Russia Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 26, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on August 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The United States is reportedly willing to supply supporting assets to a European-led force grouping as part of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine. The Kremlin has repeatedly rejected the presence of troops from NATO countries as part of any security guarantee for Ukraine in recent weeks. The Financial Times (FT) reported on August 26 that official Ukrainian and European sources stated that senior US officials told European officials recently that the United Stated would be prepared to contribute "strategic enablers," such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); command and control (C2); and air defense assets, to support a future European-led deployment on the ground in postwar Ukraine as part of security guarantees for Ukraine.[1] European officials reportedly stated that European states can only deploy troops to Ukraine with US support that enables, oversees, and protects the European ground troops. FT reported that officials stated that US postwar support would include US aircraft, logistics, and ground-based radar that would support and enable a European-enforced no-fly zone and air shield for Ukraine. The official sources commented that such US support is contingent on European states' commitment to deploy "tens of thousands" of troops to Ukraine. Three of the officials reportedly stated that Ukrainian troops would defend behind a demilitarized zone that neutral peacekeeping troops would patrol. NATO states would reportedly arm and train these Ukrainian forces. A European-led "deterrence force" would reportedly operate deeper in Ukraine as a "third line of defense," and US assets would operate further in the rear.

High-ranking Kremlin officials have repeatedly rejected Western security guarantees for Ukraine and specifically the presence of troops from NATO countries as part of such guarantees, however. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov recently stated in an interview with NBC that Western states, including the United States, should not be allowed to be responsible for Ukraine's post-war security.[2] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova similarly said on August 18 that Russia "categorical[ly] reject[s]" "any scenario that envisages the appearance in Ukraine of a military contingent with the participation of NATO countries."[3] The Kremlin would likely reject a US and European security guarantee proposal like the one US and European officials are reportedly discussing.

The United States will impose an additional 25 percent tariff on India’s exports to the United States due to India’s ongoing purchases of Russian oil. Reuters reported on August 26 that the US Department of Homeland Security confirmed that the US will impose an additional 25 percent tariff on Indian exports to the United States starting August 27, increasing total tariffs to 50 percent.[4] India is one of the largest importers of Russian oil, and India currently imports roughly 37 percent of its oil from Russia - up from approximately two percent before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[5] Bloomberg reported on August 26 that India’s oil refiners are planning to cut back their purchases of Russian crude oil in response to the increased US tariffs, but have signaled no plans to completely end purchases from Russia.[6] Familiar sources told Bloomberg that both India’s state-run and private processors will likely decrease purchases to between 1.4 to 1.6 million barrels per day, down from a monthly average of 1.8 million barrels per day throughout 2025 thus far. Reductions in Indian refiners' purchases of Russian oil over a sustained period of time will likely place significant restraints on Russia’s ability to fund its war machine. ISW continues to assess that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues that are essential for the Kremlin's financing of its war against Ukraine.[7]

Recent Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s oil refineries have contributed to gasoline shortages across Russia that will likely raise inflation and cause further macroeconomic instability in Russia. Reuters reported on August 25 that recent Ukrainian strikes on 10 oil refineries in Russia disrupted at least 17 percent of Russia’s refining capabilities, or roughly 1.1 million barrels per day, and caused A-95 (premium) gasoline shortages in some areas of occupied Ukraine, southern Russia, and Russia's Far East.[8] Reuters reported on August 26 that Russia increased its crude export plan by 200,000 barrels per day in August, as Ukrainian drone strikes disrupted refinery operations and left crude oil available for Russia to export.[9] This revision in crude export plans could increase Russian oil revenue in the short term but is likely adversely affecting the domestic economy. The Wall Street Journal reported on August 25 that several regions of Russia and occupied Crimea have implemented rationing at gas stations as a result of damage from Ukrainian drone strikes to Russian oil refineries.[10] Kurilsky Municipal Okrug Head Konstantin Istomin similarly reported on August 25 that Russian authorities suspended the sale of A-92 gasoline to Russian residents in the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin Oblast.[11] Russia struggled to keep up with domestic demand for gasoline even before recent Ukrainian strikes and has placed intermittent bans on the export of gasoline since 2022, most recently banning exports at the end of July through August.[12] Recent Ukrainian strikes have exacerbated gasoline shortages and caused a spike in gasoline prices across Russia and occupied Ukraine, which will likely result in increased consumer costs and increased business expenses across industries. This increase would drive inflation expectations and also push overall inflation upwards by increasing both direct and indirect costs throughout the economy. Russia’s Central Bank lowered interest rates on July 25, 2025, likely as a premature response to a temporary decrease in the seasonally adjusted annual rate of inflation in June 2025.[13] Increased gasoline prices and a lowered interest rate, coupled with long-term increased payments to sustain military recruitment and augment the defense industrial base's (DIB) labor force, however, will likely cause inflation to spike, weaken consumer purchasing power, devalue the ruble in the medium- to long-term, and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[14]

