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Key Takeaway: The Malagasy military took power in Madagascar in response to weeks of massive youth-led, anti-corruption protests and a resulting constitutional standoff. The crisis could affect US and allied mining operations in Madagascar, pose another challenge to the legitimacy of the African Union and regional African institutions, and alter Chinese, French, and Russian influence in Madagascar and the surrounding Indian Ocean.

The Malagasy military took power in Madagascar in response to weeks of massive youth-led, anti-corruption protests. Youth protest organizations known as the “Gen Z Madagascar” have staged mass anti-government demonstrations in Antananarivo, Madagascar’s capital, since September 25.[1] The protests initially began over water and electricity shortages but grew in size and scope. Protesters have rallied against widespread poverty, high living costs, poor access to tertiary education, and the alleged corruption of Malagasy President Andry Rajoelina and his allies.[2] Nearly 75 percent of the Malagasy population is impoverished, and 64 percent lack access to power.[3] Security forces killed at least 22 civilians in crackdowns, according to the UN.[4] Rajoelina sacked his cabinet on October 8, promised to resign in a year if there are still power cuts, and said he would not run in 2028 presidential elections.[5]

The Personnel Administration and Technical and Administrative Services Corps (CAPSAT, Corps d’administration des personnels et des services administratifs et techniques)—one of the most powerful military factions in Madagascar—mutinied and joined the protesters on October 11.[6] CAPSAT has significant sway due to its location on the Antananarivo outskirts, key role in the military’s logistics and support operations, large size, and control over arms depots.[7] The situation mirrors Rajoelina’s initial rise to power in 2009, when CAPSAT mutinied due to the mishandling of mass protests. The unit ultimately overthrew the former government and supported Rajoelina, who was the Antananarivo mayor at the time, in taking power.[8]

CAPSAT gradually co-opted key security institutions in the days after its mutiny, which Rajoelina labeled as a coup.[9] CAPSAT officers stated on October 12 that CAPSAT would issue future orders to all military forces and urged other security forces to refuse orders to shoot protesters.[10] The newly appointed Malagasy defense minister appointed CAPSAT-backed General Démosthène Pikulas to be the new chief of defense staff on October 12.[11] Most senior officers in the capital attended the ceremony, indicating widespread support among the military.[12] The National Gendarmerie Intervention Force (FIGN), an elite gendarmerie unit that had been suppressing protests, became the first National Gendarmerie unit to mutiny on October 12.[13] Pikulas installed the FIGN head as the new commander of the National Gendarmerie on October 13 and called for reconciliation and unity between the gendarmerie and military after brief clashes between the two on October 11.[14]

The military formally took power on October 14 amid a constitutional crisis. Rajoelina reportedly fled the country on October 12, fueling claims that he is physically unable to fulfill his duties. French media reported that Rajoelina fled the country on a French military aircraft to the French-administered Réunion Island on October 12, where he took a private jet to the United Arab Emirates on October 13.[15] Rajoelina claimed that he left for fear of his life due to an assassination attempt during a public address on October 13.[16]

Rajoelina then attempted to dissolve Madagascar’s National Assembly as the National Assembly impeached him, exacerbating the emerging constitutional crisis. Rajoelina announced on October 14 that he had dissolved the National Assembly—the lower house of Malagasy parliament—to trigger elections, which would take place after at least 60 days.[17] Rajoelina explicitly claimed that he consulted the leaders of the National Assembly and Senate, as legally required to dissolve parliament, but opposition figures denied that he did so.[18] The National Assembly impeached Rajoelina hours later by a near-unanimous vote that included Rajoelina’s own party members on October 14.[19] Rajoelina said the resolution was “null and void” because he had already dissolved the assembly.[20]

The Malagasy constitution dictates that the president of the Senate is head of state if the presidency is vacant, but the Senate presidency is also unfilled, leaving a de facto power vacuum. The Senate—the upper chamber of Malagasy parliament—removed previous Senate president General Richard Ravalomanana, who protesters had demanded step down due to his close ties to Rajoelina, on October 11.[21] The Senate appointed Jean André Ndremanjary to temporarily lead the body but was unable to elect a new Senate president until its next session on October 21.[22] Article 52 of the Malagasy constitution states that the High Constitutional Court must declare the presidency vacant following resignation or “abandonment of the power in whatever form that may be.”[23] The constitution goes on to state that the Senate president exercises the functions of the head of state after the High Constitutional Court has officially declared the vacancy.[24] The powers of the head of state are “exercised jointly by the Government” if the High Constitutional Court also declares Senate president incapacitated.[25]

