Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 13, 2025

August 13, 2025, 9:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on August 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian officials reiterated that Russia's objectives in Ukraine remain unchanged ahead of the Alaska summit on August 15, once again demonstrating that the Kremlin remains uninterested in pursuing serious peace negotiations. Russian Foreign Ministry's Deputy Director of Information and Press Department Alexei Fadeev stated on August 13 that Russia’s position on resolving its war against Ukraine remained “unchanged” since Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 14, 2024 speech.[1] Fadeev added that the goals for Russia’s delegation to the Alaska summit on August 15 are defined “exclusively by national interests” and implied that Russia will not consider any territorial concessions.[2] Putin outlined his uncompromising demands for Ukraine's capitulation as a prerequisite for "peace" negotiations in Ukraine on June 14, 2024. The demands included that Ukraine must withdraw from the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, including areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy; demilitarization; and denazification of the Ukrainian government and society, including the removal of Ukraine’s current democratically elected government; and future Ukrainian alliance neutrality, likely referring to NATO membership. Fadeev’s statements indicate that the Kremlin maintains its long-standing objectives in the war against Ukraine that amount to Ukraine’s full military and political capitulation to Russia and has not adjusted its position ahead of the Alaska summit.

The Trump administration clarified that the United States will not pursue any agreements with Russia regarding a peace settlement in Ukraine without an immediate ceasefire and without Ukraine's formal involvement in peace negotiations. US President Donald Trump held a virtual summit on August 13 with select European leaders and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in preparation for Trump's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the August 15 Alaska summit.[3] German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that Trump reaffirmed that Trump would not negotiate territorial issues with Putin.[4] French President Emmanuel Macron noted that Trump clearly demonstrated that the United States seeks to convince Putin to commit to a ceasefire during the Alaska summit.[5] Macron added that Trump agreed that no one but Zelensky should negotiate issues concerning territory and that Trump will not be engaging in any "schemes for territory swaps" during the summit.[6] Macron stated that Trump accepted that the United States and Europe will need to jointly give Ukraine security guarantees but made it clear that these security guarantees would not involve NATO.[7] Two unnamed meeting participants told the Wall Street Journal that Trump pledged to ask Putin for an immediate ceasefire but expressed doubts that Putin would agree to this condition.[8]

US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on August 12 that the Alaska summit is ”not a negotiation” and affirmed that Trump remains committed to informing Zelensky and European leaders about his meeting with Putin.[9] White House Spokesperson Karoline Leavitt stated on August 12 that Trump wants to use the Alaska summit to develop a better understanding of how to end the war in Ukraine and that the summit will be a "listening exercise" for Trump.[10] Leavitt added that the Alaska summit is a bilateral meeting but that any peace negotiations would require a trilateral meeting between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States.[11] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in an interview on August 12 that Trump's primary objective for the Alaska summit is to have an in-person meeting to "feel out" Putin in order to enable Trump to make further decisions on how to end Russia's war in Ukraine.[12] Rubio noted that Russian forces suffered 60,000 casualties in July 2025 alone and that such high casualty rates indicate Russia's commitment to its war effort in Ukraine.

Trump reiterated US interest in facilitating future Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations and warned that Russia would face "very severe consequences" if Putin fails to engage in serious peace talks with Ukraine after the Alaska summit. Trump stated after his virtual summit with European leaders and Zelensky on August 13 that he hopes to organize a trilateral meeting with Putin and Zelensky in the event of a successful Alaska summit.[13] Trump warned that there will be "very severe consequences" if Putin does not agree to stop his war against Ukraine after the Alaska summit but did not specify those consequences.[14] US Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent told Bloomberg on August 13 that the United States could increase or loosen sanctions against Russia depending on the outcome of the Alaska summit.[15] Bessent urged European leaders to prepare to join the United States in introducing harsher sanctions against Russia and tariffs against the People’s Republic of China and other consumers of Russian energy. One US official told Axios on August 13 that the Trump administration believes that it can "bring down the Russian economy" and that Trump will continue to sell weapons to NATO countries for Ukraine even if diplomatic efforts to resolve the war fail.[16]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders formulated common principles for potential peace negotiations with Russia ahead of the Alaska summit, many of which are in line with the Trump administration's August 12 and 13 statements. Zelensky, following a series of virtual meetings with European leaders and Trump and US Vice President JD Vance, announced on August 13 that Ukraine and its European allies agreed upon and conveyed to Trump the following common principles regarding the Alaska summit and a potential peace agreement: everything that concerns Ukraine should be discussed with Ukraine; parties should arrange a trilateral meeting between Zelensky, Trump, and Putin; parties should agree to a ceasefire prior to a broader peace agreement; the West should provide reliable security guarantees for Ukraine; Russia cannot be allowed a veto over Ukraine's potential accession to the European Union (EU) or NATO; and stakeholders should strengthen sanctions against Russia if Putin refuses a ceasefire following the Alaska summit.[17] These stated principles cohere with the Trump administration's articulated timeline for a ceasefire prior to peace negotiations, preference that negotiations occur between Putin and Zelensky directly, security guarantees for Ukraine, and resolve to impose sanctions against Russia in the event of Putin’s continued intransigence after the Alaska summit and continuation of Russia’s war against Ukraine.[18]

