC air attacks without significant Rwandan military support. M23 likely does not possess its own sophisticated air defense systems, despite its claims in late October.[cxxxiv] The FARDC had previously escalated airstrikes that killed several senior M23 commanders and dozens of fighters before Rwanda deployed short-range air defense systems in early 2024, which provided air cover and gave M23 a “significant tactical advantage,” according to the UN.[cxxxv] Africa Confidential cited US intelligence sources in early October who said that Rwanda still has at least 8,000 troops deployed in the eastern DRC.[cxxxvi] Rwanda committed not to engage in or support any direct military actions against the DRC from Rwanda in the US-backed peace agreement from late June, however, and there have been no confirmed reports of M23 bolstering its air defenses against FARDC’s ongoing campaign.[cxxxvii]

The Congolese government is likely trying to contain M23 and deny the group additional leverage as they negotiate a Qatari-mediated peace deal, which is crucial to the US-backed peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda. The French magazine Jeune Afrique reported on October 27 that the two sides are negotiating a draft agreement in “heated discussions,” particularly around the return of state authority.[cxxxviii] The return of state authority has been the most significant obstacle to a sustainable deal, but an insider source told Jeune Afrique that mediators are seeking to move toward a possible “compromise text” that would resemble a longer-term deal soon.[cxxxix] Independent Congolese journalist Steve Wembi reported on October 27 that the two sides could sign a “roadmap” agreement in the coming days.[cxl]

A peace deal between the DRC and M23 is key to finalizing the US-backed peace agreement. Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s Africa adviser, has said previously that a sustainable deal between the two sides is the “last piece of the puzzle” to the US-led peace framework.[cxli] The Congolese government has refused to sign off on the economic and political aspects of the framework, including in a head of state ceremony originally proposed for October 23, over persistent security risks related to M23 and Rwanda since early October.[cxlii] The United States proposed a new date for the signing ceremony on November 13, which likely remains contingent on a potential DRC-M23 deal.[cxliii]

Africa File Data Cutoff: October 30, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

[i] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/6th-division-captured; https://www.darfur24 dot com/en/2025/10/26/rsf-announces-capture-of-army-headquarters-in-el-fasher/

[ii] https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1982801553242144980; https://x.com/OgadenSoldier/status/1982793604163625049

[iii] https://x.com/SudaneseAF/status/1982891421548859541; https://x.com/ArkoMinawi/status/1982689843013439989; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19rEo5v3Ft/;https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BjtbRNw1K/

[iv] https://x.com/SudaneseAF/status/1982891421548859541;https://www.darfur24 dot com/2025/10/28/%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%81/; https://news.sky.com/story/army-soldiers-fled-key-sudanese-city-leaving-200-000-civilians-trapped-13459493

[v] https://news.sky.com/story/army-soldiers-fled-key-sudanese-city-leaving-200-000-civilians-trapped-13459493; https://x.com/AfriMEOSINT/status/1983675406457958898; https://x.com/yasseralfadol/status/1983829117502947652

[vi] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rsfs-hemedti-sworn-head-parallel-sudanese-government-2025-08-30/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-coalition-led-by-paramilitary-rsf-announces-parallel-government-2025-07-26/; https://www.darfur24 dot com/2025/09/08/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%b9%d8%a7%d9%8a%d8%b4%d9%8a-%d9%8a%d9%8f%d8%b9%d9%8a%d9%91%d9%86-%d8%ab%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%ab%d8%a9-%d9%88%d8%b2%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%a1-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a9-%d8%aa/

[vii] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rsfs-hemedti-sworn-head-parallel-sudanese-government-2025-08-30/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-coalition-led-by-paramilitary-rsf-announces-parallel-government-2025-07-26/; https://www.darfur24 dot com/2025/09/08/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%b9%d8%a7%d9%8a%d8%b4%d9%8a-%d9%8a%d9%8f%d8%b9%d9%8a%d9%91%d9%86-%d8%ab%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%ab%d8%a9-%d9%88%d8%b2%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%a1-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a9-%d8%aa/

[viii] https://sudantribune dot com/article/306237

[ix] https://x.com/VistaMaps/status/1970193463430807746; https://darfur24 dot com/en/2025/09/2022/military-buildup-raises-fears-of-escalation-in-north-darfur/; https://www.darfur24 dot com/en/2025/09/29/military-preparations-in-tina-amid-rsf-mobilization/; https://www.tagpress dot net/160815/%d8%a3%d9%86%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%a1-%d8%b9%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%86%d8%b3%d8%ad%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d8%b9%d8%b4%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b1%d9%83%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%a7%d8%a8%d8%b9/

[x] https://www.darfur24 dot com/en/2025/10/16/rapid-support-forces-seize-control-of-abu-gamra-in-north-darfur/; https://sudantribune dot com/article/306067; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/7a0; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/airstrike-kills-influential-tribal-leader-in-rsf-held-north-kordofan