CAPSAT seized power and announced plans to suspend most democratic institutions and create a transitional government. CAPSAT’s leader, Colonel Michaël Randrianirina announced after Rajoelina’s impeachment on October 14 that CAPSAT was in charge and had suspended all democratic institutions except the National Assembly.[26] The dissolution of the Senate prevents the Senate from electing a new Senate president to officially assume the role of head of state as mandated by the constitution. Randrianirina said that he would become president at the invitation of the High Constitutional Court; created a ruling commission including security leaders and select civilian officials; and outlined plans for a constitutional referendum and elections within the next two years.[27]

The High Constitutional Court affirmed Randrianirina’s interim leadership later on October 14, despite its dissolution, but contested aspects of the planned transition.[28] The court’s official readout declared the presidency and senate presidency vacant and offered Randrianirina to “exercise the functions of heads of state,” given that all other options are exhausted.[29] The court rejected Randrianirina’s dissolution of other institutions, however, and noted that elections must be held within 30 to 60 days per the Malagasy constitution.[30]

Political or military instability could affect critical mineral mining on the island, including some US and allied projects and supply chains. The pro-sovereigntist juntas that rose to power in former French colonies in West Africa have aggressively targeted foreign mining companies to renegotiate lopsided deals. The political instability has dampened investment, led to mine seizures, and caused production shutdowns in some cases.[31] The new Malagasy leadership has been preoccupied with consolidating power and has not made any references to foreign investment since taking power.

Madagascar is a major producer of cobalt, graphite, and nickel, all of which are used in lithium-ion batteries. Madagascar is the world’s second-largest graphite producer, with China, India, Germany, and the United States all leading purchasers. The United States purchases 4 percent of its graphite imports from Madagascar, making the island its fourth-largest supplier behind China, Canada, and Mozambique.[32] Japan and South Korea import roughly a quarter and a third of their nickel from Madagascar, respectively.[33]

Instability could undermine a fledgling US-owned critical minerals project. US-based Energy Fuels acquired the Toliara project in October 2024, a deposit with titanium, zirconium, rare earth, and radioactive minerals.[34] These elements are defined as critical minerals due to their widespread use in aircraft, aerospace equipment, electric vehicles, nuclear energy infrastructure, and renewable energy systems.[35] The company said it aimed to process these ores in Utah. The Malagasy government lifted a 2019 suspension on the project shortly after the Energy Fuels acquisition, following extensive negotiations, setting the stage for a final investment decision to operationalize the mine by early 2026.[36]

Several US allies also own mines in Madagascar. Canadian company NextSource Materials owns the Molo mine, which is one of the largest and highest-quality graphite deposits in the world.[37] The British-Australian multinational conglomerate Rio Tinto operates QIT Madagascar Minerals as part of a joint venture with the Malagasy government. The project produces the same minerals as the Toliara project and includes a deep-water public port.[38] Japanese and Korean mining companies jointly own the Ambatovy nickel mine, although there are reports that Japan has been considering selling its shares since late 2024.[39]

The crisis is both a challenge and an opportunity for the legitimacy of the African Union (AU) and regional African institutions. The AU, regional African institutions such as the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and South African Development Community (SADC), and French President Emmanuel Macron urged restraint and respect for the constitution in separate statements made before the coup on October 13.[40] These key actors also expressed unanimous interest in collaborating to support dialogue and mediation efforts prior to the military taking power. The AU Peace and Security Council specifically recommended that the AU immediately dispatch a high-level delegation to Madagascar to engage with domestic stakeholders; appoint a special envoy to Madagascar to reinforce facilitation, mediation, and stabilization efforts in the country in collaboration with SADC and IOC; and establish a follow-up mechanism to support a reconciliation and dialogue process in Madagascar.[41]

Figure 1. African Institutions Involved in the Madagascar Crisis

Source: Liam Karr.