The Kremlin is using the Alaska summit to portray Russia as a world power equal to the United States and to posture Putin as an equal to US President Donald Trump. Leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev alluded on August 13 to the 1945 Yalta Conference between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, claiming that the Yalta conference "won World War II" and that Putin and Trump will similarly "prevent World War III."[19] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Deputy Head Alexei Chepa amplified comparisons between the upcoming summit and the Yalta Conference and claims that the United States and Russia should "talk to each other as friends."[20] Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov claimed that Trump should visit occupied Crimea in order to agree to a "new Yalta peace."[21] Multiple Russian outlets similarly compared the Alaska summit to Yalta and claimed that "people who have a real influence on global processes" will be at the table in Alaska.[22]

Russian comparisons of the August 15 US-Russia summit with the 1945 Yalta Conference attempt to conceal the power disparity between the United States and Russia and are efforts to present Russia as having much stronger diplomatic, military, and economic positions than it does. Russia is already trying to present the very fact that Trump and Putin are meeting as a Russian victory in order to foster perceptions that Russia is an equal of the United States. Comparisons between the two meetings are also inaccurate because the 1945 Yalta Conference resulted in an agreement about post-war Europe, while Trump and other US officials have reiterated that the August 15 summit will not result in any US-Russia agreements about the end of the war in Ukraine.

Russia is reportedly preparing to conduct further offensive operations in priority sectors of the front line and to resume limited offensives in southern Ukraine, particularly in Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 12 that Russia may transfer 15,000 troops to the Zaporizhia direction, 7,000 troops to the Pokrovsk direction, and 5,000 troops to the Novopavlivka direction to intensify offensive operations in these areas in the near future.[23] Zelensky noted that the Russian military command may redeploy these troops from the Sumy direction. The Russian force grouping operating in northern Sumy Oblast largely consists of Russian airborne (VDV) and naval infantry elements, and the Russian military command may intend to redeploy these relatively more "elite" elements to eastern and southern Ukraine in the near future.[24]

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in an interview with Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne published on August 12 that the GUR received confirmed information that the Russian military command plans to achieve its "preliminary results" in Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Chasiv Yar – likely referring to Russian plans to seize these settlements – by the end of August 2025 or early September 2025.[25] Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces recently have changed their tactics and are currently focusing on destroying any defensible positions with persistent strikes and forcing civilian evacuations before infiltrating a settlement in small sabotage and reconnaissance groups. Skibitskyi noted that Russian forces then consolidate and accumulate forces for larger attacks.

Skibitskyi noted that Russia has recently started shelling Kherson City intensively in order to force locals to evacuate – suggesting that Russian forces may be preparing for limited infiltration operations against Kherson City and west (right) bank Kherson Oblast. Russian forces have implemented drone tactics and adaptations in recent months to generate some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and to facilitate Russian advances on key Ukrainian settlements as ISW has reported.[26] Russian forces have notably conducted drone and missile strikes against Kherson Oblast that appear to be generating some BAI effects, suggesting that Russian forces may be applying new tactics that have proven successful in other parts of the front line for preparations to resume larger-scale offensive operations in the Kherson direction.[27] Russian forces may also use infiltration tactics like those seen in the recent Russian penetration in the Dobropillya direction to attack in the Kherson direction following strike preparations. The likelihood of imminent renewed, large-scale Russian offensive operations against Kherson City and west bank Kherson Oblast remains low at the moment, however, as the Russian military command would likely need to redeploy a significant number of forces to the area to cross the Dnipro River and establish and hold a bridgehead.

