Russian Info Ops; Attritional Battles in Sudan: Africa File, July 17, 2025

To receive the weekly Africa File or tri-weekly Congo War Security Review via email, please subscribe here. Follow CTP on X, LinkedIn, and BlueSky.

Contributors: Calvin Hodges and Ellery White

Key Takeaways:

• Russia. The Kremlin will likely take advantage of recent US cuts to media funding in Africa as Russia continues to expand its media presence on the continent. Russia’s media ecosystem in Africa supports Russia’s strategic effort to supplant the United States and its allies in Africa through anti-Western and pro-Kremlin information operations to strengthen Russian soft power.
• Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces are escalating their war of attrition for key positions in strategic regions in the western half of Sudan. Some RSF activity across western Sudan is exacerbating Sudan’s humanitarian crisis and likely amounts to war crimes, including crimes against humanity, acts of ethnic cleansing, and possible genocide.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo. IS Central Africa Province conducted its deadliest string of attacks on civilians in the eastern DRC since early 2025 in retaliation for recent joint Congolese-Ugandan operations against the group.
• Sahel. The al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates in the Sahel have clashed numerous times since late June in the deadliest period of inter-jihadi fighting in the Sahel since 2022.

Assessments:

Russia

Author: Liam Karr

The Kremlin will likely take advantage of recent US cuts to media funding in Africa as Russia continues to expand its media presence on the continent. A new report from Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) noted that Russian media now broadcasts in more than 40 African countries and six languages, including new Portuguese services, and plans to begin Amharic language news by the end of 2025.[i] The GUR said that Russian state-owned new agency TASS aims to open more correspondent offices across the continent and that Russian state-owned TV network RT has doubled its African TV channel partners over the least two years, growing from 30 in 2023 to 60 in 2025.[ii] These more traditional efforts are intertwined with the launch of a new propaganda outlet in 2023—African Initiative—as part of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s effort to subsume control of Wagner Group structures.[iii]

Russia has simultaneously expanded efforts to train African journalists to create pro-Russian journalist networks.[iv] RT launched a free online international journalism training program—called RT Academy—in 2024 that it claimed trained more than 1,000 media personnel in Africa, and Russian media organizations have held journalism training sessions on the continent in 2025.[v] African Initiative has opened training centers and partnered with local media outlets in the Sahel.[vi]

The Kremlin is using multiple security agencies to support its decades-long campaign, which aims to rebuild its Soviet-era media conglomerate in Africa as part of its efforts to challenge the West.[vii] Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized building media cooperation agreements with local partners around 2015 and has used RT and state-owned news and radio agency Sputnik to bring African journalists to train in Russia for nearly a decade.[viii] Putin has leveraged various security agencies to help expand Russian state-controlled foreign language programming since 2020.[ix] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is directly overseeing the hiring of new correspondents to run TASS offices in Africa and may oversee African initiative according to some reports.[x] African Initiative’s editorial board has ties to the Wagner Group and various Russian state apparatuses, including the foreign affairs and defense ministries.[xi] The United States State Department said in 2024 that Russian intelligence services provide “material support and guidelines” to African Initiative.[xii]

The Kremlin is escalating its information efforts as the United States has cut funding for independent African journalism, leaving a growing void in Africa’s information space. The United States froze over $250 million allocated to support independent media around the world in early 2025.[xiii] At least $28 million of this budget supported organizations in Africa and included funds for training editors, fact checkers, journalists, and publishers.[xiv] US funding cuts will enable the Kremlin and their allies to co-opt or silence vulnerable African journalists.

The United States is also considering cutting funding for US international reporting and broadcasting services such as Voice of America (VOA), which would further widen this void.[xv] US President Donald Trump effectively shut down VOA in March, but legal disputes have challenged the decision.[xvi] VOA is an online and radio news source in 13 African countries for 93 million African consumers.[xvii] VOA broadcasts to the two most populous countries on the continent—Ethiopia and Nigeria—as well as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia, which have been US policy focus areas since Trump entered office in January 2025.

