Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 10, 2025

August 10, 2025, 8:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1 pm ET on August 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The United States and Ukraine's European allies agree that Europe, not the United States, will fund further military and security assistance to Ukraine. US Vice President JD Vance gave an interview to Fox News on August 10 and reiterated the Trump Administration's consistent position that the United States will no longer directly fund the Ukrainian military effort, but that Europe can continue to buy weapons from US manufacturers for Ukraine and Europe's own defensive needs.[i] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Mark Rutte stated in an interview with Face the Nation published on August 10 that the "floodgate" of lethal aid packages to Ukraine opened after US President Donald Trump met with Rutte on July 14 and that Canada and European NATO allies will continue to fund weapons for Ukraine.[ii] Rutte stated that these deliveries are in addition to Europe's investments in European and Ukrainian defense industrial facilities and that there will be additional European aid package announcements in the coming weeks. Western outlets reported on August 7 that NATO allies, the European Parliament, and several international banks — including US JP Morgan Chase, German Commerzbank, and Canadian RBC Capital Markets — are backing the new Bank for Defense, Security, and Resilience (DSRB), an international bank that will specialize in lending to NATO and allied countries for defense procurement.[iii] Western media reported that the DSRB will help NATO states reach their goal of committing five percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to defense spending and that more than 40 unspecified countries are expected to become shareholders. UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves and UK Defense Secretary John Healy endorsed the DSRB.[iv] The DSRB announcement signals NATO allies' commitment to increasing defense spending, and European NATO members will likely leverage the bank to sustain investments in Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB), to launch further joint production initiatives with Ukraine, and to fund defense production intended for Ukraine and NATO allies' own stocks.

US President Donald Trump is reportedly considering a trilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during the August 15 summit in Alaska. Reuters reported on August 9, citing sources in the White House, that Trump is open to holding a trilateral summit in Alaska with Zelensky and Putin but that the White House is currently preparing for a bilateral meeting between Trump and Putin.[v] CNN and NBC reported on August 10, citing senior US officials and sources familiar with the matter, that the White House has not ruled out the possibility of inviting Zelensky to Alaska.[vi] One of the sources noted that any meeting with Zelensky would likely occur after the Trump-Putin meeting. Vance told Fox News on August 10 that the United States is trying to schedule a trilateral meeting between Putin, Trump, and Zelensky in order to negotiate an end to the war.[vii] Vance stated that Putin's refusal to meet with Zelensky has been one of the most significant impediments to the peace process.

The Kremlin is attempting to use the upcoming Alaska summit to divide the United States from Europe rather than engage in meaningful peace efforts. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on August 10 on both his English and Russian language Telegram accounts that Europe is trying to prevent the United States from helping to stop the war in Ukraine.[viii] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Leonid Slutsky claimed on August 9 that European countries are pursuing an anti-Russian policy and trying to prevent a quick peace settlement in Ukraine.[ix] Russian political scientist Sergei Markov told the Washington Post on August 10 that Russia's main interest in the Alaska summit is to portray Ukraine and Europe rather than Russia as the obstacles to peace in Ukraine.[x] Markov stated that Russia refuses to take any steps backward and that the only compromise that Russia is willing to consider is halting military efforts to seize Odesa and Kharkiv oblasts and Kherson and Zaporizhzhia cities. Markov expressed hope that Trump will realize that Zelensky is the main reason for Russia's war in Ukraine and that European leaders are the second reason for the war, rather than Russia.

European and Ukrainian officials, including Zelensky, have consistently demonstrated their willingness to promote and engage in good faith negotiations and impose substantive ceasefire agreements to progress the peace initiative, which Russia has consistently rejected in pursuit of incremental battlefield gains and additional concessions from Ukraine and the West.[xi] The Kremlin has long attempted to weaken cohesion between the United States, Europe, and Ukraine as part of a wider campaign to deter further Western support to Ukraine and distract from Russia's intransigence regarding the peace process and unwillingness to compromise on Putin's original war demands.[xii] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains unwilling to compromise on its long-standing war aims of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO, regime change in Ukraine in favor of a pro-Russian proxy government, and Ukraine's demilitarization - all of which would ensure Ukraine's full capitulation - and that Russia will very likely violate and weaponize any future ceasefire agreements in Ukraine while blaming Ukraine for the violations as it repeatedly did in Spring 2025.[xiii]

