Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 14, 2025

August 14, 2025, 8:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on August 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian and US officials further clarified the details of the upcoming August 15 Alaska summit. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump will meet around 11:30 am local time at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska.[1] Ushakov stated that the meeting will occur face-to-face with interpreters present, after which Putin and Trump will hold a joint press conference. The Russian delegation will include Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, and leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev.[2] White House Spokesperson Karoline Leavitt confirmed the location of the meeting on August 14 and noted that Trump will meet one-on-one with Putin, then attend a bilateral lunch meeting with the US and Russian delegations, and conclude with a press conference.[3] Trump stated during an interview with Fox News that he will either hold a joint press conference alongside Putin or hold the press conference alone, depending on the outcome of his one-on-one meeting with Putin.[4]

The Kremlin is likely to use the Alaska summit to try to deflect attention away from peace negotiations with Ukraine and towards the Russia-US relationship in order to court the Trump administration into offering Moscow sorely needed economic rapprochement. The Kremlin's inclusion of Russian Finance Minister Siluanov and RDIF CEO Dmitriev in the Alaska delegation suggests that Russia will likely attempt to shift the focus of the summit away from its war in Ukraine and towards potential bilateral economic deals. Neither Siluanov nor Dmitriev attended the previous Russia-Ukraine negotiations in Istanbul in May or June 2025.[5] Dmitriev was present during the February 2025 US-Russia talks in Istanbul, however.[6] The Kremlin has frequently leveraged Dmitriev in order to frame Russia as an attractive economic partner to the United States and used his business experience to advocate on behalf of Russia's economic interests, as ISW has previously noted.[7] Dmitriev has notably been instrumental to the Russian narrative, claiming that Alaska is a historical part of Russia ahead of the summit and leveraging the summit to portray Russia as a world power equal to the United States, however, undermining Dmitriev's apparent position as a neutral, economic-focused arbiter.[8] The Kremlin relies on Siluanov to downplay the detrimental effects of Western sanctions on the Russian economy in an attempt to convince the West to drop sanctions against Russia due to their falsely claimed ineffectiveness.[9] Dmitriev and Siluanov's presence at the Alaska summit is likely intended to frame the summit as a potential business deal.

Other Russian officials have also indicated that the Kremlin will attempt to use the Alaska summit to engage in economic negotiations with the United States. Ushakov stated on August 14 that, in addition to discussing Ukraine, Trump and Putin will also speak about bilateral cooperation "in the trade and economic sphere," where there is "enormous" and "untapped" potential.[10] State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 14 that Putin and Trump "may" discuss sanctions and other economic issues.[11] Russian First Deputy Chair of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs Svetlana Zhurova claimed that "Russia and the United States will conclude an economic deal in any case" following the Alaska summit.[12] These statements are likely part of a concerted Russian effort to exploit the Alaska summit to secure much-needed economic relief from the United States. ISW continues to assess that any American acceptance of Russian-offered economic deals in the absence of reciprocal Russian concessions on Ukraine in return will degrade important economic leverage that the United States currently holds over Russia.[13]

The Kremlin is coming to Alaska with a severely weakened domestic economy, which affords the Trump administration significant leverage during the summit. Bloomberg reported on August 13 that Western sanctions and Russia’s wartime economy are seriously harming the Russian economy, while Putin’s attempts at stabilizing the economy are failing as Russian oil revenue continues to fall.[14] Falling oil prices, coupled with heavy Western sanctions and declining energy revenue, have put a serious strain on Russia’s already strained federal budget, which is now facing its highest budget deficit in 30 years, according to Bloomberg.[15] Unnamed officials told Bloomberg that Putin has repeatedly requested sanctions relief as part of any deal to be discussed in Alaska, which ISW assesses likely indicates that Putin is concerned about the state of the Russian economy and is seeking economic reprieve from the West.[16] Putin signed a law on February 25, 2022 that forced Russian lenders to issue preferential loans to war-related contracts at a government-set interest rate below the market rate.[17] The Kremlin designed this law to flood the Russian defense industrial complex with cash, which effectively subordinated Russian banks to the government and its wartime goals. ISW previously reported that Russian bankers had growing concerns over the growing number of non-performing loans and are seeking a state-funded bailout, undercutting Putin’s long-standing narrative that neither the war in Ukraine nor Western sanctions are hurting the Russian economy.[18] The Russian economy's fiscal strain is eroding the Kremlin’s ability to sustain its war effort in the long term, depleting reserves, and exposes underlying economic fragility. Trump previously threatened secondary sanctions and tariffs on countries that continue to import Russian oil, which ISW continues to assess would likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting revenues essential for the Kremlin's financing of its war against Ukraine.[19] Russia is likely setting conditions to attempt to use the Alaska summit to secure economic relief, but the Trump administration indicated that it may leverage Russia’s economic fragility to push Putin for concessions.[20]