[xi] https://x.com/VistaMaps/status/1979983343828468120;  https://x.com/moawia9/status/1979872181598167396

[xii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-nuclear-diplomacy-fano-offensive-ethiopia-drc-rwanda-progress-saf-advances-west-sudan-africa-file-october-2-2025#Sudan

[xiii] https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/crime_against_humanity; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russia-info-ops-sudan-attritional-battles-ISCAP-ADF-retaliate-DRC-JNIM-ISSP-infighting-Sahel-africa-file-july-17-2025#Sudan; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/drc-ceasefire-collapse-turkish-troops-niger-sudan-el-fasher-rsf-siege-jnim-pressure-eastern-burkina-faso-africa-file-september-25-2025#Sudan

[xiv] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/26-27; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/fall-of-el-fasher

[xv] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/28/sudan-darfur-el-fashir-rsf-ceasefire-talks/; https://x.com/sudan_war/status/1982751654983368856; https://x.com/Sudanis0/status/1982739615133175966; https://x.com/VistaMaps/status/1982403540690850203; https://x.com/Sudanis0/status/1982857573167460382; https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/b9c14991-6b22-492e-9e16-f903d25d9b49; https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/10/29/sudan-mass-atrocities-in-captured-darfur-city

[xvi] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule156

[xvii] https://apnews.com/article/sudan-hospital-rsf-darfur-fasher-who-3ac305299da5ee388429f3352ca5c6fa?taid=69022ea37add8a0001c5ea58&utm_campaign=TrueAnthem&utm_medium=AP&utm_source=Twitter#; https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/b9c14991-6b22-492e-9e16-f903d25d9b49

[xviii] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/17j7yUMzB9/?mibextid=wwXIfr; https://x.com/sudan_war/status/1982816047846617507

[xix] https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/b9c14991-6b22-492e-9e16-f903d25d9b49; https://www.darfur24 dot com/2025/10/28/%d9%85%d8%b5%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%87%d9%88%d9%84-%d9%84%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b1%d8%b6%d9%89-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%b1-%d8%a8%d8%b9%d8%af-%d9%81%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84/

[xx] https://unric.org/en/international-law-understanding-justice-in-times-of-war; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russia-info-ops-sudan-attritional-battles-ISCAP-ADF-retaliate-DRC-JNIM-ISSP-infighting-Sahel-africa-file-july-17-2025#Sudan

[xxi] https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/876b4afc-e1da-495b-ac32-b5098699a371; https://x.com/nattyray11/status/1982970770289787147; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/28/sudan-darfur-el-fashir-rsf-ceasefire-talks/

[xxii] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/sudan-joint-statement-high-representative-kallas-and-commissioner-lahbib-seizure-el-fasher_en

[xxiii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/drc-ceasefire-collapse-turkish-troops-niger-sudan-el-fasher-rsf-siege-jnim-pressure-eastern-burkina-faso-africa-file-september-25-2025#Sudan

[xxiv] https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf; https://www.un.org/en/genocide-prevention/definition; https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-19-genocide-18-usc-1091; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russia-info-ops-sudan-attritional-battles-ISCAP-ADF-retaliate-DRC-JNIM-ISSP-infighting-Sahel-africa-file-july-17-2025#Sudan

[xxv] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/28/sudan-darfur-el-fashir-rsf-ceasefire-talks/; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/6th-division-captured

[xxvi] https://apnews.com/article/sudan-hospital-rsf-darfur-fasher-who-3ac305299da5ee388429f3352ca5c6fa; https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/country/sudan

[xxvii]https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/28/sudan-darfur-el-fashir-rsf-ceasefire-talks/;  https://apnews.com/article/sudan-hospital-rsf-darfur-fasher-who-3ac305299da5ee388429f3352ca5c6fa; https://x.com/Alhadath_Brk/status/1982747908085584243; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1982768058323423723; https://x.com/Mohammed_Zakare/status/1982561522044772720

[xxviii] https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/05/09/massalit-will-not-come-home/ethnic-cleansing-and-crimes-against-humanity-el; https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-politics-darfur/

[xxix] https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/05/09/massalit-will-not-come-home/ethnic-cleansing-and-crimes-against-humanity-el

[xxx] https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/05/09/massalit-will-not-come-home/ethnic-cleansing-and-crimes-against-humanity-el; https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-politics-darfur/

[xxxi] https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/05/09/massalit-will-not-come-home/ethnic-cleansing-and-crimes-against-humanity-el; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/drc-ceasefire-collapse-turkish-troops-niger-sudan-el-fasher-rsf-siege-jnim-pressure-eastern-burkina-faso-africa-file-september-25-2025#Sudan