Ukraine's European allies continue to signal their support for Ukraine and US-led peace efforts ahead of the Alaska summit. French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen published a joint statement on August 9 expressing support for US-led peace efforts and calling for Ukrainian and European involvement in future peace negotiations.[xiv] The European leaders called for a ceasefire or reduction of hostilities before negotiations begin and stated that the current frontline should be the starting point for negotiations. The leaders also called for robust and credible security guarantees that protect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The leaders expressed their commitment to the principle that international borders cannot be changed by force and reiterated that Russia's invasion of Ukraine violates the UN Charter, the Helsinki Act, and the Budapest Memorandum, among other Russian international agreements.

Russian tank losses appear to be declining as Russian forces continue to deprioritize mechanized assaults across the frontline, indicating that the Russian command recognizes that it cannot protect vehicles from Ukrainian drone strike capabilities on the frontline and near rear. An intelligence focused open source that tracks Russian vehicle losses in Ukraine reported on August 10 that the rate of Russian tank losses continues to decline and reached its lowest levels of the war in June and July 2025.[xv] The source stated that it has visually confirmed 22 Russian tank losses in June 2025 and 19 Russian tank losses in July 2025, down from 116 confirmed tank losses in June 2024 and 97 confirmed tank losses in July 2024.[xvi] The source indicated that Russian tank loss rates began to decrease in December 2024, which is consistent with the Russian military command's theater-wide shift from costly mechanized assaults toward gradual, creeping infantry assaults.[xvii] The source stated that Russian T-62 and T-90 loss rates remain consistent, T-72 loss rates have declined in proportion to the overall decline of Russian tank losses, and T-80 tank loss rates have significantly declined.[xviii] Russia has likely exhausted much or all of its stockpiles of T-80 tanks and is likely conserving existing stores and stockpiling newer tank models while depleting stores of other tanks and armored vehicles, including the older T-62. Russian forces have conducted relatively few but costly mechanized assaults in Ukraine thus far in 2025 due to the effectiveness of Ukrainian drone strikes against armored vehicles, instead prioritizing infantry-led assaults and assaults on expendable motorcycles and other light vehicles.[xix] Russian forces have been using armored vehicles to transport infantry to forward positions for infantry assaults, constraining Russian advances to foot pace and preventing Russia from using mechanized maneuver warfare to exploit breakthroughs and achieve operationally significant advances.[xx] It remains unclear why Russia continues to invest significantly in tank and armored vehicle development and production while Russian forces are largely unable to field these vehicles for their intended purposes, as Ukrainian forces maintain the ability to inflict high frontline and near-rear armored vehicle losses with drone reconnaissance and strikes.[xxi] Russia may be preparing for the eventuality that Russian forces will become able to counter Ukrainian drone operations well enough to be able to field armored vehicles and restore at least some maneuver to the battlefield, but ISW has observed no indications of Russian technological advances in this direction.

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 9 to 10, including the first drone strike against a target in the Komi Republic. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 10 that Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) conducted a drone strike against the Saratov Oil Refinery near Saratov City, causing a fire.[xxii] The General Staff reported that the facility produces up to seven million tons of gasoline and diesel fuels per year and over 20 types of petroleum products and supplies the Russian military. Geolocated footage published on August 9 shows a large smoke plume over the Saratov Oil Refinery, and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies in the area that are consistent with reports of fires in the area.[xxiii] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that a drone damaged an industrial enterprise in Saratov Oblast.[xxiv] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in February 2025, January 2025, and November 2024.[xxv] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Lukoil Refinery in Ukhta, Komi Republic with at least one drone, and geolocated footage published on August 10 shows damage to a tank at the refinery.[xxvi] Ukhta is more than 2,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.[xxvii] Russian authorities have not yet acknowledged a Ukrainian drone strike against the Komi Republic, but did temporarily stop flights from the Utkha Airport, consistent with reactions to Ukrainian drone strikes elsewhere in Russia.[xxviii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the command post of an unspecified Russian battalion near occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, killing 25 Russian personnel, including the battalion commander.[xxix] ISW has recently observed elements of the Russian 31st Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 328th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division), and 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) operating near Oleshky.[xxx]