Russia is simultaneously preparing to continue its long-range drone strike campaign against Ukrainian rear areas, which will likely result in further civilian casualties. Skibitskyi stated that Russia's production of drones, Iskander ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles is enabling Russia to conduct combined strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, logistics, and civilian facilities.[28] Skibitskyi noted that Russia plans to manufacture over 79,000 Shahed-type strike drones in 2025, including 40,000 Geran-2 drones, 5,700 Garpiya-A1 drones, and 34,000 Gerber and other decoy drones. Skibitskyi stated that Russia is able to increase its drone and missile production after establishing new production lines in Izhevsk (referring to the Russian defense manufacturer Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol that produces Garpiya-A1 drones) and Yelabuga (referring to Russia's Shahed-type drone factory in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone [SEZ] near Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan). Skibitskyi reported that Russia is also working to decrease its dependence on foreign-made components and has already domestically produced internal combustion engines, navigation system components, and antennas.

Russia has been able to dramatically increase the size of its missile and drone strike packages in recent weeks due to increased production and stockpiling, and these larger-scale strikes have caused significant civilian casualties and damage.[29] Russia's overnight strike packages in August 2025 have contained between 45 and 163 drones and missiles - a relatively small number compared to strike packages in recent months that contained hundreds of drones and missiles per night.[30] Russia is likely not conducting massive strikes against Ukraine at this time to set conditions for the upcoming Alaska summit and will likely refrain from such strikes until the summit is over. The smaller-scale strikes, however, allow Russia to stockpile missiles and drones, particularly as the quantity of drones used in many of Russia's drone strikes in recent weeks has been below Russia's reported June 2025 daily production rate of 170 Shahed and decoy drones.[31] Russia's daily drone production rate is likely even higher now. Russia may resume its large-scale strike packages following the bilateral summit.

Russian forces have yet to reinforce and consolidate positions east and northeast of Dobropillya, and Russian and Ukrainian sources continued on August 13 to characterize the Russian penetration as consisting of limited, dismounted sabotage and reconnaissance groups.[32] Russian milbloggers continued to urge caution to their Russian audience about unconfirmed claims of Russian advance. [33] Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Andriy Kovalev stated on August 12 that three groups of Russian forces conducted the recent penetration and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two of the groups and some of the third group.[34] Kovalev stated that Ukrainian forces still need to clear Vesele, Rubizhne, Kucheriv Yar (all three northeast of Dobropillya), and Vilne (east of Dobropillya), but that Russian forces do not control these settlements. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya), while other milbloggers denied these claims.[35] One milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized the settlement.[36] ISW observed reports that elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade were operating near Toretsk throughout June 2025, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported in late July 2025 that elements of the brigade were attacking in the Dobropillya direction.[37] The recent redeployment of elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade suggests that the Russian military command is currently prioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction over those in the Toretsk area, possibly as part of efforts to bypass the southern tip of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka from the southwest after Russian forces have failed to make significant advances north of Toretsk.

ISW continues to assess that Russian forces do not control the territory east and northeast of Dobropillya where Russian forces recently infiltrated. ISW's Assessed Russian Advances map layer does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited infiltration missions. ISW’s definition of the Assessed Russian Advances layer is any area in which ISW assesses Russian forces have operated or launched attacks against but do not control. ISW uses the US Army doctrinal term “forward line of own troops” (FLOT) to indicate the most forward observed positions of forces in any kind of operation at a specific time. ISW largely uses its Assessed Russian Advances layer to depict areas within the Russian FLOT but over which Russian forces have not yet established control. ISW's Assessed Russian Advances layer illustrates areas where ISW has observed evidence of a Russian presence but does not necessarily denote areas where Russian forces have established an enduring presence. ISW evaluates its Assessed Russian-Controlled Ukrainian Territory map layer using the doctrinal definition of "control" - a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations. ISW deliberately distinguishes between the Russian FLOT and areas that ISW assesses that Russian forces control. ISW does not assess that Russian forces exercise control over the areas in their tactical penetration near Dobropillya as of August 13.

Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups continue attempts to infiltrate Pokrovsk as Russian forces heavily strike the town. Ukrainian battalion commanders operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 12 and 13 that Russian forces are using small sabotage and reconnaissance groups to try to enter Pokrovsk.[38] One commander reported that Russian forces resumed intensive artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), and air strikes against Pokrovsk in recent days, suggesting that the presence of Russian forces in the town is minimal.[39] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi's comments about Russian tactics focusing on striking settlements to destroy any defensible positions and force civilian evacuations before entering a settlement in small sabotage and reconnaissance groups - are consistent with reporting that Russian forces are intensely striking Pokrovsk and conducting infiltration missions.[40]

Russia's use of drone strikes to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects in the Ukrainian near rear are severely hindering Ukrainian evacuation efforts in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a strike against a Ukrainian drone operation point near Novomykolaivka (northeast of Dobropillya) using five Geran-2 drones.[41] Russian forces have been leveraging recent adaptations in drone technology and tactics to more heavily target Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[42] Pokrovsk City Military Administration Head Serhiy Dobryak stated on August 12 that over 1,300 Ukrainian civilians remain in Pokrovsk but that Russian forces are striking "everything that moves" along roads going into the town, forcing civilians to walk to evacuation vehicles.[43] Donetsk Oblast Administration Head Vadym Filashkin announced on August 13 the mandatory evacuation of families with children from settlements due north, northwest, and west of Dobropillya, noting that roughly 1,150 children are present in these settlements.[44] Yevhen Tkachev, head of the Proliska humanitarian mission in Donetsk Oblast, reported on August 13 that Russian forces are conducting fiber optic drone strikes against civilian vehicles that are trying to evacuate Ukrainians from areas in Kostyantynivka.[45]

The Kremlin is likely using the upcoming Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises to facilitate its nuclear saber-rattling campaign ahead of the Alaska summit. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin announced on August 13 that Belarusian and Russian forces will jointly rehearse planning for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons and Oreshnik ballistic missiles during the Zapad-2025 exercises on September 12 through 16.[46] Kremlin officials and their affiliates often use nuclear saber-rattling and demonstrative military exercises as part of their reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that disproportionately benefit Russia.[47] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko recently participated in a likely staged press event with Russian President Vladimir Putin on August 1, during which both amplified the Kremlin's nuclear saber-rattling narratives.[48] Khrenin's mention of tactical nuclear weapons and Oreshnik planning exercises are likely part of the Kremlin's broader effort to posture military strength ahead of the Alaska summit. Russian officials have also used Russia's recent withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which Russia had violated for years, to threaten the United States.[49] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin dangles the prospect of bilateral arms control talks to extract preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[50] Russia may intend the announcement that Zapad-2025 will focus on the employment of Oreshnik missiles (missiles that are banned under the INF Treaty and that Russia has publicly flaunted and employed against Ukraine) and nuclear weapons to pressure Trump to engage in arms control talks, distracting from talks about the war.

Skibitskyi recently stated that Russia and Belarus are actively preparing for Zapad-2025 but that the exercises do not pose a significant threat to Ukraine.[51] Skibitskyi noted that Lukashenko does not want to be directly involved in Russia's war against Ukraine. ISW similarly assessed that Belarusian forces are will not enter the war on behalf of Russia, but Belarus nonetheless plays an important role in Russia's war effort by forcing Ukrainian forces to defend the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, pinning forces that Ukraine could deploy along the frontline.[52]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials reiterated that Russia's objectives in Ukraine remain unchanged ahead of the Alaska summit on August 15, once again demonstrating that the Kremlin remains uninterested in pursuing serious peace negotiations.
• The Trump administration clarified that the United States will not pursue any agreements with Russia regarding a peace settlement in Ukraine without an immediate ceasefire and without Ukraine's formal involvement in peace negotiations.
• Trump reiterated US interest in facilitating future Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations and warned that Russia would face "very severe consequences" if Putin fails to engage in serious peace talks with Ukraine after the Alaska summit.
• The Kremlin is using the Alaska summit to portray Russia as a world power equal to the United States and to posture Putin as an equal to US President Donald Trump.
• Russia is reportedly preparing to conduct further offensive operations in priority sectors of the frontline and to resume limited offensives in southern Ukraine, particularly in Kherson Oblast.
• Russia is simultaneously preparing to continue its long-range drone strike campaign against Ukrainian rear areas, which will likely result in further civilian casualties.
• Russian forces have yet to reinforce and consolidate positions east and northeast of Dobropillya, and Russian and Ukrainian sources continued on August 13 to characterize the Russian penetration as consisting of limited, dismounted sabotage and reconnaissance groups.
• ISW continues to assess that Russian forces do not control the territory east and northeast of Dobropillya where Russian forces recently infiltrated. ISW's Assessed Russian Advances map layer does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited infiltration missions.
• Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups continue attempts to infiltrate Pokrovsk as Russian forces heavily strike the town.
• The Kremlin is likely using the upcoming Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises to facilitate its nuclear saber-rattling campaign ahead of the Alaska summit.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Lyman and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 12 and 13.[53]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[54]