The Russian government proposed that Russian President Vladimir Putin withdraw from the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers proposed on August 25 that Putin submit a decree to the Russian State Duma to withdraw from the convention.[15] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed the proposal.[16] State Duma Security Committee Deputy Chairperson Andrei Lugovoi claimed that Russia's withdrawal would be a formality since Russia already withdrew from the Council of Europe after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[17] Lugovoi claimed that the European Convention on Human Rights employs double standards against Russia. Russian lawyers and officials justified the proposed withdrawal in Russian outlets by emphasizing that Russian legislation already prohibits torture and that the Convention for the Prevention of Torture is part of a series of Council of Europe human rights treaties from which Russia has withdrawn since February 2022.[18] The proposed withdrawal would be in line with recent Russian measures likely aimed at worsening Russian abuses of Ukrainian prisoners in Russia and occupied Ukraine, including Putin’s July 23 decree authorizing the creation of autonomous Federal Security Service (FSB) pre-trial detention facilities.[19] ISW has observed numerous independent investigations from early 2025 detailing a systematic increase in Russia's torture of Ukrainians held in Russian detention.[20]

Russian residents in border areas are increasingly apathetic toward the war and accepting that Russia will not agree to an end to the war in the near future. Russian opposition outlet Insider reported on August 25 that Russian civilians living in border areas are decreasingly donating toward and volunteering for the war effort.[21] Insider interviewed residents in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts who reported that they do not think that Russia will accept a ceasefire in the near future and anticipate that the war will continue. Interviewees stated that civilians near the border were initially invested in and donated to the war effort but that there is no longer any motivation to help the military. An interviewee from Belgorod Oblast claimed that border residents increasingly view Russian soldiers as threats due to the high risk of Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian soldiers and instances in which Russian forces have damaged civilian infrastructure and stolen from local residents. An interviewee from Kursk Oblast stated that people are tired of the war, want to return to a normal life, and do not want to fundraise for the war effort because the war has no apparent end. An interviewee from Bryansk Oblast stated that Moscow's war aims are constantly changing, suggesting that Putin's attempts to target US audiences with claims about his willingness to negotiate are clashing with posturing to Russian audiences that Russia remains committed to achieving its war goals. Putin's attempts to play to both information spaces may be confusing Russian audiences. Russian state and independent polling from early 2025 indicated that most Russians support continuing the war in Ukraine, suggesting that populations in the areas bordering Ukraine who feel the war most firsthand are less supportive of the war effort than those in areas further from the fighting.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• The United States is reportedly willing to supply supporting assets to a European-led force grouping as part of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine. The Kremlin has repeatedly rejected the presence of troops from NATO countries as part of any security guarantee for Ukraine in recent weeks.
• The United States will impose an additional 25 percent tariff on India’s exports to the United States due to India’s ongoing purchases of Russian oil.
• Recent Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s oil refineries have contributed to gasoline shortages across Russia that will likely raise inflation and cause further macroeconomic instability in Russia.
• The Russian government proposed that Russian President Vladimir Putin withdraw from the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
• Russian residents in border areas are increasingly apathetic toward the war and accepting that Russia will not agree to end to the war in the near future.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Sumy and Borova. Russian forces recently advanced near Sumy.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces liberated Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City along the international border).[23]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Loknya (northeast of Sumy City).[24]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne and Yunakivka and in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 25 and 26.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka and Oleksiivka (both north of Sumy City).[26]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mohrytsya (northeast of Sumy City).[27] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in border areas of Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts.[28] Elements of the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[29]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Starytsya (northeast of Kharkiv City).[30]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and toward Synelnykove on August 25 and 26.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[32]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in Kharkiv Oblast reported on August 26 that Russian forces are trying to camouflage a limited number of armored vehicles in foliage.[33] The spokesperson also reported that Russian forces have been using the same tactics since Spring 2025, including small group assaults on motorcycles, buggies, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).[34]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russia's modern reconnaissance-fire complex is reducing the time between target detection and destruction and increasing the accuracy of artillery, particularly in the Kharkiv direction.[35] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Kharkiv direction are increasingly dispersing their gun crews and using single guns like high-precision weapons.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 116th Rosgvardia Special Purpose Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and toward Khatnie on August 25 and 26.[37]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kanada Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Ambarne.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced within Kupyansk and near Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that small Russian groups are infiltrating Kupyansk but that the area around the town is a contested "gray zone."[40] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces are operating toward Kupyansk from Sobolivka and Blahodativka (both west of Kupyansk), but another milblogger claimed that it is premature to report that Russian forces are attacking Blahodativka.[41]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Kindrashivka; and northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, Fyholivka, and Kamyanka on August 25 and 26.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kupyansk and near Petropavlivka.[43]