US President Donald Trump expressed concerns about the success of a potential secondary meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump stated in an interview with Fox News Radio on August 14 that Putin is entering the Alaska summit in a good headspace and is looking to "make a deal" in Alaska, but that it is unlikely that Alaska will result in a quick ceasefire.[21] Trump stated that there is a "25 percent chance" that a "second meeting" in Alaska (likely between Zelensky and Putin) will fail. Trump acknowledged that economic sanctions are "incredibly powerful" and that Putin likely agreed to meet in Alaska because of the impact of secondary sanctions against India and the threat of further US sanctions. White House Spokesperson Karoline Leavitt stated to Fox News on August 14 that Trump has other sanctions and measures that he can levy against Russia if the need arises, but that diplomatic negotiations are his top priority.[22] Trump previously stated on August 13 that there will be "very severe consequences" if Putin fails to engage in serious peace talks with Ukraine after the Alaska summit.[23]

The Kremlin is also likely to try to distract from the war in Ukraine by pressuring the Trump administration to engage in bilateral arms control talks at the Alaska summit. Putin held a meeting on August 14 with high-ranking Kremlin officials to prepare for the Alaska summit, wherein he claimed that the US-Russian talks would create conditions to ensure "peace...in the world as a whole" should the talks lead to agreements about strategic offensive weapons agreements.[24] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that Putin and Trump may "touch upon" the broader tasks of ensuring peace and security.[25] ISW has assessed in recent weeks that the Kremlin was dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks in front of the United States to secure Russia's desired demands in Ukraine and deflect from the subject of Russia-Ukraine peace negotiations.[26] Russia announced on August 4 that it was permanently withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, for example.[27] Kremlin officials began to set conditions to justify Russia's withdrawal from the treaty in June 2025.[28] Russia and Belarus publicly promoted Russia's deployment of Oreshnik ballistic missiles (which the INF Treaty banned) to Belarus even before Russia's withdrawal from the INF on August 4, 2025.[29] Reuters reported on August 13 that the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and the Center for Naval Analysis both assessed that satellite imagery shows activity at the Pankovo test site in Arkhangelsk Oblast since July 2025 that is similar to activity preceding previous Russian tests of its 9M730 Burevestnik nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile.[30] Reuters reported that a Western security source confirmed that Russia is preparing a Burevestnik test. Russia has been deliberately flaunting its missile capabilities in recent weeks in order to create the facade of an escalating situation and to pressure the Trump administration into pursuing arms talks at the Alaska summit. Russia has long violated the INF Treaty, including by launching Oreshnik missiles at Ukraine before withdrawing from the INF, and has largely failed to successfully test its Burevestnik missile; as such, the situation has not escalated in reality.[31] Russia has essentially been trying to manufacture an escalation in advance of the Alaska summit in order to coerce the Trump administration to engage in arms control talks, with the ultimate goal of extracting concessions from the United States regarding Ukraine and distracting from the Kremlin's disinterest in engaging in serious peace talks with Ukraine.