[xxxii] https://2021-2025.state.gov/genocide-determination-in-sudan-and-imposing-accountability-measures/; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/drc-ceasefire-collapse-turkish-troops-niger-sudan-el-fasher-rsf-siege-jnim-pressure-eastern-burkina-faso-africa-file-september-25-2025#Sudan

[xxxiii] https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/ffm-sudan/a-hrc-60-22-auv.pdf; https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/aug/07/genocide-sudan-zamzam-camp-timeline; https://www.msf.org/besieged-attacked-starved-mass-atrocities-el-fasher

[xxxiv] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/30c; https://x.com/VistaMaps/status/1982833741165924442; https://x.com/VistaMaps/status/1982108547044536682; https://x.com/sudan_war/status/1982710927867912332

[xxxv] https://www.darfur24 dot com/en/2025/10/27/23-civilians-killed-130-missing-in-bara-after-rsf-takeover/; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/f59

[xxxvi] https://www.darfur24 dot com/en/2025/10/27/23-civilians-killed-130-missing-in-bara-after-rsf-takeover/; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/143; https://x.com/SDN154/status/1982757020571697621

[xxxvii] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/b9b; https://www.darfur24 dot com/en/2025/10/27/23-civilians-killed-130-missing-in-bara-after-rsf-takeover/

[xxxviii] https://x.com/SDN154/status/1983789171379499157

[xxxix] https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/07/1165402; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-activists-say-rsf-forces-killed-almost-300-people-north-kordofan-2025-07-14/

[xl] https://x.com/VistaMaps/status/1966158733597356488; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1966166496947970140

[xli] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/umm-sumaima-clashes; https://sudantribune dot com/article/305464

[xlii] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rsf-seizes-control-of-al-nahud; https://www.darfur24 dot com/2025/07/13/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B4; https://sudantribune dot net/article300823/

[xliii] https://x.com/Mos_sd1/status/1966911598993592806; https://www.darfur24 dot com/2025/09/13/%d9%82%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%b9%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b9-%d8%aa%d8%b4%d9%86-%d9%87%d8%ac%d9%88%d9%85%d9%8b%d8%a7-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d8%a8%d9%8a

[xliv] https://x.com/US_SrAdvisorAF/status/1982065623430488154; https://x.com/kamalshref/status/1981643874821882186; https://x.com/NabeilShakoor/status/1982139674237026549

[xlv] https://x.com/kamalshref/status/1982507965036089843; https://x.com/atafmohamed3/status/1982489356138094604; https://x.com/AfriMEOSINT/status/1982539414099333557

[xlvi] https://x.com/US_SrAdvisorAF/status/1982065623430488154; https://www.state.gov/releases/2025/09/joint-statement-on-restoring-peace-and-security-in-sudan

[xlvii] https://www.theafricareport.com/393286/sudan-peace-talks-hit-a-stumbling-block-at-un/; https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/politics/%D8%A5%D8%B1%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B9-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A

[xlviii] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/28/sudan-darfur-el-fashir-rsf-ceasefire-talks/; https://x.com/kamalshref/status/1981643874821882186; https://x.com/NabeilShakoor/status/1982139674237026549

[xlix] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/28/sudan-darfur-el-fashir-rsf-ceasefire-talks/; https://x.com/NabeilShakoor/status/1982139674237026549

[l] https://x.com/NabeilShakoor/status/1982139674237026549

[li] https://sudantribune dot com/article/306141; https://sudantribune dot com/article/306237; https://sudantribune dot com/article/305175; https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/09/14/sudans-military-aligned-government-rejects-latest-peace-plan/

[lii] https://x.com/AnwarGargash/status/1983054780915429791

[liii] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/niger-kidnapping-american-missionary-taken-from-home-niamey/; https://apnews.com/article/niger-kidnapping-jihadists-niamey-american-missionary-d480c1587c5b72a157d0613023cc9daf

[liv] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20251022-niger-un-ressortissant-am%C3%A9ricain-enlev%C3%A9-%C3%A0-niamey

[lv] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/niger-kidnapping-american-missionary-taken-from-home-niamey/

[lvi] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/niger-kidnapping-american-missionary-taken-from-home-niamey/

[lvii] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20251022-niger-un-ressortissant-am%C3%A9ricain-enlev%C3%A9-%C3%A0-niamey; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1733275/politique/niger-un-americain-enleve-par-des-hommes-armes-en-plein-coeur-de-niamey/

[lviii] https://acleddata.com/report/new-frontlines-jihadist-expansion-reshaping-benin-niger-and-nigeria-borderlands;https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckgzy3z8lm4o

[lix] https://acleddata.com/qa/qa-islamic-state-sahel-province-kidnapping-more-foreigners

