Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 28, 2025

August 28, 2025, 6:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on August 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia killed at least 21 civilians, including children, and damaged civilian infrastructure and European diplomatic facilities during the second largest strike of the war thus far and the largest strike since the August 15 Alaska Summit on the night of August 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that overnight on August 27 to 28 Russian forces launched a total of 629 drones and missiles at Ukraine, including 598 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities, Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Hvardivske, Crimea; two Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from over Lipetsk and Voronezh oblasts; nine Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Voronezh oblasts; and 20 Kh-101 cruise missiles from over Saratov Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defense forces shot down and suppressed 563 Shahed-type and decoy drones; one Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile; seven Iskander-M/MN-23 ballistic missiles; and 18 Kh-101 cruise missiles. Drones and missiles impacted in 13 locations throughout Ukraine, and drone and missile debris fell on 26 locations. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russia used jet-powered Geran-3 (the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed-238 drone) in strikes on Kyiv City.[2]

The August 27 to 28 strikes primarily targeted Kyiv City. Kyiv City Military Administration Head Tymur Tkachenko reported that Russian drones and missiles struck over 20 locations throughout Kyiv City and caused significant damage to residential buildings throughout the city.[3] Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko reported that a direct missile strike on a residential building in Darnytskyi Raion, Kyiv City, killed 12 people, including four children.[4] The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported that as of 20:40 local time on August 28, the death-toll in Kyiv City had risen to 21.[5] Security camera footage shows two Russian missiles consecutively striking Zhylianska Street in Kyiv City, damaging residential buildings, the European Union (EU) diplomatic missile building, and the British Council building.[6] The British Council and the EU delegation to Ukraine both confirmed severe damage to their respective buildings in Kyiv City, and the European Commission and the United Kingdom have both summoned the Russian envoys to Brussels and London.[7] Russian forces hit a US-civilian owned enterprise in Zakarpattia Oblast during its last massive strike series on August 20 to 21, which ISW assessed at the time was likely part of a wider Russian effort to discourage Ukraine's allies from investing in Ukraine. The August 27 to 28 strikes on British and European diplomatic facilities was likely intended to generate a similar impact and discourage Europe's continued support for Ukraine at a time when the United States and Europe are working closely to determine appropriate security guarantees for Ukraine in a future peace settlement.[8] US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg condemned Russia's strikes on civilian and diplomatic infrastructure in Kyiv City as a threat to the peace that US President Donald Trump is currently pursuing.[9] Russia also targeted transportation infrastructure in Vinnytsia Oblast on the night of August 27–28. Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported that Russia struck train cars of the Intercity+ high-speed train fleet and a railway junction in Kozyatyn, Vinnystia Oblast, causing a massive power outage that impacted railways throughout Ukraine.[10] A Russian milblogger claimed that Kozyatyn is "the most important railway junction in Ukraine" and called for Russian forces to strike more Ukrainian transportation nodes.[11]

The August 27 to 28 strike series, which was the largest since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska, supports ISW's assessment that Russia used the lead-up to the Alaska summit to stockpile drones and missiles, launching fewer and smaller strikes to present itself to the US administration as a good-faith negotiator.[12] Russia is likely to escalate strikes against in Ukraine in the coming weeks to take advantage of the missile and drone stockpile it accrued in the weeks leading up to Alaska, and appears to be resuming its wider campaign to target Ukraine's infrastructure before the fall and winter to undermine Ukraine's will to continue fighting against Russian aggression.[13] Russian strike packages will likely continue to increasingly inflict civilian causalities as Russia scales up the size and type of munitions in its strike packages.

Ukraine's ongoing strike campaign targeting Russia’s oil refineries is contributing to gasoline shortages across Russia that will likely raise inflation and cause further macroeconomic instability in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 28 that elements of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted a drone strike against Kuibyshev Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery produces gasoline, diesel fuel, fuel oils, and solvents, and has a processing volume of seven million tons per year. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces, the Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), struck the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Neftekachka, Krasnodar Krai, just south of Krasnodar City. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Afipsky Oil Refinery has a production capacity of 6.25 million tons of oil per year and plays a vital role in providing fuel to the Russian military. Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on August 28 that the Kuibyshev and Afipsky oil refineries are key to Russia's war machine.[15]