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) reported that the July 2025 civilian casualties from Russia's war against Ukraine were the highest on record since May 2022. The UN OHCHR reported on August 13 that there were at least 1,674 civilian casualties in Ukraine in July 2025 – a record high since May 2022 and a 22.5 percent increase from July 2024.[32] The UN OHCHR reported that Russian glide bombs accounted for the largest increase in civilian casualties in July 2025 (276) as compared to June 2025 (114). The UN OHCHR stated that almost 40 percent of the civilian casualties in July 2025 were due to Russia's long-range drone and missile strikes, but that the number of casualties from these strikes decreased by about 20 percent in July 2025 as compared to June 2025. The UN OHCHR reported that short-range drones accounted for 24 percent of the casualties in July 2025 - the second largest cause. Russian forces notably started targeting civilian and military vehicles with short-to-medium range tactical drones along Ukrainian highways in an effort to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Spring and Summer 2025.[33] Russia dramatically increased the size of its missile and drone strike packages throughout Summer 2025 due to increased production and stockpiling, and these larger-scale strikes have caused significant civilian casualties and damage.[34] ISW continues to assess that Russia's relatively smaller-scale strikes in recent weeks are allowing Russia to stockpile missiles and drones, and that Russia may resume larger-scale strike packages in the near future, likely following the Alaska summit.[35]

Russian forces have yet to reinforce and consolidate positions east and northeast of Dobropillya, and Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian reinforcements are stabilizing the situation. Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Andriy Kovalev and Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on August 14 that newly-arrived Ukrainian reserves stabilized the situation in the Dobropillya direction and are holding the front line.[36] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian reserves are counterattacking in the Dobropillya direction, have started to stabilize the situation, and pushed Russian forces back slightly in unspecified areas of the penetration.[37] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Vesele, north of Zolotyi Kolodyaz (both northeast of Dobropillya), and to eastern Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya).[38] Other Russian milbloggers, however, continued to urge caution to their Russian audience about unconfirmed claims of Russian advances and emphasized that it remains unclear if Russian forces have been able to consolidate positions.[39] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor also highlighted that Russian forces will have difficulties supplying and exploiting their narrow yet deep penetration, especially in the face of Ukrainian drone operations and flank attacks, and that Russian forces have been unable to introduce a large number of troops into the area quickly enough for consolidation and exploitation.[40]

ISW continues to assess that offensive Russian forces do not control the territory east and northeast of Dobropillya where Russian forces recently infiltrated. ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances map layer does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited infiltration missions. ISW uses the US Army doctrinal term “forward line of own troops” (FLOT) to indicate the most forward observed positions of forces in any kind of operation at a specific time. ISW largely uses its Assessed Russian Advances layer to depict areas within the Russian FLOT, where ISW has observed evidence of a Russian presence, but this layer does not necessarily denote areas where Russian forces have established an enduring presence. ISW evaluates its Assessed Russian-Controlled Ukrainian Territory map layer using the doctrinal definition of "control" — a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations. ISW deliberately distinguishes between the Russian FLOT and areas that ISW assesses that Russian forces control. ISW does not assess that Russian forces exercise control over the areas in their tactical penetration near Dobropillya as of August 14 and will reassess Russian advances when ISW has observed confirmed, reliable reporting that Ukrainian forces have retaken the territory.

The United Kingdom reaffirmed its commitment to providing Ukraine with long-term, post-war security guarantees. The Times reported on August 14 that following the August 13 virtual meeting between Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and various EU leaders, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated that the UK and other European nations have developed "realistic" plans to deploy a "reassurance force" to Ukraine upon the conclusion of a potential ceasefire.[41] The reassurance force reportedly includes "air reassurance" over western Ukraine, training for Ukrainian military personnel, and mine clearance operations in the Black Sea. Starmer also noted that the UK is ready to increase economic pressure on Russia in order to force Putin into making concessions on the war in Ukraine. ISW has long assessed that Western security guarantees and continued support for Ukraine's military and economy following a potential ceasefire are critical to the development of a stable, post-war European security architecture, which will crucially bolster Ukraine's and Europe's ability to forcefully deter future Russian aggression.[42]