[lx] https://acleddata.com/qa/qa-islamic-state-sahel-province-kidnapping-more-foreigners

[lxi] https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20250121-otages-sahel-espagnol-libere-remis-autorites-algeriennes-rebelles-fla

[lxii] https://gsi.s-rminform.com/articles/full-steam-ahead-issps-2025-kidnapping-campaign; https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20250121-otages-sahel-espagnol-libere-remis-autorites-algeriennes-rebelles-fla; https://acleddata.com/qa/qa-islamic-state-sahel-province-kidnapping-more-foreigners

[lxiii] https://gsi.s-rminform.com/articles/full-steam-ahead-issps-2025-kidnapping-campaign; https://acleddata.com/qa/qa-islamic-state-sahel-province-kidnapping-more-foreigners

[lxiv] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20251027-cameroon-s-paul-biya-92-wins-re-election-constitutional-court-announces

[lxv] https://thehill.com/homenews/ap/ap-international/ap-2-protesters-shot-dead-as-tensions-rise-in-cameroon-ahead-of-election-results-opposition-says/; https://www dot stopblablacam.com/politics/1510-15126-au-observers-praise-peaceful-cameroon-election-cite-minor-issues

[lxvi] https://www dot aciafrica.org/news/18187/cameroons-catholic-bishops-acknowledge-peaceful-voting-decry-post-election-irregularities

[lxvii] https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2025/10/27/security-forces-on-high-alert-as-cameroon-awaits-election-results,110539960-art

[lxviii] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20251027-cameroun-paul-biya-r%C3%A9%C3%A9lu-pr%C3%A9sident-annonce-le-conseil-constitutionnel; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/cameroon-opposition-leader-rejects-biya-win-vows-resistance-2025-10-29/

[lxix] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20251027-cameroun-paul-biya-r%C3%A9%C3%A9lu-pr%C3%A9sident-annonce-le-conseil-constitutionnel

[lxx] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20181008-presidentielle-cameroun-maurice-kamto-revendique-victoire

[lxxi] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1735052/politique/presidentielle-au-cameroun-flambee-de-violence-apres-lannonce-de-la-victoire-de-paul-biya/

[lxxii] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20251027-cameroun-paul-biya-r%C3%A9%C3%A9lu-pr%C3%A9sident-annonce-le-conseil-constitutionnel; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1735052/politique/presidentielle-au-cameroun-flambee-de-violence-apres-lannonce-de-la-victoire-de-paul-biya/;https://thehill.com/homenews/ap/ap-international/ap-2-protesters-shot-dead-as-tensions-rise-in-cameroon-ahead-of-election-results-opposition-says/

[lxxiii] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1735052/politique/presidentielle-au-cameroun-flambee-de-violence-apres-lannonce-de-la-victoire-de-paul-biya/

[lxxiv] https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1982835259172643012; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1982835904315273308; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1982836772553027827; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1982846196847968582; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1982845552799965341

[lxxv] https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20251026-resultats-presidentielle-manifestation-opposition-reprimee-cameroun-douala-issa-tchiroma-bakary-election-gaz-lacrymogene-paul-biya

[lxxvi] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1734784/politique/presidentielle-au-cameroun-quatre-morts-dans-des-manifestations-resultats-attendus-ce-lundi/; https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/10/28/cameroon-biya-declared-the-winner-amid-post-election-violence; https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20251027-four-dead-cameroon-opposition-protests-douala

[lxxvii] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1734784/politique/presidentielle-au-cameroun-quatre-morts-dans-des-manifestations-resultats-attendus-ce-lundi/; https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/10/28/cameroon-biya-declared-the-winner-amid-post-election-violence; https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20251027-four-dead-cameroon-opposition-protests-douala

[lxxviii] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1735052/politique/presidentielle-au-cameroun-flambee-de-violence-apres-lannonce-de-la-victoire-de-paul-biya/; https://thehill.com/homenews/ap/ap-international/ap-2-protesters-shot-dead-as-tensions-rise-in-cameroon-ahead-of-election-results-opposition-says/mlite/; https://www.courthousenews.com/worlds-oldest-president-paul-biya-wins-cameroon-election-at-92/;  https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/10/28/cameroon-biya-declared-the-winner-amid-post-election-violence; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1735474/politique/presidentielle-au-cameroun-le-gouvernement-admet-des-morts-lunion-africaine-felicite-paul-biya/

[lxxix] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1735052/politique/presidentielle-au-cameroun-flambee-de-violence-apres-lannonce-de-la-victoire-de-paul-biya/

[lxxx] https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/10/28/cameroon-biya-declared-the-winner-amid-post-election-violence

[lxxxi] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1735052/politique/presidentielle-au-cameroun-flambee-de-violence-apres-lannonce-de-la-victoire-de-paul-biya/