A Russian milblogger claimed that the elevation of Kupyansk is slowing Russian advances in the area.[44] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not taken physical control of the N-26 Kupyansk-Svatove highway but that this is a key task for Russian forces in the area.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[45] Drone operators of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Kupyansk.[46]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 25 shows elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) striking Ukrainian positions north of Novoyehorivka (southeast of Borova), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[47]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka, Kolisnykivka, Lozova, and Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Cherneshchyna and Hrekivka on August 25 and 26.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Zarichne (east of Lyman).[50] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have almost cleared the entire Serebryanske forest area.[51]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and toward Novoselivka; north of Lyman near Karpivka and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Kolodyazi, and Novyi Myr and toward Stavky; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area and toward Yampil on August 25 and 26.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Novomykhailivka.[53]

A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies recently arrived in the Lyman direction and that systematic Russian reconnaissance, in cooperation with glide bomb, artillery, and drone strikes, is weakening Ukrainian positions in the area.[54] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are trying to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and are using drones that wait alongside roads before ambushing Ukrainian forces.[55] The spokesperson stated that some attacking Russian personnel only signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) about a month ago.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 25 and 26.[56]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using the same tactics in the Siversk direction as in the Pokrovsk direction by using small fireteams of two to three personnel to infiltrate into the Ukrainian near rear and gradually accumulate forces to attack Ukrainian positions.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar toward Maiske; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and Stupochky on August 25 and 26.[58]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on August 26 that Russian forces attacked six times in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 25, roughly double the usual amount.[59] Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces were attacking in teams of two to eight personnel earlier in 2025, but have now decreased the size of assault groups to one to three. Zaporozhets noted that Chasiv Yar is located on a dominant height that oversees Kostyantynivka (the southern point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast and southeast of Chasiv Yar).