Ukraine's European partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons. Germany announced on August 13 that it will fund the purchase of $500 million worth of US equipment and munitions for Ukraine through NATO's Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which allows NATO members and partners to finance the supply of American weapons and technology to Ukraine.[43] The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway previously contributed a total of one billion dollars to Ukraine through the PURL initiative.[44] Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala stated on August 13 that the Czech-led ammunition initiative has delivered one million rounds of large-caliber ammunition to Ukraine so far in 2025.[45] A US official reported to Axios on August 13 that US President Donald Trump will continue to sell weapons to NATO states that they can transfer to Ukraine even if diplomatic efforts to resolve the war fail.[46]

Ukraine and Russia conducted their 67th prisoner exchange of the war on August 14. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia each exchanged 84 civilian prisoners and prisoners of war (POWs) on August 14.[47] Zelensky noted that the prisoners returned to Ukraine include servicemembers who defended Mariupol in early 2022 and civilians who Russian forces illegally detained, some of whom had been imprisoned since 2014.[48] Zelensky added that almost all of the returned prisoners require significant medical care. Ukrainian media outlet Hromadske reported that one of the civilian prisoners returned in the exchange was 17 years old when Russian forces detained him in 2016 in occupied Yasynuvata, Donetsk Oblast, and sentenced him to ten years in a penal colony on false charges of espionage.[49]

Ukrainian forces struck a large oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast on the night of August 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 14 that elements of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a drone strike against the Lukoil oil refinery in Volgograd City and caused several fires at the facility.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff added that the refinery is the largest producer of fuel and lubricants in Russia’s Southern Federal Okrug and produces over 15 million tons of oil annually, or 5.6 percent of Russia’s total oil refining, in addition to diesel, gasoline, and aviation fuel, which Russian forces require for military purposes. Geolocated footage published on August 14 shows fires and smoke at the facility.[51] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrey Bocharov claimed that Russian forces downed Ukrainian drones over Volgograd Oblast and that falling debris caused an oil spill and set fire to petroleum products at the refinery.[52] Russian authorities temporarily grounded flights from Volgograd Airport.[53]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian and US officials further clarified the details of the upcoming August 15 Alaska summit.
• The Kremlin is likely to use the Alaska summit to try to deflect attention away from peace negotiations with Ukraine and towards the Russia-US relationship in order to court the Trump administration into offering Moscow sorely needed economic rapprochement.
• The Kremlin is coming to Alaska with a severely weakened domestic economy, which affords the Trump administration significant leverage during the summit.
• US President Donald Trump expressed concerns about the success of a potential secondary meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
• The Kremlin is also likely to try to distract from the war in Ukraine by pressuring the Trump administration to engage in bilateral arms control talks at the Alaska summit.
• The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) reported that the July 2025 civilian casualties from Russia's war against Ukraine were the highest on record since May 2022.
• Russian forces have yet to reinforce and consolidate positions east and northeast of Dobropillya, and Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian reinforcements are stabilizing the situation. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces do not control the territory east and northeast of Dobropillya where Russian forces recently infiltrated.
• Ukraine's European partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted their 67th prisoner exchange of the war on August 14.
• Ukrainian forces struck a large oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast on the night of August 13 to 14.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velykomykhailivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Limited fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on August 14.

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 13 and 14.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the Tetkino direction (southwest of Glushkovo).[55]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces crossed the international border near Novokostyantynivka (north of Sumy City) and Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City) and are operating in Kursk Oblast.[56]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division 44th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District) are reportedly arriving in Bolshoye Soldatske, Kursk Oblast, before deploying to participate in assaults in the Sumy direction.[57]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 13 that Ukrainian forces liberated Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[58] Another Russian milblogger claimed on August 14 that Ukrainian forces liberated Andriivka (also north of Sumy City) on July 9.[59]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and toward Sadky on August 13 and 14.[60] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepne (northwest of Sumy City), Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City) and Novokostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[61]