[lxxxii] https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2025/10/27/security-forces-on-high-alert-as-cameroon-awaits-election-results,110539960-art

[lxxxiii] https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2025/10/27/security-forces-on-high-alert-as-cameroon-awaits-election-results,110539960-art; https://africacenter.org/spotlight/growing-instability-cameroon-raises-fundamental-questions-about-state; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1734681/politique/presidentielle-au-cameroun-deux-soutiens-dissa-tchiroma-bakary-arretes/

[lxxxiv] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20251027-pr%C3%A9sidentielle-au-cameroun-tensions-%C3%A0-douala-et-garoua-apr%C3%A8s-l-annonce-de-la-victoire-de-paul-biya; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1735474/politique/presidentielle-au-cameroun-le-gouvernement-admet-des-morts-lunion-africaine-felicite-paul-biya/

[lxxxv] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1734784/politique/presidentielle-au-cameroun-quatre-morts-dans-des-manifestations-resultats-attendus-ce-lundi/

[lxxxvi] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/27/cameroon-paul-biya-oldest-serving-head-of-state-declared-winner-in-election; https://www dot khq.com/national/rallies-in-cameroon-after-rival-rejects-92-year-old-biyas-win/article_28638247-ec9a-5177-b66e-e36c15011407.html

[lxxxvii] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1734681/politique/presidentielle-au-cameroun-deux-soutiens-dissa-tchiroma-bakary-arretes/

[lxxxviii] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1734681/politique/presidentielle-au-cameroun-deux-soutiens-dissa-tchiroma-bakary-arretes/

[lxxxix] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1734681/politique/presidentielle-au-cameroun-deux-soutiens-dissa-tchiroma-bakary-arretes/

[xc] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/21/cameroon-government-bans-opposition-coalitions

[xci] https://www.channelstv.com/2018/11/04/police-arrest-19-opposition-protesters-in-cameroon/; https://www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-s-opposition-moves-to-safe-holy-ground-for-anti-biya-protests/4633578.html

[xcii]  https://www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-s-opposition-moves-to-safe-holy-ground-for-anti-biya-protests/4633578.html

[xciii] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/21/cameroon-government-bans-opposition-coalitions; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/29/cameroon-opposition-leader-maurice-kamto-claims-won-2018-election-arrested; https://www.amnesty.org/es/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/AFR1717782020ENGLISH.pdf

[xciv] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/21/cameroon-government-bans-opposition-coalitions

[xcv] https://www.africanews dot com/2025/08/05/constitutional-councils-decision-leaves-kamto-out-of-presidential-race/

[xcvi] https://www.facebook.com/groups/1984624875200918/posts/4156026448060739/; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=3765627813731309&rdid=dbJxirpAPUiJv3i0; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1131706915834981; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=4213023595579656; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=767013746361578

[xcvii] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=3765627813731309&rdid=4sW8dI9jMkAwI11l

[xcviii] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1488050135739729

[xcix] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/what-the-madagascar-coup-means-for-africa-mining-and-competition-in-the-indian-ocean-africa-file-special-edition

[c] https://thevoiceofafrica dot com/2025/10/27/cameroons-youth-erupt-enough-is-enough-a-nation-protests-paul-biyas-43-year-rule/

[ci] https://254news.co.ke/ruto-reshuffles-government-in-major-shake-up-under-executive-order-1-of-2025/; https://www.bbc.com/news/live/c1jd8enywplt\ https://apnews.com/article/kenya-protests-police-brutality-ruto-sabasaba-6a6459779d85310f6bcc96cd12683501; https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/10/15/morocco-protests-met-with-repression-violence; https://www.npr.org/2025/10/02/g-s1-91601/anti-government-protests-morocco

[cii] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c886g5evlxjo

[ciii] https://africa dot businessinsider.com/local/lifestyle/a-gen-z-led-protest-has-toppled-yet-another-government-this-time-in-africa/p40ny9e; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1732278/politique/on-exige-detre-entendus-a-madagascar-apres-linvestiture-du-nouveau-president-la-gen-z-retient-son-souffle/

[civ] https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20251029-more-than-2-000-young-moroccans-face-prosecution-over-gen-z-protests; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-29/moroccan-authorities-charge-2-400-people-over-genz-protests; https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/07/africa/kenya-police-prodemocracy-protests-intl; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/9/at-least-31-dead-532-arrested-in-kenyas-antigovernment-protests; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/2/death-toll-rises-to-3-in-morocco-with-more-protests-expected

[cv] https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2025/10/27/talks-in-doha-airstrikes-in-east-drc-m23-and-kinshasa-brace-for-battle,110539921-art; https://actualite dot cd/2025/10/19/walikale-les-positions-des-rebelles-de-lafcm23-mpety-de-nouveau-ciblees-par-des-frappes