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on August 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northeast of Oleksandro-Kalynove, north of Yablunivka (both northwest of Toretsk), near Bila Hora, and in Oleksandro-Shultyne (both north of Toretsk).[60]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, Bila Hora, and Oleksandro-Shultyne; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Yablunivka, Katerynivka, Kleban Byk, and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Berestok, Pleshchiivka, and Stepanivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 25 and 26.[61]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) and artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pleshchiivka.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive efforts in the Pokrovsk direction on August 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on the southwestern outskirts of Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk).[63]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rubizhne and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zapovidne, Mayak, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Hruzke, Shakhove, Krasnyi Lyman, Volodymyrivka, and Sukhetske and toward Sofiivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Novoekonomichne, Hrodivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka and toward Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne, Shevchenko, and Leontovychi; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Troyanda, Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on August 25 and 26.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[65]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 26 that Ukrainian forces are eliminating the recent Russian penetration near Dobropillya and that Russian forces are trying to consolidate and bring up reserves to the area.[66] The NCO reported that Russian forces are decreasing the intensity of their assaults but have not stopped attacking, including with motorcycles. Ukraine's Dnipro Group of Forces reported that Russian forces resumed their use of motorcycle assaults in the Pokrovsk direction.[67]

A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor continued to claim that the Russian penetration near Dobropillya was unsuccessful because it was too narrow relative to its depth. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces failed to quickly provide effective strike support to prevent Ukrainian counterattacks and strikes while Russian forces brought in additional exploitation forces.[68] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling to support the penetration given its depth. The milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking the northern flank of the penetration and have "generally sealed off the main part" of the penetration.

Ukrainian Confederation of Free Trade Unions Head Mykhailo Volynets reported on August 26 that Russian forces shelled a mine in Dobropillyskyi Hromada, cutting off electricity to the mine and trapping 148 miners underground.[69] Volynets reported that the mine was able to later extract all the miners but that one worker died and three sustained injuries.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [CA], SMD) are reportedly operating near Rodynske and Novoekonomichne.[70] Elements of the 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Udachne.[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zelenyi Hai and Tovste (both southwest of Novopavlivka) and advanced northwest of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka) and west of Zelenyi Hai.[72]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; east of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta, Zaporizhzhia and Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Hrushivske on August 25 and 26.[73] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zelenyi Hai.[74]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated on August 26 that Russian forces continue to conduct infantry assaults but are adapting their tactics, including with the use of hexacopters.[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka) and advanced west of Voskresenka (east of Velykomykhailivka), south of Ternove and Zaporizke (both southeast of Velykomykhailivka), and near Komyshuvakha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[76]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka, Novoheorhiivka, Vorone, Sichneve, Komyshuvakha, and Shevchenko on August 25 and 26.[77] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksandrohrad.[78]

The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukraine's Dnipro Group of Forces refuted on August 26 claims that Russian forces seized Zaporizke and Novoheorhiivka.[79] Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian forces entered Zaporizke and Novoheorhiivka and are attempting to gain a foothold.[80]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Sosnivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka), and drone operators of the 1461st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[81] Drone operators of the 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Zaporizke.[82] Drone operators of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kalynivske (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[83]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Obratne (northeast of Hulyaipole) and advanced northwest of the settlement.[84]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on August 25 and 26.[85] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Malynivka.[86]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Temyrivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[87]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) and within Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv).[88]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Stepnohirsk and toward Pavlivka on August 25 and 26.[89] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kamyanske (west of Orikhiv).[90]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Stepnohirsk and Plavni.[91] Drone operators of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) and Nemets group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[92]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on August 26 but did not advance.[93]

Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on August 26 that Russian forces have increased drone strikes along the M-14 Kherson City-Mykolaiv City highway in the past day and are striking civilian vehicles.[94] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted drone strikes against civilian vehicles, including a car from the Kherson Oblast Prosecutor General's Office, traveling on the highway on August 25 and 26, injuring four people.[95] A Russian milblogger threatened that Russian forces will consider all vehicles traveling on the highway as targets and that Russian forces intend to strike critical infrastructure in Mykolaiv City.[96]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian logistics in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) stated on August 26 that SSO elements struck unspecified Russian logistics facilities in occupied Crimea.[97] Geolocated images published on August 26 show smoke after a drone strike against the Urozhaina railway station in occupied Kurman, Crimea.[98] Occupation energy enterprise Krymenergo reported on August 26 an emergency power outage in Kurmanskiy raion.[99]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 25 and 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 59 Shahed-type and decoy drones from Kursk and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[100] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 47 drones over the north and east of Ukraine and that 12 drones struck nine unspecified locations. Izyum City Military Administration Head Serhiy Fedchenko reported that Russian forces struck Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast with Shahed drones on the morning of August 26, destroying residential infrastructure.[101]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.ft.com/content/66ec25a0-4af8-467f-9fbe-cf42de890a7e