Ukrainian State Border Guard Spokesperson Colonel Andriy Demchenko stated on August 14 that small Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are trying to infiltrate unspecified areas of the Sumy Oblast border, but that Ukrainian forces are striking the groups.[62] The Sumy Oblast Military Administration reported on August 14 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone struck a civilian vehicle in Yunakivskyi Hromada (northeast of Sumy City).[63] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the 382nd Separate Naval Infantry Battalion (810th Naval Infantry Brigade, Black Sea Fleet) retreated from Sumy Oblast toward the international border and are "chaotically scattered" around Yelizavetovka, Kursk Oblast (just north of Novokostyantynivka).[64] The milblogger claimed that a recent rotation to replace elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) with elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade in Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) was very difficult, suggesting that Russian forces completed the rotation but struggled to do so efficiently or effectively.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mohrytsya (northwest of Sumy City) and in Chernihiv Oblast border areas.[65] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kyianytsia (north of Sumy City).[66]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on the southern (left) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and near Synelnykove (south of Vovchansk).[67]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on August 13 and 14.[68] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the southern bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk and near Synelnykove.[69]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kanada Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) and 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions along the E105 Kharkiv-Belgorod City highway on the international border.[70] Elements of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion and Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) forces are reportedly operating near Vovchansk.[71]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 14.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk) and advanced southwest of Tyshchenkivka (northwest of Kupyansk) and in eastern and east of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[72] A Russian milblogger subsequently claimed that the situation around Petropavlivka is unclear, and Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[73] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces "infiltrated" Kupyansk in unspecified locations and are holding some positions in buildings likely on the outskirts of the settlement.[74]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Myrove; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, Zapadne and Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Fyholivka; and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on August 13 and 14.[75]

Kupyansk Raion Military Administration Head Andriy Kanashevich stated on August 14 that indiscriminate Russian FPV drone strikes against civilian and military vehicles have made some areas around Kupyansk inaccessible for Ukrainian police and emergency services.[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Druzhelyubivka, Novovodyane and Hrekivka on August 13 and 14.[78]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Torske (east of Lyman).[79]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Serednie and 500 meters within Shandryholove (both northwest of Lyman).[80]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka; north of Lyman in Hlushchenkove and Novyi Myr, near Ridkodub, and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near and in Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area.[81]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces have concentrated a large number of troops in this direction and are constantly replenishing reserves.[82] The spokesperson added that Russian forces operating in this direction receive only a month of training and attack Ukrainian positions in fireteams of two to four infantrymen. The spokesperson stated that the “kill zone” (in Ukrainian military parlance, an area of elevated drone strike risk) in the area is between 15 and 20 kilometers deep.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on August 14 that Russian forces, including elements of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]), advanced south of Novoselivka (east of Siversk).[83] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced south of Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk).[84]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Novoselivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on August 13 and 14.[85]

A drone operator of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Siversk direction reported on August 14 that Russian forces are attempting to break through Ukrainian defenses in this direction on all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) before accumulating for further attacks.[86] The drone operator reported that Russian forces have almost entirely destroyed Siversk with mortar, artillery, and glide bomb strikes and that there are almost no civilians left in the settlement. The drone operator stated that Russian forces are adjusting to changes in Ukrainian drone technology and tactics in this direction by altering the settings on electronic warfare (EW) systems, increasing their use of interceptor drones, and shooting down Ukrainian drones.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Chasiv Yar and north of Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar).[87]

Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne on August 13 and 14.[88]

The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian company operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated on August 14 that Russian forces have yet to seize Chasiv Yar despite fighting for the town since 2023.[89] The chief sergeant stated that small Russian infantry groups are penetrating Ukrainian lines in order to plant flags to claim advances and seizures, but that Russian forces often do not maintain enduring positions at the flag locations.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including elements of its 331st VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[90]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on August 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on August 14 that Russian forces, including elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), seized Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[91] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk) and to the eastern bank of the Kleban Byk reservoir north of Shcherbynivka.[92]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Pleshchiivka, Kleban Byk, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Katerynivka, Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, and Rusyn Yar and toward Stepanivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 13 and 14.[93] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Pleshchiivka.[94]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Katerynivka, Pleshchiivka, Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk), and Oleksandro-Shultyne (northeast of Toretsk).[95] Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Kleban Byk and Katerynivka.[96] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade and 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (both of the 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Katerynivka.[97]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 13 and 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