The Russian government announced on August 27 that it will extend its ban on gasoline exports, which was set to expire on August 31, to September 30 for gasoline producers and to October 31 for non-producers in an attempt to stabilize the domestic fuel market.[16] Russia struggled to keep up with domestic demand for gasoline even before recent Ukrainian strikes and has placed intermittent bans on the export of gasoline since 2022, but recent Ukrainian strikes have exacerbated gasoline shortages and caused a spike in gasoline prices across Russia and occupied Ukraine.[17] These gasoline shortages and price spikes will likely result in increased consumer costs, increased business expenses across industries, and drive inflation expectations, thereby pushing overall inflation upwards by increasing both direct and indirect costs throughout the economy and creating further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[18]

The Russian information space responded to the strikes against the Afipsky and Kuibyshev refineries and reiterated concerns about the poor performance of Russia's air defense systems near critical and military infrastructure. A Russian milblogger complained that recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian gasoline refineries are collapsing Russia's oil and gas sector and that Russian citizens are already noticing the effects of Ukrainian strikes in rising gasoline prices as production struggles to keep pace with domestic demand.[19] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger accused "authorized agencies" of failing to protect targets and down Ukrainian drones.[20] Another milblogger lamented that the Russian government has not arrested anyone for failing to protect Russian deep-rear infrastructure from "slow-moving" Ukrainian strike drones.[21] Another milblogger suggested that Russia delegate part of the authority for air defense to those who can use non-standard counter-drone measures and that Russia equip mobile air defense groups and construct air defense at vulnerable facilities.[22] The milblogger recommended that air defense groups arm themselves with small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery, man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), interceptor drones, and radars to detect and down targets at low altitudes. The milblogger accused the Russian government of lacking initiative and being incompetent and demanded that Russia increase the use of interceptor drones, small radars, and helicopters to prevent such strikes. The milblogger suggested that Russia take inspiration from BARS (Russian combat army reserve) drone units operating in Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts, and called for an increase in the recruitment of volunteers to air defense groups. The Russian information space has blamed Russian leadership for failing to defend Russian military infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes throughout Russia's full-scale invasion.[23] Ukrainian long-range drone strikes continue to place pressure on this existing point of neuralgia in the Russian information space.

Russian intelligence services are likely tracking US and European military supply lines in Europe by conducting reconnaissance operations over NATO territory. The New York Times (NYT) reported on August 28 that Russia or unspecified Russian proxies are flying surveillance drones over routes that the United States and its allies use to ferry military supplies through eastern Germany, collecting intelligence that Russia could use for its sabotage campaign or to assist Russian troops in Ukraine.[24] NYT reported that US and EU military officials are increasingly concerned about drone flights in Germany and cited a German publication’s report that some of the drones tracking Western military supply routes are Iranian-manufactured drones and are likely originating from ships in the Baltic Sea. NYT reported that US officials confirmed the drone operations, and the officials stated that the origins of the flight are still unknown but that they believe Russian intelligence services are responsible for the flights. NYT reported that Western officials stated that Russian sabotage acts decreased significantly in 2025 after reaching a peak in 2024. The Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS) told NYT that it tracked a significant drop-off in sabotage attacks in the first six months of 2025 with only four identified incidents of Russian sabotage or attempted sabotage in Europe. CSIS stated that the drone flights over supply routes are likely Russian espionage attempts to learn what firms are manufacturing weapons for Ukraine and to understand how the West is shipping weapons into Poland and subsequently Ukraine. CSIS noted that the drone flights are likely related to battlefield intelligence attempts meant to give Russia a better idea of what weapons Ukraine has and where Ukraine will deploy them. ISW previously observed reports that Russian intelligence services appeared to be decreasing the frequency sabotage operations but noted that Russia may be reassessing and possibly innovating their sabotage operations in Europe.[25] Potential drone reconnaissance efforts may constitute a new iteration of Russia's hybrid operations on the European continent. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on August 28 that the Kremlin is "unaware" of NYT’s reports of Russian reconnaissance flying over US arms supply routes in Germany.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia killed at least 21 civilians, including children, and damaged civilian infrastructure and European diplomatic facilities during the second largest strike of the war thus far and the largest strike since the August 15 Alaska Summit on the night of August 27 to 28.
• Ukraine's ongoing strike campaign targeting Russia’s oil refineries is contributing to gasoline shortages across Russia that will likely raise inflation and cause further macroeconomic instability in Russia.
• The Russian information space responded to the Ukrainian strikes against the Afipsky and Kuibyshev refineries and reiterated concerns about the poor performance of Russia's air defense systems near critical and military infrastructure.
• Russian intelligence services are likely tracking US and European military supply lines in Europe by conducting reconnaissance operations over NATO territory.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, near Lyman and Pokrovsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline for Ukrainian strikes in Russia.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka; northeast of Sumy City near Varachnye and Yunakivka; and in unspecified areas of Sumy and Kursk oblasts on August 27 and 28.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bezsalivka and northeast of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka.[28]