Ukrainian drone manufacturers have developed a new drone capable of intercepting higher-speed Russian drones. Representatives of the Ukrainian drone manufacturer Besomar told Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi on August 10 that Besomar developed a reusable interceptor drone that is capable of downing Russian drones at speeds up to 200 kilometers per hour, including Geran-type long-range strike drones.[xxxi] The interceptor drone is equipped with a shotgun and an automated firing system that can hold between two and four shots. The interceptor drone is also equipped with a digital communications system with a frequency response that allows the drone to approach its target unnoticed by the Russian drone's evasion systems. The drone can fire manually or automatically due to a sensor in the nose of the drone that the drone operator can activate to initiate a shot when a target enters the drone's range.

Key Takeaways:

• The United States and Ukraine's European allies agree that Europe, not the United States, will fund further military and security assistance to Ukraine.
• US President Donald Trump is reportedly considering a trilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during the August 15 summit in Alaska.
• The Kremlin is attempting to use the upcoming Alaska summit to divide the United States from Europe rather than engage in meaningful peace efforts.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to signal their support for Ukraine and US-led peace efforts ahead of the Alaska summit.
• Russian tank losses appear to be declining as Russian forces continue to deprioritize mechanized assaults across the frontline, indicating that the Russian command recognizes that it cannot protect vehicles from Ukrainian drone strike capabilities on the frontline and near-rear.
• Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 9 to 10, including the first drone strike against a target in the Komi Republic.
• Ukrainian drone manufacturers have developed a new drone capable of intercepting higher-speed Russian drones.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 9 and 10.[xxxii]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) struggled with cohesion when repelling a recent Ukrainian counterattack near Novokostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[xxxiii]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near Manev, Bryansk Oblast (northeast of Chernihiv City along the international border).[xxxiv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on August 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces recaptured Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City), but a Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces refuted this claim.[xxxv] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[xxxvi]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on August 9 and 10.[xxxvii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near and within Yunakivka.[xxxviii]

The Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces have partially encircled elements of the 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) in forest areas near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[xxxix] The milblogger claimed that these Russian forces suffered a breakdown in communication as a result and are panicking and struggling to distinguish between enemy and friendly forces.

Order of Battle: The Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that the Russian military command redeployed an unspecified battalion of the Russian 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) to the Kindrativka-Andriivka area (north of Sumy City) from an unspecified area to stabilize the frontline.[xl]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced on the southern (left) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) near Ohirtseve and Hatyshche (both west of Vovchansk), east of Vovchansk, and west of Synelnykove (south of Vovchansk).[xli]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on August 9 and 10.[xlii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ohirtseve and Hatyshche.[xliii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian targets in Vovchansk.[xliv]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 10.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within northern Kupyansk.[xlv]

Russian forces continued ground assaults toward Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Myrove (formerly Moskovka) and toward Kovalivka; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka and toward Petro-Ivanivka and Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and south of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 9 and 10.[xlvi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly fighting near Stepova Novoselivka.[xlvii] Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kasyanivka (north of Kupyansk).[xlviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove and southeast of Borova toward Olhivka on August 9 and 10.[xlix]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into northern Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman) and northwest of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[l]