See topline text for reports of Russian activity east and northeast of Dobropillya.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced east of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[98]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rubizhne and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Shakhove, Volodymyrivka, Zapovidne, Krasnyi Lyman, Rodynske, Myrolyubivka, Mayak, Vilne, Fedorivka, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Novoekonomichne, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on August 13 and 14.[99] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Vesele, and Hruzke (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[100]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces have maintained their rate of attack in the brigade's area of responsibility (AOR) for the past few months and continue to attack using small group tactics.[101] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are primarily attacking on motorcycles, but Russian forces recently "staged" an armored assault for the first time in three months. The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces have increased drone usage in the Pokrovsk direction compared to the spring, when Ukrainian forces shot down an average of 100 to 150 Russian drones per week, as opposed to over 250 in the last week (roughly since August 7).[102] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces significantly changed their tactics in the last year, transitioning from massive assaults with both heavy and light armor in the summer of 2024, to now only attacking with light infantry and drones. The spokesperson noted that Ukrainian forces in this area have only destroyed one tank and three armored vehicles, highlighting how infrequently Russian forces are now using armor. The spokesperson also reported that Russian forces have maintained the intensity of their attacks and are continually replenishing forces. A Russian milblogger claimed that the southern part of the Pokrovsk direction near the city of Pokrovsk proper is the calmest section of this front, and that the scale of fighting is greater in the northern sector despite the fact that Russian forces have managed to advance into Pokrovsk with small fire teams.[103] The Telegraph reported that Russian forces are stealing civilian clothes from abandoned homes and using them to attempt to disguise themselves and infiltrate Pokrovsk, likely a resort to perfidy that would amount to a violation of international law.[104]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Vega Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[105] Elements of the 2nd CAA and 51st CAA are reportedly attempting to cut off the M04 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway from either side in order to encircle Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[106]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novokhatske (southeast of Novopavlivka).[107]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Dachne, and Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste on August 13 and 14.[108]

The commander of a Ukrainian artillery battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on August 14 that Russian forces have made practically no progress in the last week.[109] The commander reported that Russian forces continue to attack in small fire teams on foot and have not used heavy or light equipment in a long time. The commander stated that Russian forces in the area are not using motorcycles but have to bring supplies to forward positions on foot. The commander reported that Russian forces, including drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, are striking settlements, crossings, and bridges with guided glide bombs to complicate Ukrainian logistics and are very active at night when Ukrainian forces supply positions and conduct rotations.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk (Novopavlivka) direction.[110]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 14 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Andriivka-Klevstove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[111] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing the settlement.[112]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of  Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka).[113]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne and Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka and Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha, Zaporizke, and Novoheorhiivka on August 13 and 14.[114]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Nefrit Assault Company of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Sichneve (east of Velykomykhailivka).[115]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka and northeast of Hulyaipole near Poltavka on August 13 and 14.[116]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Plavni; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; and southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka on August 13 and 14.[117] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in southern Stepnohirsk.[118]

A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) are attempting to advance toward the T-0605 Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia City highway.[119]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 13 and 14 but did not advance.[120]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[121]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two S-300/S-400 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast and 45 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[122] The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Russian drones mainly targeted frontline areas of Donetsk and Chernihiv oblasts and conducted missile strikes against Sumy Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down or suppressed 24 drones over northern and eastern Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 14 that Russia delivered another batch of Su-30SM2 multirole fighter aircraft to Belarus as part of a bilateral military-technical cooperation agreement.[123] The Belarusian MoD claimed that the Su-30s will allow Belarus to secure its airspace. Russia previously delivered a batch of Su-30 aircraft, including some SM2 variants, in May 2025.[124]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.