Ukraine’s Special Operations command reported on August 28 that aerial reconnaissance footage captured commanders of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) beating and executing a subordinate in the Kursk Oblast border region.[29]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the 1434th Akhmat-Chechnya Regiment attacked near Varachyne but abandoned the mission.[30]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kursk border area.[31] Elements of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Yunakivka.[32] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) and the 1st Infantry Battalion (137th VDV Regiment [106th VDV Division]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mohrytsya (northeast of Sumy City).[33]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) along the E-105 Kharkiv City-Belgorod City highway.[34]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on August 27 and 28.[35]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 27 but did not make confirmed advances.[37]

Unconfirmed Russian claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 27 that Russian forces advanced near Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and cleared an unspecified forested area.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and toward Kolodyazne; and northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka on August 27 and 28.[39]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on August 28 that Russian forces are unable to move heavy equipment or motorcycles across the Oskil River due to Ukrainian strikes and that Russian forces must cross the river at night on foot through shallow water in groups of up to 20 soldiers.[40]

The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on August 28 that a Russian first-person-view (FPV) drone struck an ambulance in Kupyansk and injured two emergency responders, in violation of international law.[41] Kupyansk Raion Military Administration Head Andriy Kanashevych reported on August 28 that Russian forces killed one civilian in a strike against Kupyansk.[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[43] Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk.[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zahryzove and advanced within Bohuslavka (both northeast of Borova).[45]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka and Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on August 27 and 28.[46]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 28 shows two Russian servicemembers raising a flag north of Novomykhailivka (north of Lyman), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced to the northeastern outskirts of the settlement.[47] ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances map layer notably only shows the Russian Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) and does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited infiltration missions.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Novomykhailivka and advanced east of Shandryholove and west of Serednie (both northwest of Lyman); northeast of Stavky, to central Ridkodub, and within Hlushchenkove (all north of Lyman); west of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman); northwest of Zarichne (east of Lyman); and within the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[48] A Kremlin-affiliated source claimed that Russian forces advanced to the western outskirts of Zarichne and that Russian forces do not fully control Kolodyazi, refuting a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claim that Russian forces seized the settlement as of August 16.[49]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Hlushchenkove, Ridkodub, Novyi Myr, Karpivka, Stavky and Zelyna Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 27 and 28.[50]

A Russian milblogger claimed that water obstacles are preventing Russian forces from advancing quicker in the Serebryanske forest area.[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka and Zakitne; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Fedorivka and Pereizne on August 27 and 28.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 28 but did not advance.

[Chasiv Yar map]

Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on August 27 and 28.[53]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian supply routes north of Chasiv Yar.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on August 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk).[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Katerynivka and Poltavka and towards Pleshchiivka along the railway line that leads to Kostyantynivka (all northwest of Toretsk).[56]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Shultyne and Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, Katerynivka, and Pleshchiivka and toward the Kleban-Byk Reservoir; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 27 and 28.[57]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 28 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian-occupied building in southern Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced into the settlement.[58]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Pokrovsk and north of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[59]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 28 that Russian forces seized Nove Shakhove (north of Pokrovsk); seized Zapovidne, Vesele, and Krasnyi Lyman (all northeast of Pokrovsk); and advanced north of Vesele and Myrnohrad (just east of Pokrovsk) and in central Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[60] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into southern Petrivka, in eastern Rubizhne, and in and near Zolotyi Kolodyaz (all north of Pokrovsk), as well as southeast of Hruzke and into western Shakhove (both northeast of Pokrovsk).[61] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that southern Novoekonomichne remains a contested "gray" zone.[62]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Kucheriv Yar, Shakhove, Novoekonomichne, Rodynske, Myrolyubivka, Sukhetske, Volodymyrivka, Krasnyi Lyman, and Mayak; east toward Myrnohrad, Promin, and Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Sukhyi Yar, and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on August 27 and 28.[63] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near southern Mykolaivka (east of Pokrovsk).[64]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue to advance with small infantry groups and that Russian forces are attempting to use small warehouses along the route of advance to store weapons and ammunition but that Ukrainian forces conduct drone strikes to destroy resupply groups and the warehouses.[65] A Kremlin affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) have recently increased strikes against Myrnohrad.[66] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that the Russian military command is mainly relying on penal colony recruits to conduct highly attritional assaults in the Pokrovsk direction and that Russian forces are also using a significant number of drones.[67] The officer noted that the Russian military command is not concerned with using such forces to achieve tactical successes because their function is to probe Ukrainian defenses for weaknesses and advance to Ukrainian shelters or trenches before destroying positions with a backpack full of explosives. The officer reported that the Russian military command is unconcerned about bolstering scant logistics for the so-called "kamikaze" soldiers, as there is only one viable unidirectional road from which the soldiers advance.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian AirNomads Group are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[68] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in Pokrovsk.[69] Drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Dobropilliya (northwest of Pokrovsk).[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 28 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces only control southern Filiya, refuting the Russian MoD's August 24 claim that Russian forces seized the settlement.[71]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, Zaporizhzhia, and Hrushivske; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka, Tovste on August 27 and 28.[72]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne, Oleksandrohrad, and Andrivka-Klevtsove and toward Lisne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka, Komyshuvakha and Zaporizke and toward Sichneve on August 27 and 28.[73]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Komyshuvakha.[74]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Temyrivka on August 28.[75]