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 12 to 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 13 that elements of Ukraine’s Missile and Artillery Forces, Unmanned Systems Forces, and Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted drone strikes against several major Russian defense industrial facilities, including the Unecha oil pumping station in Vysokoe, Bryansk Oblast.[55] The General Staff reported that the strike caused damage and started a large fire in the area of a support pumping station building. The General Staff added that the station supplies the Russian military and has an annual pumping capacity of 60 million tons of oil. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that Ukrainian intelligence sources confirmed that GUR drone operators conducted a strike against the pumping station, which is part of the 9,000-kilometer Transneft Druzhba pipeline.[56] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that local residents observed the glow from the fire, and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies in the area.[57] Bryansk Oblast Governor Aleksandr Bogomaz claimed Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone and HIMARS strike, which caused a fire at a fuel infrastructure facility in Unechsky Raion.[58]

Ukrainian State Security Service (SBU) Head Vasyl Malyuk stated in an August 12 interview with Ukrainian TV channel My-Ukraina that the SBU has struck over 200 Russian defense industrial and logistics facilities, command posts, and oil refineries in the Russian deep rear with long-range drones since February 24, 2022.[59]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[60]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 13 that Ukrainian forces control Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[61]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Stepne; north of Sumy City in Oleksiivka and near Novokostyantynivka and Kindrativka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on August 12 and 13.[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City in Oleksiivka and near and within Kindrativka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka and near and within Yunakivka.[63]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[64] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that the Russian military command is planning to withdraw the reconnaissance company of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) from Oleksiivka to the rear to either restore combat readiness or redeploy elements of the regiment to a different direction.[65] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) reportedly continue to operate near Kindrativka.[66] Elements of the rocket artillery battalion of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[67]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a Ukrainian command post in Byryne, Chernihiv Oblast (northeast of Chernihiv City) with a Geran-2 drone.[68]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced within central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[69]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Synelnykove, and on the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River on August 12 and 13.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove.[71]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction.[72]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced near Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[73]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Ambarne on August 13.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[75]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Myrove; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, Kolodyazne, Radkivka, and Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka, Kamyanka, and Krasne Pershe on August 12 and 13.[76]

A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on August 13 that Russian forces are using groups of one to three soldiers to find blind spots in Ukrainian defenses to advance and then conduct reconnaissance and adjust artillery fire and drone strikes.[77] An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on August 13 that Russian forces are using different tactics due to a significant manpower advantage, including using drones to strike Ukrainian logistics and attacking primarily with light vehicles and sometimes armored vehicles in the direction.[78] The Ukrainian officer stated that small Russian infantry groups are leveraging fog, rain, and anti-thermal imaging coats to advance in forests and clearings and that Russian sabotage groups are constantly infiltrating Ukrainian positions to push far into the Ukrainian rear.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue operating near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[79]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novovodyane on August 12 and 13.[80]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southeastern Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[81]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on August 13 that Russian forces advanced near Serednie, Shandryholove (both northwest of Lyman), and Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[82]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka; north of Lyman near Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Torske, Dibrova, and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on August 12 and 13.[83]

A Russian milblogger claimed on August 13 that the southwestern part of the Serebryanske forest is a contested “gray zone.”[84]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Novoselivka, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on August 12 and 13.[85]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on August 13 that Russian forces operating in the Siversk direction are increasing the number of infantry assaults and are leveraging artillery, tactical airstrikes, and new types of drones, particularly the Molniya strike drone, to strike the remaining buildings within Siversk to eliminate potential Ukrainian fortifications within the city.[86]