[cvi] https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2025/10/27/talks-in-doha-airstrikes-in-east-drc-m23-and-kinshasa-brace-for-battle,110539921-art

[cvii] https://actualite dot cd/2025/10/21/rdc-une-position-des-rebelles-de-lafcm23-ciblee-par-une-frappe-de-drone-des-fardc-pres; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/1980580457034236407; https://actualite dot cd/2025/10/21/rdc-apres-kalembe-une-autre-position-des-rebelles-de-lafcm23-ciblee-par-une-frappe; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2025/10/21/masisi-des-positions-de-lafc-m23-bombardees-a-kalembe; https://beto dot cd/actualite/la-rdc-a-la-une/2025/10/21/les-fardc-intensifient-leurs-frappes-contre-le-m23-a-masisi.html/199849

[cviii] https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2025/10/27/talks-in-doha-airstrikes-in-east-drc-m23-and-kinshasa-brace-for-battle,110539921-art; https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/1983117222873530788

[cix] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H5KFhxu5VfA; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/1974736039827608027; https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/1974609027645714916; https://x.com/RealManziWilly/status/1974720831889547515; https://x.com/BenMbonimpa/status/1974707015613386853; https://x.com/FannyKaj1/status/1974719564240896273; https://x.com/AganzeRafiki/status/1974764852955476188; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2025/10/02/nord-kivu-des-bombardements-de-drones-des-fardc-touchent-des-civils-a-rutshuru; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/1973693769443582124; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/1973646417802448916; https://x.com/FelixMugenzi/status/1973713787187540457; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/1973690907171168392

[cx] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/drc-ceasefire-collapse-turkish-troops-niger-sudan-el-fasher-rsf-siege-jnim-pressure-eastern-burkina-faso-africa-file-september-25-2025#DRC

[cxi] https://actualite dot cd/2025/10/23/walikale-la-position-des-rebelles-de-lafcm23-busika-ciblee-par-une-frappe-aerienne-des; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/1981403231533007214; https://actualite dot cd/2025/10/28/rdc-nouvelle-frappe-aerienne-de-larmee-sur-une-position-des-rebelles-de-lafcm23-pres-de; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/1983104477403197783; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/1983205411525185813; https://x.com/LwarhibaM/status/1983067821631275078

[cxii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-april-3-2025-russia-sahel-summit-sahelian-juntas-target-chinese-mining-m23-loses-walikale-but-uganda-leaves-vacuum#DRC; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/03/20/en-rdc-le-m23-s-empare-de-walikale-chef-lieu-d-une-importante-zone-miniere_6583828_3212.html; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1669638/politique/cessez-le-feu-entre-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda-la-cartographie-de-lavancee-du-m23

[cxiii] https://www.dw.com/en/congos-m23-rebels-on-the-trail-of-mineral-resources/a-70715387;  https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf; https://www.ipisresearch.be/mapping/webmapping/drcongo/v6; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/03/20/en-rdc-le-m23-s-empare-de-walikale-chef-lieu-d-une-importante-zone-miniere_6583828_3212.html

[cxiv] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/congo-war-security-review-march-19-2025; https://actualite dot cd/2025/04/03/rdc-larmee-et-les-wazalendo-de-retour-walikale-centre-apres-le-retrait-des-rebelles-de; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/1907763132623204388; https://x.com/michombero/status/1907533478263951441; https://x.com/AKimonyo/status/1907532247487385765; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-rebels-leave-strategic-town-ahead-planned-doha-talks-2025-04-04

[cxv] https://actualite dot cd/2025/10/15/masisi-accalmie-malemo-apres-des-affrontements-entre-les-rebelles-de-lafcm23-et-les; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/1978415866703184054; https://actualite dot cd/2025/10/23/walikale-affrontements-entre-les-rebelles-de-lafcm23-et-les-wazalendo-ihula; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2025/10/23/walikale-des-combats-signales-ce-matin-entre-les-wazalendo-et-lafc-m23-a-ihula; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/10/23/actualite/securite/combats-violents-entre-les-fardc-et-le-m23-ihula-au-nord-kivu; https://x.com/VoiceOfCongo/status/1981407600634720541; https://actualite dot cd/2025/10/24/walikale-accalmie-ihula-au-lendemain-de-violents-combats-entre-les-rebelles-de-lafcm23; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/10/27/actualite/securite/sept-morts-dans-des-accrochages-entre-wazalendo-et-afcm23-en-trois; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2025/10/27/masisi-une-fillette-tuee-et-trois-blesses-dans-une-attaque-armee-a-mbuhi; https://actualite dot cd/index.php/2025/10/27/masisi-quatre-enfants-tues-lors-des-affrontements-entre-les-rebelles-de-lafcm23-et-les; https://x.com/GeorgesKisando/status/1982770577237483526