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv).[76] ISW assesses that this advance likely did not occur in the past 24 hours.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Prymorske along the Prydniprovska Railroad (southeast of assessed Ukrainian positions).[77] A Ukrainian military analyst reported on August 27 that Russian forces recently seized Plavni (west of Orikhiv) and that Russian forces seized the Prymorske railroad station in southern Prymorske.[78]

Russia may attempt new offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported that Russian forces are likely preparing for a large offensive in this direction and accumulating forces, preparing reserves, regrouping and conducting reconnaissance in frontline areas.[79] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are mostly moving in the dark in small fire teams, have increased the use of unmanned systems, and are more actively striking Ukrainian positions. The spokesperson reported that this increase in Russian activity is the first indicator that Russian forces are preparing for a larger operation and noted that Russian forces are striking Ukrainian drone operation point antennas. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces will likely not attack with large amounts of heavy equipment as they did in Spring 2025 because Ukrainian drones and remote mining were effective in destroying heavy equipment.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Orikhiv.[80] Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[81]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on August 28 but did not advance.[82]

A Ukrainian source told the independent Russian investigative outlet Novaya Gazeta on August 25 that Russian forces are trying to break through to Korabel Microraion (southwestern Kherson City) from the Dnipro River in small groups to gain control over the high-rise buildings to conduct more effective drone operations near Kherson City.[83] The Ukrainian source reported that constant Russian shelling of the bridges over the Koshevaya River connecting the microraion to mainland Kherson City could cause the bridges to collapse and isolate Ukrainian residents. ISW has previously observed increased Russian strikes against the road bridge connecting Korabel Microraion with the rest of Kherson City.[84]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Hateful Eight Drone Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the M-14 Kherson City-Mykolaiv highway.[85]

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 28 that GUR and a Ukrainian special forces unit conducted a joint missile strike against the Russian Project 21631 Buyan-M small missile ship in Temryutskaya Bay in the Sea of Azov (east of the Kerch Strait Bridge) equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles.[86] GUR reported that operatives successfully struck and damaged the ship's radar and the side of the carrier and that the carrier was forced to evacuate the area.

Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on August 28 that Russian forces struck the Ukrainian Navy reconnaissance ship the Simferopol and killed one crew member and injured several others, and that several crew members are missing.[87] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck the ship with an unmanned surface vessel (USV) near the mouth of the Danube River.[88] Geolocated footage published on August 28 indicates that Russian forces struck the Simferopol while it was on the Danube River about 25 km from the mouth of the Danube east of Izmail, Odesa Oblast.[89] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the strike against the Simferopol is the longest strike that Russian forces have conducted against a target along the Danube River.[90]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports of Russian strikes against Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian forces continue to develop advanced weapon systems that are interoperable with Russian forces ahead of the upcoming Belarusian-Russian Zapad-2025 joint military exercise. The Head of the Belarusian Communications Department Major General Vadym Romaniv stated on August 28 that Belarusian signal troops tested an automated command and control (C2) software and conducted drones and communication system suppression exercises with Belarusian electronic warfare (EW) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) forces.[91] Romaniv also stated that Belarusian forces ensured that all Belarusian communication systems are interoperable with Russian forces ahead of the Zapad-2025 joint military exercise.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.