Order of Battle: Sniper elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd LNR AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[87]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Oleksandro-Shultyne, and Predtechyne on August 12 and 13 but did not advance.[88]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[89]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Footage published on August 9 and geolocated on August 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced into northwestern Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[90]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Poltavka (northwest of Toretsk).[91] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 8th CAA (SMD), including its 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions, are operating near Poltavka.[92]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Pleshchiivka, Kleban Byk, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Katerynivka, Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, and Nelipivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 12 and 13.[93]

Order of Battle: Elements, including drone operators, of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka and Kleban-Byk.[94]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 13 that Russian forces seized Zatyshok and Nykanorivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk).[95] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized Zatyshok and Nykanorivka as of August 11, 2025.[96] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and within eastern Rodynske (northeast of Pokrovsk) and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northwestern Udachne.[97]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Rubizhne, Novyi Donbas, Marivka, Petrivka, and Novotroitske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Kucheriv Yar, Hruzke, Mayak, Nove Shakhove, Pankivka, Fedorivka, Volodymyrivka, Kolodyazi, Zapovidne, Krasnyi Lyman, and Rodynske and toward Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Pokrovsk near Svitle, Novoekonomichne, Myrolyubivka, Myrnohrad, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on August 12 and 13.[98] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zolotyi Kolodyaz.[99]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on August 13 that Russian forces are mostly sending small infantry groups of one to three personnel to attack on foot or with light motorized vehicles such as motorcycles and scooters in the Pokrovsk direction.[100] The commander stated that Russian forces leverage mechanized vehicles in occasional, isolated instances and that Russian drone operators provide support for ground troops.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[101]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 13

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Dachne, Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Tovste, Filiya, and Myrne; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove on August 12 and 13.[102]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka, Vilne Pole, and Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha on August 12 and 13.[103]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoselivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[104]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske and toward Poltavka on August 12 and 13.[105]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Separate Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Hulyaipole) direction.[106]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[107]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka; and west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Plavni, and Kamyanske on August 12 and 13.[108] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mala Tokmachka.[109]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported on August 13 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian mechanized assault near Mala Tokmachka and destroyed one tank, four buggies, and four motorcycles and damaged an unspecified number of infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers.[110] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces increased artillery and unguided bomb strikes while maintaining a high degree of first person view drone strikes in the days leading up to mechanized assault. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces increased artillery and unguided bomb strikes while maintaining a high degree of first person view drone strikes in days leading up to mechanized assault.

Order of Battle: Elements, including drone operators, of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate near Kamyanske, Plavni, and Stepnohirsk.[111] Elements, including drone operators, of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Mala Tokmachka.[112] Elements of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and drone operators of the 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[113]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Dnipro direction immediately east of Kherson City near Antonivka and Prydniprovske and southwest of Kherson City near Hola Prystan on August 13 but did not advance.[114]

Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on August 13 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a civilian vehicle along the T-0403 Novoraysk-Kostryka highway in Beryslav (northeast of Kherson City), killing two civilians.[115] This precision drone strike may suggest that Russian forces may be achieving some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects in the Kherson direction.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 12 and 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast and 49 Shahed-type and decoy drones from Kursk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[116] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and 32 drones and that 17 unspecified drones struck 15 unspecified locations.

Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Head Vasyl Malyuk reported on August 13 that Russia aims to eliminate Ukrainian officials via Shahed and missile strikes against residential buildings associated with such officials rather than targeted assassination attempts due to traditional assassination methods’ apparent ineffectiveness.[117] Russian forces conducting high-impact strikes against residential buildings with Iskander ballistic missiles would very likely constitute a violation of the proportionality principle as defined by international law due to the subsequent civilian harm that would excessively outweigh Russia's expected military advantage.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarus continues to deepen military cooperation with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on August 13 that Belarusian Logistics Chief of Staff Major General Alexander Mosolov will lead a Belarusian delegation to meet with PRC representatives to discuss bilateral military logistics cooperation to support the rear and visit PRC military bases in the rear.[118]

Belarus is hosting additional joint military exercises ahead of its Belarusian-Russian Zapad-2025 military exercise. Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin stated on August 13 that military forces from some Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) states will conduct military exercises in Vitebsk Oblast (in northern Belarus bordering Lithuania, Latvia, and Russia) from August 31 to September 6 and that some Russian forces have already arrived.[119]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.