Unconfirmed claims: Russians source claimed that Russian forces advanced near Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman) and established positions in Serednie (west of Zelena Dolyna).[li] Another Russian source claimed that Russian forces only advanced east of Serednie.[lii]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Lyman near Karpivka and Serednie and toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novyi Mir and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske, Zarichne, Dibrova, and the Serebryanske forest area on August 9 and 10.[liii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian motorized assault consisting of 25 motorcycles near Torske on an unspecified date.[liv] The spokesperson described the Russian assault as the largest assault on motorcycles that the brigade had repelled in the area.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly fighting in the Serebryanske forest area.[lv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Siversk itself, northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka, and southwest of Siversk near Pereizne on August 9 and 10.[lvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove, and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne on August 9 and 10.[lvii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade and Berkut Group of the 238th Artillery Brigade (both 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksiievo-Druzhivka (northwest of Chasiv Yar).[lviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on August 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on August 10 that Russian forces advanced west of Toretsk and northwest of Toretsk near Katerynivka, Rusyn Yar, and Yablunivka.[lix]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and toward Bila Hora and Oleskandro-Shultyne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove; and northwest of Toretsk in Poltavka, near Katerynivka, Ivanopillya, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz and toward Pleshchiivka and Rusyn Yar on August 9 and 10.[lx]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, and the 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are reportedly operating near Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[lxi] Additional elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly operating near Poltavka, and additional elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly fighting near Rusyn Yar and Yablunivka.[lxii] Elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [AC], SMD) are reportedly operating on the southern outskirts of Oleksandro-Shultyne.[lxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Nove Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk).[lxiv] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not yet seized Nove Shakhove and that the Russian forces that reportedly entered Nove Shakhove were only sabotage and reconnaissance groups.[lxv] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Chervonyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk).[lxvi]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Zatyshok, Novoekonomichne, Sukhetske, Zapovidne, Chervonyi Lyman, Ivanivka, Pankivka, Fedorivka, and Nykanorivka, and toward Kucheriv Yar and Vilne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka, Chunyshyne, and Zelene; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Kotlyne, and Molodetske on August 9 and 10.[lxvii]

Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on August 10 that Russian forces have concentrated up to 100,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk direction in an effort to seize Pokrovsk.[lxviii] Trehubov stated that Russian forces are trying to advance from the southwest and northeast to envelop Pokrovsk and cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka).[lxix]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Zaporizhzhia and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste and Zelenyi Hai on August 9 and 10.[lxx] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dachne and Filiya.[lxxi]

The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Dachne and refuted Russian claims that Russian forces seized the settlement.[lxxii] A Ukrainian soldier operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces continue attacking in three groups with 10 soldiers in each and using greenery to conceal themselves from Ukrainian drones and make gradual advances.[lxxiii] The soldier stated that Russian forces primarily only attack with infantry but sometimes attack on motorcycles, and that Russian forces are using fiber optic drones waiting on the ground near Ukrainian logistics routes to ambush passing Ukrainian vehicles.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Dnipropetrovsk (Novopavlivka) direction.[lxxiv] Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border.[lxxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka) and north of Zelene Pole (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[lxxvi]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka toward Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka, Vilne Pole, Shevchenko, and Komyshuvakha; and south of Velykomykhailivka toward Novoivanivka on August 9 and 10.[lxxvii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksandrohrad.[lxxviii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Temyrivka and Olhivske and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on August 9 and 10.[lxxix]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske, Ternove, and Kalynivske and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka.[lxxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division consolidated positions in Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) but do not control the entire settlement.[lxxxi] The milblogger claimed that the area between Stepnohirsk and Kamyanske (south of Stepnohirsk) is a contested "gray zone."

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Kamyanske, and Stepnohirsk and south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka on August 9 and 10.[lxxxii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Kamyanske and Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[lxxxiii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to target Ukrainian forces near Plavni and Stepnohirsk.[lxxxiv] Drone operators of the Russian 218th Tank Regiment and 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxxxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Kherson City toward Karantynnyi Island, southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island, and east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi road bridge on August 9 and 10.[lxxxvi]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 9 to 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched 100 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiivske, Crimea.[lxxxvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 70 drones in northern and eastern Ukraine, that 30 drones struck 12 locations in Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, and that drone debris struck three unspecified locations. Kharkiv Oblast officials reported that Russian forces struck Chuhuiv, Rozdolne, and Martove, damaging civilian infrastructure.[lxxxviii]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and condemned Russia's recent strikes against the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) oil depot in Odesa City and Ukrainian gas infrastructure transporting Azerbaijani gas.[lxxxix] Russian Shahed drones struck the Ukrainian gas compressor station in Odesa Oblast that transports Azerbaijani gas overnight on August 5 to 6 and struck the SOCAR depot overnight on August 7 to 8.[xc] Azerbaijani outlet Caliber reported, citing unspecified sources, that Azerbaijan will consider lifting arms embargos on Azerbaijani military supplies to Ukraine if Russia continues to strike Azerbaijani energy facilities in Ukraine.[xci]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.