The AU has explicitly called for Madagascar and regional partners to reactivate the 2011 “Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar,” which ended the political crisis that resulted from the 2009 coup, to address the current crisis.[42] The AU and SADC mediated between Madagascar’s four main factions after the 2009 coup.[43] These African-led mediation efforts suffered many setbacks but resulted in several shaky initial power-sharing deals, a new constitution in 2010, and the SADC-backed 2011 transition roadmap.[44] The roadmap called for the formation of a consensus government to lead until elections, the construction of an electoral framework, national reconciliation efforts, and other confidence-building measures.[45] The transition concluded with successful elections in 2013.[46]

CAPSAT’s recent rhetoric and historical experience following the 2009 coup indicate that it may be open to regional mediation, which would accelerate a transition and help mitigate coup-related sanctions. The international community gradually lifted economic and political sanctions imposed after the 2009 coup as part of the 2011 roadmap.[47] Randrianirina’s new transitional council creates a body for mediators to engage with, and his outlined transition plan already includes several elements from the 2011 roadmap, including representation for civilians and the political parties involved in former conflicts to ensure dialogue and reconciliation.[48] The Malagasy security forces and political parties appear relatively less fragmented and more supportive of CAPSAT compared to the 2009 coup, which makes Randrianirina’s two-year timeline more feasible. The 2009 crisis included counter-protests, threats from rival military factions, and continued party loyalty to the ousted president, all of which have not materialized to the same extent in 2025.[49]

African institutions across the continent are struggling to effectively respond to a multitude of military and political crises. The West African regional bloc remains divided after juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2025. The juntas cited punitive coup-related sanctions and a failure to address the insurgencies enveloping their countries as key reasons for leaving ECOWAS to form a counter-bloc called the Alliance of Sahel States.[50] SADC and the East African Community both failed to negotiate an end to the conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda by the end of 2024 despite years of mediation.[51] Qatar and the United States assumed responsibility for negotiations after fighting intensified in early 2025, with the AU playing a supporting role.[52] The AU and other African institutions have failed to halt the civil war in Sudan, which is partially the legacy of the coup against the civilian-led Sudanese transitional government in 2021.[53]

The crisis could affect France’s dwindling influence on the continent and the Indian Ocean, given France’s strong ties with Madagascar and the countries’ shared involvement in regional institutions. France has maintained close economic and political ties with Madagascar since Madagascar gained independence from France in 1960. France is one of Madagascar’s leading economic partners, with bilateral trade exceeding $1.1 billion annually in the last three years, mostly in agricultural and textile products.[54]  Macron became the first French president to travel to Madagascar in nearly 20 years when he visited in April 2025 to finalize energy, infrastructure, technology, and tourism agreements to expand and modernize this economic partnership.[55] Macron expressed interest in developing supply chains and partnering on critical minerals during his visit.[56]

Some protesters view Rajoelina as pro-French, which could spark anti-French backlash, as seen in other coups in former French colonies. There were isolated cases of anti-French slogans during the protests, but such sentiment was not a widespread theme, unlike in West Africa.[57] The juntas that came to power in West African countries cut defense ties with France and pressured French businesses out of their countries.[58] Rajoelina’s naturalized French citizenship became public during the 2023 elections, which sparked backlash that he was a French puppet and should lose his Malagasy citizenship and eligibility for office according to Malagasy law.[59] Pro-sovereigntist Malagasy news outlets have amplified articles accusing France of neocolonial practices and plotting to intervene after helping evacuate Rajoelina.[60] Randrianirina declined to speak French in a BBC interview on October 15 because he does not like “glorifying the colonial tongue.”[61]

France has nearly 2,000 military and civilian defense personnel stationed on French islands near Madagascar as part of the Armed Forces in the Southern Indian Ocean Zone (FAZSOI, Les forces armées de la zone sud de l’océan Indien).[62] Réunion hosts an air base, a naval base, and the 2nd Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment. Mayotte hosts a second naval base and the Mayotte Foreign Legion Detachment. Two frigates, six smaller naval vessels, one helicopter, and two medium transport aircraft are located across the two islands. Mayotte lies roughly 200 miles from Madagascar’s west coast between Madagascar and the African mainland, while Réunion is approximately 450 miles off Madagascar’s east coast. French forces also have a permanent presence on the islands of Juan de Nova, Europa, and the Glorieuses.

Figure 2. Armed Forces in the Southern Indian Ocean Zone

Source: French Army General Staff.