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082425

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081825

[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/india/steep-us-tariffs-set-hit-indian-exports-wednesday-2025-08-26/

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073025 ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-26/india-to-ease-russian-oil-purchases-as-higher-us-levies-loom

[6] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-26/india-to-ease-russian-oil-purchases-as-higher-us-levies-loom

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071725 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025

[8] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russian-oil-refineries-terminals-burn-ukraine-hits-putins-war-economy-2025-08-25/

[9] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-raises-august-oil-export-plan-after-drone-strikes-disrupt-refineries-2025-08-26/

[10] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/ukraine-russia-drone-attack-oil-2f14c1aa?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAiJ6ObKo5Ys7t7RIVISbwkhMM9YinFjU-jhjy0udLmy9aCmXFUOjEH2cPosvXU%3D&gaa_ts=68adfddc&gaa_sig=b8zyQMWAmIDUsIvYHeEGs5VBdDNv5eWUC6G2X3HRSdH0avAe7wGNaYspngVf9KM-eDPvYzvrzBlin8YiTSyVrg%3D%3D

[11] https://t.me/Ist_konst_mayor/552

[12] https://t.me/government_rus/22750

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071725 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071725

[15] https://tass dot ru/politika/24869955

[16] http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202508250028

[17] https://www.gazeta dot ru/social/news/2025/08/26/26578892.shtml

[18] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7990285; https://www.mk dot ru/politics/2025/08/26/pravozashhitnik-merkacheva-obyasnila-zachem-rossiya-vykhodit-iz-konvencii-po-preduprezhdeniyu-pytok.html; https://mash dot ru/news/208147/; https://www.ng dot ru/politics/2025-08-26/3_9324_torture.html

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2025

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-may-5-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2025

[21] https://theins dot ru/confession/283938

[22] https://www.chronicles dot report/chapter14; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/17/world/europe/russian-troops-peace-putin.html; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2025

[23] https://t.me/rybar/73097

[24] https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/1960251142937665715; https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/1960251082975916158; https://t.me/brygada47/1661; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30495

[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28293 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28260 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28258 ; https://t.me/rybar/73097 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/78204 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4946 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32977

[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/28783 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4946

[27] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177334

[28] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177377

[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32977

[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/333543

[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28293; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28260; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28258; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16442

[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32965

[33] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/26/hovayut-u-lystvi-kushhah-yak-vorog-maskuye-poodynoku-bronetehniku/

[34] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/26/spishuyutsya-i-prodovzhuyut-nastup-rosiyany-ne-zminyuyut-taktyku-z-vesny/

[35] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13936

[36] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67000

[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28293; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28260; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28258;  https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16442

[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177312

[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/28783; https://t.me/tass_agency/333553; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177358; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13936

[40] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13936; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41415

[41]https://t.me/motopatriot78/41415; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13936

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28258; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28260 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28293; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16442; https://t.me/wargonzo/28783; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13936

[43] https://t.me/wargonzo/28783; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13936

[44] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13936

[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41396

[46] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177380

[47] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1960109294155894910 ; https://t.me/Visla3/1535 

[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28258; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28260 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28293; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16442

[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41432

[50] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66988; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177358

[51] https://t.me/tass_agency/333566; https://t.me/tass_agency/333576; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66988; https://t.me/yurasumy/24448

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28258; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28260 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28293; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16442; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66988; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41431

[53] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41392

[54] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66988

[55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/26/volodar-persniv-vidpochyvaye-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-vorog-shturmuye-z-minamy-v-rukah/

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28293 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28260 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28258 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16442

[57] https://t.me/sashakots/55823

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28293 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28260 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28258 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16442 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28783 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177320