Figure 1. Russian Information Operations in Africa

Sources: Liam Karr, European Parliament, Institute for the Study of War, Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

Russia’s media ecosystem in Africa supports Russia’s strategic effort to supplant the United States and its allies in Africa by propagating anti-Western and pro-Kremlin information operations to strengthen Russian soft power. The US Department of Defense–funded Africa Center for Strategic studies reported in 2024 that Russia backed at least 80 information campaigns in 22 African countries.[xviii] These campaigns center on Kremlin narratives that push the view that Russia should be Africa’s preferred “great power partner” over the West on various issues, thereby eroding US and Western access, presence, and influence in Africa.[xix] These narratives often posit Russia and other revisionist powers as anti-imperial allies against the “exploitative” West.[xx] Some campaigns disparage Ukraine, the United States, and the West directly, while others seek to cultivate positive public opinion about Russian engagement.[xxi] This approach has latched onto genuine preexisting grievances with the West’s approach to engagement with the continent, especially in Francophone Africa, gaining Russia more popular support and allies while obscuring Russia’s exploitative objectives.[xxii]

The Kremlin uses its human network of pro-Russian journalists to spread these information narratives and reach different audiences. Russian journalist training programs include some standard journalism courses but bake false Russian narratives about the West and “anti-Russian fake news” into course modules.[xxiii] Russia also invites these journalists and other bloggers and influencers to visit Russia, where they are fed Russian propaganda narratives that they spread to their African audiences.[xxiv]

Less independent media on the continent will create opportunities for countries such as China and Russia to shape opinions on the continent unchallenged, which will create economic and military opportunities.[xxv] China has used affiliated news outlets to push positive stories on economic projects that have harmed local communities and withheld funding when journalists try to hold China accountable. Russia’s information campaigns helped shape opinions in the Sahel and set conditions for Russia to be the preferred partner of the new military regimes, even if it is one of many larger factors behind the regional shift away from the West.

Sudan

Authors: Liam Karr with Ellery White

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are battling for key positions in the Kordofan region in central Sudan. The SAF recaptured the um Sumeima area on June 15 after RSF fighters had initially captured the area on July 13.[xxvi] Um Sumeima is 40 miles (65 kilometers) west of the SAF-controlled North Kordofan state capital, el Obeid, and is the SAF’s furthest westward position on the main east–west highway. The SAF separately recaptured the al Dashoul area on June 28, nearly a week after the RSF captured the area.[xxvii] Al Dashoul lies along a key stretch of road 110 miles (182 kilometers) south of el Obeid between SAF-controlled Dilling and Kadugli, the South Kordofan state capital. The RSF has besieged Kadugli since June 2023, but the SAF partially broke the siege in February 2025 when it first captured the al Dashoul area.[xxviii] The SAF has also significantly escalated drone strikes on Bara, which is nearly 40 miles (60 kilometers) north of el Obeid on the highway to Khartoum and is the largest RSF-controlled town in North Darfur, since the beginning of March.[xxix]

Figure 2. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Kordofan Region

Sources: Liam Karr; Vista Maps; Thomas van Linge; Kathryn Tyson.

Control over the Kordofan region is strategic for both sides. RSF control would strengthen its position to partition the country, whereas SAF control would enable it to threaten the RSF’s center of gravity in Darfur. The RSF has intensified operations to capture several besieged SAF holdouts in Kordofan and neighboring Darfur in 2025 as part of a broader strategic effort to consolidate military and political control of the western half of the country and enforce a de facto partition. RSF-aligned militias launched an unsuccessful offensive against SAF positions in Kadugli in February 2025.[xxx] The RSF has escalated attacks on el Fasher—the North Darfur state capital—and Babanusa, which are the last SAF strongholds in North Darfur and West Kordofan states, respectively, since it lost Khartoum in March 2025.[xxxi] The RSF simultaneously prepared a parallel government throughout the first half of 2025 and officially launched the government on July 1.[xxxii]

Figures 3 and 4. RSF Intensifies Attacks on Besieged Areas in Western Sudan

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The SAF aims to open multiple potential lines of advance through Kordofan to threaten the RSF’s center of gravity in Darfur, in part by breaking the RSF sieges throughout the region. Um Sumeima is 86 miles (138 kilometers) east of an Nahud—the RSF-controlled West Kordofan state capital. The SAF breaking RSF sieges in Kordofan would enable it to use the towns as launching pads for an alternative line of advance into Darfur along a secondary highway toward Nyala, the South Darfur state capital and the RSF’s de facto capital. The SAF already launched unsuccessful offensives south of el Obeid in May and July to advance toward its positions in South and West Kordofan.[xxxiii] The offensive in May targeted al Dabibat—a town 50 miles (86 kilometers) south of el Obeid that connects to roads leading to Babanusa and Dilling.[xxxiv]

Figure 5. Control of Terrain in Western Sudan

Sources: Liam Karr, Vista Maps; Thomas van Linge; Kathryn Tyson.