[cxvi] https://kivumorningpost dot com/2025/10/20/masisi-deux-personnes-blessees-dans-une-incursion-des-hommes-armes-a-nyange; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/10/27/actualite/securite/sept-morts-dans-des-accrochages-entre-wazalendo-et-afcm23-en-trois; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2025/10/28/walikale-combats-intenses-a-kibati-entre-lafc-m23-et-les-fardc-allies-aux-wazalendo; https://actualite dot cd/2025/10/28/walikale-nouveaux-affrontements-entre-les-rebelles-de-lafcm23-et-les-wazalendo-kibati; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/1983205411525185813; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/1983104477403197783; https://actualite dot cd/2025/10/29/walikale-retour-au-calme-kibati-apres-une-journee-dintenses-combats-entre-les-rebelles; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/1983462741269504365

[cxvii] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/1972394570878185800; https://actualite dot cd/2025/09/28/walikale-deux-positions-des-rebelles-de-lafcm23-ciblees-par-des-frappes-aeriennes-de; https://actualite dot cd/2025/09/29/nord-kivu-pour-la-deuxieme-fois-le-pont-minjenje-detruit-par-des-frappes-aeriennes-de; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/09/29/actualite/securite/une-jeune-fille-blessee-lors-des-combats-entre-wazalendo-et-rebelles; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2025/09/29/walikale-le-pont-mpeti-detruit-lors-des-bombardements-des-fardc; https://actualite dot cd/2025/10/09/walikale-un-nouveau-bombardement-de-laviation-de-larmee-vise-le-pont-minjenje; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2025/10/09/nord-kivu-larmee-bombarde-de-nouveau-le-pont-mpeti-pour-stopper-lavancee-du-m23

[cxviii] https://actualite dot cd/2025/10/09/walikale-un-nouveau-bombardement-de-laviation-de-larmee-vise-le-pont-minjenje; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/1972394570878185800; https://actualite dot cd/2025/09/28/walikale-deux-positions-des-rebelles-de-lafcm23-ciblees-par-des-frappes-aeriennes-de; https://actualite dot cd/2025/09/29/nord-kivu-pour-la-deuxieme-fois-le-pont-minjenje-detruit-par-des-frappes-aeriennes-de; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/09/29/actualite/securite/une-jeune-fille-blessee-lors-des-combats-entre-wazalendo-et-rebelles; https://kivumorningpost dot com/2025/09/29/walikale-le-pont-mpeti-detruit-lors-des-bombardements-des-fardc

[cxix] https://actualite dot cd/2025/09/26/rdc-walikale-les-rebelles-de-lafcm23-relancent-les-travaux-de-construction-du-pont; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/1972394570878185800

[cxx] https://radiomaendeleo dot org/sud-kivu-lusine-de-twangiza-mining-fortement-frappee-par-des-drones-des-fardc; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/1978333986838470942; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/1978415866703184054; https://radiomaendeleo dot org/sud-kivu-lusine-de-twangiza-mining-fortement-frappee-par-des-drones-des-fardc; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/1978336259362725894; https://x.com/Aiglekivu003PKM/status/1978343498140041523; https://x.com/Katsuva_R/status/1978331259131568473; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/10/23/actualite/securite/bombardement-de-lusine-dor-de-twangiza-au-sud-kivu-sous-occupation-du; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/1981219730863149378; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/1981274350545219687; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/1981233593897677091; https://x.com/RutegaBin/status/1981225033771909295; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/1981403231533007214

[cxxi] https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/1978333986838470942; https://radiomaendeleo dot org/sud-kivu-lusine-de-twangiza-mining-fortement-frappee-par-des-drones-des-fardc; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/1981219730863149378; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/1981233593897677091; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/10/23/actualite/securite/bombardement-de-lusine-dor-de-twangiza-au-sud-kivu-sous-occupation-du; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/m23-rebels-loot-70-million-worth-gold-congo-mine-since-may-company-says-2025-10-21; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/1978333986838470942; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/1978415866703184054; https://radiomaendeleo dot org/sud-kivu-lusine-de-twangiza-mining-fortement-frappee-par-des-drones-des-fardc; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/1978336259362725894; https://x.com/Aiglekivu003PKM/status/1978343498140041523; https://x.com/Katsuva_R/status/1978331259131568473; https://x.com/etiennemulindwa/status/1981219730863149378

[cxxii] https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2025/10/27/talks-in-doha-airstrikes-in-east-drc-m23-and-kinshasa-brace-for-battle,110539921-art

[cxxiii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/drc-ceasefire-collapse-turkish-troops-niger-sudan-el-fasher-rsf-siege-jnim-pressure-eastern-burkina-faso-africa-file-september-25-2025#DRC; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/mali-jnim-blockade-burundi-hedges-drc-sudan-rsf-offensive-is-mozambique-resurges-cameroon-biya-election-africa-file-october-23-2025#Burundi