[59] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1099568-cekaut-prosuvan-bila-torecka-recnik-11-armijskogo-korpusu-rozkazav-pro-osoblivosti-sturmiv-casovogo-aru/

[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32992 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177320

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28293 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28260 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28258 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16442 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/78204 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41407  

[62] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14214 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1960324425225543698

[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41419

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28293; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28260; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28258; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16442 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28783 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41419

[65] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41419

[66] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/26/yim-skladno-vse-potribno-robyty-z-nulya-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosiyany-zakriplyuyutsya-bilya-zrizanogo-vystupu/

[67] https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16442; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/26/na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-vidnovyv-zastosuvannya-motoczykliv/

[68] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2986

[69] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1099620-sahta-dtek-pid-obstrilom-e-zagiblij-ta-poraneni-so-vidomo-pro-ataku-u-dobropilskij-gromadi/; https://www.facebook.com/MykhailoVolynets/posts/pfbid02M6TLHwqrU3tk9PG6FDQqpH6JMSftLAXbjuqpko9dQdm2sFCd3jpB3cNmDRv7Z14Pl; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/08/26/pod-dobropoliem-iz-za-rossiyskogo-obstrela-obestochena-shahta-pod-zemley-zastryali-148-gornyakov

[70] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1960113250420580633; https://t.me/Tsaplienko/79393

[71] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22425

[72] https://t. me/DnevnikDesantnika/32996; https://t.me/rybar/73111

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28293; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28260; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28258; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16442

[74] https://t.me/rybar/73111; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32996

[75] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/26/aktyvno-praczyuyut-geksakopteramy-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-chekayut-na-shturmy-vorozhoyu-tehnikoyu/

[76] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32996; https://t.me/rybar/73111; https://t.me/rybar/73097; https://t.me/wargonzo/28783; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98477

[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28293; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28260; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28258; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16442; https://t.me/rybar/73111; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28294; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16459; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98477

[78] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32996

[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28294; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16459

[80] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1099614-u-deepstate-vperse-zaavili-pro-okupaciu-dvoh-sil-na-dnipropetrovsini-ak-komentuut-situaciu-v-osuv-dnipro/

[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/16622; https://t.me/voin_dv/16624; https://t.me/voin_dv/16627

[82] https://t.me/voin_dv/16627

[83] https://t.me/voin_dv/16615

[84] https://t.me/rybar/73111

[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28260; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12887; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28258

[86] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41423

[87] https://t.me/voin_dv/16627

[88] https://t.me/wargonzo/28783; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177385

[89] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28260 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12887; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28258; https://t.me/wargonzo/28783; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177385; https://t.me/dva_majors/78204; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32967; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32977; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177365

[90] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177385; https://t.me/dva_majors/78204; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32967

[91] https://t.me/dva_majors/78204

[92] https://t.me/epoddubny/24526; https://t.me/wargonzo/28792

[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28293; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28260 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12887; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28258

[94] https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/9993; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/26/vorozhi-drony-uzdovzh-trasy-herson-mykolayiv-v-ova-poperedyly-pro-nebezpeku/

[95] https://www.facebook.com/pgo.gov.ua/posts/1229091762586988?; https://suspilne dot media/1098294-obmin-polonenimi-dopomoga-vid-kanadi-sili-oboroni-zvilnili-tri-sela-na-doneccini-1279-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1756143039&; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/41286; https://suspilne dot media/kherson/1099218-vijskovi-rf-atakuvali-dronom-avtivku-na-trasi-miz-klapaa-ta-cornobaivkou-na-hersonsini-poraneni-dvoe-likariv/

[96] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28570; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28572

[97] https://t.me/ukr_sof/2044

[98] https://x.com/GeoCrow_/status/1960250601574387952; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1960247927953093026

[99] https://t.me/crimeaenergy/4843

[100] https://t.me/kpszsu/41041

[101] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1099266-izum-na-harkivsini-vranci-26-serpna-atakuvali-sahedi-e-poraneni/