SAF-aligned forces repelled a major RSF incursion into el Fasher as the RSF escalates its efforts to capture the besieged North Darfur state capital. The RSF attacked el Fasher on July 11 and captured several areas of the town for the first time since it began besieging the town in April 2024.[xxxv] The SAF launched a counterattack on July 12, however, and pushed the RSF beyond the city limits. The incursion is the latest sign that the RSF is wearing down the SAF defenders. The RSF captured areas around el Fasher in March and then stormed the Zamzam refugee camp—nine miles south of the state capital—in April.[xxxvi]

Figure 6. RSF Incursion into el Fasher

Source: Liam Karr.

The RSF’s offensive is exacerbating the humanitarian catastrophe in the city. The siege on el Fasher has displaced 780,000 people, including 500,000 civilians who the RSF displaced when it attacked the Zamzam refugee camp.[xxxvii] The RSF has prevented adequate humanitarian aid from entering the town as part of its siege, which has led to famine conditions since August 2024 due to extreme shortages of food and clean water.[xxxviii] Over 200 children have died from malnutrition in 2025, and 40 percent of children under five are suffering from acute malnutrition.[xxxix]

Some RSF activity across western Sudan—particularly el Fasher—likely constitutes war crimes, including crimes against humanity, acts of ethnic cleansing, and possible genocide. International law defines crimes against humanity as specifically egregious crimes against civilians that violate human dignity, which include: murder, extermination, forcible deportation, torture, sexual violence, ethnic persecution, disappearance, and apartheid.[xl] The International Criminal Court deputy prosecutor said on July 10 that there are “reasonable grounds to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity have been and are continuing to be committed in Darfur.”[xli] Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute, but the UN Security Council previously referred investigations into the Darfur genocide committed by the Janjaweed—the Darfur-based rebel groups that became the RSF—to the International Criminal Court.[xlii]

The RSF has repeatedly violated international humanitarian law across Sudan. United Nations agencies and human rights watchdogs have reported that both sides in Sudan, but primarily the RSF, have systematically used “rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war” to “humiliate, assert control and displace communities across the country.”[xliii] The RSF massacres civilians to assert its authority, including as recently as July 12, when it killed over 450 civilians—including 35 children—in villages around Bara in North Kordofan without any apparent military cause.[xliv] The RSF has imposed famine conditions, used indiscriminate artillery and drone attacks against civilian infrastructure, and targeted humanitarian aid as part of its siege.[xlv] The RSF also deliberately attacked medical facilities and executed unarmed people when it attacked the Zamzam camp on April 12.[xlvi]

The RSF’s war crimes likely include acts of ethnic cleansing, which may amount to consistent acts of crimes against humanity and genocide. A UN Commission of Experts previously defined ethnic cleansing in the context of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as “rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area” and “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”[xlvii] Acts of ethnic cleansing may amount to constituent acts of genocide, which are defined as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.”[xlviii]

Figure 7. RSF Atrocities in Sudan

Source: Liam Karr.

RSF violence across Darfur has involved elements of ethnic cleansing. The RSF conducted a “systematic” mass ethnic cleansing campaign against the Massalit ethnic group in al Geneina, West Darfur state, from April to November 2023, killing thousands, with upper estimates from the United Nations reaching 15,000 killed.[xlix] The United States declared in January 2025 that the RSF had committed genocide against the Massalit.[l] The Zamzam camp predominantly hosted Zaghawa and other non-Arab civilians that the Janjaweed displaced as it carried out the early 2000s Darfur genocide. The RSF killed over 300 civilians, displaced 400,000 more, and systematically destroyed homes, markets, and health care facilities when it attacked the camp in April.[li]

The RSF will likely commit more of these crimes as it intensifies its efforts to capture el Fasher and consolidate political control through overwhelming violence. The United Nations and other international observers have warned repeatedly that the RSF could perpetrate a genocide if it captures el Fasher.[lii] The RSF has demonstrated a pattern of genocidal violence throughout its history stretching back to the Janjaweed’s Darfur genocide in the 2000s up to al Geneina in 2023.[liii] This pattern serves as a template for what will likely happen if the RSF captures el Fasher.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Authors: Yale Ford with Calvin Hodges