[cxxiv] https://x.com/KadimaYassin/status/1920798858411393462; https://actualite dot cd/2025/05/09/sud-kivu-twangiza-mining-suspend-ses-activites-apres-larrivee-des-rebelles-de-lafcm23; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/1920203438656532926; https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/congo-war-security-review-may-6-2025; https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/congo-war-security-review-may-8-2025; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/congo-gold-miner-halts-operations-tax-dispute-with-m23-rebel-administration-2025-05-09; https://x.com/TazamaRDC_Infos/status/1948715842922746252

[cxxv] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/m23-rebels-loot-70-million-worth-gold-congo-mine-since-may-company-says-2025-10-21

[cxxvi] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/m23-rebels-loot-70-million-worth-gold-congo-mine-since-may-company-says-2025-10-21

[cxxvii] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/1982791850621551066; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/m23-rebels-reject-accusations-gold-theft-eastern-congo-mine-2025-10-23; https://x.com/afcongo/status/1981616292739088821; https://x.com/HeritierBarak/status/1981654486549504200; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/1981372235609698511; https://x.com/Kivuinfo24/status/1981383346438754542

[cxxviii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/m23s-statebuilding-project-rwanda-drc-africa-file-special-edition

[cxxix] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/1946547313062584727

[cxxx] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/1946547313062584727

[cxxxi] https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/1978072757809066311; https://x.com/Com_mediasRDC/status/1978056282008322412; https://x.com/MofaQatar_FR/status/1978119423006306586; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20251014-est-de-la-rdc-kinshasa-et-l-afc-m23-s-accordent-sur-le-m%C3%A9canisme-de-v%C3%A9rification-du-cessez-le-feu; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1730732/politique/exclusif-la-rdc-et-le-m23-sentendent-sur-un-mecanisme-de-verification-du-cessez-le-feu; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-m23-sign-deal-doha-ceasefire-monitoring-sources-say-2025-10-14; https://apnews.com/article/congo-m23-rwanda-ceasefire-fighting-6e31fee274c3ca2c3a79fdd76078d3e9; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-14/congo-and-rwanda-backed-m23-rebels-agree-to-ceasefire-monitoring; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/10/14/actualite/politique/le-gouvernement-et-lafc-m23-signent-un-mecanisme-de-surveillance-du; https://actualite dot cd/index.php/2025/10/14/doha-au-sixieme-round-des-discussions-la-rdc-et-lafcm23-sentendent-sur-le-mecanisme-de

[cxxxii] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1734331/politique/est-de-la-rdc-de-washington-a-doha-des-mediations-sous-la-pression-de-trump; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YdfWq1NN_cI; https://actualite dot cd/2025/10/24/cessez-le-feu-dans-lest-de-la-rdc-le-gouvernement-et-lafcm23-continuent-de-saccuser-de; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/1981396752830718260; https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/1983117222873530788; https://x.com/BenMbonimpa/status/1983093774772216168

[cxxxiii] https://www.dw.com/fr/interview-sylvain-ekenge-rdc/a-74490164

[cxxxiv] https://x.com/MukambaK38350/status/1981684429908283796; https://x.com/Kivuinfo24/status/1981471658952077323

[cxxxv] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/118/80/pdf/n2411880.pdf; https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf; https://docs.un.org/en/s/2025/446

[cxxxvi] https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/15673/peace-talks-falter-as-m23-tightens-its-grip-on-the-kivus

[cxxxvii] https://www.state.gov/peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda

[cxxxviii] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1734331/politique/est-de-la-rdc-de-washington-a-doha-des-mediations-sous-la-pression-de-trump

[cxxxix] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1734331/politique/est-de-la-rdc-de-washington-a-doha-des-mediations-sous-la-pression-de-trump

[cxl] https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/1982063219557437804

[cxli] https://www.state.gov/briefings-foreign-press-centers/unga-2025/advancing-trump-administration-priorities-in-sub-saharan-africa

[cxlii] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-rwanda-will-not-sign-economic-deal-this-week-setback-peace-process-2025-10-03; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-03/trump-touted-rwanda-congo-economic-pact-trips-on-elusive-peace; https://information.tv5monde.com/international/video/echec-de-la-signature-dun-accord-economique-entre-kigali-et-kinshasa-2792999; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/10/09/en-rdc-pas-d-accord-economique-avant-une-paix-restauree-avec-kigali-affirme-kinshasa_6645448_3212.html; https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2025/10/24/washington-proposes-13-november-for-signing-of-peace-deal,110539444-bre

[cxliii] https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2025/10/24/washington-proposes-13-november-for-signing-of-peace-deal,110539444-bre

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