FAZSOI aims to protect French interests in the Indian Ocean. The FAZSOI Permanent Area of ​​Responsibility includes 14 countries from southern Africa and the Indian Ocean and 11 islands in the French Southern and Antarctic Lands.[63] The French Defense Ministry describes FAZSOI as “the main support point of the Indian Ocean theater.”[64] FAZSOI protects French sovereignty and shipping, provides natural disaster assistance, participates in regional training, and prepares to conduct military operations in the event of a crisis across the islands and roughly 3-million-square-kilometer exclusive economic zone.[65]

FAZSOI is one of several tools that France uses to boost regional cooperation, including with Madagascar, and support its regional influence. France has worked with Madagascar through FAZSOI, including providing technical assistance to Malagasy naval vessels and cooperating on humanitarian aid after cyclones.[66] Nearly 150 Malagasy trainees train in French military academies annually.[67] France is also a member of the IOC, which includes Madagascar and three other African Indian Ocean nations, through Réunion. France participates in international maritime security cooperation through the IOC, including extraregional cooperation with countries along Africa’s eastern coast on the Indian Ocean.[68]

Russia has previously tried to meddle in Madagascar and could try to capitalize on the crisis to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean, although it is ill-positioned to do so. The Wagner Group meddled in the 2018 Malagasy elections, offering financial, informational, and strategic support to preferred candidates, which included Rajoelina.[69] A Wagner-linked mining company established a partnership with a Malagasy state-owned chromium mining company around the time of the election.[70] Wagner-linked networks also used troll farms and social media to spread pro-Russian and anti-French narratives, using the same playbook that it would perfect in other former French colonies in West Africa.[71]

Russia has not commented on the crisis, but it likely retains an interest in Madagascar given its efforts to increase its naval power projection in key waterways on both sides of the continent. The Kremlin is working to secure naval bases on Libya’s Mediterranean Sea coast and Sudan’s Red Sea coast as part of its broader efforts to improve its power projection, including the Indian Ocean.[72] Russia signed a naval agreement with São Tomé and Príncipe—a West African Atlantic island nation—in April 2025 that allows Russian ships to refuel at São Toméan ports, allowing Russian ships to remain in the area for longer and improving Russian naval power projection.[73] The São Toméan deal is a template for future agreements with other willing coastal countries, including a potential pro-Russian, or at least anti-French, Malagasy government. The AU and Macron have warned against foreign interference, although there is no evidence of Russian meddling so far.[74]

Figure 3. Africa Corps Logistics Network in Africa

Source: Liam Karr.

The Kremlin is more poorly positioned to quickly capitalize on the crisis, however, since subsuming control of the Wagner Group and shifting toward more traditional state-to-state relations. The late Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin quickly emerged to offer the group’s services after coups in West Africa that replaced pro-French leaders with anti-French juntas.[75] The Kremlin has subsumed Wagner’s operations under the Ministry of Defense–controlled Africa Corps since the Wagner mutiny and Prigozhin’s subsequent death in 2023, however. This shift has promoted more traditional state-to-state military arrangements and constrained Wagner’s flexibility and entrepreneurial nature.[76]

Russia also has little to offer beyond regime protection, which may be unappealing to the new military leaders. The Gen Z protests and Madagascar’s greatest needs are development-focused, not security-focused, which is the area where Russia has had the most success making inroads. Russia could offer the new junta leaders the regime security package it has used to keep other pro-Russian authoritarian regimes in Africa, but it is unclear if the new military leaders plan on remaining in power long-term or fear a possible countercoup.[77] Harsh international sanctions and fears of external military intervention pushed the new West African juntas further into Russia’s orbit after their coups, although the international community has yet to formally respond to CAPSAT’s power seizure.[78]

The crisis is unlikely to affect China’s dominant economic position, but the erosion of French influence could create additional gaps for China to fill. China is Madagascar’s other largest trade partner, with $1.08 billion in trade in 2023.[79] Billions of dollars of Chinese investment through the Belt and Road Initiative has supported several major economic projects, including railways and mines.[80] Chinese media have encouraged dialogue and emphasized the importance of long-term Chinese-Malagasy ties.[81] This rhetoric mirrors China’s previous approaches to coups in Africa, where it maintains a low profile and attempts to cultivate ties with the new authorities to protect its business interests. China has capitalized on the erosion of French influence in parts of West Africa to expand its presence in affected economic sectors and provide more defense equipment.[82]

Africa File Data Cutoff: October 15, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.