IS Central Africa Province (ISCAP) conducted its deadliest string of attacks in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since early 2025. ISCAP, known locally as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), conducted at least six separate attacks in the Walese Vonkutu chiefdom near the border between Ituri and North Kivu provinces from July 9 to 13.^[liv] The attacks targeted several villages roughly 15 miles north of Oïcha village in Beni district in North Kivu and 15 miles north of Eringeti in Irumu district in Ituri on the RN4. ADF kidnapped an unknown number of people and killed at least 70 civilians, marking the group’s deadliest five-day stretch of attacks since late January.^[lv]

ADF conducted the attacks in retaliation for recent joint DRC-Uganda operations against the group. The attacks came after a joint DRC-Uganda counterterrorism effort, dubbed Operation Shujaa, purportedly dealt a blow to ADF’s most important subgroup in Ituri province. The Ugandan army (UPDF) and Congolese army (FARDC) launched a major offensive against the ADF’s largest and most administratively important cell in an area along the RN4 near the Mambasa and Irumu district border in Ituri on July 6.^[lvi] The UPDF spokesperson claimed on social media on July 11 that joint forces captured and drove the subgroup out of a “huge camp” that housed up to 1,500 people.^[lvii] ADF fighters told locals in several villages near Oïcha that it attacked and targeted civilians in response Shujaa’s offensive in Ituri and left survivors to “tell the security forces that they were ready to respond to any threat.”^[lviii]

Figure 8. ISCAP Retaliates for Operation Shujaa

Source: Yale Ford; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

ADF likely aimed to redirect the operational focus of DRC-Uganda operations away from its strongholds in Ituri province. ADF typically increases the rate and scale of its attacks on civilians in response to intensified pressure from Operation Shujaa.^[lix] The average number of civilian fatalities inflicted in any given ADF attack against civilians roughly doubled to 13 in the recent attacks, compared to an average of seven deaths throughout 2025, according to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.^[lx]

ADF has previously conducted highly lethal attacks on civilians—often targeting urban areas, such as in Beni district—to divert Shujaa’s operational focus from ADF’s main camp locations in the eastern DRC.^[lxi] The recent spate of attacks on civilians fits a similar pattern from early 2024, when ADF focused attacks in Beni and southern Irumu district after the FARDC-UPDF announced that it would begin conducting operations to destroy ADF’s strongholds in Ituri province.^[lxii] The UN reported in December 2024 that the “majority” of ADF camps, including the largest and most administratively important near the RN4, were in Ituri.^[lxiii]

Sahel

Authors: Miles Charles with Liam Karr

Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP) and Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) have clashed numerous times since late June in the deadliest period of inter-jihadi fighting in the Sahel since 2022. JNIM militants initially clashed with ISSP militants in northeastern Burkina Faso from June 22 to 24, and the two sides have clashed a further seven times since.[lxiv] ISSP and JNIM have claimed to kill 14 and seven militants, respectively. The spate of attacks since June is more than six times the average monthly rate of inter-jihadi battles since August 2023 and resulted in more than three times the average number of monthly fatalities.[lxv] All but one of the skirmishes took place Burkina Faso’s Sahel region, which is in the far northeast of the country, near the tri-border area with Mali and Niger.

Figure 9. Salafi-Jihadi Infighting in the Tri-Border Region

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The uptick in fighting is the largest surge in inter-jihadi clashes since 2022. Inter-jihadi fighting reached its peak in 2022 after French forces withdrew from Mali. The French drawdown in Mali created a security vacuum that allowed ISSP to expand across northeastern Mali and retaliate against certain ethnic groups.[lxvi] JNIM partnered with these communities as ISSP approached JNIM territory in northern Mali.[lxvii] JNIM and allied ethnic militias eventually launched coordinated offensives into ISSP-dominated territory, resulting in 79 clashes and 897 fatalities from January 2022 to July 2023, but failed to prevent ISSP from consolidating control over most of the Menaka region and parts of Gao region.[lxviii]

Africa File Data Cutoff: July 17, 2025, at 10 a.m.

The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.